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ABSTRACT
This research investigated various factors considered to influence safety attitudes of
construction workers, and management, towards safety performance in the UK
Construction Industry.
The factors examined are listed in the research model and consist of historical, economic,
psychological, technical, procedural, organisational, environmental, and safety
performance variables (factors).
The study based upon the above factors was conducted under the key assumption that:
"Safety Performance is a function of operatives' and management attitudes in respect of
behavioural and environmental factors in the Construction Industry".
This key assumption lead to further sub-hypotheses, namely:
a) Safety performance is a function of operative attitudes towards the above listed
factors;
b) Safety performance is a function of management attitudes towards the above listed
factors;
c) Operative attitudes towards the above factors differ from those of site managers;
d) Site managers' attitudes towards the above factors differ from those of contract
managers, and safety advisors, etc.;
The research methodology centred upon literature reviews, interviews and questionnaires
administered to operatives, site managers, contract managers and safety advisors, in ten
construction companies in the UK, covering a sample population of 325 subjects.
Analysis of the 325 questionnaires suggests that the key research assumptions, and
attendant sub-hypothesis are found to be valid as far as the research data examined are
concerned.
Ultimately, the results of multivariate analysis determined that organisational factor, and
industry norms, are the primary and most dominant influence upon safety performance in
the UK Construction Industry.
xii
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction to the Research
CHAPTER ONE
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH
Health and Safety at Work is in itself a complex phenomenon, and the subject of 'Safety attitudes
and safety performance' in the construction industry is even more so. Where man and work interact,
particularly in such a complex and uncertain environment as construction, there are bound to be
problems of human behaviour, weather effects, geology and unforseen circumstances resulting in
accidents.
The disruptive effects of accidents in the construction industry are clearly classified and well-
documented almost annually in the United Kingdom (Health and Safety Executive Reports: 1952-
88). The impact of accidents, and health and safety in general include the following:
a) Loss of employee morale.
b) Financial implications for the individual, the company and the State.
c) Psychological consequences for the individual, colleagues, and the family.
d) Pain, suffering or death, resulting in incalculable consequences to the individual, family,
company, the State and society at large, etc.
The office of Health Economics (1978-85) has recently indicated that there were over 370 million
lost working days due to classified incapacity in United Kingdom.
The Health and Safety Executive (1984/85) reported that over 15 million days were lost due to
industrial injuries.
This volume of industrial statistics is quite substantial, and of considerable concern to managers of
industry, the medical profession and society in general. It remains however, one of the paradoxes
of post-industrial revolution that in spite of a systematic rise in real earnings, improved working
conditions and environments, and major advancement in technological developments in industry at
large, there remains a steady increase in the level of industrial injuries or accidents, particularly in
the construction industry (ref: Figure 1.1, p3 below).
The amount of working time lost through industrial injuries, and other causes, and the means by
which such factors might be reduced, has been a matter of general concern to the workers,
managers, and safety practitioners through centuries, as industry transforms from craft-orientated
work to the use of sophisticated technology. In very recent years (at least the past twenty years)
individual companies, trade union organisations, and government agencies concerned with Health
and Safety in the workplace, have intensified the amount of effort given to the problem, and this
has led to the evolution of a uniform method of classification of accidents, and safety performance
measurement criteria, together with an improvement in the general understanding of the accident
1
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and safety phenomenon.
Despite these changes in the health and safety climate, there appears to be no marked initiatives on
the part of the researchers or safety practitioners towards the facilitation of meaningful comparative
studies into the psychological aspects of safety in the UK construction industry. Accident rates in
the construction industry, along with construction turnover figures, and productivity or
performance indicator factors, are more often considered as objective measures of relative
efficiency of a construction company.
Organisations with high employee incident rates, in terms of occupational injuries, are generally
considered as less efficiently managed organisations than those having a lower accident rate (ILO,
Geneva, 1984).
It is also generally assumed that:
'attitudinal and behavioral factors of employees can be related to this objective
measure of efficiency. Workers who are not particularly keen or interested in
their jobs, or who are dissatisfied with their work situation, might be more
inclined to perceive accident as a means of withdrawal from the work situation,
than those who enjoy their work, and were satisfied with the aspects of
supervision, and with the opportunities their jobs provide for pay, self-esteem,
promotion, and establishment of relationships with their peers.
(Hale and Hale, 1970)
Most studies have found that many of the accident occurrences on construction sites can be
avoided. They stated that quite often, "these accidents are exacerbated by human factors, climatic
factors, and the physical, as well as the technical aspects of the more rigorous occupations"
(Atherly, 1978; Shimmin, 1980).
The result of accidents on site, is clearly undesirable since it presents a major threat to site work,
and the individual domestic welfare, whilst imbalance of production, plant/machine usage time for
profitable production, material turnover, low worker morale, and low productivity rates, are just
some of the more pronounced or tangible consequences of industrial accidents. Whilst the level of
construction accidents remains high in the UK construction industry, its level varies amongst
contractors and from site to site; for it is the result of certain important factors which act upon the
individual and/or groups, both in the job environment, and outside the work situation. These
principal factors associated with safety behaviour, broadly concern the following:
a) daily and seasonal variations of the site;
b) occupational category;
c) medical and health factors, and
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d)	 personal and organisational variables.
The model for this study shown in Chapter Three (Fig 3.8), demonstrates the role of these factors
which represent a web of complex relationships that ultimately shape safety behaviour. The model
is evolved around certain theories of risk/safety behaviour.
Various studies have shown that a substantial part of safety or risk behaviour is essentially non-
medical, the safety decision is therefore predominantly personal. (Suchmann, 1961), (Surry, 1969),
(Hale and Hale, 1970), (Wrigglesworth, 1972), (Hale and Perusse, 1978), (Andersson et al, 1978),
(Perusse, 1980).
Abeytunga (1979) on the other hand, demonstrated that organisational factors, particularly the
identification of safety training needs and training of employees in hazard identification is an
organisational decision, and should not be left to the individual employee.
There are however, bound to be other factors in between as shown in the chosen research model
(Fig 3.8). The main objective in safety behaviour (safety attitudes and safety performance)
measurement and analysis, is therefore to distinguish between the human factor causes, and the
organisational factors. For an accident may be determined either solely by Human factors, or by
the interaction between humans, the work situation, and the organisational factors.
Thus, the separation of human and organisational factors etc, constitutes the fundamental stage of
some form of safety/accident control process, though subsequent control strategies ought to be
[ideally] linked to certain concepts in the field of attitudinal and motivational [psychological]
theory. This conviction, together with the writer's previous work and experience (Sawacha and
Langford, 1987), constitute the drive behind this study.
Whilst the research may aim to compensate to some extent, the deficiency of work concerning
'safety attitudes and safety performance', in the field of construction, the main thesis advanced in
support of the study, was that of producing suitable criteria upon which decisions might be based
concerning certain management practices, and policies, associated with Health and Safety of
employees, and the possible prevention of accidents, and control on site.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of safer construction management in the construction industry is
dependent upon a detailed knowledge, and understanding of:
(a) Hazard identification techniques;
(b) Positive safety attitudes by operatives, and management; and
(c) Improved safety performance.
The above factors must all be jointly focused upon and developed to meet the desired goals of a
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safety-orientated construction environment. Ultimately, the attainment of such goals must depend
largely upon educational institutions at all levels, the construction industry itself, government
legislation and enforcement, a more effective policing of the workplace in the industry by
management, and the Safety Inspectorate, and more essentially, industry-focused safety research on
the behavioral, mechanical and environmental aspects of Health and Safety in Construction.
With these broad aims/objectives in mind, this study is developed to explore the various aspects of
worker/management attitudes and safety performance in the (UK) construction industry.
1.2 DEFINING AND DISCUSSING SAFETY ATTITUDES
The term "attitude" is derived from the subjects of social sciences, particularly in the field of social
psychology or psychology in general. Within this specialised field of the study of human
behaviour, has emerged diversified definitions of the term "attitude", and most social scientists
would agree that no single definition of the term can be suggested as being definitive. Each
definition places its emphasis upon a single or multiple factor, and to some, the words "attitudes"
and "opinions" are almost synonymous; however, those working in the field of attitude studies
proffer a number of definitions for the term "attitude".
General opinion suggests that everyone has an attitude, and hence people would use the word
"attitude" to describe any form of human behaviour. For example, assertions like 'people's attitudes
today are the same ..."everyone for himself ...'; 'young people's attitudes today are all about drugs,
sex, 'disco-mania', and football hooliganism'. In the construction industry, statements of
attitudes/opinions are commonplace. For example, "safety is a matter of commonsense"; "safety is
a matter of individual attitudes - if the attitude is right, accidents will not happen"; "the cowboys of
the trade have bad safety attitudes, and they give the industry a bad image".
The above statements may be expressive of attitudes, nevertheless, they fall short of a scientific
definition of "attitudes". Some discussion may identify the meaning of the word "attitude".
"Attitudes" simply stated, are defined as "a tendency to react positively or negatively towards an
object or a person" (Sartain et al. 1974).
Porter et al (1974) on the other hand, describes attitudes as "either explicitly or implicitly related to
people, events, actions, ideas or institutions". In other words an attitude has an 'object' (the term
'object' here is used to denote any aspect of the world, including people and ideas, towards which
we have an attitude).
Some further characteristic is that "attitudes express the way a person evaluates the degree of
positive or negative feelings he/she has towards the object in question, for example: "attitudes
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towards aspects of work, people, or even safety procedures in the construction industry".
Krech and Crutchfield (1948) stated that "attitudes are relatively enduring, and that, if you know a
person's attitudes, you can usually predict what he/she will say or think in future reactions to that
object or similar objects". Attitudes therefore, must be based on some underlying
physiological/experimental system 'inside people'.
Gordon Allport in giving "attitude" a physiological slant, described "attitude" as a "mental and
neural state of readiness, organised through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence
upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which he/she is related (Allport
1954). Similarly, Krech and Crutchfield (1948) defined "attitude" as
"an enduring organisation of motivational, emotional, perceptional and cognitive
process with respect to some aspects of the individual world."
From the above illustrative definitions, it becomes apparent that "attitudes" generally, and "safety
attitudes" especially are specifically not tangible; they are only inferred.
The concept of "attitudes", or "safety attitudes", therefore is indeed nothing but an abstraction. It is
used to denote certain consistencies in a person's behaviour, statements/opinions, and presumably,
experiences and beliefs. According to English and English (1958), "attitude is a hypothetical
construct". Other sources define an attitude as
"an inferral entity conceived as actually existing and as giving rise to a
measurable phenomenon, including phenomena other than the observables that
led to hypothesising the construct".
The implication of the fact that it is 'a hypothetical construct' is that there is no one absolute and
final definition of the concept of "attitude" or "safety attitude", any more than there is of the
abstract terms, 'opinion', 'truth', 'beauty' or 'justice'. The definitions given will depend on what
observables are selected as a basis for inference. As such, the concept of "safety attitudes" must be
viewed as complex and multi-dimensional. Like Krech and Crutchfield (quoted above) and Katz
(1960) "safety attitude" is seen by the author as having an emotional or affective aspect, that is, it
embodies positive or negative feelings about the object of 'safety behaviour' in construction; a
cognitive aspect - beliefs or ideas/opinions about it; and conative aspect - a tendency to behave in
a particular way towards aspects of construction. Katz (1960) has described "attitude" as "the
predisposition of the individual to evaluate some symbol or object, or aspect of his/her world in a
favourable or unfavourable manner".
"... attitudes include the affective, or feeling core of liking or disliking, and the
cognitive or belief elements which describe the effect of the attitude, its
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characteristics, and its relations to other objects (p168).
The problem therefore in defining what is "safety attitude" and what behaviour shall be studied for
a particular piece of research illustrates one point: namely that there is no such specific thing as a
"safety attitude". Therefore the choice of definition and of behaviour to be studied can only be
decided by the use to which the research findings are to be put.
If the main reason for the study is to positively influence causes of fatal and lost-time accidents
reported from construction sites to the Health and Safety Inspectorate, then such must be the
subject for study even though some of the factors affecting whether or not an injury is reported as a
lost-time accident have no bearing on the causation of the original injury. If the aim of the study is
to reduce the incidence of that dangerous behaviour which has been defined as dangerous, then the
incidence of dangerous behaviour must be the object of attention or inference.
Brown and Smith (0.U. 1974) have asserted
"... that attitudes and beliefs are not mere reflections of aspects of the world with
which an individual comes in contact but rather constructions, coloured and
shaped by efforts to maintain consistency, not just with related beliefs, but with
personal needs and actions, external demands and social context".
This study has set out to study "safety attitudes" and "safety performance" in terms of variables
selected as factors of influence on the subject matter, and are shown in the research model within
the thesis (Fig 3.7).
1.3 DEFINING AND DISCUSSING SAFETY PERFORMANCE
The term "safety performance" has been applied for many years in connection with the
safety/accident phenomenon, in terms of accident reporting as well as with safety audit in most
industries, including the construction industry. Whilst the problem of safety performance
measurement has existed since the very beginning of organised attempts to control accidents and
accident consequences, the main difficulty has been 'what was meant by measurement'. In its most
rudimentary form, "measurement" has been defined as "the process of assigning numerals to
objects according to rules" (Stephen 1951).
In an industrial context, what "object" to measure and what "rules" to follow, is dependent upon
what form of performance is considered. Some of the commonest performance measurements in
industry surround productivity measurement, quality assurance, financial, as well as safety
performance. In the main, safety performance measures seem to be centred around one essential
element - "accident statistics"; aimed at accident control (after the event), and prediction (for the
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future). Tarrants W.E. (1970) suggested that in accident control and prediction valid and reliable
measurements of safety performance are essential in order to satisfy certain objectives. Such
objectives, he stated were to include the following:
"to	 (1)	 locate and describe problem areas;
(2) identify casual relationships;
(3) make decisions concerning the optimum allocation of accident prevention
resources;
(4) evaluate the effectiveness of applied counter-measures; and
(5) detect when the system is deteriorating toward unacceptable limits of
control".
Tarrant (1980) has since argued that
"unfortunately, none of the traditional measures of safety performance permit
achievement of the above objectives effectively".
He asserts that on more pragmatic grounds, the measures of safety performance are inadequate
because members of top and middle management often simply do not believe them, as evidenced
by the frequent complaint of safety directors (in the USA), which is "if only I could convince my
managers to accept and act on my recommendations".
Recently in the UK, the Accident Prevention Advisory Unit (APAU) of the Health and Safety
Executive (HSE), has pointed out that: "Accident statistics are only one index of safety
performance and even then, are only an index of failure" (APAU), 1985).
Morgan and Davies (1981), found that:
"... for every major injury accident, there are ten property damage accidents, and
for every property damage accident, twenty near-misses".
They reported that the objective for conducting safety audit/performance is "to reduce the number
of hazards and thereby reduce the number of accidents". Their report went on to state that: Safety
performance audits -
(1) "should seek to be positive rather than being preoccupied with fault-finding;
(2) should be capable of identifying deviations from agreed standards;
(3) should be analysing events which lead to them, and
(4) should highlight good practices".
Morgan et al concluded that:
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"the majority of safety performance audit schemes tend to concentrate on the
'hardware' aspects of accident prevention, such as machinery-guarding, the
provision and use of protective clothing and equipment, and exhaust-ventilation
systems, and are primary hazard-spotting exercises. It is equally important for
audits to emphasize 'software' aspects, such as safety systems of work, safety
instruction, training and supervision".
In brief, safety performance entails the collation of accident information covering the following
events:
a) injury to persons requiring 'First Aid' attention, minor injury leading to absence from the
work situation, serious injury requiring hospitalisation, and fatal injuries/death etc;
b) non-injury accidents to persons causing minor or no disruption to the person or work
situation;
c) property damage etc, and
d) near-misses etc, causing one effect or the other to persons, property, and the work
environment.
This is the context in which this study views safety performance throughout.
1.4 THE NEED FOR THE STUDY
For many years, writers worldwide, particularly in the developed and industrialised societies, have
grappled with the problem of understanding the 'accident' or 'safety' phenomenon (Warr, 1978)
(Hale & Hale, 1970). Several researches and papers have been produced in such areas as:
accident-proneness; the classification of accidents; the influence of age, race, intelligence etc;
ergonomic factors; safety propaganda; stress; safety motivation and many other areas of diverse
interests, with the subject area. Many attempts are being made worldwide too, to find ways and
means of preventing and reducing accident occurrence.
Although all these endeavours have failed to produce a solution of a zero accident-rate (a Utopian
ideal), nevertheless, major in-roads have been made into the understanding of human behaviour in
terms of interaction between man and his work environment. Such contributions are based on the
formulation and accumulation of knowledge. In many ways however, researchers in the UK have
ignored the need to identify the relationship between safety attitudes and safety performance in the
construction industry (Shimmin, 1980).
This research is an attempt to fill that gap. The need for the research is hence, to contribute some
knowledge and understanding of the subject area of safety behaviour.
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Finally, the study is potentially useful for further research, to explore and co-ordinate existing
knowledge, and to expand upon such knowledge through the analysis of the collected data for this
research. Also, future policy-makers and safety practitioners may benefit from the outcome of this
research by promoting better safety measures and coherent safety management procedures within
the construction industry.
1.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF SAFETY RESEARCH. AND THE IMPACT OF
ACCIDENTS
The importance of safety research and the impact of accidents cannot be ignored. The essence of
safety research is mainly geared towards the finding of possible solutions to accident prevention or
reduction, and the building up of a knowledge base within the industrial environment and society at
large that will contribute towards the creation of safety awareness.
Such is the case that, it is very doubtful if any single solution will cover all types of safety events
applicable to the subject of industrial safety and accidents. Nevertheless, the impact of accident
occurrence on society as a whole is incalculable. The Royal Society for the Prevention of
Accidents reports that in 1982, more than fifteen and a half thousand people were killed, and well
over half a million people received serious injuries as a result of accidents in Great Britain. More
recent figures (April 1988) by the Health and Safety Executive, indicating accident occurrence
across all industries, have shown that 175,000 injuries at work were serious enough for the victims
to need more than three days off work, and 405 cases were fatal. The cost of such occurrences to
the British economy, individual concerns/enterprises and the psychological trauma which families
of the deceased or seriously injured suffer, is considerable.
1.6 THE CONTENT OF THE THESIS
The Structure
The first three chapters of the thesis cover the general introduction to the research, and outline the
methodological approaches adopted for the research; establish its literature base by way of
reviewing current knowledge concerning the subject matter of the research, and discuss the
theoretical framework, including explanations of previously designed research models as applied
by others, and which the writer considered to be relevant to the current research. Finally, they
discuss the research model as designed by the writer for the specific purpose of this study. These
chapters are hence structured as follows:
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CHAPTER ONE:	 Introduction
CHAPTER TWO:	 Literature
CHAPTER THREE: Theory - explaining other relevant research models, the
"research model" for the study, and chosen hypothesis and
sub-hypotheses tested for this research.
CHAPTERS FOUR & FIVE:
CHAPTER SIX:
Look at the analytical background and details of data
collected, and review the research findings that tie up with
the literature reviewed in Chapter Two: that is, Chapter
Four -Analytical Content; Chapter Five - Review of
Findings that tie up with the literature as discussed in
Chapter Two.
Discuss the overall results of the research, and the
conclusions drawn from the results of the research analysis
as contained in Chapters Four, Five and Six collectively.
This chapter also contains the following:
(i) Recommendations for further research;
(ii) Implications of the research;
(iii) List of references, and finally
(iv) Appendices.
1.7 SUMMARY
This introductory chapter to the research has attempted to outline some of the more important
methodological and conceptual issues concerning the assessment and implications of safety
attitudes and safety performance in the construction industry.
The meaning, classification, measurement format, and levels of analysis of safety attitudes and
performance are shown to reveal the difficulties which confront researchers of the subject matter of
safety and accident studies, and the various factors which lead to the use of distorted data, and
hence misleading or haphazard conclusions.
Some of these factors were thus given due consideration in the formation of the objectives of this
research, and the subsequent research design.
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Whilst an attempt has been made to portray a snapshot of the contents of individual chapters at this
stage of the research, reliance should be placed on the material covered within the boundaries and
depth of each chapter, in order to appreciate the fullness and scope of individual chapters
throughout the thesis.
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CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review
CHAPTER TWO
2.	 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The Literature Review is based upon materials searched, and researched throughout the duration of
the study between September 1984 and December 1989. Material reviewed contains both
'published and unpublished' work, and is consistent with general research ethics, codes, and
methodologies. For the purpose of this study, 'published' work is defined as: all papers or articles
of academic, professional or general nature, published for a wider readership. On the other hand
'unpublished' work/material, means all research projects, studies and theses, produced by various
institutions, including educational (ie. Universities, Polytechnics, Colleges etc.), professional
bodies or organisations, which are published mainly on the basis of a systematic/scientific research,
and stored within the confines of academic libraries, or organisational archives, and used as a
reference source. Such materials can only be accessed with permission from the bodies that own
them. They are not aimed at a general readership, but for specialist groups.
Literature search and review has three principal aims:
(i) To introduce a broad or general background to the subject matter as covered by the
researcher, in terms of reading and consultation.
(ii) To assist the researcher in the acquisition of general and specific knowledge that is
relevant to the subject matter being investigated or researched.
(iii) To assist the researcher in formulating and developing a broadly-based research
framework, and model, upon which a sound research methodology can be based.
In the main, a literature review provides the researcher with the basis for a clear understanding of
the subject of his/her research, using existing or available knowledge produced by others before
him/her.
2.2	 GENERAL BACKGROUND AND DEFINITION OF RISK
Since the dawn of civilisation, the human race has had to consider and contend with, the various
threats surrounding it from its environment. Such threats have occurred, and continue to occur,
either through natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, storms etc, described as "Acts of God"
by some or as a direct result of human interaction with the environment. Such environments may
include the home, the workplace or other facets of human activity. Uncertainty over these threats
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was, and remains, the essence of human behaviour. The future of mankind, and the prediction of it
has therefore always occupied the human imagination since historical times to modern day.
Consequentially, survival has played a dominant or crucial role in influencing human attitudes, and
behaviour towards risks.
"Risk" has been described in a article entitled 'Do we need risk managers in construction?' as "The
essential fuel on which all commercial enterprises run"; so it may seem strange to describe it as a
problem "yet uncontrolled risk can threaten and destroy the profitability of any company" (Tye,
James 1980)1. Tye, 1980 commented that:
"any businessman who realises the importance of quality controls, training
schemes, fire procedures, or insurance policies is aware of the need to control
risk, but until recently few people have attempted to co-ordinate these
procedures into a specialised managerial role".
The concept of risk therefore associated with uncertainty, fear and worry, has become an essential
part of human nature. The earliest civilizations organised compensation for those suffering loss due
to mishaps or accidents (Hamm Urabi's Code). In more general terms, society has perceived threats
and risks, and accordingly created systematic procedures to deal with them. On the other hand,
these societies suffered vast degrees of losses because of great disasters. Perhaps typical examples
of disasters of this kind are: the Fire of Babylon, 538BC; the Fire of Rome 64AD; the Fire of
London, 1666; earthquakes and the Fire of San Francisco, April 1906 (Jones, 1978).
The pattern of catastrophe has not changed since. Each year, disasters take place, in the UK, or
somewhere in the Universe. Most of these disasters are caused either by natural phenomenon (ie.
"Acts of God"), through technological/scientific advancement, eg. Radioactive waste.
Lagadic (1982), in his book, highlights an analysis of major technological disasters/risks. He
presents a general profile of the major industrial risks which predominate this century.
New catastrophes, he asserts, are often a result of technological advances and industrial progress.
Most of the notable technologies utilised in petrochemical industries, pharmaceutical, mining,
construction, aeronautical, and nuclear plants are exceedingly hazardous sources of risks. Klets
(1985) demonstrates that certain incidents are near-misses, and management ought to learn from
them. He explains in a detailed and analytical manner, all technical causes of major incidents,
where human error has been shown to be a source of many accidents. Thus, the growth of
technology has created disastrous situations that have led to disastrous consequences. The same
new technologies have created new trends of attitudes, and perceptions of human behaviour and
risks. Perhaps, disasters of this type and scale are epitomised by: Flixborough, June 1974, United
Kingdom; Seveso, July 1976, Italy; Three-Mile Island, March 1979, USA. The latter was
considered more of a near-miss.
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The Flixborough disaster highlighted several issues that had previously been ignored or neglected.
These issues included risk planning, lack of training, negligence of safety measures and
procedures, and even more important, the lack of coherent risk management systems and codes.
According to the 'Report of Inquiry' (1974) the Department of Employment, the Flixborough
disaster occurred mainly because of the "lack of safety training on the part of the operatives". The
Report went on to state that "there was the general attitude of complacency, and a tendency to
overlook unlikely risks". It concluded: "... nobody ... foresaw the possibility of a major accident".
More recently, there have been other major disasters, for example - Bhopal (India) where over
1,000 people were killed, and some 20,000 injured. "Another man-made disaster of all time".
(Mackenzie, 1984); (Morris, 1984).
In Belgium (1988) the Zeebrugge disaster occurred, the result - the Townsend Thoresen Ferry,
called Herald of Free Enterprise, capsized, killing lots of passengers, and also causing many
injuries to people. The formal investigation found that: " ... the company and the Ship's Master
could be considered negligent ... the direct result of commercial interests". (Guardian, June 15,
1988)
The Seveso tragedy (Italy 1976) brought the introduction by the EEC (European Economic
Community), of The Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazard Regulations (CIMAH). This
compels industries which have "processes and storage substances" to draw up on-site emergency
plans, to inform the public adequately, and to bear the financial obligation towards such planning.
In the United Kingdom, the Health and Safety Executive went further by introducing in October
1989, the COSHTI (Control of Substances Hazardous to Health) Regulation. This compels
organisations to catalogue all substances utilised by them, and to show their effects, protective
measures, and safety precautions to be taken in the event of accidents etc.
During the last four years, many disasters have occurred and most of them were blamed on human
error, negligence, complacency, or technological errors. Such disasters include: Bradford Football
Stadium fire; Manchester Airport aircraft fire; King's Cross fire in London; Piper Alpha oil
platform explosion in the North Sea; Clapham Junction Railway collision; Kegworth air crash;
Purley rail crash; Hillsborough and the sinking of the Thames cruiser "The Marchioness". James
Tye, Director General of the British Safety Council remarked: "I believe there is a common theme
of disasters - they could have been prevented". (Guardian, August 23, 1989). Again, lack of
training in safety systems and commercial interests were blamed.
"Lack of spending on safety up-date, as well as reduced manpower to
oversee safety of the public, and above all - complacency".
were to blame.
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The Health and Safety Executive Report, made the following statement as a result of these
disasters:
"A high proportion of major disasters in the last two or three years has
occurred in industries outside the remit of HSE - the Herald of Free
Enterprise, Piper Alpha, King's Cross and Clapham. Is it right that the
Department of Transport is responsible for both running and safety
inspection of our railways, or that the Department of Energy checks its own
safety record in the North Sea?"
It concluded:
"Pursuit of profit must affect observation of safety standards and therefore,
the Health and Safety Inspectors must be given the responsibility for these
industrial sectors. Public safety must be guarded by a body that is both
independent and fully resourced".
(HSE Safety Report, 1988/89)
Further illustrations of disasters are shown in Table 2-1 (List and Frequency of International
Natural Catastrophes and Major Losses, 1970-1981) and Fig 2.1 and 2.2 respectively below
(World-Wide).
16
Na) 0
to
to
C.1 CO
sa.o.
.et.•
••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••
...•
etIf) 1"..
(0 0)a) to
.c0.
2
Co
co
co
C.)
co
ai	 6
>CO
tic	 o
CO
To	 8
tic	
ni
-0
a
_c
7)	 &.;
•
	 0a c —
al	 al	 o,),„ 0
. co 0
>
cco,n=co
ca	 (I)
-o g
cn z o cE	 0 o-
-0	 o
o.c
o C	 O. al
5	 w
8
`C)
.0
a)	 c7)
an	 as 0E	 0.
x
a)	 cp>.,
as	 cl)
.c
- co FoE	 (1)C.)	 C
•	- (0
.5	 u)	 •-•
a o
—
	
ac
o
.
	
CO
	 E
a = co o
—	
cT)
'S	 =
EmEi00
co
a)
al
'ESC
_
o(7)
o
m'n
i=
W
/3
a ..-
CO
20)
_C
o
co
c
OS 0
C.)
Co
a)
.c
CO
.0 -0
00)
----
-o to	 U)
ca.	 .0- cna	 _c .to
CO	 CI)
"2 8	 0 5
a) a) to c	 C
t) .2	 CO
a) co	 -c
CO
T2 CO CO
	
0
o_	 0 0
etCO I	 I
atI.
-0)
C)
0)
cr.
I0
0)
CO
0)
C1)
CO
CO
• 
Val	 N
• .a) CV
	 CV
e-
00
•CN
co
CI)
03
CO tcs. v.) CO CO CV
Cal N
-cr
Lc' 	 N
LO
N
N
NN
CO r"-- a—	 a) as CV	 N
.c1,4
co
er ,Cal VI V CO	 N
N N cal	 I 03	 o	 c•-)
to
	 0 to •Cf
.!
N N CID U) CO LO
co a- t- V) CV
C.9
:C7
CO cO N
••••••••
••••
(NI o	 et
r-- co
Li) CI)	 I	 N-
CI
to LO N
N	 N
11
C
V.4
cal	 I o3 et
(O 0) CO cO
tO	 N (C) CO
N
•nnn
CV ol
k.
c,n
.Z
1:4
•
Li]
•nn
CS
(')
N-
N •••	 I
N
ma-
a—	 I
2
a)
CO
a)
co 0
I I	 CD
17
er
Meteors (World)
(theoretical)
Meteors (England & Wales)
(theoretical)
-10
High rise flats:_
N Drowning by floods over dikesV(Netherlands) (theoretical)
*
gas explosions
(Great Britain)
-5
10
-6
	
1	 1	 1	 1
	
10	 102	 103	 104	 1051
-3
10 -
	 N	 30 Nuclear reactors on semi-urban sites
N	 Great Britain) (theoretical)
-4
10
•-2
10
• •
•
N
N
N
N
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Annual frequency
1	 1 0 1	 1	
1
Mine disasters (Great Britain)
1
-
0 0
0 •
•
-1
10 - A
• A
• I
Numbers killed
Key
O Natural disasters (World)	 •	 Mine disasters (France)
• Air pollution disasters (World)	 •	 Dam disasters
* Points represent midpoints of horizontal log ranges, i.e. point at 50 represents
average for events killing 10 to 100.
FIGURE 2.1: COMPARISON OF RISKS 
Source: Sinclair C, Marstrand P and Newisk P, (1974)
Pub: "The Evaluation of Human Life and Safety in Relation
to Technical Change", Innovation and Human Risks.
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2.3 HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK
2.3.1	 History
The history of Health and Safety at Work has been very well detailed over the years. Barrett and
Howells (1978) state the history is mainly that of a legislative nature. Avid (1976) shares a similar
view. In their review of the historical background, they explained how the industrial revolution, and
the appalling conditions in which some of the children were put to work, led to the introduction of
the 1802 Act. At sea, the efforts of Samuel Plimsoll contributed tremendously in sponsoring 'Bills'
that protected seamen, and trade. His single-handed struggles, led to the advancement of controls
over shipping, loading, seaworthiness of ships, and undermanned vessels (Turner, 1950).
The poor conditions, long working hours, and employment of children, led to enactment of the
1802 Act. Pollard (1968 p.195) says:
"Sir Robert Pitt the Elder has put on record his horror and disgust, at the
conditions of the near 1,000 children, in his family mills before persuading
Parliament to pass the 1802 Act".
This Act has created so much awareness that it led to the need for further statutes in 1819, 1820
and 1831 - which aimed at reinforcing or extending the control formulated in 1802 (refer also Eva
and Oswald, 1981).
In 1833, the Factory Inspectorate was established. It monitored 2,000 mills to ensure that child
labour was not over-exploited (Clutterbuck, 1981). Later, in 1860, a series of surveys by the Royal
Commission identified pulmonary diseases, health effects of silica dust, and phthisis (pulmonary
Tuberculosis). This discovery accelerated the growth in demand for further safety measures at
work.
Briefly, the history of health and safety is a long-running battle with industrialists, and those with
interests in the exploitation of labour for profit. The first and second World Wars have contributed
immensely to getting employers to consider the various hazards at work. Therefore, the
government established Boards and Research Bodies (or groups) to investigate "Fatigue" and
health in industry (initially the Industry Fatigue Research Board: later known as The Industrial
Health Research Board). Roebuck, 1973, p.95:
The hazards created by new products, and technologies were increasing at a faster pace than that at
which techniques were developed to control these hazards (Clutterbuck, 1980).
This historical progression has significantly developed health and safety measures in industry -
pressure groups were formed to inform the public of hazards in their environment. The complexity
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and scale of the hazards themselves led to this outcome. A relatively high degree of awareness has
been created by the information provided, and the pressures applied by these groups to inform, and
alarm the public, who in turn pressurised the government into action. The impact of these
pressures is clear from the legislation which proceeded, linking safety at work with public safety,
and product safety (Barrett and Howells, 1978).
The Accident Prevention Unit (APAU)(1980, p.4) states:
"There is increasing pressure from employers, trade unions and sections of the
public for improved working conditions. Expectations, relating to health and
safety, are rising and frequently featured as an industrial relations problem".
This demonstrates how the social, industrial and environmental climates have contributed to
increasing awareness, and thus leading to increase of these pressures on government, and
employer organisations to act on improving health and safety. It is pointed out that the
pressures are operating in favour of safer workplaces, and better working conditions. This
same report goes on to state:
"... some sectors of Society now consider the whole range of accidents, ill-
health, pollution or loss of amenity to be preventable, and are unwilling to
accept technical difficulties or financial constraints as reasons for lack of
control".
(The Accident Prevention Unit, 1980)
Society as a whole is developing a rational attitude where the new advanced technological culture
would, to a great extent, reject any irrational explanation. They are more aware of the existence of
the prominent features of health and safety. This is clear in the creation of bodies, groups and
associations to deal with threats facing society. The existence of laws is a source for motivating
different sectors of the society to demonstrate against the threats that they are facing or likely to
face. Thus, a perception of what constitutes an acceptable level of risk at any given time is
generated.
In support of the above, Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p.9) state:
"... people select their awareness of certain dangers to conform with a specific
way of life, it follows that people who adhere to different forms of social
organisations are disposed to take (or avoid) different kinds of risks. To alter
risk selection, and risk perception, then, would depend on changing the social
organisation".
The culture, and its members are hence responsible for the pattern of development that will take
place in regard to hazards, and risks.
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2.3.2 The Robens Report (1970-1972)
The Robens Report marked a changing point in the history of Health and Safety in Britain. The
Report indicated the increase in fatalities, injuries, and economic wastes resulting from accidents at
work. New hazards, and their associated consequences were emerging. Therefore, one of the main
recommendations of the report was that a revision of statutory arrangements should evolve. This
was done in association with increasing the efficiency of the State's contribution to Safety an
Health at Work. Also, the Report recommended that new statutory arrangements should be made to
provide a framework for better control, and self-regulation by industry.
The Report called for the establishment of written statements of safety policy by industry. The full
participation of employees should be fully recognised by management in relation to health and
safety matters. Annual Reports should be required to include prescribed information about
accidents, and occupational diseases suffered by a company's employees.
The main recommendation was the formation of a Health and Safety Executive (HSE), which is
discussed in the section immediately following. This body was granted the statutory powers to
prosecute, and to enforce the law in terms of health and safety infringements by individuals and
companies. A special section was assigned to ensure public interests, particularly where large-
scale hazards were concerned.
In the text of the Report, a section was designed to advise on a list of major risks and hazards.
These risks included fire, explosives, and toxic substances, asbestos, noise, and unsafe machinery
and equipment. The Report assigned what was to be done about each of the listed risks and
hazards in terms of liaison between the Employment Medical Advisory Service, and the new
proposed body of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).
Finally, a list of topics related to training on safety, research and information, statistics, cost of
accidents, compensation and prevention was discussed to show the need for organising and
promoting these activities in the context of the new legislation.
This comprehensive Report was enforced by Health and Safety at Work Act (HASAWA) 1974.
This Act is in operation throughout Great Britain. Thomas (1981) indicates that the introduction of
this law has immensely influenced safety performance in the United Kingdom. This research
investigated safety performance in the companies which were surveyed in this study, using
questionnaires and interviews. The research was conducted over a period of five years, after the
inception of HASAWA. All frequencies of safety incidents have shown a marked trend towards
approaching the lower control limit in 1979. The major conclusion of this research shows that
whilst the incidence rate throughout the construction industry remains unacceptably high, yet the
organisations which took part in this research are shown to treat health and safety matters with
more concern than they did before the Act.
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2.3.3	 Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
The establishment of the HSE was a major outcome of the Robens Report of 1972, and a
mandatory setting up of a Health and Safety Committee with trade union representatives became
part of every management's responsibilities, has the most important role of monitoring and auditing
safety at work in the United Kingdom. Their role is clearly defined by the diversified structure of
organisations within the body of the HSE. The organisational structure covers a wide range of
activities. This allows the HSE to be involved at every level of the process of risk control. The
latest organisation set up is shown in the Health and Safety Commission Report, 1984-1985.
The extent of the activities of the HSE is shown from the total net expenditure. There has been a
constant increase in the expenditure of this body to meet the different requirements of their
financial control (Table 2.2).
TABLE 2.2 NET EXPENDITURE (HSE) ( x £'000)
Year 1980 - '81 1981 - '82 1982 - 83 1983 - '84 1984 - 85
Expenditure 73,727 78,457 86,375 91,080 93,718
Source: HSE Commission Report, 1980 - '85
Research is an activity that is fully recognised as part of the role of the HSE. Their research
encompasses various hazards in different occupations. The main topics are occupational medicine,
environmental hazards, engineering and construction hazards, electrical hazards, explosion, fire an
major hazards. These are to occupy a period of 1-19 man-years.
TABLE 2.3: INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY 1981-1984 FOR HSE AND
AGENCY INSPECTORATES (*) 
1981 1982 1983 1984(p)
No. of visits made (x 1,000)** 257 258 248 245
No. of accidents or incedients investigated
(x 1,000)
17.2 18.8 13.8 11.4
No. of improvement, prohibition and Crown
notices and infraction letters served (x 1,000)
8.1 7.6 8.7 8.8
No. of prosecutions 1301 1396*** 1381 1267
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Inspection and enforcement activity is another major part of the duties of the HSE. There are
regular visits to registered premises, sites, and others as shown in Table 2.3 above. There have
been cases of prosecutions which have increased in number in relation to the number of visits.
The Health and Safety Commission - a tripartite body from the government, industry and Trade
Unions, sets the policy for the Health and Safety Executive. It essentially looks after procedures for
factories and offices under the auspices of the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act.
In addition, there are separate agencies under the direct control of the government offices such as
the Department of Transport, and the Department of Energy which look after nuclear power, oil
and gas activities, railways, airways and agriculture. In 1979, the Department of Transport set up a
new agency - the Marine Accident Investigation Branch to administer safety on water. Its first task
was to examine the sinking of the "Marchioness" pleasure vessel on the River Thames in London.
Since the enactment of the 1974 (HASAWA) Act, additional areas of enforcement responsibility
have been given to the Health and Safety Inspectorate over the same period (1980-1985/6), as the
inspection and enforcement responsibilities increased, there has been a steady decrease in both
funding of the HSC (Health and Safety Commission), HSE (Health and Safety Executive), and the
fall in the number of Health and Safety Inspectorates. The effect of the fall in inspection manpower
has been the reduction in the number of safety visits made to construction sites, as well as other
workplaces.
(TABLE 2.4). MAIN ADDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES TAKEN BY THE
FACTORY INSPECTORATE (SINCE 1979) 
1981	 The Notification of Accidents and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations.
The Health and Safety (Dangerous Pathogens) Regulations.
The Control of Lead at Work Regulations.
The Diving Operations at Work Regulations.
1982	 The Dangerous Substances (conveyance vy road in road tankers and tank containers) Regulations
1983	 The Notification of Installtions - Handling Hazardous Substances Regulations
1984	 The Asbestos Licensing Regulations.
The Classification Packaging and Labelling Regulations
1985	 Tie Gas Safety Regulations.
The Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards Regulations.
1986	 Various regulations including control of the use of pesticides, and environmental pollution hazards
1987	 etc.
1988
1988	 The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations (COSHH)
1989
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The 1982 Annual Report of the HSC underlines a drop of 6 percent (6%) in visits compared with
the two previous years. Total visits in all sectors was down from 285,000 in 1979/80 to 267,000 in
1981. The reduction rate of Safety Inspectors is shown in Table 2.5 below, as published by Sylvia
Collier (1987).
TABLE 2.5 SAFETY INSPECTORATE MANPOWER (1978-1986)
Year
(1 April)
Factory Inspectors
in HSE as a whole
Factory Inspectors in HM
Factory Inspectorate
Factory Inspectors
in HMFI (field only)
1978 695 642 619
1979 743 688 656
1980 759 702 664
1980 735 682 638
1982 678 620 594
1983 654 589 563
1984 627 564 539
1985 652 589 559
1986 623 560 540
Source:	 Health and Safety at Work publication, Feb 1987, p.8 (Author: Sylvia Collier)
2.4	 CATASTROPHE AND THE HUMAN FACTOR
A very close look at any system will reveal the role of the human as "operator", and his
contributions to the industrial processes. As a matter of fact, he is a crucial determinant of every
industrial system. His/her role as the key "operator" in the industrial sector, has gained great
significance with time.
Research has revealed evidence of human 'operators' being responsible for catastrophes (Howland,
1980); (Sinclair et al, 1974). Major disasters are believed to be caused mainly by 'human error'.
Research by Sinclair et al, (1974) concludes:
"...the 'conventional safety levels in nuclear stations governed by the Factories
Acts are higher than in thermal power stations'. This is usually ascribed to the
modernity of the buildings and the superior quality of the staff. (This latter
explanation, incidentally, is also used in respect of the lower accident rates in
stern trawlers as compared to side trawlers)".
They also concluded that:
"training and education may now be the most cost-effective methods for reducing
industrial accident risks in many areas".
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(Howard, 1980) indicated that failures due to the human factor or more specifically, 'human error' is
the result of psychological, and ergonomic factors. Reasons such as lack of motivation, low
morale, incompetence, illness, accident-proneness, stress, and social behaviour, in conjunction with
poor design an inadequate training are the causes of 'human error'.
Emery (1980) on the other hand, sets out clearly the theoretical relationship between risk
perception an human error. If an individual does not perceive a situation as risky, then an
apparently innocent decision can seriously affect the safe operation of the system. The human
'operator' is best looked upon as an 'input-output' system; (Irvine, 1980). Following Craik, Irvine
concludes that:
"inadequate training or the individual's incompetence will result in either no
decision being made or, the possibility of the wrong decision being made and/or
inappropriate action being taken".
Hale and Hale (1970), with their model of accident causation, clearly illustrated the effect of
perceived information on action an/or decision. Perception is considered here as synonymous with
'a source of decision in risk situations'.
Swain (1982) indicate that
"the prediction of the probability of failure of equipment components is far more
reliable than the prediction of human error".
The explanation given by Swain, is that
"humans use their intentions, needs, goal-biases, and even their emotions in their
operation; factors much more complex, and difficult to quantify".
Accidents, as stated above, do not occur only due to negligence or human error(s). Ergonomic
factors have an influence of some degree of importance; indeed ergonomists see this factor as one
of the key causes of industrial accidents. There is a wider field of research, particularly in
'consumer ergonomics' where studies have shown that 'poor ergonomic design is responsible for
accidents, (Warne, 1982) (Wilson, 1979) (Singleton, 1974). Some other relevant ergonomic tests
are used to avoid further product liability hazards (Wilson et al, 1980).
A more recent comprehensive research into the contributions of ergonomic design to accidents was
undertaken by Adams et al, 1981). A five-year analysis of industrial injuries showed that poor
ergonomic design is directly or indirectly responsible for industrial injury.
Earlier, a study by Cherns (1966) had outlined the main topics related to accidents at work. The
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most relevant aspect of this work, is the social aspect of accidents. A review of research that
explains accidents in terms of social attitudes and values was well detailed. A most recent review
of literature in 'Safety Psychology' is that of Dunn, (1971).
2.5	 ACCIDENT AND DEFINITION
As man has become more willing to utilise scientific techniques to the study of human behaviour,
human attitudes towards risks and accidents have undergone a considerable change. They are no
longer regarded as entirely due to chance, and one of the inevitable prices to be paid for
technological advancement, and innovation. Events which were previously viewed to be
determined by chance are now considered as avoidable or indeed, preventable; and causes which
were originally considered to be beyond individual control, are now viewed to be related to an
individual's psycho-physiological make-up.
Freud (1915-17) directed attention to the destructive, or indeed self-destructive, unconscious
wishes underlying some kinds of accidents. The classical statistical enquiry into what happened to
women munitions workers in the process of manufacturing shells, by Greenwood and Woods
(1919), set the scene for serious scientific investigations into accident occurrence.
In the majority of research papers reviewed, the synonymous notion of accident and injury are
discussed. However, the term 'accident' is generally defined in dictionaries as "without apparent
cause"; "an unplanned event"; "unexpected"; "unintentional act"; "a chanced event"; or even
"mishaps". Others describe accidents as "An Act of God", as stated above in this chapter. From
the above, it would seem that the word "accident" has different meanings to different people, and
hence, researchers of 'accidents' have had to provide their own definitions to delineate their own
interests. Furthermore, the papers reviewed in this chapter define accidents in different ways. It
has been suggested that if researchers define 'accidents' in a number of different ways as stated
above, such definitions must affect the findings of their research (Vant J, 1982). Vant stated that:
"A major difficulty facing those investigating accidents is the nature of the accident itself'. Churns
(1968), describes an accident as: "an error with sad consequences". All the same, many similar
errors have no significant consequences; it is these near-accidents - the near-misses - which mostly
go unrecorded and therefore unexamined or analysed for future actions. Any factor tending to
discriminate between damage-causing accidents, and those without any consequences must have
the effect of inhibiting true scientific enquiry into safety generally, and more particularly safety in
the workplace (Vant, 1982).
Whilst "Act of God" is as stated above, attributed to major accidents, it is used to give
interpretation to causes of accidents which are not clearly understood or analysed by accident
investigators. Such accidents are those where causes are difficult to explain by scientific means.
The term "Act of God" originate in marine policies, which then transferred over to land insurance
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(Schmidt, 1976). The phrase is mainly attributable to 'Third Party Liability' (who is to blame ...?).
The legal profession uses the concept of "Act of God" in order to prejudice a case in favour of their
client.
The insurance professions have in a series of publications, defended what they have referred to as
the "Act of God Fallacy". They have clarified that it is neither excluded from the insurance policy
nor implied as being excluded by common law, (Features, 1981), (Vant, 1976), (Student Special,
1975). The degree of negligence associated with the case is the judged liability. Whatever
justification the professionals give, it is still widely used as an outlet, and may provide an excuse to
avoid compensate and/or liability. The Dictionary of Insurance (1980) defines an "Act of God" as:
"An event that is the result of natural forces arising without human intervention
and which no human foresight could have provided against".
This study accepts the premise that accidents in the construction industry are the result of human
intervention with his/her work environment, and that human or individual attitudes play a part in
accident occurrence. From this, it assumes that accidents in the construction industry are
preventable, or avoidable, and not left to chance or "Acts of God".
If the above definition of "Act of God" is accepted as valid for such a term, then it could be argued
that such a phrase has no place in construction related accidents. This is because construction
accidents are man-made, due to the presence of the human factor in relation to its working
environment. As such, human intervention, and human forethought and foresight, remain the key
to accident prevention through the design and implementation of safe systems of work, and through
training and education.
From the above, we may conclude that the above definition of "Act of God" in a world where
people should be trained and educated is probabilistic and not deterministic (Slovic et al, 1980).
2.6	 CLASSIFICATION OF ACCIDENTS/SAFETY
Studies have been undertaken over the years, in the field of accident research, and the review
undertaken by Hale and Hale (1972), indicated that most are based on:
(a) the relationship of individual factors to accidents, and
(b) personal as opposed to environmental factors.
Several researchers have attempted to provide a classification of accident motivators. Fleishman
(1946), attributes four contributory causes:
(a)	 situational;
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(b) mechanical;
(c) human, and
(d) chance.
Blum and Naylor (1968), have examined accidents in terms of physical and psychological factors.
Leather (1983) examined accidents and safety in terms of:
(a) environmental (structural) factors, and
(b) psychological (individual) factors.
Environmental (structural) factors were defined by Leather (1983) as
(a) site conditions (eg. 'access to work' etc.);
(b) site tidiness;
(c) availability of technical resources;
(d) inter and intra-group co-operation;
(e) control and supervision of work activities;
(0	 effectiveness of long-term planning;
(g) role and position of the safety officer, and safety representatives, and
(h) pay structure.
Psychological (individual) factors were defined as consisting of the following:
(a) care an attention on the part of individuals;
(b) skill an experience brought to the job;
(c) safety training;
(d) origins of safety norms;
(e) accuracy of subjective risk-evaluations;
(0	 perceived responsibilities;
(g)	 feelings of competent autonomy or fatalism.
These factors, according to Leather (1983), were found from the operatives studied, to be amongst
the key problems affecting the individual's safety attitudes, and risk perception in the construction
industry. He indicated that the "potential accident subject" (which is the individual who, by his/her
presence on the construction site, is the potential accident victim, or is the potential accident
contributor, and not necessarily the victim). He concluded that the person present on-site is
therefore the subject of a set of inputs of information or influences (which may be good or which
may inculcate unsafe practices), leading in turn to outputs represented by his/her attitudes and
consequent behaviour. This study also found that a degree of difference in attitudes' existed
between workers in the private sector of the industry and the public sector. Other dominant items
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in safety promotion were organisational features, such as:
(a) bonus systems;
(b) the provision and maintenance of safety equipment, and
(c) general working conditions.
Artherley (1975) proffers that: "Accidents are caused by human elements and human error". He
concludes that:
"changes in attitudes and changes in human behaviour can reduce human error,
and the human elements in accidents".
Therefore: "efforts to advance Health and Safety at Work, should be directed towards altering
workers' attitudes, and including safe behaviour". (Artherley, 1975).
Hale and Hale (1972) share a similar view. In their review of Accident Research Literature, they
identified 355 research studies, all concerned with human error, as a cause of accidents. They
however, made it clear that "clear-cut findings are few and far between". Nevertheless, they
concluded:
"All Health and Safety strategies have human involvement. Therefore attitudes
and behaviour of employers, managers, workers (operatives etc), and specialist,
are crucial in the implementation of safety strategies. From health and safety
specialists' point of view, an understanding of human attitudes and behaviour may
be the most crucial factor in getting appropriate strategies adopted and
maintained".
Pirani (1976), found that whilst workers were reluctant to wear safety protective clothing, safety
unawareness was far more to do with personal attitudes than anything else. He suggested that the
only way to counter such individual negative attitudes was to persuade people to wear safety
clothing through the use of a "poster campaign" or "fear techniques".
Janis and Fleshback (1953) have investigated the effectiveness of fear-arousal communication in
the United States of America. They concluded that:
"the use of strong fear-appeals interfered with the overall effectiveness of a
reasoned approach.
Kay (1978) has indicated that:
"Where society has made a deliberate intervention in any specific type of event to
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influence accident rates, it has often succeeded".
He indicated three factors most likely to cause accidents:
(a) the individual himself, who causes the accident;
(b) the risks inherent in the work itself; the skill of the worker, and design of the work;
(c) the working-social environment;
accidents, and absenteeism; physical factors, eg: lighting, temperature, noise, stress,
fatigue, alcohol, age, safety, propaganda and training.
He concluded:
"common to all three areas (as above), is the behaviour of the individual which
we have not identified separately (p.104).
In Kay's summary, he expressed the view that:
"Different kinds of behaviour are often placed in the same category, only because
they have the same outcome - they result in an accident. Exactly similar actions
which do not lead to accidents may not be associated. If we are to understand
accidents, we need to investigate the relationship between behaviour which
results in accidents; behaviour which potentially might have resulted in an
accident, and everyday actions. ... an outstanding feature of many accidents is
that 'a person has to switch from operating in a pre-programmed mode to an
environmentally controlled (stimulus-response) mode' etc".
Apart from studies into the factors most likely to cause accidents, there have been suggestions that:
"Studies on attitudes to work must focus on the links between attitudes and
actions; but that the argument on attitudes is based in most cases, upon a
recognition that behaviour is multiply determined".
Kay concludes that:
"It is inappropriate to seek single determinants, for example, in terms of attitudes
alone; since a range of social, environmental and personal factors also come into
play. In some cases, attitudes may be the dominant influence on behaviour, but
on other occasions, they will be of minor significance.
Several studies have shown that behaviour may also generate or change attitudes, particularly in
role-playing. The indicate that there may be a circular relationship over time; or that attitudes may
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interact with other features in complex causal inter-dependencies (Shimmin et al, 1980) (Kelman,
1974).
Kelman stressed that:
"action is the ground on which attitudes are formed, tested, modified, and abandoned".
Shimmin, in discussing the issues concerning the relationship between attitudes and action,
concluded that:
"If safe construction is to be achieved, it will be necessary to change the attitudes
and perceptions of both managers and men, and the structural features which
inform these attitudes".
(Shimmin et al, 1980)
She stated that:
"managers should realise that they must make every effort to ensure that safe
working conditions begin at the design stage, and are not jeopardised by poor site
co-ordination. They also need to give full safety training to all their employees so
that they develop an accurate subjective risk model. Workers should realise that
safety cannot be thrown aside for higher pay and, while recognising that their
supervisors are legally bound to ensure their safety, they need to press more
forcibly for safe working conditions rather than acquiescing in bribery to take
risks".
Socrates (1978) also emphasised the role of human factors in accident causation. He stated:
"Generally, accidents at work occur either due to a lack of knowledge or training,
a lack of supervision, or a lack of means to carry out the task safely, or
alternatively, due to an error or judgement, carelessness, apathy or downright
reckless indifference".
Stressing the need for employees to take a more positive attitude towards working safely and
avoiding accidents, he concluded:
"In examining the accident statistics of the construction industry, it is quite
obvious that it is this problem of mental attitudes which needs to be overcome;
given that all machines and buildings are designed to be as fool-proof and vandal-
proof in the safety aspects as possible".
(Socrates G, 1978/80)
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Over the years, several researches (as documented above) have identified the numerous human
factors which lead to accidents in the work station. Nevertheless, there exist only minimal
agreement amongst psychologists on the easiest ways of approaching the issue of attitude-change.
Whilst most agree that much emphasis should be placed on training, education, and role-playing as
ways of improving or changing attitudes, Sinnott (1978) highlights a major problem facing the use
of teaching to change attitudes to safety. He argues that one of the first difficulties to overcome in
attempting to change safety attitudes through teaching or education, is:
"the ambivalence of society's attitude to danger; it demands protection, but
despises anything that smacks of fearfulness or timidity. It went on to state that
"all societies admire bravery and risk-taking, and the basic reason for this is that
the survival of the group is more important than the survival of an individual".
Thus, individuals are encourages to put themselves at risk if this is likely to
benefit the group as a whole".
He asserts that because brave behaviour is admired, people will seek admiration by displaying to
their peers and to the world at large that they are not afraid to take risks. As a result, they disdain
the wearing of seat belts, eye protection, and even of safety protective clothing, including safety
helmets and industrial safety boots (Sinnott R, 1978).
Various writers on the influence of 'peer groups' and the theory of risk-taking, have suggested that
such behaviour cannot be confirmed as standard behaviour for all circumstances in the perception
of danger or risk (Glendon, 1983) and (Shimmin, 1980). He proposes the following course of
action for improving people's ability to recognise dangers - both to themselves and others:
(a) Research into the nature of hazards (hazard identification).
(b) Effective transmission of scientific knowledge.
(c) Understanding of hazards (cognition being essential to learning).
(d) Knowledge of appropriate action(s).
It is also suggested that the main problems likely to be associated with improving hazard-
recognition include the following:
(i) Perception: many hazards are not easily perceived, particularly health hazards;
(ii) The gap between the levels of knowledge: personal experience, and statistical fact (or
artefact!);
(iii) Development: once acquired, individual perceptions of, attributes towards, and behaviour
in respect of danger are likely to be relatively resistant to change.
(Glendon, 1983)
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Leather (op cit) (1983) on the other hand, believes that the many dangers and hazards in
construction work require considerable care and attention if they are not to lead to accidents. He
contends that there are many other factors in the construction industry which might easily be said to
run counter to the need for a high safety awareness. Such factors include the following
characteristics of the industry:
(a) The need to avoid penalty clauses for late contract completion;
(b) The unpredictability of the weather, and
(c) Operator's desire to maximise bonus earnings.
He argues that 'since time is put at a premium by all these factors, the time spent on safety
precautions and forethought, is put into an acute balance with production time. In short, there is a
competition or conflict between safety and production as claimants upon time, and this conflict
must somehow be resolved both practically (achieving some degree of efficient organisational
production) and psychologically (achieving some degree of personal satisfaction with the job and
its rewards).
He concludes:
(1) "Any self-based attitude wherein the major input to safety is a reliance upon the
individual work experience of the operative - regardless of either organisational
constraints or any systemised safety training - can clearly be seen to provide this kind of
resolution.
(2) ... those major attitudes to be found in the construction industry, are those which are most
successfully fostered by its relevant "rewards and punishment". For example:
the reliance upon bonus payments to bolster individual earnings;
the threat of penalty clauses;
the "macho" image of the tough;
the "dare-do-all" building worker;
the problems created by adverse weather conditions etc.
It is these and other factors like them which combine to reinforce certain attitudes towards safety
and risk-taking. The attitudes are born of the reinforcement. It is the latter which may well hold
the key to any effective attitude change. Indeed, attitudes will not change until such desired change
is clearly and readily reinforced within the day-to-day workings of the construction industry".
(Leather, 1983)
Wilkinson (1975) however, suggests that for anything to change for the better in the field of safety
of people at work, then everyone connected with it must change their attitudes. He makes the
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following conditions for attitude change in construction to take place.
(a) Safety Managers must learn to talk about safety to their superiors in top management
terms if they are to get attention.
(b) Safety Representatives must learn how to persuade rather than simply use pressure.
(c) Supervisors must realise that the correction of an unsafe situation is primarily their
responsibility in the first place.
(d) Employees must realise that if they see unsafe situations, they should ask their supervisor
to have them corrected, and
(e) Managers must realise that any unsafe situation is a potentiality for loss, degraded profit
and disgrace.
2.7	 SAFETY TRAINING AND PROPAGANDA
The three ways of preventing accidents, as identified by the Accident Prevention Unit (APAU,
1980), are:
(a) by making the working environment as safe as possible;
(b) by protecting the worker from the remaining hazards by means of suitable protective
clothing and equipment; and
(c) by training him/her to act in a safe way at all times.
The principal player in all the above is the human factor. For the human factor to eliminate or
prevent accidents, we must first be aware of what the causes of accidents entail in the work
environment. Hazard identification and assessment are considered to be highly significant factors
in attitudes towards risks in general, and safety performance in particular (Robaye, 1963) (Hale and
Hale, 1970).
A point of view generally held by safety advisers/officers and as evidenced by previous research is
that, the results of hazard identification and assessment exert considerable influence upon the
choice of a type of action taken (CITB, 1972; APU, 1980). Lawrence (1974) shared a similar view.
Hale and Hale (1972) proposed that such a view was implicit in most safety propaganda. They
stated that, such propaganda is aimed at influencing a person's assessment of a hazard, or attitudes
towards a safety environment. The underlying assumption is that by identifying the hazard, or
potential hazard, people will change their assessment caused by a prior hazard identification, and
this could lead to an attitudinal/behavioural change (Hale and Hale, 1972).
Similar theses underlie some forms of safety training in the construction industry (CITB, 1972).
When the hazards of a similar work situation, and the severity of their outcomes are described to
new entrants to the industry, it is assumed that their behaviour towards safety will be influenced in
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the way described above (Hale and Hale, 1972) (Aldridge, 1976).
Miller and Agnew (1973) and others, hypothesised that "the hidden benefits of first-aid training,
impinge upon some assumptions or thesis". They assert that first-aid training leads people to
become aware of the range and of the severity of injuries which can result from certain situations.
It is also asserted that this new awareness, alters people's assessment of those safety situations, and
hence their behaviour (Miller et al 1973; Artherley et al 1973; McKenna, 1978).
The aim of safety training and safety propaganda, is to influence safety behaviour generally, but
more particularly, in the face of dangerous situations. It is therefore assumed that such influence
can be achieved by a change in hazard identification, and hazard analysis. The essence of the
efforts made to modify hazard analysis therefore, may well depend upon what is known about
hazard identification, and hazard assessment, in terms of safety training, and safety propaganda.
2.8	 SAFETY PERFORMANCE
Safety performance is viewed mostly within the context of accident occurrence. A recent report
suggests that "most discussions of safety performance seem in the main to centre round accident
statistics" (Accident Prevention Advisory Unit (APAU, 1984) of the Health and Safety Executive.
The report however, pointed out that 'accident statistics are only one index of safety performance,
and that they are an index of failure.
Morgan and Davies (1981) suggests that 'for every major injury accident, there are ten property
damage accidents, and for every property damage incident, twenty near-misses'. It concluded that
the objective for conducting safety audits, is to reduce the number of hazards, and thereby reduce
the number of accidents.
The HM Factory Inspectorate (HMFI) during 1981, 1982 and 1983 had shown that of the 1186
fatalities during those years, reasonably practicable precautions were not identified in 192 cases,
and that a further 34 could not be classified. Of the remaining 960 cases, 576 were considered to
have been influenced by a secondary cause. The report pointed out that when an accident or
incident occurs, management blames the employee, and issues edicts that the worker should take
more care. The worker on the other hand, will argue conversely. As a result of these diverse
arguments, 'APAU' therefore makes a judgement as to who is primarily responsible. This
judgement made against the background of HASAWA (1974) places the prime responsibility for
compliance with legal requirements on the employer. As such, any analysis would show that
responsibility for failure rests principally with senior management.
Analysis of the 960 accidents indicated above, showed that senior management was responsible for
61 percent (61%), work people for 18 percent (18%), and joint responsibility between workpeople,
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and management, for 12 percent (12%).
The report went on to specify the role of accidents and incidents in the measurement of safety
performance, and prescribed that incident-reporting should define the following:
(a) Personal injury accidents;
(b) plant/property damaged incidents;
(c) dangerous occurrences, and
(d) near-misses.
"The purpose of monitoring safety performance is to ensure the proper and
economical use of resources which will show dividends not only in regard to the
accident and ill-health record, but also in the efficiency of the firm".
(APAU, HMIFI Report, 1984)
Westerlund (Stockholm, 1954), whilst commenting on productivity factors, stated that:
"... series of measures could be classified as more or less indirect productivity
measures. Such would include absence figures, labour turnover, medical data on
the workers, number of accidents, number of grievances etc".
He suggested that:
'it is difficult to measure directly the amount of energy expended in a situation, or
satisfaction given up or found in a situation, and consequently, the ratio output
over the kinds of input can hardly be ascertained'.
He concluded:
"Labour turnover like numbers of accidents and absence figures may be the first
readily recognisable indicators of an undesirable development in the audit or
measurement of safety performance".
(Westerlund G, 1954)
Brayfield and Crockett on the other hand concentrated their research on the attitudes and
performance of employees in the work situation. They hypothesized that "Employee attitudes bear
a significant relationship to employee performance". Their premise was that it was of some
practical and theoretical interest to establish the relationships which exist between employee
attitudes, and employee performance. According to Brayfield and Crockett, any research into
employee attitudes and employee performance must satisfy certain established conditions. Such
conditions were as follows:
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(a) the indices of employee attitudes must permit classification of respondents along some
attitude continuum;
(b) the indices of employ attitudes must have been obtained directly from the employees
themselves, and
(c) the investigation must have been conducted in industrial or occupational settings.
They concluded:
"Whilst ratings of job performance by supervisors and others are useful (if no
other criteria of performance are available), nevertheless, estimates of attitudes by
someone other than the individuals who attitudes and performances are
investigated remained invalid, and insignificant".
(Brayfield and Crockett, 1955)
One of the classic studies relating attitudes and performances in an industrial setting was conducted
by Kornhauser and Sharp (1930), in Neenah, Wisconsin (USA). The study was conducted in the
mill operated by Kimberley Clark Corporation (as reported in Brayfield and Crockett, 1955). The
study was based n a population sample of between 200 and 300 young girls engaged in routine
repetitive jobs at machines. Both questionnaires and interviews were used. The findings on the
relationship of attitudes to performance is summed up in the statement that:
(1) "efficiency ratings of employees showed no relationship to their attitudes".
(2) No description was given of the rating system. With respect to the criterion of
withdrawal from the job, Kornhauser and Sharp reported that "unfavourableness of job
attitudes is slightly correlated with lost time because of sickness".
Hill and Trist (1953) in their investigation 'A consideration of Industrial Accidents as a Means of
Withdrawal from the Work Situation', suggested that:
"Accidents [may] be considered as a means of withdrawal from the work
situation through which the individual may take up the role of absentee in a way
acceptable both to himself, and to his employing organisation".
Accidents are considered to involve the "quality of the relationship obtaining between employees
and their place of work". In an empirical test of this hypothesis, Hill and Trist found accident rates
to be positively associated with other forms of absences, and to be most strongly associated with
the least sanctioned forms of absence. They contended that:
"The level of accidents sustained in any working organisation has been held to
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depend on the interaction of two major groups of factors. On the one hand, are
what may be called the "opportunities" for accidents - the actual risks and hazards
of the job; on the other, the propensities of individuals to take these
opportunities, that is, to have accidents".
They asserted that:
"Current remedies tend to concentrate either on blocking up the opportunities for
accidents in the physical environment (for example, by guarding machinery or
prohibiting access to certain areas), or an attempting to reduce the propensity of
the individual employee to take these opportunities (e.g. by accidents propaganda
and the campaigns of various kinds, or by selection or training)".
(Hill and Trist, 1953)
For several years, the construction management programme at Stanford University (USA), studied
people's problems in construction. However, in 1973, their research programme placed emphasis
on how management could affect safety performance on construction sites.
Hinze and Henry studied superintendents (as part of the above programme), to see their effect on
the frequency of injuries on their construction sites. The study investigated how work practices on
job policies of these field supervisors affected the safety performance of workers on their projects.
Information was obtained through interviews on:
(a) General job management practices.
(b) Job safety policies.
(c) Safety attitudes of the supervisors, and
(d) the general descriptive information about their jobs.
The measure used to evaluate the safety performances of the superintendents was the number of
recordable injuries that had occurred to their workers. Comparison were made between the
supervisors by developing a ratio that represented the total number of recordable injuries that had
occurred in each man's operatives per 1,000,000,000 man-hours of operative exposure. The
research concluded that:
"Good safety performance and high productivity are compatible; one does not
have to sacrifice one for the other. Good safety performance is also related to
management styles, and that applying excessive pressure by any means to the
workmen resulted in increased injuries. Excessive pressures do not contribute to
better productivity; only injuring more people".
(Hinze J, Henry Parker W, (1978))
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Most management surveys on safety performance insist that management cares about workers'
health and safety in industry and give many reasons to justify their feelings of care (Revelle J B,
and Boulton Lola, (1981), Workers' Attitudes and Perception of Safety", pub. 'The Professional
Safety Manager' pp28-35). The concluded:
"The sick or injured employee is not productive; in fact he is counter-productive
in terms of time lost, and increased costs to the employer for medical insurance,
workers' compensation, increased staffing, and decreased efficiency".
(Revelle and Boulton, 1981)
In most industrially developed societies today, legislation requires the employer to provide
'employment and a place of employment which are free from recognised hazards that at causing or
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees' (Public Law 91-596 (USA, 1973),
(Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974, UK).
These requirements in both countries have had the effect of spurring management attention,
organisational skills, and scientific research on the subject of worker and workplace safety and
health. Employers' organisations and industrial associations provide forums for collection and
dissemination of information on occupational safety and health, towards the goal of understanding
and eliminating workplace risk(s).
Revelle and Button's (1981) study on 'Worker attitudes and perceptions of safety' had assumed a
working definition as a result of continuing observation such as "an awareness is developed, as a
tendency to behave in a particular way regarding safety". Their study attempted to learn about the
role of beliefs, and behaviour on safety. In order to do that they endeavoured to find out:
1.	 Do workers think about safety?
2.	 What do they think about safety in regard to:
(a) Government involvement in their workplace safety.
(b) Company practices in training and hazard prevention.
(c) Management attitudes as perceived by the workers.
(d) Co-workers' concern fr themselves and others.
(e) Their own safety on the job.
3.	 What do workers think should be done, and by whom, to improve workplace safety?
Their study did not formulate any hypothesis in advance. Instead, they considered their survey
strictly as a fact-finding project. They designed a questionnaire to draw out the employees'
attitudes and perceptions of various conditions affecting his safety on the job.
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The questionnaire was arranged in sections with groups of questions relating to 'government',
'company', 'supervision', 'co-workers', and 'the individual himself. An analysis of the returned
questionnaires revealed the following conclusions:
1.	 Government versus Company
(a) Worker expectations regarding government, and company involvement in workplace
safety is about even in agreeing that both have gone about the right distance in making
the workplace safe. Workers expect more participation from their companies in this
regard than from their government by a margin of almost two : one.
(b) Workers in small companies seemed to be more satisfied with all efforts towards
workplace safety than those in large companies. They felt that 'this could be the result of
the closer rapport between employers and employees in small companies where the
owner/manager often works alongside the others, and all are on first-name terms'.
2.	 Government and Safety
The major and common criticism voiced regarding government involvement in safety is the same
as those criticisms regarding government involvement in any area of life. These were:
(a) Bureaucracy;
(b) Unnecessary Regulations;
(c) Improper application of standards;
(d) Lack of proper monitoring and enforcement etc.
Probably the most interesting revelation about these comments is that, half of them were made by
workers (and not management) who feel that the government has not gone far enough in regard to
its involvement in making the workplace safe. Also for each person who feels the government has
gone "far enough".
The overwhelming consensus was for:
(a) more frequent inspections;
(b) stricter regulations;
(c) monitoring, and control etc.
Twenty five percent (25%) of workers also think the government should be more involved in the
handling, and disposal of hazardous wastes in industry, eg. chemicals, asbestos etc.
3.	 In-Company Safety
Workers clearly expect more involvement by their companies in workplace safety than they are
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getting. For each worker who is satisfied with his company's participation, there is another worker
who thinks his employer should be doing more.
4.	 Supervisor and Safety
The importance of management's visibility, and participation in achieving successful safety scheme
performance cannot be over-emphasised. Safety literature is full of such evidence (Levy and
Green, 1962).
"Employees have clear-cut ideas about their company's safety activities, and this
perception of management's interest and efforts in safety not only strongly
influences his behaviour but also his actual ability to learn from, and respond to
safety media".
(Levy and Green, 1962)
Davies and Staehl (1964) found that:
"frequent daily contacts between workers, and supervisors on safety, and other
job matters, is most important to accident control efforts. Top management's
attitude towards safety is also a significant factor".
National Safety Council (USA, 1966) stated that any safety scheme must always start with top
management. Whilst Stafai-Sahrai (1971) found management in general to be highly interested and
involved in plant safety, others have indicated that 'low-rate plants have a greater commitment to
safety schemes'. This commitment is found to be the result of a greater personal involvement by
management, and greater plant resources available for, and already committed to in-plant safety
and health (Smith, 1975).
The Accident Prevention Advisory Unit also reached a similar conclusion, when they reported that:
"A strong management commitment to safety, and a motivation to work towards
the attainment of high safety standards are common factors in low-accident rate
plants".
They also found that extensive formal and informal contacts between workers and management on
safety issues enhance the achievement of low-accident rate plants. (APAU, 1976, HSE).
Barrow (1977) on the other hand found that "the employee's attitude towards his supervisor, and his
company, is one of the primary factors determining his [safety-related] behaviour".
Various studies on the subject of safety attitudes and performance over the years agree on the role
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which management's support, involvement, and commitment has on the efficiency, and success of
any safety performance scheme. Most conclude that:
"Management's commitment to safety, that is, its overt concert and support for
safety activities within the company, represents a dominant factor in any
successful safety experience in industry".
Also that:
"this involvement, support, and direction of top management is the catalyst which
is absolutely necessary to make safety and health schemes work".
(Cohen, 1977; Re Velle and Bates, 1977; Zohar, 1980)
Kinsler (1979) reached similar findings, but went further to state that "ultimately, the supervisor is
the 'linch-pin' of any successful safety programme".
In 1972, a study reported by Don Peterson measured 'employee perceptions of the effectiveness of
safety media and of management's interest in safety' at Lozier Corporation in Omaha (USA).
In 1976, a study was conducted at the Skinner Macaroni Company, also in Omaha (USA), to
determine the effectiveness of the company's safety scheme (as reported by Re Velle and Bates,
1977 (ref. Conclusion above)).
Dov Zohar (1980) (of Israel Institute of Technology in 1978), measured the safety climate of
twenty factories in Israel by testing employee perceptions about the relative importance of safe
conduct in their behaviour on the job(ref. Conclusions above).
Abeytunga and Hale (1982) conducted research on supervisors' perceptions of hazards on
construction sites in the United Kingdom (reported in the 20th Annual Congress of the
International Association of Applied Psychology, Edinburgh, July 1982).
A most recent study based on similar parameters as the above studies is that the Phil Leather
(1983). He stated that:
"the general trend in the mean sources to affirm safety as a joint undertaking
between self (individual), workmates, and management; the perception of safety,
is a shared responsibility".
Leather's study revealed the following findings:
(a)	 More than fifty tree percent said that their supervisors never talked to them about safety.
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Of those whose supervisors talked to them about safety, fifty two percent thought they
were merely following instructions; while the rest felt the supervisor was serious about the
subject of safety.
(b) Supervisors who never talked to their workers about safety are also never seen conducting
a safety inspection.
Supervisors who do talk to their employees about safety are observed differently regarding
the conduct of safety inspections, depending on whether the employees perceived them to
be serious about safety or just following instructions. The serious-about-safety supervisors
are seen as conducting safety inspections almost three times as often as the instruction -
following supervisor (41 vs. 61 percent). Conversely, the instruction-followers are also
perceived as not inspecting for safety, three times as frequently as the safety-serious
supervisor (52 vs. 17 percent).
(c) Supervision is more concerned with production than with safety and sometimes forces
workers into unsafe conditions.
Re Velle and Bates (1977) pointed out this problem when they also concluded that "too
often, line management perceives that safety and production are of necessity, mutually
exclusive".
(d) Supervisors do not possess enough knowledge of equipment and procedures to be aware of
unsafe conditions.
(e) Supervisors do not listen when workers report unsafe conditions.
(f) Supervisors do not act to correct unsafe conditions when they are reported, etc.
Where safety performance and its improvement were concerned, Leather concluded:
"Given that personal experience of an accident is apparently a major cause of
attitude change, significant improvements in safety might be achieved by relaying
to non-victims, the frequently horrifying results, the effects of construction
accidents. In other words at operative level, propaganda aimed at increasing
safety consciousness and performance through a heightened awareness of the
consequences of an accident is more likely to be effective when presented in
terms of personal experience than in the form of accident statistics".
A study by Hinze (USA, 1978), entitled 'Turnover, New Workers, and Safety' also found strong
connections between workers and supervisor's longstanding working relationships. The following
findings emerged from the study:
(a)	 Superintendents whose operatives had fewer injuries per 1,000,000 man-hours of exposure
were those having larger percentages of workers transferring with them from one job (site),
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to the next p<0.001). In other words, the safer superintendents were those who had a
smaller percentage of their workers with whom they had no familiarity, that is, they knew
more of their workers from prior projects.
(b) The superintendents who keep, or transfer more of their workers from a previous job have a
better safety performance (p<0.05). It is customary for superintendents on these types of
projects to move several hundred miles from one job to the next.
(c) Companies with better safety performance records are those that have a greater percentage
of their workers employed with them for more than one year (p<0.06).
This is particularly true when workers are employed for longer than five years (p<0.001).
The results show not only that the safer companies are those that keep their employees for
over one year, but also that there is considerable benefit in terms of safety when employees
are kept for even longer durations.
(d) High employee turnover is directly related to the frequency of job injuries.
It could be inferred that the frequency of job injuries increased directly with the number of
new workers in the workforce. For example, if a company has a high incidence of worker
turnover, it is faced with the problem of recruiting (or hiring in the case of labour-only sub-
contractors), new workers.
If the number of workers in the company is maintained at some constant level, an increase
in turnover rates also increases the numbers of new workers that are recruited or hired.
Note: New workers are defined as "those who are new to the particular company or the
job supervisors, or both". Consequently, the term 'new worker' defines a much
broader spectrum of workers in the construction industry than in other industries.
(e) Turnover and new workers influence construction safety, and they are related problems.
(f) Reduced turnover has a beneficial impact on safety performance. With reduced turnover,
there are also fewer new workers. The problem of turnover and new workers is essentially
solved when most workers are retained on the company payroll for extended durations.
(g) The foreman's manner of dealing with new workers had a strong influence on the safety
record or performance of his operatives or workers. Safer foremen were those who asked
many questions of the new workers (p<0.01). This policy is one way by which the
foreman can express an interest in and a concern for, the new worker. In communications
with these new workers, the safer foreman would not consider safety as being separate
from the work to be done (p<0.05). In addition, the safer foreman watched new workers
closely during their first few days on the job (p<0.05).
(h) The foreman under the safer superintendent gave careful attention to the new workers
during their first few days on the job-site. In addition, they instructed the new worker on
matters of job safety.
(i)
	 A direct involvement between top managers and new workers is beneficial to company
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safety performance (p<0.05).
Note: These tended to be small firms, so there were generally not enough employees to
prevent this type of interaction.
(j) With regard to the new workers, the safer firms were those having trained or orientation
programmes for the newly recruited workers (p<0.0002). In addition, the safer companies
were also those that had a programme of formal orientation for their new foreman
(p<0.005).
(k) Finally, the study shows that management at any level plays a vital role in the safety of new
workers (recruits). Consequently, every level of management can be instrumental in
reducing worker injuries and achieving a high level of safety performance at all company
levels.
Hill and Trist in their Tavistock (UK) Study earlier in 1953, also related worker turnover to morale
of workers, and safety performance. They stated that turnover could also be influenced by such
factors as:
(a) Poor or hazardous working conditions;
(b) remoteness of the job site;
(c) bad weather, and
(d) better opportunities elsewhere.
They drew the following conclusions:
"It is essential that the causes of turnover on a job or in a company be considered
individually. Different factors could be the causes of high turnover rates on very
similar projects. It is management's role to identify these factors, and then to
decide if they can be eliminated or if their impact on turnover can be reduced.
Experience has shown that it is not always possible to reduce turnover as the
construction industry is in a constant state of change. A company may find that
upon the completion of one project, it has no project to which to transfer the
workers. In addition, the construction industry is worst hit by inactivity during an
economic recession as it is used to regulate the economy by governments,
particularly in the United Kingdom".
(Hill and Trist, Tavistock, 1953)
Andriessen's (1978) study on "Safe Behaviour and Safety Motivation", also covered the role and
perceptions of the supervisor on safety performance. Andriessen's study arrived at the following
outcome:
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(a)	 Management has the highest influence on the degree of safety of the work behaviour, the
group somewhat less.
Of least importance are the personality factors (at least as far as they were studied in the
research).
(b) Workers will work more safely with a supervisor who is seen as someone who respects his
workers and their contribution, and who is stimulated by a distinct company policy on
safety. Because they see that their supervisor regards safety equally important as
production, they can also expect that he will react positively when they work safely.
(c) When the attitude and leadership style of the supervisor is excluded, it still holds that one
will work safer if one sees that safety has definitely a place in the policy of higher level
management. The results of this study support those in a company who advocate safety, in
two ways.
(i) There is an indirect relationship: higher management policy influences that of the
direct supervisor, and therefore the motivation of workers.
(ii) There is a direct relationship: even if the supervisor is not interested in safety,
workers will work more safely when higher management stresses safety in its
policy. This means also that although the direct supervisor may show positive
interest in safety, workers will still work less safely if they realise that higher level
management has little interest in safety.
(d) Other aspects of leadership such as a strong emphasis on rules or on high production are
not as important as the degree to which the leader respects his personal problems. In other
words: working unsafely is not related to the fact that the supervisor emphasises rules or
higher performance but, to the fact that he respects his personnel (which is expressed
among other things in a certain indifference to safety on his part).
(e) A positive attitude on the part of the supervisor has other positive results, namely, that his
personnel are much more convinced that working safely does indeed help to reduce the
number of accidents. Probably, we must assume that a supervisor who is positive about
safety will also give more information and advice on safety, so that his personnel can see
clearly that working safely helps, with the result that they do work more safely. It is
essential for employees to realise that working safely really does help to reduce the number
of accidents, and it is especially the safety promoting supervisor who can contribute to this
conviction.
(0 Groups that are well co-ordinated in their work and in which there are few
misunderstandings, work more safely. This is the case because such a group atmosphere
promotes the development of a positive safety norm so that members are supported in their
working safely by the approval of their partners and other colleagues.
(g)
	
Besides the above-mentioned factors, there are a number of situational characteristics
which are important (although it is not always clear why): these are:
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(i) size of company;
(ii) working on the basis of piece rate;
(iii) size of the project concerned, and
(iv) floor level (height at which work was being done at the time of the study) etc.
(Anddriessen (1978) pub. Journal of Occupational Accidents, pp363-376).
Finally, a report by the USE (1976), declared that "the most readily identifiable factor in the
provision of high safety standards at the workplace is the quality of management". Based on work
carried out by the HSE's Accident Prevention Advisory Unit, the report concluded unequivocally
that "low levels of health and safety performance in Britain are a function of inefficient
management". It stated that any simple measurement of safety performance in terms of accident
frequency rate or accident incidence rate is not a reliable guide. The report found no correlation
between accident rates and work conditions, the injury potential or the severity of injuries that
occur. But it found that factories with a high accident rate, often have parallel problems of high
absenteeism, and high labour turnover (same findings as Hill and Trist, 1953; Hill and Hill, 1970;
Hinze, 1978).
APAU's studies which were aimed at discovering how low accident incidence rates are achieved,
emerge with several characteristics including:
(i) Good housekeeping;
(ii) Compliance with the law (Act);
(iii) lower-than-average absence after minor injury;
(iv) no marked control of the incidence of minor injuries; and
(v) high standards or recruitment.
The report found geographical difference in high accident rates recorded in certain UK regions, and
attributed such differences to the following factors:
(i) work methods;
(ii) incidence of machinery accidents;
(iii) relative incidence of serious and fatal injuries;
(iv) structural features of the premises (sites);
(v) training;
(vi) employee selection;
(vii) work group sizes, and supervision levels;
(viii) standards of medical facilities; and
(ix) geographical difference in social attitudes to injuries.
In the United Kingdom as a whole, some twenty percent (20%) of all serious accidents, and forty
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percent (40%) of all fatalities at work are directly related to construction practices. Fig 2.7 below
illustrates the distribution of accidents since 1952 up to and inclusive of 1986. Figures of accidents
released by the HSE in 1983 showed that deaths in manufacturing stood at 121, a drop of 11 over
the previous year. The same figure for construction showed a rise of 17 to the staggering total of
148. This rise was despite the launch of 'Site Safe '83'. (HSE Reports, 1950-1987). Commenting
on the figure, the 'New Civil Engineer' of 16th May, 1985 (p.20) declared:
"construction finds itself in a period of recession with fewer workers in full-time
employment than at any time since the introduction of the Health and Safety at
Work Act, eleven years ago. Yet it is suffering the highest incidence rate of fatal
and major injury of any section of industry".
The Report concludes:
" ... but no matter how carefully sites are set up and maintained, it is the attitude
of the operatives which finally prevents accidents. Accidents are caused by the
same situations repeatedly, and it is only through education that better working
practices will be encouraged".
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2.9
	
SUMMARY ANDCONCLU SION LITERATURE RE VI W
The contribution which literature reviews make to any research, irrespective of subject matter
cannot be emphasised enough; therefore this study into 'Safety Attitudes and Safety Performance
in the UK Construction Industry' is no exception. The review of available literature has revealed
shortcomings in the body of knowledge on the subject matter in the United Kingdom. Although
recent developments in academia within the UK have since led to an increase of interest in the
subject area, this interest fails to measure up to the published matter in the United States of
America. There seems to exist a larger body of knowledge on the subject in the USA compared to
the United Kingdom, as revealed by the review. Although a large volume of literature was
unearthed during the study, nevertheless, the author declares that the works examined here
constitute only a small percentage of knowledge which exists, concerning construction worker and
management safety attitudes and safety performance.
Many of the published materials on the subject of safety in the United Kingdom had been mainly
concerned with the 'mechanistic' aspects of safety, that is to say, they still do dwell on areas of
accident prevention concentrating on guards, machines, tools, and methods, as well as accident
statistics, rather than upon the human behaviour elements of the construction industry. However,
these published matters remained conceptually, and theoretically lacking in great depth as far as
specific attitude studies are concerned. Notwithstanding this short-coming in the UK research
field, the review has produced, with some consistency, a body of existing knowledge on worker-
management behaviour in the safety aspects of construction.
The review has revealed that apart from the structure and characteristics inherent in construction,
certain attitudes prevailed in the workforce, and management which influenced safety behaviour.
Such factors of influence revealed so far entail the following:
(a) The influence of organisational behaviour on worker attitudes to safety performance.
(b) The inherent reluctance to wear safety protective equipment and do things.
(c) The relationships between worker turnover and safety.
(d) The relationships of worker/management involvement in safety policy and safer working
practices.
(e) The relationships between 'supervisor attitudes' and the safety performance of 'new
recruits/workers'.
(f) The relationships between top management commitment to safety and its influence upon
worker attitudes to safety, productivity drive, job pressure, and safety performance.
(g) The effects of the 'macho' image of the worker, and the 'peer-group' character/behaviour
upon safety attitudes and safety performance.
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All these findings have emerged as an established body of knowledge through research using
various research tools in psychology and other social science research methods. The review gives
a clear indication that no systematic studies and comparison of safety attitudes and performance
can produce a single acceptable research theory in the subject. All that this research aims to do as a
result is to complement existing theories and knowledge, and not to develop new research trends.
Any findings which result therefore from the study, whether they confirm or reject the set
hypothesis would be considered as a fulfilment of the research objectives, as explained in chapters
one and three of the text.
2.10 ADDITIONAL LITERATURE
Developments in this field of research have been monitored closely throughout the period of this
research. The aim being to update literature which contributes knowledge to the work done in this
subject area, and to identify other ongoing research in this field, with particular reference to the
United Kingdom. One such work is that currently undertaken at the Department of Building
Engineering and School of Management, University of Science and Technology - U.M.I.S.T.
U.M.I.S.T have recently published two papers, and the papers are briefly reviewed below to
highlight new approaches, and to acknowledge the importance of continuing research in the subject
area.
2.10.1 A BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH TO IMPROVING SAFETY ON
CONSTRUCTION SITES 
This paper builds upon previous work in the area of behavioural or psychological approaches to
solving safety problems in industries. However, this research attempts to develop a reliable safety
performance measure, within the evaluation of the effectiveness of the behavioural analytic
approach.
To achieve this initial objective, a detailed classification of the most frequent causes of accidents
from a wide range of construction safety literature was developed, and used to develop a
questionnaire. Arising from this questionnaire, site personnel were asked to rank the frequency of
occurrence of each unsafe behaviour/situation, the likelihood of an accident occurring as a result of
this and the likely severity of injury if an accident occurred. The authors combined these ratings to
produce a measure of perceived risk.
The paper describes the categories of activities sampled for study, and control system adopted, and
went on to detail monitoring processes and tentative research outcomes.
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Phillips et al, 1991, suggests that
"provided management and site personnel are committed to the behavioural
approach, their support should lead to improvements in safety performance levels
on construction sites".
Furthermore, they indicated that "the nature of managerial support required by this approach is
attendance at goal - setting meetings and/or training sessions, and exerting reasonable pressure on
everyone to reach the goals set.
The paper concluded:
"it appears when the safety is used in conjunction with goal-setting and the
posting of performance feed-back, safety can be significantly and cheaply
improved".
(Phillips et al, 1991).
2.10.2 MEASURING CONSTRUCTION SAFETY
This paper gives a background of the research programme started in 1989, at the University of
Manchester, Institute of Science and Technology (U.M.I.S.T), sponsored by the Health and Safety
Executive (HSE), entitled 'Improving Safety on Construction Sites by Changing Personnel
Behaviour'. Its stated objectives were:
develop and test methods of measuring safety performance on construction sites;
use these methods to evaluate the effectiveness of specific behavioural techniques aimed
at changing work behaviour to improve construction safety.
Under the sub-heading: "SAFETY MEASUREMENT", the paper states that "In managing
company quality, audits are adopted as a tool for effective management. To manage safety
effectively it is necessary to measure safety performance". It went on to describe the main purpose
of measuring safety performance, and the current safety performance measuring methods in the
United Kingdom which are accident data; and audit data.
Following the above descriptions, and their definitions, the paper detailed principles of safety
measure which it listed as:
Proportional units of measurement;
Quantifiable measurements;
Sensitivity;
Reliability;
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Ratae behaviours or
situations in terms of
importance
Rate behaviours or
situations in terms of
changeability.
Validity;
Understandable;
and efficiency, all of which were clearly defined to aid the reader.
A very significant aspect of this paper, is the method selected for direct measurement of specific,
readily observable types of deficiency in safety related behaviours or situations, and which it
developed into a model for identifying unsafe behaviours or situations, such as:
Inventory of unsafe behaviours and situations.
I
Conduct literature Review accident 	 Interview site
review.	 reports.	 personnel.
1
Validate critical behaviours or situations.
Choose initial critical items.
Consider reliability issues.
Methods of measurement 	 Politically sensitive issues 	 Items common to all phases or
research programme
I
Select final critical
behaviours or situations.
1
Develop safety measure.
FIGURE 2.8	 Model for identifying unsafe behaviours or situations (Phillips, et al, 1993).
From the above, the paper set out to describe systematically, items selected for measurement, and a
rating scale used to record the proportion for each unsafe situation or behaviour, and the evaluation
of the measure.
It concluded that the most important results of this research suggest that the developed measure is:
Universally applicable;
Capable of discriminating between sites;
Easy to learn;
54
Quick to use;
Reliable, and
Valid and sensitive.
R. A. Phillips, A. R. Duff; I. T. Robertson, M. D. Cooper - University of Manchester,
Institute of Science and Technology.
CIB W.65, Trinidad, W. I., Sept, 1993.
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CHAPTER THREE
Research Design and Methodology
CHAPTER THREE
3	 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 THE RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
The main research aims originated from a previous study carried out by the author, in the summer
of 1982 entitled: "Employer and Employee Attitudes towards Safety Representatives and Safety
Committees in Construction", Sawacha E, 1982 (unpublished), Sawacha E, and Langford D, 1987
(published).
The study determined a tenuous connection between safety attitudes and accident occurrence
(safety performance) and the aim of this research is to confirm or deny this tenuous correlation.
Secondly, the general objectives of the research are to provide a framework of reference
concerning safety behaviour, in terms of 'workers' safety attitudes (or opinions), and safety
performance in the construction industry', upon which decisions might be based in relation to some
safety management practices and policies associated with the prevention and control of accidents
on construction sites in the United Kingdom.
Specific to the above aims, the following constitute the major objectives of the study, as outlined
below:
1. To identify the incidence and diversity of the most common accident causes on
construction sites;
2. To identify the more common factors associated with safety behaviour in construction
workers;
3. To identify where possible, the extent and effects of company safety policy items
associated with employee occupation, age, marital status, length of service etc.
4. To investigate generally, safety behaviour characteristics in relation to employee and
organisational variables, such as:
(a) Historical factors;
(b) Economical factors;
(c) Psychological factors;
(d) Procedural factors;
(e) Technical factors;
(0	 Organisational factors;
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(g) Environmental/or External factors, and
(h) Safety performance factors
5. To review the theoretical an practical implications of safety attitudes (opinions),
and safety performance and accident control in the light of the research findings.
6. To suggest/recommend safety systems and procedures where possible, towards the
prevention and control of some of the safety behaviour identified by the research as having a strong
correlation with safety performance; and finally;
7. To make recommendation(s) based on the research outcome, for further research.
3.2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH MODELS
For any major study of this type, it is essential from the outset to set a research framework, upon
which a methodology can be established or developed. In order to assist in ensuring the success of
the above, it has become customary - and almost imperative - to embark upon a review of previous
research work. Such work may be in the subject area of the research, or in related research fields.
This Chapter is therefore devoted in the main, to review and discussions of previous research
models conducted by others in the fields of accident research, safety and risks management etc.
Additional to the above, the Chapter discussed the chosen model for the study, its framework and
methodology, as well as other areas considered as essential to complement the study.
Upon this background, the primary area of interest to this study, is the development and refinement
where possible, of construction safety/accident research models, particularly those models which
may lead to the formation of a research framework, and which can hence be either adopted or
adapted for the definition of safety attitudes (opinions), and safety performance. In this regard, a
model is vital for determining the scope (and variables) of the research. It is the source which
drives the research, in terms of identifying the relevant variables that need to be considered and
controlled in the spheres of data collection and analysis.
Since the 1960s researchers were concentrating and directing their studies towards investigating the
organisation and management of safety, particularly the causes of accidents, and accident statistics.
Surry (1969) reviewed 246 publications, and Hale and Hale (1972) reviewed 355 documents. Even
allowing for the 57 publications reviewed in both books, as described by Perusse (1980), the
figures represent a large volume of documentation on these topics. Since these reviews, interest in
the subject area of safety in general, and construction safety in particular, has continue to develop,
and even further publications have ensued through the auspices of the National Safety Council
(USA), Aston Health and Safety Society (Birmingham, UK) and elsewhere.
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Given that such a large body of reference exists, in order to summarise or indeed evaluate what is
known to-date about safety, accident and human factors in safety, so as to indicate where
knowledge is wanting, existing frameworks and models become an essential source.
In applying models, two strategies may be adopted:
Firstly, new models may be derived from a systematic, and critical literature review.
Secondly, existing models may be scrutinized with a view to improving them, adapting them, or
understanding the state of the art to date.
Models however, are usually devised by authors who have carried out major reviews of the relevant
literatures, or by researchers who incorporate a major development to a hither-to published model,
on the basis of empirical findings. Research work is that of problem definition; therefore, when a
problem needs to be defined for further investigation, comparing existing models can be a valuable
source.
3.2.1 The Use of Existing Models (Refer: Perusse (1980))
A selection of models have been devised since the early 1960s to synthesize human factors in
safety, particularly in relation to accidents, risks and dangers. Such models like those of Suchman
(1961), and Wrigglesworth (1972), are relatively simple and limited in terms of scope, as discussed
by Surry (1969). Others are more detailed and tend to incorporate some of the simpler models. In
order to have a broad overview of some of these models, this chapter will focus upon brief analysis
and/or review of the broader, and more detailed models.
Perusse (1980) has suggested that "Models may be seen as representations of complex realities in
summarised and simplified form". He asserted that "very often they are devised for specific
purposes and therefore, to criticise a model in great detail can be misleading". General criticisms
of a number of models, however, can serve to focus attention upon topics worthy of further
consideration.
The first model to be considered is that of Surry (1960). Her model was the first major attempt at
providing a structure for the evidence which existed at that time.
Two of the other four models discussed in this chapter were elaborations upon which Surry's model
was based. Therefore Surry's model is discussed in greater depth than later models. Later models
are reviewed mainly in terms of their features which are relative to Surry's model, and the current
research topic. Then similarities and differences between them are also reviewed.
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3.2.2Surry's Decision Mide1 Of The	 A Process ft Perusse (198O
Surry (1969) proposed a multi-stage model as an explanation of the process by which accidents
occur. The first stage or cycle of the model, is concerned with an increasing build-up of danger.
The second stage is a direct consequence of the first stage, and is initiated when danger has built up
to the extent that it is being released. This "decision model of the accidental process", discussed
below, is shown in Figure 3.1.
Both stages or cycles of the model are made up of four parallel types of components. The first
category of components in each stage is essentially environmental; it concerns the presence of
perceptible indications that a dangerous situation is either building up, or is being released. The
second pair of components are perceptual, and refer to whether the information about the
impending danger being perceived, is perceived by a person involved in the process in the first
place. The third type of component refers to cognitive processes. A series of questions are
successively asked in each case:
(i) Is the meaning of the perceived information recognised?
(ii) Is the right mode of avoidance known?
(iii) Is a decision made to try and avoid the impending danger?
Surry (1969) labels a fourth and final component type "physiological response". The question
which is asked for that component in both stages or cycles is: 'Does the person have the physical
capability of avoiding the danger?'
Surry (1969) postulates that, in the first cycle, if all questions are answered positively "the danger
will not grow, and no injury can ensue". But if any question is answered negatively, "the danger
will become imminent". In the second cycle, assuming that danger has built up, Surry (1960)
suggests that a positive answer to all questions will lead to an accident being avoided. But a
negative answer to any question "will lead inevitably to injury" or cause damage.
DISCUSSION OF MODELS 
3.2.3 Surry's Model (Figure 3.1)
Surry's model shown in Figure 3.1 illustrates the dynamics of an accident occurrence or non-
occurrence. It assumes that the mechanisms for an accident to occur is imminent and building up
in a given system or environment. However, what the model does not indicate is the source of the
danger within the system, and what form or type of danger was present in the system. It would
seem that the danger simply emerges from a situation called "Man and Environment" or the
interaction of both.
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FIGURE 3.1 A DECISION MODEL OF THE ACCIDENT PROCESS (SURRY, 1969)
Source: Perusse M., 1980 (see references)
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Also, because the model is not concerned with the origin or the type (nature) of danger, it can only
be applied in the description of how an accident occurred once danger was present, and not why an
accident occurred. As such, the model could not be used to identify sources of danger, or prescribe
what preventative action was to be taken to alleviate them from occurring, or re-occurring. And yet
hazard identification and elimination of danger at source is probably one of the most effective
prevention strategies in the course of safety control and management.
Another problem with the model is the lack of feed-back loops within the model. Because it does
not identify the origin or sources of the danger, and type of danger, it is difficult to infer that
control factors exist to counter the imminent danger that is present, bearing in mind that the essence
of safety monitoring and control, is the elimination of danger or accident at source, before it has the
opportunity to cause damage or not.
Whilst the model satisfies the purpose for which it was devised (ie. to describe the dynamics of
accident occurrence), it does not go far enough, to take into account the various factors which
impinge upon accident occurrence in any given situation. Also any model relevant to a detailed
consideration of accident or safety, must demonstrate a feed-back or loop system. This is because
accident occurrence is not a one-off event, but continuous. Incidents must be capable of being
monitored, revised and refined, in order that solutions to minimise their occurrence or reduce any
damage that such a situation was likely to cause. For this reason alone, this model falls short of the
aims, and objectives of the current study. It is therefore suggested that some form of loop might be
needed in the model in order to introduce the possibility of some form of appraisal format which is
inevitable in any accident situation or model. Such a provision would have led to hazard
assessment, which Surry does not mention in her model. The model does not attempt to describe
what outcome is likely to result in any case.
The writer suggests that the above issues emanating from the model, must not be taken as
criticisms of Surry's ability to devise a model, but should be taken as useful comments aimed at up-
dating the model to the present state-of-the-art evaluation of safety. Judging by the literature which
Surry reviewed it seems justified to state that her model is an adequate synthesis of these human
factors which had been examined up to that time. One can only conclude therefore, that the
shortcomings described in this section, can only appear as areas which had been left unevaluated
when Surry designed her model.
The rest of this chapter is devoted to discussing some of these models, and other aspects of the
research methodology. The models discussed have been chosen, not because of their shortcomings,
but as a result of their broad scope, and because they throw new light on to Surry's model.
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3.2.4 Model by Andersson et al (1978)
One of the criticisms of Surry's model was that, it assumed danger was present from the start, thus
ignoring the sources of danger within the system or environment. Andersson et al (1978) argue
that this causes problems of "classification of the casual patterns". The model that they propose is
an attempt to overcome some of those problems.
Probably the most recognizable feature of this model is the resemblance of its second and third
sections to Surry's model, though there are slight differences or variations. In each section, the
steps which have been adapted from Surry's model have been given different meanings.
Within each of the comparable sections, Andersson et al (1978) have incorporated two additional
steps to Surry's model. These steps ask the questions:
(i) "Can the danger be avoided?" and
(ii) "Is there freedom of choice?"
This introduces a distinction between a danger avoidable per se, and a danger avoidable by a
person involved in the process. The corresponding question in Surry's model referred to a person's
ability to avoid more than to the avoidability of a danger. These questions remove two of the
assumptions which Surry made in her model: firstly, that danger is always avoidable and secondly,
that a person faced by danger can always decide whether or not to attempt to avoid it.
The main modification by Andersoon et al (1978) to that of Surry's model (1969) is to include a
first section preceding the two sections derived from Surry's model. The first section was devised
for the specific purpose of describing the presence of danger in work systems. It examines in some
degree of detail, the starting point, labelled "man and environment", in Surry's model. Andersson
et al (1978) stated that this section enabled them to shed some light on accidents which could not
be analysed by Surry's model. This development of the model therefore seems justified from the
theoretical standpoint indicated earlier, as well as from the point of view of practicability for case
studies.
The modified model still leaves some of the earlier mentioned shortcomings unclarified. Some of
these issues are also mentioned by Andersson et al (1978). Finally, although the new model does
describe the presence of situational danger, it can hardly be applied to describe danger which
would be attributed to human intervention in the work environment or system. This however,
constitutes the essence of the next model to be discussed in this Chapter.
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3.2.5 Hale and Hale's Model (1970)
Almost at the same time as Surry (1969) proposed her model as discussed above, Hale and Hale
(1970) devised a model, the purpose of which was to remedy some shortcomings in their research
on accidents. The model they proposed which is discussed here, is shown in Figure 3.3.
FIGURE 3.3 A Model of Accident Causation (Hale & Hale, 1970)
Source: Hale & Hale (1970) (see references)
This "model of accident causation" has four main steps. Firstly, information is perceived by a
person (whether victim of an accident, or bystander (or observer). This information is a function of:
(i) available information;
(ii) information expected by the person; and
(iii) the mechanism influencing both these factors.
Secondly, given the perceived information, a range of possible courses of action are devised in
order to cope with this information. The elaboration of the various courses of action is influenced
by training, skills, goals etc.
Thirdly, a decision is made about which course of action to adopt. The decision is made on the
basis of the person's assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of each type of action.
Finally, once a course has been chosen, action is taken.
Whatever action is taken, it influences the prevailing situation. Iinfluence gives rise to modified,
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different or additional available information with which the person will have to deal. This is the
mechanism which is implied by the loop in the top chart of Hale and Hale's (1970) model.
3.2.6 Structure for Empirical Evidence
Hale and Perusse (1978) discussed results of researches undertaken by themselves and their
colleagues. In an attempt to provide a theoretical structure for the empirical evidence they
reviewed, they proposed the model shown in Figure 3.4 (Hale and Perusse, 1978).
Like Surry's model, this structure assumes the existence of danger from the beginning. Despite the
difference in their presentation, the elements of the model are largely inspired by Surry (Hale and
Perusse, 1978). The model also assumes that the process is identical at various phases of danger.
No feed-back loop is shown either in the model, but it assumed the questions in the model are
asked again if danger level is increased. The model is therefore comparable to Hale and Hale's
model (1970), when the information which is being processed in the latter is related to danger.
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Steps 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 of Hale and Perusse's model (1978) (Fig 3.4) shown above, are comparable to
the questions in Surry's model (Surry, 1969) discussed above. But steps 4, 6 and 7, when
scrutinized carefully, represent an elaboration of corresponding steps in Surry's model. For
example, recognition and labelling of danger appear to be considered as two distinct mechanisms.
Whether the appropriate avoidance action is known, and whether that action can be carried out are
also portrayed as two separate considerations. These may well be what Surry (1969) sees as two of
the steps in her model:
(1) Is avoidance action known? and
(2) Can action be taken?
Finally, step 7 appears to question whether a decision is made, and if it is, whether it receives
sufficient priority.
Hale and Perusse's model also includes steps which are not obvious adaptations of earlier models,
as discussed above in this chapter. Step 2 is an example of such addition to the existing models. It
may be that, even if danger is not perceived, the person confronted with danger (whether actor or
victim) checks more thoroughly - possibly with the use of special instruments, or visually - whether
danger exists in the system. This behaviour is encompassed by Step 2.
The model is also alerted to the possibility that a person having noticed danger, does nothing about
it on the grounds that such action is outside the scope of his responsibilities. Finally, the model
points out that there may be circumstances where avoidance action may remove danger only
temporarily or partially.
3.2.7 A Model by Saad Darwish, 1987
Darwish (1987) conducted his research at The Polytechnic of Central London to compare fatal
accidents in industrial workers (eg. the UK), and in Iraq (Middle East) 'non-industrial workers'.
The purpose of the research was to identify factors which have influences in fatal accident
occurrence in the two types of societies under study. The model illustrated below in Figure 3.6
shows the main factors studied in the research, and their interactions with the accident situations or
environment.
The contrast between the model by Saad, and the others previously reviewed in this chapter is the
conspicuous loop which illustrates the relationships or interactions between one factor and the
other, and the overall component factors between and within the system. It is seen that the
'environmental factors' play a dominant role as a key factor of influence which impinges upon all
the other dependent factors enclosed within the organisational environment. Within the
organisational environment, workers' attitudes and their perceptions are seen to have parallel
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relationships in their interactions with organisational risk management systems, and hence leading
to the generation of control and safety performance mechanisms within the partial enclosure of the
overall environmental influence. For Saad, whilst the individual attitudes act as a sub-system
within the main environmental outer system, which acts as the main trigger of risk factors, human
attitudes are dependent upon the outer factors which he describes as 'environmental factors'. Here,
in the model, the key environmental factor is acting as an intervening factor to the attitudinal
factors, without indicating the relationship of these factors to the process by which accidents or
'risks' occur in the model.
The model however, serves as a highly useful contribution, by listing most relevant factors already
identified by most accident researches or investigations.
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- Fire and Explosion Risks
- Emergency Planning
- Safety Perception
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- Cultural and Relogious Factors
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FIGURE 3.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THIS MODEL SHOWS THE MAIN
FACTORS STUDIED IN THIS RESEARCH AND THEIR INTERACTION
Source: A Model of Safety Risk Behaviour (Darwish S, 1987)
For Surry (1969) the explanation of the process by which accidents occur is highly important, and
occupied a more central stage than Saad (1987). On the other hand, Saad (1987) concentrates on
the interrelationships which exist between the attitudinal factors and the environmental factors,
without indicating their direct relationship or impact upon risk presence in the system. Hale and
Perusse (1970) dealt with perceptions of risk, as an indication of danger within the system or
environment, and goes on to ask a series of questions which aid decision-making to deal with
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necessary actions to be taken, in the event of danger or risk being recognised by the person
perceiving the risk. Hale and Perusse (1970) identify the presence of risk or danger, but Saad
(1987) only assume the inherence of risk within the sub-system. Whilst Hale and Perusse (1970)
recognise the hierarchy of dangers, Saad (1987) treats all risks to be the same, and hence equate
equal status to them, as far as managing risks/safety environments are concerned.
This model (Saad, 1987) is significant mainly because it emphasises the main thrust of the
environmental factors upon other variables within the organisational influences. Darwish (1987)
identified once again like others (Hale and Hale, 1970; Perusse, 1980; Leather, 1986 etc.), the
environmental influence upon individual attitudes and behaviour, in relation to safety situations
(perceived or experienced).
For Darwish (1987), the influence of culture upon attitudes of the person is a significant indicator
as to how a person perceives risks and safety in his/her total working environment, and how he/she
reacts to safety mechanisms within that environment.
3.2.8 A Model by Leather (1987)
Leather (1983) started the research in 1980 at Lancaster University (UK). The research was
initiated and commissioned by the Building Research Establishment, its brief was:
"to try to describe and understand some of those attitudes prevalent amongst
construction workers and management, the aim being, to try subsequently to
identify any significant influence points which might be used to effect a greater
likelihood of safer working behaviour".
A simple model (shown below as Figure 3.7) was developed from the apparent diversity of
problems and 'concerns' revealed by their field survey and then integrated into the model, having at
its core the "potential accident subject" (PAS) (see model below) - the PAS is described as
"the individual who, by his presence on the construction site, is the potential
accident victim or is the potential accident contributor and not necessarily the
victim. The PAS is the subject of a set of inputs of information or influences
(which may be good or which may inculcate unsafe practices), leading in turn to
outputs represented by his attitudes and consequent behaviour".
Leather (1983) suggested as shown in the model that
"the behaviour of the PAS is subject to monitoring, ie., it is observed ("policed")
and possibly constrained by custom and practice or the law (legal sanctions). In
the event of unsuitable behaviour (or an accident) suggestions (or demands) for
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change are returned to the input stage in the form of feedback when inputs may
be reinforced or modified, and so the cycle continues" -
as illustrated by the model:
FIGURE 3.6 A MODEL OF ATTITUDE INPUTS AND OUTPUTS OF A 'POTENTIAL
ACCIDENT SUBJECT (Leather P, 1987)
In this model the "inputs" to the model are those environmental and psychological factors listed
below.
Environmental (Structural) Factors
a) Site conditions - access to work etc;
b) site tidiness;
c) availability of technical resources;
d) inter and intra-group co-operation;
e) control and supervision of work activities;
0
	
effectiveness of long-term planning;
g) role and position of safety officer and safety representatives, and
h) pay structures.
Individual Psychological Factors
a)	 Care and attention on the part of individuals;
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b) skill and experience brought to the job;
c) safety training;
d) origins of safety norms;
e) accuracy of subjective risk evaluations;
0	 perceived responsibilities;
g)	 feelings of competent autonomy or fatalism.
Apart from the above influences, Leather suggests in the model that
"the mechanisms by which change might be effected are threefold: training,
propaganda, and what may broadly be termed "example" (the demonstration to the
workforce that the organisation is doing all that is technically possible and certainly
whatever is legally required)".
This model illustrates once again the interacting factors which culminate in a state of accident
situations or occurrences. Whilst the factors are similar to those of Darwish (1987) and the model
for this research, the location of the factors in the model, and the emphasis placed upon each factor
is varied. Also the model fails to indicate or differentiate between what is 'environmental' and what
is 'psychological' within the boundaries of the model itself, and this causes some confusion in its
reading. For Darwish (1987) and other models discussed in this chapter, the demarcation between
the categories of factors are clearly defined. This is not meant as a criticism of the model in itself,
but to highlight a major difference in model designs. A commonality between the models
discussed here is that of safety performance measures - taken as "the accident itself, or an accident
situation, or near-accident situation". It is agreed from all the reviews that "accident occurrence" is
universally taken to be a key variable in the equation of safety performance measurement.
Darwish (1987) and Leather (1983) are the two most recent safety researches which focus upon
attitudes as variable which may impinge upon safety occurrence situations. Both models are
designed with 'attitudes' as the core of the subject matter under investigation. For Darwish (1987),
safety performance results from an interaction which takes place between a selection of
environmental factors, organisational influences, and individual attitudes. On the other hand, for
Leather, accidents (safety performance) are the culmination of environmental factors and individual
attitudes only. For Leather, organisational influences, training and legal sanctions, are feedbacks
relevant only as factors needed to effect change in the scheme of things. They are therefore not
central to attitudes and the environmental factors - they serve only as post-mortem requirements to
solicit change in the future.
Finally, it is essential to note that the location of the factors of influence within the model would
also determine their central roles or cores in the research framework. The model by Leather (1983)
whilst essential, seems too simplistic.
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33 THE RESEARCH MODEL
The model presented in this research consists of a number of variables like those of other models
reviewed in this Chapter. Where similarities of variables may exist, they do so only because they
are common to construction safety attitude surveys in particular, and attitudes to risks in general.
Nevertheless, the variables contained in this model are those which emerged from the pilot
interviews conducted amongst operatives and management at the outset of the research design.
The model indicates only those variables which had to be measured and/or controlled in data
collection and analysis. Figure 3.7 shows the inter-relationship between these variables which are
to a more or lesser degree postulated in a model similar to those of Darwish (1987) and Leather
(1983).
The model displays connecting arrows and a feed-back loop, between safety attitudes and safety
performance characteristics; their relationship(s) will only be examined if they are found to
correlate. Otherwise, the research model will concentrate on comparing the relationship between
the variables and the attitudes factors and any linkage they may have (or not) with the safety
performance factors.
3.3.1 Details of the Research Model
The components of the research model are condensed below, and the variables are identified as Cl
to C10 (see Research Model below):
Safety Attitude Retainers 
The main attitude retainers which constitute the research sample are:
C 1 - Operatives, and
C2 - Management : Site management.
In brief, the above may be classified as management and operatives. The categories were chosen
for the sample, not because of organisational hierarchy, but mainly because their positions are more
directly related to the construction environment where their positions interact with the 'attitudinal
generating factors based on organisational policies and practice, and which impinge upon safety
performance factors'.
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C9 = ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
C9 = ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
FIGURE 3.7 THE RESEARCH MODEL
Their characteristic roles in the construction industry have an impact on the day-to-day operations
which take place on the sites where they interact with each other. Although their individual roles
differ greatly and their levels of communication are clearly distinguishable as a result of the nature
of the construction industry, nevertheless, their attitudes to safety may not vary. Site managers and
operatives, contract managers and safety officers etc. - by virtue of their continuous presence on
site, are more likely to suffer accidents, become potential accident victims etc, than non-site-based
members, hence their inclusion in the model (Leather, 1987).
Thus it is hypothesized that these variables will influence safety performance, the essence of the
research is to identify site-based attitudes which may or may not influence safety performance.
BEHAVIOURAL FACTORS
The factor or characteristics which are considered to generate attitudes of any kind and level on site
are as follows:
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C3 - Historical Factors;
C4 - Economic Factors;
C5 - Human Psychological Factors;
C6 - Technical Development Factors;
C7 - Procedural Factors;
C8 - Organisational Factors, and ultimately
C9 - Environmental Factors effecting the above.
These variables are considered to influence individual behaviour, as suggested by both
management and operatives during the pilot interviews. They all relate to organisational policies,
and their implementation, which may vary from company to company, will therefore affect and/or
influence, organisational members differently. For example, individual payment systems,
overtime, or bonus or profit-sharing, is likely to motivate individuals one way or another, in the
operation of their duties within the organisational hierarchy. Provision of protective safety clothing
and equipment or non-provision of same, may have some influence on safety performance levels
within and between organisations, hence their relevance.
Linkage between the "attitude retainers" and the "attitude generators" and the interaction which
takes place may determine the degree of attitude development, and hence influence safety
performance.
These variables, and their levels of differentiations between individual categories would be
explored and measured where possible during analysis. Any results of such analysis will contribute
knowledge to the safety problem in the construction industry.
Safety Performance
For this reason, safety performance is identified as:
C10 - Accident occurrence to person resulting in various degrees of injury.
Historically, the universal measurement of safety performance has been the accident, its victim(s),
nature of accident, degree of damage caused, and type etc. However lately, property damage with
cost implications were added to the catalogue and then, near-misses, as a source of feed-back to aid
future avoidance.
All these factors are currently monitored industry-wide as a true measure of safety performance.
For this research, these variables will be considered in the light of data from the questionnaire
analysis.
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Their individual trends in occurrence will be measured and correlated where possible, with their
source of origin - the "attitude retainers".
3.4 THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
The research model (Figure 3.7) generates one central hypothesis, such as:
"Safety performance is a function of operatives' and management attitudes
dependent upon safety behavioural and environmental factors in the construction
industry".
For the purpose of comparing safety performance specifically with safety attitudes of operatives
and management, the central hypothesis is further broken down into more specific sub-hypotheses,
taking into account the behavioural and environmental factors which impinge upon human
performance on site.
3.4.1 Sub-Hypothesis
Cl - Operatives Versus Safety Performance.
Safety Performance is a function of operative attitudes influenced by behavioural factors (see
above).
3.4.2 Definition and Measurements of the Variables with the Research Model
The variables within the research model has been grouped under four headings. These are:
1.	 Safety Attitude Retainers 
Safety attitude retainers for the purpose of this research, refer to those persons whose attitudes
and/or opinions were investigated. By implication, they are those persons whose attitudes/opinions
were considered to be most likely to influence or affect safety performance in the British
construction industry. These are:
C2 - Management: 
i) Contract Managers: whose role may involve design, contractual and cost matters etc.
He/she may therefore be able to influence safety costs during contractual considerations of
the project.
ii) Safety Advisers/Managers: the role of the safety adviser or manager, is to ensure that
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safety audit is maintained throughout the life of the project, including the interface between
design and construction. He/she is in fact saddled with the sole responsibility for ensuring
Health and Safety on site. His/her role is therefore a major factor in the maintenance of
health and safety throughout the construction phases of any project.
iii) Site Manager/Supervisor: the site manager, project manager/supervisor is mainly
responsible for putting together the project on site. They transfer the design from drawings
into reality, and therefore are solely responsible for managing the project and all the
resources (including manpower, plant, materials, equipment etc), required to implement the
project on-site. His/her role is therefore directly crucial to the general and safety behaviour
on site.
Cl - Operatives: 
The operative(s) refer to the generality of trade or craft-based personnel who work under the
guidance or direction of the site manager and his/her team of trade forepersons/supervisors and
safety representatives on site. The operative is considered the most likely person to become an
accident statistic on site, because of his/her direct exposure to the construction environment.
The above groups are classified as "Attitude retainers" because they hold opinions/attitudes led by
attitude-generating factors, as described below. They are a fixed independent variable.
2.	 Behavioural Factors (C3-C8)
For the purposes of this Study, the term "Attitude Generators" was used to indicate those factors
which the research sample identified as most likely to influence the behaviour or attitudes of the
persons involved directly or indirectly with a project construction or implementation from design to
site assembly. These are the factors which impact upon the people concerned and described above
as "attitude retainers" because they hold or exhibit deeply held opinions or beliefs/attitudes most
likely to influence their behaviour. These are either independent variables or those which could be
described as intervening variables.
C3 - Historical Factors: 
These factors consist of personal details such as age and experience, occupation (trade) and
training, Trade Union membership etc. Generally identified from the pilot interviews and literature
reviews, to be strongly influential in construction worker behaviour and safety performance
(accidents). (See Appendix Tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9).
C4 - Economic Factors: 
These are such factors as payment systems and reward methods: 'danger money', productivity
bonus etc, generally identified from the pilot interviews to be strongly influential to construction
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worker behaviour and safety performance (accident). (See Appendix Tables 4.16 to 4.21).
- HC5AlliaiLtsysfo_ogFactors:__„.1 Psychological
These are such factors as worker safety, effect of the 1974 Act, training influence, danger or risk-
taking, skills and accidents, supervisor carefulness and worker carelessness etc, identified by the
sample to have influence on worker behaviour and safety performance/accidents. Leather (1983)
also considered similar variables in his model (See Appendix 4.21 to 4.29).
C6 - Technical Development Factors: 
These are for such items as plant/equipment, asbestos etc, known to cause accident damage to
persons and property in the construction industry, in the course of their usage. Such items are
likely to cause accidents if they are not correctly used, and with care, in accordance with set
procedures etc (See Appendix 4.30 to 4.40).
C7 - Procedural Factors: 
These are factors which fall into areas considered as 'custom and practice' as far as safety provision
is concerned. They include mainly protective clothing and equipment which ought to be used as
part of construction safety norms, in order to reduce accident damage or avoidance. Use of safety
equipment/clothing and safety instruction is considered as good safety procedure likely to prevent
or reduce accident impact on construction workers. (See Appendix 4.41 to 4.47).
C8 - Organisational Factors: 
Organisational factors were considered by the sample as such items as: group interactions/inter-
relationships, trade union involvement, safety policy and safety propaganda etc. Dawish (1987)
labelled them as 'organisational and management risk systems', whereas Leather (1983) considered
them as 'organisational changes within a feed-back loop' (See Appendix 4.48 to 4.56).
3. Environmental Factors (C9)
These are the factors which directly concern the site conditions in which the construction workers
play their respective roles. It also concerns the inter-relationships between the construction groups,
such as inter and intra-group co-operation, control and supervision of work activities, site tidiness,
influence of site planning and worker safety observance. Various writers have identified that
'environmental influences' are predominantly crucial as major contributory factors to accidents on
site - Tarrants (1976), Leather (1983), Darwish (1987) (See Appendix 4.57 - 4.64).
4. Safety Performance (C10)
Safety performance is defined to mean: accident statistics in accordance with the 1974 Act, and as
categorised by the Health and Safety Executive/Inspectorate of Great Britain. These include:
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statistics
i) Accident Records/Statistics: these are records of reportable Accident statistics
kept by individual companies and the HSE, as required by statute (See Appendix
Table 4.15(b).
3.5 THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
The research has evolved from an up-date of previous work (Sawacha, 1982), and through an
extensive literature review. This sets the basis for the research objectives, which were then
formulated in relation to the principal factors found in the pilot to be associated with safety
attitudes and safety performance. The research design developed along the FIGURE 3.8:
The Resea ch Conduct -
Methodology
PRINCIPAL FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH SAFETY ATTITUDES AND PERFORMANCEL	
	f
THE ANAYSIS
FIGURE 3.8 THE RESEARCH DESIGN
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3.6 THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology was fairly conventional. Conventional because it had followed
established research processes and conventions previously adopted by other researchers. For
example, Hale and Hale (1970), Vant J, (1986), Darwish S, (1987). These processes and
conventions included a combination of the following:
i)	 The use of the writer's previous unpublished work in the subject area, as background for
the study (Perusse, 1980), Vant J, (1986). For the study, Sawacha (1982), had determined
a tenuous relationship between safety attitudes and safety performance, in the form of
accident occurrence (publ. Sawacha E and Langford D, (1986));
ii)	 collection of data regarding safety attitudes/(opinions), and safety performance, through the
use of purposely designed questionnaires and structured interviews;
iii)	 a review of major global research studies and published papers on the problems of safety
attitudes, safety performance, and the accident phenomenon;
iv)	 a survey of current construction workers by questionnaire, considered relevant to safety
studies;
a) Operatives - craftsmen/skilled men and unskilled labourers;
b) site management;
c) contract/project management, and
d) safety management.
v)	 the collection and analysis of data concerning:
a) Historical factors (C3);
b) Economic factors (C4);
c) Psychological factors (C5);
d) Procedural factors (C7);
e) Technical factors (C6);
0	 Organisational and managerial factors (C8);
g) Environmental/external factors (C9);
h) Safety performance factors (4.15(b))
3.7
	 THE LONGITUDINAL STUDY(ie. over a period of time)
This was carried out with three national building and civil engineering companies, on three fairly
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medium and large construction projects in the London, Maidenhead and Uxbridge areas of
Southern England. The projects concerned the construction of a new Police headquarters, two
office/commercial buildings. Steelframe, concrete and traditional brickwork, and large glass-
panelled cladding were used for the major part of the construction; the contracts were valued from
£5 million, £10.5 million to 15 million respectively.
The studies investigated general accident levels on the sites, types of accidents which were
common to the experience of the subjects, and general safety factors, over a period of six months,
amongst a population of directly employed operatives, site managers, contract/project managers
and safety managers/advisers.
Data collected over these periods were in the form of unstructured interviews recorded on a mini-
tape recorder in open view of those concerned, and later in the form of semi-structured
questionnaires designed from data obtained from the preliminary interviews, and validated by the
respondents throughout. These interviews and questionnaire completion took place within the
construction site environment, ie, site accommodation, and without external influences, with the
exception of the occasional telephone conversation. The environment was reasonably controlled,
in that people were discouraged from wandering in and out of the designated area of the research
exercise. Access to each individual on site was necessary in order to clarify occasional doubtful
data, thereby avoiding a revisit just for that purpose. Nominated groups of the contractor's site staff
assisted throughout the arduous task of the preliminary data collection, but sub-contractor's
members on all the sites refused to co-operate.
All information gathered at this stage of the study culminated in the design of the final data
collection processes, and were subsequently transferred onto standard data bank in Brunel
University Computer Centre ready for analysis, using mini-tab statistical packages, and SPSS
multi-variate analysis package.
A summary of the population studied for the research is to be found in Table 1, under the heading
of 'The Research Population Studied', as described below.
3.8	 THE	 - E	 1%,1	 a longer period of ti e
This was carried out in all twenty five construction companies of mixed sizes, over a continuous
study period spread over two years.
Originally, the writer had planned to include only those persons or groups, and companies covered
in the longitudinal study, but this idea was rejected, as the constant mobility of workers between
sites and companies was thought to have a restrictive effect upon the database, scope and size. As
a significant database was necessary for a representative sample, and validity of any results
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achieved, it was decided to depend upon the population of all respondents to the questionnaire
survey.
During the first year of the Study, safety attitudes and safety performance was examined in
connection with aspects of site conditions (environmental factors), historical factors, procedural
factors and economical factors likely to influence safety behaviour and accident occurrence on
sites. The factors were those originally identified through literature search, and through the
longitudinal study. Subsequently, further literature search, interviews etc, had revealed that other
factors were equally significant to the study, and these included: economic factors, psychological
factors etc (refer Research Model), Fig 3.7 above. The last eighteen months was devoted to the
distribution and collection of questionnaires developed from data derived from interviews, and
draft questionnaires during the preliminary study.
Transcript of interviews recorded with operatives, and management groups, was discussed with
operative and manager samples on site, as well as at head offices, with safety advisers etc, to
ensure that the transcripts were representative of the views and opinions given at the interviews.
Most groups were positively inclined towards their views being truly reflected. The revised
views/opinions of those who felt their views were not truly reflected in the original transcripts,
were then taken into account in revalidation before the collection of final data.
The companies involved were mainly concerned with the construction of new industrial,
commercial, public and heavy civil engineering projects; residential buildings only constituted a
small percentage of their company workloads. Some employed in excess of five hundred
operatives, and others in the sample employed below one hundred operatives. The company head
offices, included 'building and civil engineering', and design sections; safety organisations, plant
and joinery departments etc, and were located as diverse as Maidenhead, and London; the
Midlands, South Yorkshire, Scotland and South Wales.
Safety behaviour was recorded for each individual, using the questionnaire returns as a basis for the
examination of individual safety behaviours or attitudes/opinions. Aspects of the questionnaires
contained questions on safety performance of the individual respondent. Individual response to
these questions would form the basis for the statistical calculation o safety performance. It was
also considered essential to develop some means of assessing the accuracy and authenticity of all
safety performance data. Within this context, an important consideration concerned access in
principle to all individual company records, thereby the collection of all personnel, descriptive and
causative data by whatever method appropriately applied. In this regard, company annual safety
reports covering three to five years span, and structured interview questionnaires were used.
Assistance was given in the collection of safety performance data by fourteen safety management
officers from fourteen companies, and representing six ercent (60%) of the overall company
sample in the research.
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The population surveyed throughout this period of the study, consisted of 126 operatives, 74 site
managers, 55 safety managers/advisers, and 56 contract/project managers. Samples of the
questionnaire used are contained in the body of the thesis, and give overall details of data collected
for analysis. (Refer: Ch 4; pp 144; Section 4.4.1 etc).
The study of personal and organisational variables considered to be of relevance to a study of this
nature, ie. safety attitudes and safety performance, was examined during the cross-sectional studies.
Statistical analysis using MINITAB computer package incorporated in the mainframe computer of
Brunel University Computer Centre was applied throughout this research.
The retrieval of safety attitudes data, and safety performance data was somewhat simplified by the
use of Likert's Five-point Scale questionnaires, which was scored by individual respondents,
according to how each felt against the ranges of factors addressed by the questionnaires (Refer pp.
144 etc). Personal and organisational information for each employee respondent in the sampled
population, and their companies were obtained mainly from the questionnaire surveys, and partly
from interviews. It was subsequently sought to explain the trends of safety attitudes and safety
performance in terms of possible associations with the various personal and organisational
variables examined. Details of the interviews, and results of statistical analysis concerning safety
attitudes and safety performance are contained in Chapters four, five and six respectively; and
Chapter seven contains the general overall conclusions and discussions of the research findings.
3.9 THE RESEARCH POPULATION STUDIED
1.	 The core of the population studied consisted of:
(a) Operatives from twenty five companies;
(b) Site management from twenty five companies;
(c) Contract/project management from twenty five companies;
(d) Safety management from twenty five companies.
This 'working Universe' or 'working population' was chosen after the pilot interviews between the
writer and some ten safety practitioners from ten construction companies. Prior to the pilot
interviews, a realistic literature review was conducted to gain a world view of the research subject
matter. This literature review whilst granting an insight into a general Universe or population from
previously conducted empirical and theoretical studies (published and unpublished), has confirmed
the validity of working from a 'working population' base, rather than a 'general population' base.
The reason for this is that, a working population facilitates the sampling process - being the first
step to be taken before the sampling process actually begins to decide who or what you are going to
sample. Smith (1975) suggests that
"the population that you as the researcher are interested in will almost
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certainly differ from the very specific population from which you decide
to sample".
A working universe or population is therefore, the precisely specified population the researcher is
actually going to study (Smith, 1975, Ch 6, 'Sampling : the Search for Typicality', pp 105-114).
Smith defined the general universe or population as "the wider population to which the researcher
(or other researchers) sees his or her findings as relevant".
(a) Operatives: the operative group consisted of most trades and crafts operational in the
construction industry, and ranged from general labouring gangs to those with specialised or
trained crafts or trade skills. Skilled operatives ranged from bricklayers, scaffolders,
roofers, carpenters„ plumbers, electricians etc, to plant operators of fitters, steel-erectors
etc. A wide range of skills operational in the constructional industry were represented in
the operative sample.
A total of one hundred and twenty six operatives (out of an initial survey population of two
hundred) representing 63 percent (63%) were studied. Some through interviews on-site
before handing them questionnaires for completion, and the rest through postal
questionnaires. A breakdown of the individual crafts or trades categories is contained
elsewhere in the body of the thesis (ch 4, pp145a of the thesis).
(b) Site Management: on the whole, seventy four site managers/foremen (from an initial
survey population of one hundred and four) representing 67 percent (67%) were studied.
Twenty of them were interviewed, and all were studied through questionnaires completed
either on site, or through postal surveys. Their individual background and characteristics
of age, original trades etc, are categorised elsewhere in the body of the thesis (Ch 4, ppl 81
of the thesis).
(c) Contract/Project Management: fifty six contract/project managers (from an initial
survey population of one hundred and four), representing 54 percent (54%) were studied
for this research.
Ten were site-based at the time of the survey, and were interviewed but all others were
studied through postal questionnaires. The experience levels were varied; and their general
background and individual characteristics covering age, trade/professional levels are
discussed elsewhere in the thesis (Ch 4, pp181 of the thesis).
(d) Safety Management: the safety management group consisted of safety managers and
safety officers who were site-based; and safety advisers and two safety directors based at
either regional offices or head offices of the companies surveyed.
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Fifty five safety managers/advisers etc (out of an initial survey population of eighty six)
representing 56 percent (56%) were studied.
Ten were interviewed, but all fifty five had responded to postal questionnaires. Their levels
of experience, age and qualifications, and professional membership details etc, are covered
elsewhere in the thesis (Ch 4, pp145a of the thesis).
Additional to the above, twenty three specially designed structured interview
questionnaires were posted to twenty three companies, out of the twenty five companies in
the sample. Fourteen questionnaires were returned fully completed, and representing 60
percent (60%) of the sample.
A SUMMARY OF THE SURVEY POPULATION
On the whole, the population studied in this research consists of:
(a) 126 operatives, and
(b) 185 managers of different specialisms, forming a cumulative total of some 325
respondents.
TABLE 3.1 SURVEY POPULATION SAMPLE
TABLE OF SURVEY POPULATION SAMPLE
SUBJECT STUDIED QUESTIONNAIRES
SENT
RETURNED % AGE
RETURN
Operatives
Site Managers etc
Safety Managers etc
Contract/Project Managers
Safety Advisors
200
104
86 **
104
23 **
120
74
55
56
14
63
67
56
54
60
517 325 63%*
Overall percentage
The 23 safety advisors are within the 86 subjects surveyed in safety managers, but
two separate questionnaires
Note: All questionnaires returned were usable. Although signatures of respondents were
not sought by the writer, a few respondents however identified themselves. There
was no significance attached to signed or unsigned returns, as individual identify
was of no particular consequence to the results of the survey.
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3.10 ANTICIPATED PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTION
This research study will contribute to existing knowledge of safety management, generally in the
UK construction industry. It will attempt to identify some of the weaknesses inherent in current
factors utilised in the measurement of safety performance, and safety generally.
The analysis of safety attitudes and safety performance management, and organisation will
highlight some of the problems related to safety attitude measures and safety management in the
UK construction industry.
Ultimately, future planners, and safety policy-makers, and accident prevention personnel may
benefit from the outcome of this study, by way of promoting better safety measures and coherent
safety management within the construction enterprise as exists in the United Kingdom.
3.11 DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENTS
The Measurement of Safety Attitudes
In discussing the notion of response consistency, a major characteristic that distinguishes 'attitude'
or indeed 'safety attitudes' from other concepts, is its evaluative or affective nature. Indeed there is
widespread agreement that "affect" is the most essential part of the attitude concept (Fishbein and
Ajzen, 1973); (Allport G W, 1935). Most of the commonly accepted attitude-measurement
procedures arrive at a single number designed to index this general evaluation or feeling of
favourableness or unfavourableness towards the object in question. Consistent with Thurstone's
(1931) position, attitude may be conceptualised as the amount of 'affect' for or against some object.
Thurstone suggests therefore that "attitude" should be measured by a procedure which locates the
subject on a bipolar affection or evaluative dimension vis-a-vis a given object. Fishbein and Ajzen
(1973), conclude that:
"there seems to be widespread agreement that affect is the most essential part of
attitude, and that the proposed definition therefore appears to do justice to the
concept of attitude (p11-13).
Affect, according to Fishbein et al, refers to a person's feelings towards an evaluation of some
object, person, issue or event; and that 'cognition' refers to a person's knowledge, opinions, beliefs
and thoughts about the object.
The measurement of attitudes of any form, is always problematic, due to the diverse methods of
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approaches available, each professing to be the most valid. For this study, an 'item analysis'
approach is adopted. Using a Likert five-points scalling method described below, respondents are
forced to discriminate favourably or unfavourably against statements of opinion relative to some
chosen items, ordered under different headings as set out within the pre-designed questionnaires
which are used for primary data collection for the study. The statements of opinions are based on
items selected during the pilot interviews and questionnaires, by the respondents themselves to
represent 'attitudinal objects' against which construction workers are supposed to have an attitude in
the UK construction industry. An item analysis of the individual 'item-scores' representing the
respondent's degree of feelings expressed under the categories of 'strongly agree', 'agree', 'don't
know', 'disagree', to 'strongly disagree', would form the safety attitude measurement as far as the
Study is concerned. However, the operative data will further be subjected to multivariate analysis
to strengthen the initial analysis by isolating key variables, and to partial out the influences of the
variables upon one another.
3.11.1 Thurstone Scales
One of the best-known approaches to attitude scaling is Thurstone's method of 'equal-appearing
intervals', which attempts to form an interval scale of measurement.
The first step in its procedure is to collect for the item pool a large number of items, consisting of
statements on the survey subject (say attitude to management), ranging from one extreme of
favourableness to the other. These are reduced, by cutting out obviously ambiguous items,
duplicates, and so forth, to somewhere near a hundred, each of which is written on a card. A large
group of 'judges' - perhaps fifty or so, are then asked to independently assess the items.
Each judge has to sort the items into a set number of piles according to his or her assessment of
their degrees of favourableness on the attitude in question; and he/she is asked to form the piles so
that they appear to him/her to be about equally spaced along the attitudinal continuum. The number
of piles is often eleven, but seven and nine are also used, and the middle pile is sometimes labelled
'neutral'. Judges whose sortings indicate that they have failed to perform the task adequately -
perhaps through a misunderstanding of instructions or just carelessness - can be eliminated. Then,
scoring the piles from 1 to 11 (or 7 or 9), for each item is a median value is calculated - the value
such that half the remaining judges give the item a lower position and half a higher - and also the
interquartile range, which measures the scatter of judgements (the extent of which various judges
place the item at different parts of the scale). This list of items is now reduced by:
(a) discarding those with a high scatter, for they are clearly in some sense ambiguous or
irrelevant; and
(b) selecting from the remainder some twenty or so which cover the entire range of attitudes
(as judged by the medians) and which appear to be about equally spaced (again, as judged
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by the medians) along the scale. At the final selection stage it may be possible to choose a
second set of items in the same way so that the alternate forms method can be used to
measure the scale's reliability; or, alternatively, the scale may be formed as two halves so
that the split-half method can be used.
The items so selected are then embodied in a questionnaire, in random order, and each
respondent is asked to endorse all the items with which he/she agrees. The average (mean
or Median) of the median values of all the items endorsed by the respondent forms the
respondent's scale score.
Thurstone scales are sometimes termed differential scales, in the sense that, given a sound and
reliable scale, the individual will agree only with items around his/her scale position, disagreeing
with those more extreme on either side.
Some criticism of Thurstone's Scaling Method:
A frequent criticism of the method (Moser C A/Kalton G, 1985), has been that the characteristics
and attitudes of the people who judge the items in the item pool may be different from those of the
respondents whose attitudes are to be scaled, and that the former may affect the scale values.
Another criticism is its laboriousness. The judges' task requires careful application and a certain
level of skill, and it may not be easy for the researcher to gain the co-operation of a large number of
persons able and willing to do the work (particularly on a building site).
This last criticism was strongly considered as the greatest obstacle to the original intentions of the
author, and hence Thurstone's scale method was discounted.
3.11.2 Guttman Scales (oppenheim. 1966) 
Another technique considered is the Guttman scales (1944) called the 'scalogram analysis'.
The scalogram analysis was designed to test whether a set of beliefs or intentions can be ordered
along a single (evaluation) dimension. The items are said to form a Guttman scale, if they can be
ordered so that respondents who endorse an item in one position on the scale (eg. an item put in the
4th position) also endorse all items that are lower in order (ie. items in positions 1, 2 and 3). When
this condition is met, the result is a set of items that form a uni-dimensional cumulative scale, and
the respondent's attitude is indexed by the most extreme item he/she is willing to endorse.
When discussing attitude-scaling of different types, assumption is made that the various attitude
statements in the scale all belong to the same dimension. With the Thurstone method, the only
evidence comes from the relative agreement of those who judge the scale position of the individual
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items. In the ordinary Likert method, the correlations between item scores and total scores provide
some evidence, but perfect correlations are needed for complete uni-dimensionality. With Guttman
scaling, however, the attainment of a high degree of uni-dimensionality is a measure of concern.
The Guttman Scalogram is fundamentally different from the Thurstone and Likert techniques, in
that the latter produce a final score of a given magnitude from quite different patterns of responses,
so that it is impossible to tell from the score what the individual answers were. With the Guttman
technique, the perfect scale implies that a person who answers a given question favourably will
have a higher score than a person who answers it unfavourably. Guttman scale is prone to errors,
together with the fact that the ordering of the items in it is unknown in practical situations, making
the scaling procedures more complicated than the Thurstone and Likert techniques.
Despite its appealing nature, the author found the Guttman scale method to be unsuitable for the
type of study undertaken. It was found to be unsuitable particularly due to the longer process it
takes from first stage, to final stage of administering to respondents. It was also considered too
difficult for operatives to understand. An added difficulty was caused by the strict deterministic
nature of the underlying model, namely that a person who responds positively (negatively) to one
item must respond positively (negatively) to a series of others. As a result, departures from scale
types have to be treated as aberrations or errors. It was hence decided to use a simpler-to-
understand and easier-to-administer type of scale.
3.11.3 Osgood Semantic Differential Technique
By far the most important new contribution (other than Thurstone and Likert) techniques to attitude
measurement however, was the development of the semantic differential technique by Charles
Osgood and his associates (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957). Designed originally to
measure the meaning of concept, Osgood et al recognised that the technique could be used to
measure attitudes.
The semantic differential consists of a set of bipolar evaluative adjective scales, such as good-bad,
harmful-beneficial, pleasant-unpleasant, positive-negative. Typically, the adjectives in a given pair
are placed on opposite ends of seven-place graphic scales, and respondents are asked to evaluate
the attitude object by rating it in each scale. For example, attitude towards War might be assessed
by means of the following evaluative semantic differential.
WAR
Harmful
	
	 :Beneficial
Good	
	 :Bad
Pleasant	
	 :Unpleasant
Awful	
	 :Nice
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site-based, and who had considerably less time to spare on business(es) unrelated to their main
tasks. Besides, Likert method was considered to have the following advantages such as:
(a) Less costly;
(b) Ease of data collection;
(c) Easy format for analysis of collected data;
(d) Possessed the characteristics of easier, and more structured result presentation, and more
importantly,
(e) convenient in terms of the research timescale.
3.11.4.1	 The Likert Scale
In designing the questionnaire(s) for collecting primary data for use in this study, initial
consideration was given to three main factors:
(a) The best or most convenient way of collecting the primary data, within the research
timescale;
(b) the likely most cheap way for collecting the data, and most importantly,
(c) the best way to order the data collected, for ease of measurement or analysis by computer.
The Likert Scale was found to satisfy all three criterion as stated above, and hence it was adopted
as a basis for the design of the questionnaires which were used for this study.
Basically, in Likert scaling, the respondent is not asked to decide just whether he/she agrees or
disagrees with an item, as in Thurstone scaling, but rather to choose between several response
categories, including various strengths of agreement and disagreement. The categories are
assigned scores and the respondent's attitude (or opinion) is measured by his total scores, which is
the sum of the scores of the categories he has endorsed for each of the items. Reflecting these main
characteristics of Likert scaling, these scales are sometimes known as 'summated and summated
rating scales'.
Five categories are normally employed for each item (as illustrated by the questionnaire(s) sample
contained in the Appendix to this Report), although three and seven have sometimes been utilised.
The usual descriptions for the five categories are: 'strongly agree' (or strongly approve), 'agree'
(approve), 'don't know' (undecided), 'disagree' (disapprove) and 'strongly disagree' (strongly
disapprove). Although more complex scoring has been attempted, assigning scores of 1, 2, 3, 4
and 5 (in ascending order), or 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1 (in a descending order), has generally been found to
be adequate. The choice between the two orderings of scores for an individual item depends on
whether 'strongly agree' indicates a favourable or unfavourable attitude. Some items on the scale
will be expressed positively, so that the answer 'strongly agree' indicates a favourable attitude, and
others negatively, 'strongly disagree' then indicating an unfavourable attitude; thus to make the
89
total score meaningful, positive items must be scored in one order and negative ones in the reverse
order.
In forming the pool, Shepherd (1966) suggested that three basic considerations should be borne in
mind, which are:
(a) Since the aim of an item is to spread the respondents over the response categories, no
purpose is served by extreme items to which nearly everyone in the sampled population
will respond in the same way;
(b) it has been found that neutral or don't know items do not work well in Likert scales;
(c) it is advisable to have a roughly equal number of positively and negatively worded items in
the scale. Variation between positive and negative items (hopefully) forces the respondent
to consider each item carefully, rather than to respond automatically (without thought) to
them in the same way.
Shepherd (1966) suggested such approaches act to minimise the effects of a response set towards
either agreement or disagreement with whatever statement is made. However, as the items
comprising a Likert scale are themselves rating scales they can often usefully be analysed
individually.
Unlike Thurstone's scaling, once a large item pool has been compiled a questionnaire format, it is
administered to a sample of people reasonably representative of those whose attitudes are to be
measured. Whilst in Thurstone scaling, the initial judges do not represent the sample whose
attitudes the researcher intends to score. In Likert scaling, the sample population are asked in the
first instance to respond only to each item by choosing the category representing their own opinion.
The item analysis for eliminating poor items involves examining the consistency of their responses
to the various items. One way of investigating this internal consistency is to correlate the scores of
individuals on each of the items with their total score (or total score less the score on the item
involved); items failing to correlate highly with the total score are rejected. Other methods of
discrimination of items for rejection in the final questionnaire, are well documented in text books
for the subject of psychology/social psychology. As such no detailed description of such methods
is discussed in this study.
Likert scales seem to have higher reliability than Thurstone scales of the same length, and also
require fewer items to reach a given level of reliability. The main reason given for this key
difference is that Likert scales collect more information per item than do Thurstone scales.
When the items have been selected, it only remains, apart from testing reliability and validity, to
ask the actual respondents to indicate their attitudes by checking one of the categories of agreement
or disagreement for each item on the scales. The total score is then derived as described above, and
scores are allocated according to intensity of opinions, and not according to the content of the item.
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Moser C A, and Kalton G, (1985) have explained that "A Likert Scale" is clearly not an interval
scale, and no conclusions can be drawn about the meaning of distances between scale positions.
Fishbein et al on the other hand suggest that:
"there are doubts as to whether Thurstone scaling, which attempts to attain
interval measurement, produces a true internal scale".
They agree that Likert scale appears to be a reasonable ordinal scale, and that, "it is somewhat
simpler to construct and it is likely to be more reliable than a Thurstone scale".
The author has adopted the Likert scale mainly for its simplicity, and straightforwardness in its
design, and ease of analysis of data resulting from it. More details concerning statistical techniques
for data analysis are discussed under the heading: Possible Analytical Approaches (see paragraph
3.4 below).
Though Likert attitude scale is adopted for this study, it is worthy of mention again that, for this
study, "attitudes" and "opinions" are taken to be synonymous. The terms 'attitudes' and 'opinions'
are hence, interchangeable for the purpose of this study: the questionnaires used for data collection
and measurement are therefore viewed as instruments for the collection of attitudinal/opinion data.
The results of data analysed for the study, should be viewed as measures of attitudes/opinions of
the respondents sample population studied.
3.11.5 Safety Performance Measurement
No industrialised society, or indeed any society today, is without the complex phenomenon of
accidents and fatalities, resulting from the effects of human interactions with work and machines
within industrial, commercial, social and even home environments. The control of such accident
incidences and fatalities has been focused upon the best possible safety performance measures.
Nevertheless, most of our present-day safety checks and efforts are based on "after-the-event"
appraisals of loss-producing factors that happen to produce an accident of sufficient severity to be
included within the limits of our reporting criteria, or to make the front page of the national media
or press.
Tarrants (1976) suggested that "present attempts to control accidents and their consequences can
best be described as "trial-and-error", chiefly because adequate measures of the effectiveness of
this control do not exist in practice". For Tarrants, "control must begin with sound measurement".
The degree to which accident control is possible is a function of the adequacy of the measures used
to identify the type and magnitude of potential injury-inducing problems existing within the field of
concern.
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If we follow the standards and criteria set by the Health and Safety Inspectorates throughout the
United Kingdom, the criteria for reporting accidents involves more than three days lost time or
some permanent injury, first-aid or disablement or death.
Such is the state of play in the U.K. that hardly any system exists for the monitoring of 'non-injury'
or 'property damage' accidents or 'near-misses'. Any such system which may exist, result from
individual company initiatives or efforts. Even then, such systems or records can best be described
as 'scanty', since they are based not on statutory guidelines, but on individual company goals. At
present, any records which exists of non-injury related damages to persons and property is
therefore voluntarist; statute or regulations do not prevail upon companies to maintain or report
such occurrences in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.
In the industrial context, the level of safety achieved is a combined result of philosophical, legal,
economic, technological, managerial and motivational factors of influences which exist among
others. The measurement of construction safety performance levels, are also subject to these
influences, and a critical study of safety performance measurement will have to take them into
account. For example, the earliest safety performance measurement may be traced to the emerging
industrial safety legislation in the late 19th and early 20th century that required factory inspections,
the guarding of dangerous machinery, and the assumption of financial liability by employers
(Factories Act, 1937 and National Joint Council, 1948, refers).
Safety measurement generally involves the measurement of safety events (or their consequences)
that have been labelled "accidents". There are many conceptions of the term "an accident", and the
conception that is selected will, therefore influence the measurement criterion employed. To many,
the word "accidents" and "injury" are almost synonymous; nevertheless, those familiar with
accident research, proffer a number of definitions/conceptions of the word "accidents". For
example, at one extreme, the fatalistic view of accidents ascribes their causes to "forces outside the
control of the individual". From this standpoint, there is little to be gained in their control or
measurement, as the phrase: "an Act of God" can still be found in legal text books or in literature.
Parallel to the above fatalistic view, is the belief that so-called accidents are random events, again,
with little to be gained from their tabulation.
Arbus and Kerrich (1951) defined an accident as
"a chain of events, each of which, being the result of some non-adjustive act on
the part of the individual (variously caused), may or may not result in injury".
Greenwood and Woods (1919), saw accident causation as an invariant human characteristic,
summarised under the cloak of "accident-proneness". Hence the measurement is of selected
personality characteristic of the individual.
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" -an accident, with or without injury, is in the main a morbid phenomenon
resulting from the integration of a dynamic variable constellation of forces, and
occurs as a sudden, unplanned and uncontrolled event".
(Schulzinger, 1954)
A concept which has a direct impact on industrial safety measurement, despite the variations in the
definition of the consequences of safety mishaps, is "causation". "Causation" has been simply
defined by the axiom
"that every effect has its single cause, and that the aim of accident investigation,
and hence its measurement/recording of it, is to locate that 'cause'; the aim of
safety measurement is thus the tabulation of the various causes uncovered by
investigation".
From the above basis, it seems that the problem is that of finding a criterion of safety effectiveness,
and some way of measuring safety performance. Because lost-time accidents or injury-
producing/disableness accidents are statistically rare events, and first-aid cases and serious injury
frequency rates are subject to large-scale under-reporting, the safety practitioner is faced with only
an intuitive notion of the effectiveness of various accident prevention methods.
Recent figures released by the Health and Safety Executive, indicating accidents occurrence across
all industries up until April 1988, showed that 175,000 injuries at work were serious enough for the
victim to need more than three days off work and 405 cases were fatal accidents. The HSE again
emphasized "substantial under-reporting". It says that the true injury statistics were at least fifty
percent (50%) higher than tabulated, and that "failure to report is most prevalent among the self-
employed". The self-employed accounted for 1,756 cases, with about two thirds coming from the
construction industry. Deaths at work have shown a slight downward trend since 1982, but the
worrying thing is that of the consistency of the death rate, which has averaged 400 for the last six
years. Major accidents by contrast have been increasing from 12,407 as reported in 1982, rising to
13,389 in 1985, and 20,379 in 1987.
Published performance statistics by the USE also indicated that among employees, the most
common accidents remained: falls, slips and trips, followed by handling and lifting or carrying
objects. Together, the report (provisional) states that
"these accidents account for more than half the total (ie. 56 percent). Eighty-
eight percent of accidents (classified under minor accidents) resulted in more than
three days off work".
These statistics, though interesting to read, fail to tell the complete story. A true reflecting of safety
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performance measurement must be capable of appraising the internal effectiveness of an accident
prevention programme by directly measuring its influence on an acceptable criteria of safety
performance as it fluctuates over time.
Whilst accident statistics remain a true 'after-the-event' pointer in safety performance measurement,
they indicate only one consequence of worker behaviour within specified industrial work activities.
As such they tell us very little about antecedent behaviour, without covering the wider aspect of the
total work-environment. In effect, a realistic measure of safety performance must help the safety
practitioner to prevent, not just record, accidents. It must cover items such as:
(a) hazard identification;
(b) machine/plant/tool failures;
(c) property and equipment damage;
(d) human error analysis, including failure to us safety protective clothing and
equipment;
(e) site condition/work environment etc.
Tarrants (1965) suggests that the purpose for safety performance measurement must include:
(a) help to prevent and report accidents;
(b) report continuously on the change in safety levels within a plant and to evaluate the
effects of accident-prevention efforts as rapidly as possible within an organisation.
Such measures he stressed, should be measuring 'lack of safety', instead of 'the presence of safety'.
Tan-ants stated that a realistic safety performance measurement should be
"A technique selected for its applicability to a particular situation, the relative
cost involved in using it, the criticality of the component or system under study,
the desired output, its compatibility with other programmed activities, and its
meaningfulness to managers and to those who must use it".
Additional to the above, he suggests "an accident causal factor identification technique is needed
which will identify non-injurious accidents as well as those involving injuries" ... "we should be
able to identify unsafe conditions or defects in the work environment, which have an accident-
producing potential". In accordance with his conception of safety, he defines 'accident' (1965) as
"As unplanned, not necessarily injurious or damaging event, which interrupts the
completion of an activity, and is invariably preceded by an unsafe act and/or an
unsafe condition or some combination of unsafe acts and/or unsafe conditions".
Other writers have equally proposed that whilst it has been customary to name a single factor as
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'the cause of the accident', even people who recognise that nearly all accidents have more than one
factor, may urge us to report only the 'most important' factor is either the easiest factor to discover
or the easiest to control (Blumental, quoting Baker (1954).
Grimaldi (1970) argues differently by taking the stance that
"safety achievement is best not measured simply in terms of the occurrence of
unqualified events, with an absolute null point as the performance objective".
He argues that
"There is a normal predilection, it seems, for taking risks if the possible
consequences appear more attractive than the apparent probability and degree of
harm that exposure to them may present. ... the ambivalent attraction between
safety and risk apparently is a deeply ingrained human bent, which often disables
wise decision".
Society, like the individual argues Grimaldi
"apparently responds to day-to-day perils - in accordance with the dictates of the
most influential culture and needs of the moment - by accepting a level of safety
that it finds tolerable. Thus a zero accident incidence, although ideally desirable,
is not the universal standard for safety effectiveness.
Grimaldi (1970) concludes that the difficulty in setting a universal safety performance
measurement is because, safety standards seem to vary from individual to individual, and within
the individual according to the several discretionary factors he sees.
According to Grimaldi (1970), there are four judgement factors which, although not usually
calculated rigorously, may intuitively govern safety decisions.
(a) The likelihood (probability) of an unwanted consequence occurring;
(b) the maximum degree of harm that could result from the consequence;
(c) the social-sensitivity of the issues associated with the possible consequence (ie.
their legality or ethicalness);
(d) the magnitude of the gain expected from the action taken.
He concludes that each factor is related instinctively in some degree when a safety decision is
required.
It appears that a performance measurement which uses accidental events in some scalar fashion to
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ESTABLISH OBJECTIVES
PLAN IMPLEMENTATION OF OBJECTIVES
ORGANISE TO FULFIL PLANS
CO-ORDINATE COMPONENT & INDIVIDUAL WORK
MEASURE PERFORMANCE
quantify safety effectiveness cannot reliably and validly reflect the quality of the safety process.
Drucker (1954) likened the measurement of safety performance to that of managerial work, as
illustrated in Figure 3.10 below:
Based on the above theory, Drucker asserts that
"the industrial hierarchy is an outcome of the need for distributing and
channelling the responsibility, authority and accountability for the fulfilment of
the corporate objectives".
BASIC INPUTS OF MANAGERIAL WORK
FIGURE 3.9 FLOW DIAGRAM OF MANAGERIAL WORK INPUTS AND
MEASUREMENT FEEDBACK
As such
"safety is no more likely to be accomplished than any of industry's
responsibilities, if the hierarchical chain does not activate it as well".
For this reason it appears especially important for the safety performance measurement to be
responsive to managerial measurement requirements. This suggests that the measurement
technique should assist, in its area of application, the fulfilment of the steps which generally
comprise the work of management. Thus in the above diagram of inputs to managerial work, it is
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seen that the manager plans the accomplishment of his objectives, organise to achieve his plans, co-
ordinates the workings of his organisation, and then measures its progress providing thereby a loop
which enables optimisation according to the sensitivity, clarity, reliability and validity of the
measure's feedback. "This is the means of control" (Drucker, 1954). Drucker declares that "The
measurement used determines what one pays attention to". It seems therefore that the measure
should deal clearly with what it is that is essential to the performance objectives. However, various
studies indicate the universal agreement that measures of safety performance customarily have
been "accident-rate" yardsticks, probably on the supposition that numerical differences in accident
tabulations, over periods of time, mirror the relative intensity of safety programmes (Hale and Hale,
1970; Tarrants W, 1970; Blumenthal M, 1970; Grimaldi J, 1970). Jacobs (1970) summarises the
purposes or objectives of safety performance measurement as follows:
a) Evaluating the relative "levels of safety" of various activities or operations as a
basis for:
measuring the relative effectiveness of safety management practice;
determining the level of remedial effort to be applied;
allowing effort between competing (for attention) operations.
b) Evaluating overtime, the degree of progress or regression in the specific hazardous
situations, as a basis for:
appraising progress in safety management effectiveness;
determining changes in the type or level of remedial effort being applied;
assessing the cost/effectiveness relationship of alternative counter-measure
systems.
Jacobs (1970) conclusion was that
"the ultimate object of measurement is not "accidents", rather, it is some intrinsic
property which might be thought of as "safety expectation", which depending
upon the generally strong role of chance, governs the probability of occurrence of
any given number and severity of human accidents during some specific future
time interval or some particular amount of human exposure".
This property is, of course, not directly measurable, but must be inferred from the measurement of
other attributes or events which are observable - including, but not necessarily limited to, current
accident rates.
Measurement of safety performance must measure only those attributes which relate to the specific
occurrences which it intends to control. A useful and efficient scheme will hence seek to cover
only those occurrences which are the subject of particular control interest.
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While many authors on safety performance measures may profess different approaches to the
problem of human accidents, nevertheless, they are agreed on a single common ground, which is,
"that safety performance measures depend on accidents to occur before they can be calculated".
Recognising this common ground, most current approaches to safety performance measurement
being used in industry rely on:
a) the use of available historical data; for example, accident data, accident cost,
accident frequency rates, severity rates, etc, and secondly;
b) the use of indirect indices based on the occurrence of events which are believed to
be related to the causes of accidents, and which are statistically much more
frequent in their occurrence.
For this study, a similar criterion was followed. However, the approach and data considered for
use in the determination of safety performance measurement was derived from tabulations and
calculations deducted from data representing cumulative rating of some chosen items which bear
upon accident/damage factors. Such factors were those identified by the research sample and
population, and which are contained in the four purposely designed questionnaires for the purpose
of this study. These factors or items were those identified in the pilot study, and which were then
applied to the questionnaires used in the cross-sectional studies. The questionnaires have been
designed in accordance with Likert - five-point scales, and arranged likewise to take account of the
most repeated items by the pilot population, as indicative of accident-producing factors. An
evaluation of these factors based on the Likert principle of data ordering, forms the basis of the
human behaviour and environmental sampling. From this, an analysis of such data determines the
level of safety performance measurement in the form of an index or indices. For this study
therefore, this comparative index would form the measurement of safety performance of the sample
population.
3.12 METHOD  F ANALYSIS TO TEST HEOTYP HESI
3.12.1 Previous Research
One of the most noticeable features of the models reviewed above, is that despite specific
differences in their general aims, their general methods still show some similarities. For example,
in all the models, instruments were devised to identify the meanings which people attached to
hazards, or safety behaviours. To a large degree, the instruments specifically measured people's
perceptions of hazards, or safety behaviours.
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As such, it is not totally unexpected that these models and their instruments of measurements, show
similarities. All the instruments reviewed were based on a classification of two broad types of
components. Firstly, respondents in the form of questionnaires, or structured interviews.
Secondly, they all included a series of scales which respondents used in order to rate the items of
hazards or potential safety behaviour. Resulting from the detailed literature reviewed, it was
apparent that similar components or instruments would be adequate for this study. The method
chosen for analysis is therefore similar to those applied in the models reviewed in this study.
Whilst all the instruments were similar, there were however some important differences between
them. Differences between instruments only stemmed from mainly the way in which these were
assembled. In the main, Goland, and Burton (1969) used a 'semantic differential test' for which
hazards and scales were provided by the researchers; Green and Brown (1976a) used a 'repertory
grid' for which the researchers supplied the list of hazards; respondents themselves provided the
criteria which they subsequently used to rate the hazards. Champion (1977) also used a form of
'repertory grid' where criteria or scales were elicited during a series of pilot studies, and supplied to
the original respondents in order for them to rate the hazards on these scales.
Considering the above, it would have been logical to apply a 'repertory grid' format for this study.
But as discussed in 3.6 above, the "Liked Scale" was chosen instead as more suitable instrument of
measurement. The reasons for this choice of instrument can be found in Section 3.6.4 above.
Also, Dr Leather (1987) on a study similar to the current study, had considered the 'Likert Scale' a
more suitable and 'easy-to-administer scale' for measuring and analysing attitude studies, for similar
reasons stated in Section 3.11 above, in this Chapter.
3.13
	 Possible Analytical Approaches
Direct observations carried out on a number of individuals over a predetermined number of
selected variables is the first step in the traditional multivariate analysis. The second step is the
choice of appropriate instruments or techniques, determined by the purpose of the analysis, and the
type(s) of data; the purpose of the analysis being to reduce the large volume of variables initially
considered, thereby revealing a latent structure for detailed scrutiny. This is achieved by
identifying which of the originally considered variables or a combination of them, can be utilised as
true representation of the initial large volume of variables derived from the collected data. Such
data encompasses both general variance and total variance in the forms of principal components
analysis, cluster analysis, multi-dimensional scaling, factor analysis, item analysis, and discriminate
analysis.
Exceptions of cluster analysis and multi-dimensional scaling aside, all the above instruments
require to operate on a priori classification of the original data. The data for this study has been
derived from the respondents' replies given in the structured questionnaire administered to them on
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site. The questionnaire is arranged on a five-point "Likert-scale" instrument as generally used for
such studies. Such material can therefore be analysed using cluster analysis, multi-dimensional
scaling or item-analysis - these being appropriate instruments for attitudinal data analysis, for
example, Henerson et al (1978), Saad, (1985), Vant, (1986).
3.13.1 Cluster Analysis
The purpose of Cluster Analysis is to group items (individuals or variables) which are highly
similar in terms of likeness. The similarity of items is a composite, calculated from measurements
on a set of variables (like-to-like) for each of the items being clustered or grouped. The application
of cluster analysis encompasses two distinct phases, with regards to:
(a) the identification of appropriate measures of similarity, mostly referred to as a similarity
coefficient, and,
(b) the most suitable method of clustering.
However, the identification of suitable applications for cluster analysis is not often as straight
forward as widely propagated. For example, Alexander and Blashfield, (1984) pointed out that
while classification is a fundamental stage or step in the process of scientific measurement or
ordering, different sciences have differing problems that demand different solutions, and varying
degrees of enquiry. As a result, it is not surprising that cluster analysis which is described as an
objective means of classification, has taken many forms and definitions.
Whilst cluster analysis is a very valid and useful analytical instrument, its goal is to identify
homogeneous groups or clusters. Therefore, it is suitable for data collected, for example, from
unstructured questionnaires, or mainly from open-ended questions as used by Vant (1986). For
data collected through use of open-ended, unstructured questionnaires, cluster analysis can be used
to identify groups. When used for such cases, three basic questions need to be answered, for
example:
(a) Which variables will serve as the basis for cluster formation?
(b) How will the distance between cases be measured? and
(c) What criteria will be used for combining cases into clusters?
The decisions arising from answers to these questions determines the use of cluster analysis, since
the selection of variables to include in such an analysis is always crucial to its outcome.
For this study, the Likert Scale as an instrument determines the categorisation ratios from 1-5, and
therefore does not need any form of group identification, since this criteria is controlled by the
instrument itself. Also, the groupings from the 'Likert' Scale is based on individual items, readily
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classified according to the ordering of the strength of feelings or opinions (attitudes) of the
respondent. Cluster analysis, was therefore discounted as an instrument of analysis for this study
for the reasons given above.
3.13.2 Multi-Dimensional Scaling
The application of cluster analysis to the readily ordered data, as described in 4.2.2 above was
discounted.
Also, statistical analysis by the use of the technique of multi-dimensional scaling to the attitude
survey data was discussed as the research design stage. Its objective was that of obtaining a
perceptual map(s) as a means of gaining a comparison between the prediction classification
discussed in the literature reviewed in Chapter Two, and the views/opinions of the research
constructs (respondents) to the questionnaires.
Multi-dimensional scaling technique attempts to represent the similarities between items or things
geometrically, in what is generally described as a perceptual or special map. Carroll and Arbie,
(1980) have described two ways of defining multi-dimensional scaling. According to the more
general of the two definitions, multi-dimensional scaling means a set of techniques for estimating
parameters in geometric models so as to obtain a true representation of the structure of data under
consideration for analysis. Such a definition would totally encompass both cluster analysis and
factor analysis. Nevertheless, these techniques generally, are considered as alternatives, and more
acceptable definitions are given as:
(a) a set of statistical techniques for estimating the parameters in assessing the best fit of
various spatial distance models for proximity or performance data, and
(b) the co-ordinated representations of stimulus structure that results from such statistical
techniques (Davidson, 1984).
Multi-dimensional scaling differs on several criteria. The most common models apply to
symmetric proximity data; measurements are defined over pairs of objects that quantify the
degrees to which the two objects are similar. Correlation coefficients and joint probabilities are
two examples of proximity data. A proximity measurement may be called a measure of similarity
or dissimilarity, dependent upon whether the highest scores correspond to pairs that are most or
least similar. In contrast to models for symmetric, proximity data are models for preference data.
The data constitutes measurements defined over pairs consisting of a stimulus and a subject. Each
measurement quantifies a subject's attraction to, or liking for, the stimulus object.
Despite the above, the type of measurement of a subject's similarity or attraction to, or liking for the
stimulus object, will depend upon what form or type of multi-dimensional scaling technique is
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applicable. In the main, there are four basic types of techniques, these are:
(a) fully metric;
(b) fully non-metric;
(c) non-metric, and
(d) individual difference multi-dimensional scaling.
Each differs according to the kind of input data and output information used. Fully metric methods
have metric input (interval or ratio scales data), and metric output, while fully non-metric methods
have ordinal output and generate ranked output. The non-metric methods generate metric output
from ordinal input (Church Jr, 1983 and Schiffman, Reynolds and Young, 1981).
Individual differences scaling, allows for differences in individual perception; basically these
solutions contain, in addition to stimulus co-ordinates, a measure of how significant each
dimension is to the perceptions of each subject/respondent.
Because of the various differences in the technique of multi-dimensional scaling, it was decided
that detailed multi-dimensional scaling techniques be curtailed for this study. Instead, it was
decided to follow advice from the Department of Mathematics and Psychology in Brunel
University, and to expose the data for this study to the statistical techniques of item-analysis based
on percentage tally, and correlation coefficient, a branch of multi-dimensional scaling, since the
data was based on a Likert Scale of the ratio-type ranging from 0-5.
One of the main criteria for choosing this method of analysis is that attitudinal scalings, particularly
the Likert-type scaling is a ratio scale, whilst other scaling, including linear regression analysis are
predominantly ordinal scales. Item-analysis is therefore most suitable for attitudinal scaling.
3.13.3 Item Analysis
Measurement is the assignment of numbers or codes to observations. Levels of measurement are
distinguished by ordering and distance properties.
The traditional classification of levels of measurements into nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio
scales was developed by Stevens (1946), as described in Norusis/Spss Inc, (1988). This remains
the basic typology and is the one used in most texts of analysis.
In these measurement texts, statistical techniques of item analysis are described for making
comparisons between how respondents performed on individual items and how they scored on the
instrument as a whole.
The purpose of doing an item analysis is to select from a pool of items the ones that most
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effectively obtain the information wanted, and to eliminate the less effective items from the
designed instruments of measurement.
Item analysis is performed by analysing each statement in the "Likert Scale" according to how high
and how low scores responded to the statements. The scores could be expressed in percentage
scores or numbers (frequency) scores, or both (Henderson, Morris & Fitz-Gibbon (1978).
For this study, a combination of percentage scores has been utilised, to display the responses for
'Historical' data, and the correlation coefficients and chi-square test of significance were used for
the initial univariate analysis. Minitab statistical package was used for performing all the univariate
and bivariate staistical analyses. Further multivariate analysis was then performed as a result of
limitations found to be inherent in the univariate and bivariate analytical approaches. Details of the
multivariate analysis are described under further analysis in paragraph 4.8 in Chapter 4 below.
3.13.4 The Scope of the Survey
The attitudinal survey was conducted by means of the "Likert-type" questionnaire instrument,
administered to the employees of ten co-operating construction companies. All the companies in
the sample were operating in general building and civil engineering construction operations
throughout Great Britain. Most had international experience.
The employees within the sample were all currently engaged in the construction process at the time
of the survey, and were directly employed by the companies in the study in various categories of
trades/craft, and professional positions (see Tables 4.3, and other tables in the Appendix).
The methodology consisted of the use of literative reviews, interviews and questionnaires, to
sample a cross-section of opinion in the construction industry, ranging from those operatives, to
management, including some top management. It is believed that the attitudes and commitment of
operatives and management towards safety, is a major influence on safety performance in the
construction industry, hence their inclusion in the study.
The extent of the ranges of age, company size, individual and company experience, as well as the
several factors covered within the research model (Chapter Three), are taken into account in the
detailed analysis discussed below.
The views of Erdos (1970), Korn Hauser and Steatsley, (1959), Payne, (1951) and the "Survey
Control Unit, Central Statistics Office", London, UK, (1975), were taken as guidelines for the
evaluation of material detailed in the questionnaires, and are as follows:
(a)	 Is the question necessary?
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(b) Is the question repetitious?
(c) Can the answer to the question be obtained more easily by any other means, eg. by simple
observation or from existing records?
(d) Does the question contain more than one meaning or idea, that is, does it constitute a
'double-barrelled' question, and likely to lead to a confused answer?
(e) Is the question adequate as it stands, or should complementary questions be asked as a
follow-up?
(f) Can the respondent answer the question, it, is it simple, or geared to his/her level of
understanding?
(g) Will the question embarrass the respondent?
(h) Is the question clear and precise enough to present the same meaning to all in the sample?
(i) Would a memory-jogger help?
(k)	 Is the question too indirect?
(m) Should precoded answers be given in an endeavour to yield more accurate answers than
open-ended questions?
(n) Is the questionnaire susceptible to an order effect?
(o) Can the items be arranged so that particular answers preclude the need to answer others?
(P)
	
Is an item likely to cause bias to those following it?
(c1)	 Does the sequence maintain interest or motivation?
(r) Is the opening or introduction to the questionnaire appropriate?
(s) Is the question simple enough to enable the respondent to read and understand the
question(s)?
(t) Is the length or size of the questionnaire such that it does not become an inconvenience to
the respondent etc?
3.13.5 The Questionnaire Design
The questionnaire designed and administered, is shown in Appendix Section A-D. Bearing in mind
the findings of other past researches, Khan and Cannell (1957), Burch (1982), Sawacha (1982) and
Dr Leather (1983), care was taken to try out the selected questions by carrying out an exploratory
(pilot) survey on operatives, managers and safety advisers/directors in five companies in the
sample. The pilot questionnaires were also posted to twenty company personnel managers for
comments (including the five in the pilot study).
The survey was conducted within the site environment so as to bring reality to bear upon the
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research, and to accommodate environmental (external) influences, and constraints, which
workplace is known to have upon subjects and safety performance (Surry, 1969; Hale et al, 1972).
Environmental factors are defined as:
'problems caused by external influences and constraints, which include the
following:
(a) weather conditions;
(b) seasonality of employment, and mobility of employees;
(c) the working environment (sites), and political influences (Surry, 1969; Hale and
Hale, 1972; Thompson, 1967, Dill, 1958; and Dr Leather, 1983)."
Assistance given by the companies concerned in carrying out a survey of an exploratory nature on
their employees and their workplace (sites), proved most valuable to the research design and final
outcome.
Aware that questionnaires administered on individuals at their workplace or employment tend to
yield a better response rate, Alluto, (1970); Carnegie, (1976)), the exploratory questionnaires were
administered direct to the employees on site. This arrangement was previously agreed between the
writer and the personnel managers, safety advisers and the site managers of the contributing
companies. The questionnaires were collected immediately on completion by the respondents. No
influence was brought to bear upon the respondents by the writer, or company managers either
before, during or after the completion of the questionnaires. Discussions then took place between
the writer, site managers, safety officers and the respondents. This was to avail the opportunity of
an on-the-spot feedback about the questionnaire design. This feedback proved to be a great
contribution to the shape, content, and design of the final questionnaires as contained in
Appendices A - D hereto.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Research Analysis and the Interpretation of the Results
CHAPTER FOUR
4.0	 THE RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
RESULTS 
Purpose of the Analysis
The purpose of the analysis is to compare the predictive classifications described in chapters 2 and
3 previously, with the opinions of the respondents (constructs) to the questionnaires. These
predictive classifications are based upon findings from previous research and literature examined
for this research (see chapters 2 and 3).
The structure of analysis took the following stages:
1. Initial analysis (correlation)
2. Further analysis (multivariate analysis)
3. Comparison of safety behaviour! characteristics of the research constructs (subjects).
4.1	 Initial Analysis (Correlation)
The initial analysis correlated the attitude data of the operative sample with the safety performance
factors (accident experience) of the operatives. Details of the analytical steps are described in
paragraph 4.4.
4.2	 Further Analysis (Multivariate)
This analysis is an extension of the initial analysis described above. The aim of this analysis was to
subject the operative data of attitudes and performance to multivariate analysis in order to
strengthen the correlation analysis described in section 4.4. The end point of this analysis is an
attempt to identify primary (dominant) variables which were strongly correlated with safety
performance, and secondary variables which were loosely or uncorrelated to safety performance.
To achieve the above aim, the data was subjected to the following multivariate analysis processes
using SPSS:
(a) Factor Analysis;
(b) Multiple Regression Analysis.
The results of this analysis are discussed below.
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43	 Comparison of Safety Behaviour of Operatives and Managers
This process of analysis followed a similar approach as the initial analysis described in section 4.1.
Data was correlated, and significance was tested using chi-square analysis as contained in
MINITAB.
The main aim of this analysis was to ascertain any similarities or non-similarities amongst the
operative and site manager safety behaviours, and those of site manager and contract/safety
managers.
The results of this analysis are discussed below in this chapter and chapter 5.
4.4	 The Analysis and Results - Initial Analysis
After reviewing various possible analytical approaches as discussed in Sections 3,14-1<ve, "Item
Analysis" was chosen as an instrument for data analysis (described in 4.2.4 above). This
instrument displays the statistical analysis of the questionnaire responses according to individual
items or statements contained in the questionnaire. The details of each analysis show the results
according to its frequency distribution and percentage scores per item. This process reduces the
data by eliminating the less desirable items from the designed instrument of data collection, in this
case, the "Likert-type" scale. Following this process of elimination, the coefficient of correlation
and chi-square test of the most effective items was then calculated to test the hypothesis of the
research for association validity and reliability of the calculated outcome (results).
The research analysis followed the following stages:
(a) Completed questionnaires were coded manually on receipt from the respondent companies.
(b) Data from the survey was then manually inputted on-line, into the computer mainframe in
Brunel Computer Centre.
(c) A spreadsheet of each group (category) of the five sets of questionnaires were then
produced and inspected to eliminate any errors or missing items.
(d) Data from the 356 subjects or sample population were then analysed and evaluated, using
statistical techniques with the assistance of a statistical computing package called
'MINITAB', running on the mainframe computer housed in the Computer Centre within the
campus of Brunel University.
This system was utilised for the data analysis mainly because data already stored within the
mainframe system could be accessed interactively, using either MINITAB Statistical
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package or the SPSS package.
In summary, this section analyses the relationships between different variables (in the nature of
"Behavioural" and environmental factors), and Safety Performance factors (accidents), of
operatives within the elements of the research model (Ref: Fig 3.7).
It also compares the patterns of behaviour (attitude) factors (variables) between operatives and site
management on the one hand and site management, contract managers, and safety officers/advisers
as derived from the research data; and notes whether differences exist between their responses to
the behavioural and environmental variables as detailed in the research model, sub-hypothesis, and
null-hypothesis.
The central hypothesis is divided into sub-hypothesis, which is in turn separated into null-
hypothesis (of no significance or no relationship/association), to allow the use of the statistical
tests. The main statistics used are the percentage frequency for the "Historical" factors (variables)
and for other variables, the correlation coefficients and the chi-square test of significance. The
significance level is derived from the statistical tables, and the null-hypothesis was rejected having
a significance of P=0.05 and under (see Statistical Tables by Murdock and Barnes (1979), second
edition).
However, some relationships may show high correlation but were not considered conclusive
because when subjected to the chi-square test, they suggested that 'chance' may have played some
part in such relationships.
4.5	 THE CENTRAL HYPOTHESIS
SAFETY PERFORMANCE IS A FUNCTION OF OPERATIVE'S AND MANAGEMENT
ATTITUDES IN RESPECT OF BEHAVIOURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
(VARIABLES) TN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY.
4.5.1	 Sub-hypotheses 1: 
CI = SAFETY PERFORMANCE IS A FUNCTION OF OPERATIVE PERSONAL HISTORICAL
FACTORS (VARIABLES) IN RESPECT OF: AGE, EXPERIENCE, TRADE OR OCCUPATION
AND TRAINING (Cl)
Null-hypotheses 1.1: 
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGE, EXPERIENCE, TRADE OR OCCUPATION
TRAINING AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
The literature reviewed for the study showed that the most significant factors of all accident causes
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relate to the age and experience of the worker. Vernon (1944) states that usually the two factors are
so closely bound together that it is impossible to disentangle them.
The operative sample shows the most active age groups in the industry to be between 21 years and
45 years (see Table 4.5a). This fact is quite significant in that the nature of work and environment
demand very good health in the operative, toughness for the conditions that exist in the industry, a
high activity level and the need for a 'macho' image (Carnegie (1978), Pirani (1975), Shimmin
(1976). Over 76 percent of the sampled population were between the ages of 21 and 45 years.
Churns (1968) contends that as ageing is a slow process, one can adjust to one's continually
changing powers. Therefore, whilst one may continue to undertake the same work as one did when
one was younger, one tends to do it in a different way. Thus, because of this ability to adjust, one
can continue with a highly skilled activity which makes considerable demands on the perceptual
and central mechanism well beyond the age at which we could ever hope to acquire such a skill
from start.
Classification.Age Row Frequency Count Percentage Score
(a)	 Under 21 Years 1 4 3.71
(b)	 21 - 25 2 25 19.84
(c)	 26 - 30 3 17 13.49
(d)	 31 - 35 4 19 15.08
(e)	 36 - 40 5 19 15.08
(0	 41 - 45 6 15 11.90
(g)	 46 - 51 7 7 5.56
(h)	 51 -55 8 10 7.94
(i)	 56 - 60 9 7 5.56
, w	 61 years and over 10 3 2.38
TOTAL (N) = 126 100%
Table 4.5a	 Q.7. Age Factors / Category
Schulzinger (1956) demonstrated that accidents are most frequent in the age range seventeen (17)
to twenty-eight (28) and that they decline steadily after that to reach a low point in the late fifties
(50s) and sixties (60s). Furthermore, the tendency for individuals to experience more frequent
injuries during their early years in the labour force, is one of the most consistent findings in the
accident or safety field (Haddon, Suchman and Kline (1964)).
It has been shown by Grew (1958) that there are many jobs that are by tradition, the preserve of the
young, and that when older workers are engaged in these jobs, they tend to be regarded as
particularly prone to accidents. Grew stated that older men are unable to meet the demands of such
job types, unless they are modified to match their capabilities. Vant (1986) suggests that:
109
"the age group 26-30 years (irrespective of background) are the happiest with
physical aspects; this is not true of the under 25s who quibble about most things.
However, taken as a whole, younger people (all under 30) had more grievances in
general than older people (31+) for whom the physical aspects were beginning to
become relatively more demanding vis-s-vis any other factor".
Similarly in construction (as far as these research interviews are concerned), those under 30 years
old complained more about the general conditions of their work and its environment than their
older counterparts (46 years or older), for whom the physical conditions of construction were
viewed by many as requiring energy rather than technique or flair.
Pertaining to operative experience of individual companies, about nine percent (9%) of the sample
had remained with their companies for less than one year. On the whole, people tend to stay with
one company on an average from one to ten years before moving on (Table 4.5b). Forty-four
percent (44%) were with their companies from one to five years, whilst only twenty-three percent
(23%) had stayed with one company from between six to ten years on average (Table 4.5b). Those
staying with one company for up to a period between twenty-six and over forty-one years
constitute less than five percent (5%).
COMPANY SERVICE FACTORS:
Classification
Row Frequency Count Percentage Score
(a)	 Less than 1 year 1 11 8.73
(b)	 1 - 5 years 2 55 43.65
(c)	 6 - 10 years 3 29 23.02
(d)	 11 - 15 years 4 10 7.94
(e)	 16 - 20 years 5 12 9.52
(f)	 21 - 25 years 6 5 3.97
(g) 26 - 30 years 7 1 0.79
(h)	 31 - 35 years 8 2 1.59
(i)	 36 - 40 years 9 - -
(j)	 41 years and over 10 1 0.79
TOTAL (N) = 126 100%
Table 4.5b	 How long have you worked for this company?
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Whilst the above indicates a high mobility level between companies, most construction workers
liked to remain within the construction industry (Table 4.5b). Mobility of construction workers
seems to be within the industry itself rather than movement from it to a completely new industry.
Over ninety-two percent (92%) of the sample had moved from one company to the other, but had
remained in the industry for between one to forty-one years (Table 4.5b, 4.5c). The industry
maintains therefore a more or less stable workforce.
The rapid turnover of workers from company to company however, has a degree of implication for
safety training and standardisation of safety procedures and performance audit which varies from
one company to another. A preferred remedy would be to either standardise safety procedures and
customs across companies, or to regulate training and retraining through induction each time a
person moved from one company to another. The current practice seems to be an assumption that
everyone who spent a year or so in the industry has received health and safety training sufficient to
work anywhere in the industry (operative interviews). Compulsory safety induction on movement
from one company to another, would hence ensure consistency, and also acclimatisation to new
methods and the safety environments obtained in an organisation.
This finding confirms the association between age, experience, occupation/trade, training and
safety performance, and a rejection of the null-hypothesis that there is no relationship between age,
experience etc., and safety performance in the construction industry.
4.5.1	 (a)	 Conclusion of Sub-Hypothesis 1: 
SAFETY PERFORMANCE IS A FUNCTION OF OPERATIVE PERSONAL
HISTORICAL VARIABLES: AGE AND EXPERIENCE; TRADE / OCCUPATION
AND TRAINING = C3 vs. C10.
The review of past researches on accidents and safety has shown that most of the assumed
ingredients of operative personal historical variables do have a strong association with safety
performance (accident causation), and hence supports the hypothesis. The research interviews with
operatives and site management also supports the hypothesis, and rejects the null-hypothesis of no
association. The most significant contribution has been age and experience, occupation and safety
training.
4.5.2	 Sub-Hypothesis 2: 
SAFETY PERFORMANCE IS A FUNCTION OF ECONOMIC VARIABLES (C10
vs. C4)
Null-Hypothesis 2.1: 
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PAYING OPERATIVES 'DANGER
MONEY' AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
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A strong correlation was indicated between safety performance and paying operatives 'danger
money' (see chi-square test results, and correlation coefficient, significant at P=0.001 and null-
hypothesis rejected (Tables 4.6, Appendix K). This result shows that sites or tasks where operatives
are paid 'danger money' are likely to have higher safety performance levels than those that do not
pay it as an incentive.
The research interviews with operatives and management also indicate that 'danger money' was
perceived as a payment or incentive to take risks, and should be discouraged as a reward system or
policy.
It is also very interesting to note the view that Union Stewards should negotiate the payment of a
percentage 'danger money' for high-risk jobs was supported strongly by 26 percent of operatives
and rejected by 56 percent, and 18 percent had no view either way. The results however further
showed that only eight percent of companies paid 'danger money'.
Null-Hypothesis 2.2: 
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY PERFORMANCE AND
BANKSMAN TRAINING.
The statistical analysis showed support to the null-hypothesis that there is no relationship between
safety performance and Banksman Training (see results of chi-square test at 6.93; p < 0.05). In
other words, it is not highly important to train Banksmen but it is necessary to do so to get the job
done.
Nevertheless, 39 percent of the operatives sample felt that Banksmen should be better trained than
is currently the case in the building industry to ensure improved safety operations where Banksmen
are involved on the site. Only 27 percent disagreed.
Null-Hypothesis 2.3: 
THERE IS NO ASSOCIATION BETWEEN 'BONUS PAYMENTS' AND SAFETY
PERFORMANCE.
Statistical evidence showed that the null hypothesis can be rejected, as a strong correlation was
found between 'bonus payments' as a productivity incentive and safety performance (see chi-square
test results and correlation coefficient which showed significant at p<0.001). The explanation for
this result might be that making bonus payments is not necessarily in opposition to the aims of
safety performance - rather it could be seen as the linkage between productivity performance. This
in itself could encourage the worker to increase his/her normal work tempo to a level which would
influence safety performance.
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The results of data analysis also indicate linkage between bonus payments and superior behaviour
towards safety procedures (see results of chi-square test for psychological variables above and in
Tables in Appendix K) (significant at p<0.001).
Null Hypothesis 2.4; 
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 'SAFETY BONUS' PAYMENTS AND
SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Statistical analysis of the research data showed evidence strong enough to reject the null hypothesis
(see chi-square test and correlation coefficient), and an association exists between paying 'safety
bonus' and improved safety performance (significant at p<0.001; see tables).
The above association means that operatives can be induced to work more safely without
necessarily risking productivity by paying them a safety-related payment as an incentive to adhere
to safety procedures, rules and safety policy. The explanation might be that 'safety bonus'
payments to operatives promotes safety awareness, which means that operatives think 'safety'
when paid extra to do so, and therefore take fewer risks in order to achieve an accident-free record.
Results of item analysis also showed that 63 percent of the operative sample believed that safety
bonus discourages risk-taking behaviour and is highly significant in influencing a reduction of
'chance-taking' by operatives on site. An added explanation for this association might be that since
they had nothing to lose by working safely - as in the case of productivity-related bonuses - they
had to ensure that they safeguarded their accident-free record, thereby earning a financial reward.
The finding was therefore that 'safety bonuses' enhanced safety management on site.
Null Hypothesis 2.5:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 'RISK-TAKING' AND SAFETY
PERFORMANCE.
Chi-square test and correlation coefficient showed a highly significant association between
risk-taking and safety performance levels on site (significant at p< 0.001, see tables). That means
the higher the level of risk-taking , the poorer the safety performance level, and the lower the level
of risk-taking, the lower the level of safety performance.
This finding is logical since as indicated by Null Hypothesis 2.4 above, safety bonus payments
reduced risk-taking and hence improved safety performance levels and assisted site management in
achieving better self regulation by the workforce under their control.
Although 72 percent of the operative sample believed that some level of risk-taking is inevitable in
the job as part of individual self motivation, they suggested that the occasional chance-taking,
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particularly when the supervisor was not looking, was considered as part of the job itself. A similar
conclusion was reached by Leather (1983).
Operatives and management interviews showed that the workforce felt safer and happier working
with site managers on contracts where safety bonuses were part of the incentive scheme policy.
They also perceived companies that implemented safety bonus schemes as more caring about their
personal welfare amongst other things.
Null Hypothesis 2.6:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRODUCTIVITY/ SAFE-WORKING AND
SAFETY PERFORMANCE
Chi-square test and correlation coefficient results concluded that a strong association exists
between productivity/safe working and safety performance (significant at p=0.001, null hypothesis
can be rejected). That is, high productivity performance and safe-working can be achieved in
parallel with good safety performance overall.
The general opinion held by 82 percent of the operative sample had equated good productivity
schemes with good safety practice on site. Operatives and site managers believed that productivity
in general and safe working ought to go hand-in-hand in safety management.
This outcome may explain the result of data analysis which indicates that close association exists
between productivity bonus payments and safety bonuses and safety performance. It suggests that
for good safety performance, productivity schemes must make allowance for safe working
procedures and practices. In other words, there is a need to strike a happy medium between
promoting incentive schemes and attaining good safety performance levels in the construction
industry.
4 5.2 (a) Conclusion of Sub-Hypothesis 2:
SAFETY PERFORMANCE IS A FUNCTION OF ECONOMIC FACTORS
(VARIABLES) (c10 = C4).
Statistical tests showed a very strong correlation between safety performance levels and all the
assumed ingredients of the economic variables, which leads to the conclusion that safety
performance is a function of economic variables and the strongest contribution resulting from
overall good designs of safety productivity schemes. For example, non-payment of 'danger money',
good safety training, productivity or reward systems designed to discourage risk- or chance-taking,
with increased productivity performance, and ultimately good or effective safety/site supervision.
All the other selected variables did have a correlation but to a lesser degree. No significant
correlation existed between training of Banksmen and safety performance levels.
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Economic Versus Safety Performance Variables - Test of Significance for Operatives
Data : C4 versus C10
Danger
Money
Banksmen
Training
Bonus Safety
Bonus
Risk -
Taking
Productivity
Pay
Safety
performance
p=0.001
sign
p=0.05
not sign
p=0.001
sign
p=0.001
sign
p=0.001
sign
p=0.001
sign
TABLE 4.5.2(a):	 LEVEL OF ASSOCIATION (TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE -
ECONOMIC VARIABLES)
4.5.3. Sub-Hypothesis 3:
C 1 = SAFETY PERFORMANCE IS A FUNCTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
(VARIABLES) C10 vs. CS.
Null-Hypothesis 3.1:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CARE FOR PERSONAL SAFETY ON
SITE AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Site-based operatives who were most exposed to safety hazards were the main source for this data
as it was hoped to establish the practical views of these operatives regarding their perception of
their own personal safety on site and its assumed effect or the level of safety performance
(accidents).
The statistical analysis of the data showed a significant association between the individual care for
personal safety and safety performance; significant at p=0.001 (see results of chi-square test and
correlation coefficient in Table shown in Appendix K). In other words, the higher personal care
for safety shown by the individual, the higher the level of safety awareness of the individual. Also,
the higher the compliance with Company Safety Procedures and policy, the lower the level of
safety performance achieved by the individual operative. Most operatives considered their personal
safety as the single most important factor in their work (94 percent of operative sample results).
Similarly, safety awareness by the individual and the group, is seen by site managers as an
influential factor in accident reduction in the construction industry. This was the view of 96 percent
of site managers interviewed during the research.
A logical explanation for this finding may be that the more safety aware a person is, the more effort
is made by that person to avoid accidents, by taking more safety precautions, playing by the
[safety] rules and, hence reducing the chances of an accident occurring to him/her.
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Null-hypothesis 3.2:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CARE FOR WORKMATES' SAFETY
AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Statistical analysis of the data supported the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between
care for workmates' safety and safety performance (see results of chi-square test and correlation
coefficient, p=0.100 not significant in table 4.22 in Appendix K).
Construction work is generally a team/group activity, and the well-being of members of the
team/group would be seen as essential to the morale of the team and good performance.
As a result of the above, it is surprising that the statistical analysis of the data should support the
null hypothesis. The explanation may be that the individual concentration on personal safety is
more powerful than group or team safety. However, it is reasonable to assert that individual care
for personal safety will enhance the group/ team safety performance in a job/site situation.
Null-Hypothesis 3.3:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE OF THE 'HEALTH AND
SAFETY ACT (1974) AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Statistical tests showed a very strong correlation between knowledge of the 1974 Health and Safety
Act and safety performance, and therefore reject the null-hypothesis that there is no relationship
between knowledge of the 1974 etc. Act and safety performance.
It is interesting to note that 61 percent of the operative sample perceived knowledge of the Act to
be a highly significant source for the creation of safety awareness in the construction industry and
55 percent of the sample had heard of the Act through their Trade Unions (Sawacha and Langford,
1986).
Null-hypothesis 3.4:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY TRAINING AND SAFETY
PERFORMANCE.
Statistical analysis of the results indicated a mixed result for the null-hypothesis. For example, the
correlation analysis showed a moderate support for the null-hypothesis. However, when subjected
to a chi-square test, the result rejected the null-hypothesis (see Table 4.25 in Appendix K).
A possible explanation for this outcome may be the operatives' view, expressed during interviews,
that training and experience must go hand-in-hand for any influence to be exerted upon working
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practices and safety performance.
Interview results showed that operatives saw safety and skills training and experience as the most
important factors of influence on safety performance, on site and in the industry as a whole.
Whilst 86 percent considered safety training as the single most significant source of influence upon
safe working, 60 percent (63%) thought experience in the industry and skills in construction were
important factors for accident reduction.
Null -hypothesis 3.5:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATIVE PERCEPTION OF
CONSTRUCTION AS TOUGH AND DANGEROUS, PREPAREDNESS TO TAKE
RISKS AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
The statistical analysis of the data showed a significant association between the perception of
industry 'toughness', danger, preparedness to take risks and safety performance (see results of
chi-square test and correlation coefficient in Table 4.26, Appendix K). (significant at p=0.001).
An explanation of the outcome could be that toughness perception induces 'macho' behaviour, and
hence risk-taking (see Pirani eta! 1976). The null-hypothesis is therefore rejected.
Null-hypothesis 3.6:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPERIENCE AND SKILL AND SAFETY
PERFORMANCE.
Statistical tests showed a very strong correlation between experience, skills and safety performance
of the operative (see results of chi-square test and correlation coefficient in Table 4.27 of Appendix
K). (significant at p=0.001).
Interview results indicate 63 percent of operative sample considered the possession of industry
skills and experience to be highly significant factors in the reduction of accidents on site and in the
industry generally. The above evidence therefore rejects the null-hypothesis.
Null-hypothesis 3.7:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUPERVISORS 'CAREFUL BEHAVIOUR
TOWARDS SAFETY, AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Statistical analysis of the research data showed enough evidence to reject the null-hypothesis (see
chi-square test and correlation coefficient in Table 4.28, Appendix K. significant at p=0.001), and
an association exists between careful behaviour and safety behaviour.
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The above association means that site management, including supervisors, can influence operative
safety performance by taking safety supervision seriously and showing operatives that they care
about safety on site, by example. The explanation might be that operatives seeing site managers/
supervisors take safety seriously, would decide to "toe the safety line" and because they feel that
the supervisor/site manager "means business" when he talks about safety. It would seem too that
operatives' expectations of supervisors' safety behaviour is relatively high, since they see the
supervisors' behaviour as being a great influence on their own.
Null-hypothesis 3.8:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORKMATES' CARELESS SAFETY
BEHAVIOUR AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Statistical analysis of the date supported the null-hypothesis that there is no relationship between
workmates' carelessness about safety and safety performance (see results of chi-square test and
correlation coefficient in Table 4.29, Appendix K, p=0.10 not significant). The explanation for the
above finding might be that operatives are too concerned about their own personal safety (as stated
above) to pay attention to the careless behaviour of their workmates, despite the fact that
workmates' carelessness could spell danger for their colleagues' safety.
The peer group behaviour as an influence, does not seem to have been borne out in this, as 69
percent of operatives disagreed when questioned, that their workmates' safety behaviour affected
their own behaviour. Only 21 percent felt there was the possibility of their workmates' carelessness
affecting them.
4.5.3 (a)	 Conclusion of Sub-hypothesis 3:
SAFETY PERFORMANCE IS A FUNCTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
(VARIABLES).
Statistical tests indicated a very strong correlation between safety performance and psychological
variables, and most of the assumed ingredients of the psychological variables considered. This
leads to the conclusion that safety performance is a function of psychological variables. The
strongest contributions resulting from the effect of psychological factors are shown below:
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Psychological vs. Safety Performance Variables - Test of Significance : Operatives'
Data: C5 vs. C10
Personal
Safety
Workmates
Safety
H & S Act
1974
Safety
Training
Tough's
Danger &
Risk-
taking
Experienc
e & Skills
Supervisor
Care
Workmates'
Care
Safety
Performance
p=0.001
sign
p=0.10
not sign
p=0.001
sign
p=0.01
sign
p=0.001
sign
p=0.001
sign
p=0.001
sign
p=0.10
not sign
TABLE 4.4(a):	 LEVEL OF ASSOCIATION - TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE -
PSYCHOLOGICAL VARIABLES
4.5.4 Sub-hypothesis 4: 
C 1 = SAFETY PERFORMANCE IS A FUNCTION OF TECHNICAL FACTORS
(VARIABLES) CIO vs. C6.
Null-hypothesis 4.1:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY PERFORMANCE AND
ASBESTOS HAZARD AWARENESS.
Operatives were the main source of this data since they were the most likely to be exposed to
asbestos substances on site. It was hoped to establish the operatives' views of asbestos awareness
and safety precautions in relation to asbestos risks. The statistical analysis of the data showed a
significant association between asbestos awareness and safety performance in terms of exposure to
asbestos (see results of chi-square test, and correlation coefficient in Table 4.30 of Appendix K,
significant at p=0.02), hence rejection of the null-hypothesis that there is no relationship between
asbestos awareness and safety performance (asbestos risk).
The result suggests that operative awareness of asbestos risk would lead to safety precautions being
taken to minimise the risk of exposure.
Null-hypothesis 4.2:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY PERFORMANCE AND
ASBESTOS RECOGNITION
Statistical analysis of the results showed no support for the null hypothesis that there is no
relationship between safety performance and asbestos recognition (see chi-square test results and
correlation coefficient).
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The same reasons for the rejection of this null-hypothesis can be suggested as being similar to
those for null-hypothesis 4.1 above.
Null-hypothesis 4.3:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY PERFORMANCE AND
ASBESTOS HANDLING.
The null-hypothesis was supported by the chi-square test and the correlation coefficient, and as
such, the above argument is valid (not significant, see Tables)
Null-hypothesis 4.4:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY PERFORMANCE AND
ASBESTOS INFORMATION.
Chi-square test and correlation coefficient rejects the null-hypothesis (see table - significant at
p=0.001).
Interestingly enough, most employee operatives (95 percent) of the sample showed awareness of
the harmful effects of asbestos to health in the workplace; 50 percent (55%) indicated that they
would recognise asbestos on site if they saw it, and 58 percent thought they were to blame should
they handle asbestos on site without adequate protection. However 77 percent believed that the
company had overall responsibility for the presence of asbestos within the site environment.
It is therefore not surprising that the null-hypothesis was rejected in view of the interview findings.
Null-hypothesis 4.5:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY PERFORMANCE AND PLANT/
EQUIPMENT OPERATION TRAINING.
Chi-square test and correlation coefficient supports the null-hypothesis (not significant, see Tables),
concluding that no relationship exists between safety performance and plant operation training.
The original premise was that plant operation training (particularly mobile plant) would lead to a
reduction of accidents caused by them. However, both statistical test results reject this association.
Null-hypothesis 4.6:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY PERFORMANCE AND POOR
LADDER / SCAFFOLDING USAGE ON SITE.
Seventeen percent of the operative sample had suffered accidents involving falls from scaffolding
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and ladders in spite of the fact that 79 percent indicated the usage of specialist-erected scaffolding,
well-tied ladders and regular inspections before use (see Table 4.15(b) in Appendix).
However, chi-square test and correlation coefficient rejects the null hypothesis that a relationship
exists between safety performance and poor ladder and scaffolding on site (see result of chi-square
test and correlation coefficient in Table 4.35 - significant at p=0.005).
Null-hypothesis 4.7:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY PERFORMANCE AND
ADEQUATE SCAFFOLDING INSPECTIONS ON SITE.
Chi-square test and correlation coefficient rejects the null-hypothesis (significant at p=0.001, see
Table 4.36 in Appendix K ), thus indicating association exists between safety performance and
scaffolding inspections on site.
The relevance of regular technical inspections of scaffolding and working platforms by someone
qualified, was indicated by 79 percent of the operative sample, and only 14 percent thought
specialist inspections to be unnecessary before use.
Both interview results and statistical tests therefore strongly reject the null-hypothesis that there is
no relationship between safety performance and adequate scaffolding inspections on site.
Null-hypothesis 4.8:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY PERFORMANCE,
COMMONSENSE AND BUILDING EXPERIENCE FOR SCAFFOLDING ERECTION
ON SITE.
84 percent of the operative sample did not share the belief expressed at the pilot interviews that
'only commonsense and sufficient building experience (not training)' were required to erect a safe
working platform and scaffolding structures on site. However, chi-square test and correlation
coefficient (see Table 4.37, Appendix K, significant at p=0.001) indicate that good training,
experience, as well as commonsense go hand-in-hand
The null-hypothesis that no relationship exists between safety performance and scaffolding
training, only commonsense and training, was rejected.
Null-hypothesis 4.9:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY PERFORMANCE AND
TRAINING/SKILLS FOR STEEL ERECTION.
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The opinion that no training or experience was necessary to become a steel-erector (as suggested
during site interviews) was not confirmed by the questionnaire response.
76 percent of the operative sample indicated that steel erection and scaffolding erection were a
specialist activity and that technical/specialist training, skill and experience was necessary.
Chi-square statistical test, and correlation coefficient again rejected the null-hypothesis, and the
above argument found to be invalid (see Table 4.38 in Appendix significant at p=0.01). There
seems to be a very logical relationship.
Null-hypothesis 4.10:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY PERFORMANCE AND
DUMPER DRIVING WITHOUT ADEQUATE TRAINING, ONLY COMMONSENSE.
Statistical tests and correlation coefficient supports the null hypothesis (not significant, see Tables).
A great degree of discrepancy seems to exist between the results of the statistical tests and the
general opinion expressed at the site interviews. The latter indicated that some kind of certificate
was necessary before anyone was allowed to operate or drive a dumper, or indeed any form of site
transportation vehicle. This was the view of 75 percent and the general consensus was that only
those persons who had received prior training or instruction be allowed to operate mobile and
mechanical plant/tools on any construction site in order to minimize the level of accidents caused
by site transportation etc.
The explanation for this disparity between opinion expressed and the statistical examination of the
data may be due to the difference between 'actual' experience on site and expectations of the
operative, or 'chance' playing a part in the statistical results, or both.
Null-hypothesis 4.11:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY PERFORMANCE AND PLANT
DRIVER TRAINING.
Chi-square test and correlation coefficient found an association to exist between plant driver
training and safety performance, and hence the above argument is rejected. It is logical that the
training of plant drivers should be associated with safety performance (see Tables, significant at
p=0.01).
4 5.4 (a)
	 Conclusion of Sub-hypothesis 4:
SAFETY PERFORMANCE IS A FUNCTION OF TECHNICAL FACTORS
(VARIABLES)
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Technical Factors = C6 vs. C10 = Safety Performance
Asbestos
Awareness
Asbestos
Recognition
Asbestos
Handling
Asbestos
Information
Plant
Operation
Training
Poor usage
of ladder
Safety
Performance
p=0.002
sign
p=0.001
sign
p=0.25
not sign
p=0.001
sign
p=0.75
sign
p=0.005
sign
Scaffolding
Inspection
Scaffolding
Erection &
Commonsense
Steel Erection &
Skill Training
Dumper
Driving &
Training
Plant Driver &
Training
Safety
Performance
p=0.001
sign
p=0.001
sign
p=0.01
sign
p=0.25
not sign
p=0.01
sign
TABLE 4.5e: Level of Association (Test of Significance -Technical Variables)
Since statistical tests and correlation coefficient supported only two of the eleven null-hypotheses,
and found association to exist between the compared variables in nine of them, it would be logical
to assume that safety performance is a function of technical factors or variables as proposed. It is
significant to state that the associations shown were statistically very strong indeed and as such the
association found between safety performance and technical factors (variables) examined, is
logically valid.
4.5.5. Sub-Hypothesis 5:
Cl = SAFETY PERFORMANCE IS A FUNCTION OF PROCEDURAL FACTORS
(VARIABLES) C10 vs. C7.
Null-hypothesis 5.t:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY PERFORMANCE AND
PROVISION OF SAFETY PROTECTIVE CLOTHING.
Chi-square test and correlation coefficient found an association to exist between the provision of
protective clothing and safety performance and, hence rejects the null-hypothesis (significant at
p=0.001, see Table 4.41 - Appendix K).
It is not surprising that the null-hypothesis is rejected by the statistical findings, since 91 percent of
the operatives interviewed indicated that the supply of safety protective clothing and equipment etc.
was the sole responsibility of the employer and management, and that safety protective clothing
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enhanced safety performance in the workplace.
Null-hypothesis 5.2:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORKERS' NON-USE OF PROTECTIVE
CLOTHING ETC AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Chi-square test and correlation coefficient supports the null-hypothesis (not significant, see Tables
4.42 - Appendix), concluding that there is no relationship between non-use of protective clothing
etc, and safety performance.
This result confirms the linkage between the supply of protective clothing and equipment to the
workforce, their correct usage and safety performance.
Null-hypothesis 5.3:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISSUING WORKERS' PROTECTIVE
SAFETY EQUIPMENT AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Chi-square test and correlation coefficient rejects the null-hypothesis. The Statistical analysis
instead confirms an association between issuing workers with protective safety equipment and
safety performance. The explanation for this is the same as for null-hypothesis 5.1 above.
Null-hypothesis 5.4:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY EQUIPMENT / CLOTHING
TRAINING AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Chi-square test and correlation coefficient supports the null-hypothesis (not significant, see Tables),
concluding that: there is no relationship between safety equipment etc., training and safety
performance.
Perhaps an explanation for the above may be similar to that for null hypothesis 4.10 above, i.e.,
training alone is inadequate without experience and some application of commonsense in the
process.
Null-hypothesis 5.5:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROVIDING WORKERS WITH SAFETY
PROCEDURE BOOKLETS, WITH NO SAFETY INDUCTION, AND SAFETY
PERFORMANCE.
Chi-square tests and correlation coefficient supports the null-hypothesis (not significant, see Table
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in Appendix), concluding that there is no relationship between safety procedure booklets and no
induction, and safety performance.
The explanation for this result is that induction training must precede the provision of safety
procedure booklets. What this means is that whilst it may be useful to give safety procedure
booklets to the construction worker, they are considered no substitute for safety training.
Null-hypothesis 5.6:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROVIDING WORKERS WITH SAFETY
PROCEDURE BOOKLETS DURING INDUCTION TRAINING AND SAFETY
PERFORMANCE.
Chi-square tests and correlation coefficient do not support the null-hypothesis (significant at
p=0.001, see Tables), concluding that there is a strong relationship between providing safety
booklets and training, and safety performance. This indicates that training with a safety procedure
booklet has a significant influence on operatives' safety performance.
Null-hypothesis 5.7:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY PERFORMANCE AND SAFETY
INDUCTION WITHOUT A SAFETY MANUAL ON SAFETY PROCEDURES ON AN
EMPLOYEE'S FIRST DAY ON SITE.
Chi-square test and correlation coefficient supports the null-hypothesis (not significant, see Tables),
concluding that no relationship exists between safety performance and safety induction with no
safety manual.
The same argument given above in hull-hypothesis 5.6 could be applied in this result despite the
strong correlation found in null-hypothesis 5.6 above (see Tables 4.46 in Appendix).
However, most operatives saw regular safety induction and updating of safety training - with
regular reference to the Safety Manual/Procedure Handbook on Safety - as highly essential. 89
percent thought this would ultimately lead operatives into developing positive safety awareness and
attitudes thereby leading to enhancement of safety performance.
4.5.5 (a) Conclusion of sub-hypothesis 5:
SAFETY PERFORMANCE IS A FUNCTION OF PROCEDURAL FACTORS
(VARIABLES) C7 = C10.
On the basis of percentage responses by operatives to the above suggestion, there is an
overwhelming support for the view that safety performance is a function of procedural factors
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(variables) in the construction industry (89 percent of the operative sample supported the
argument).
However, statistical analysis based on chi-square test and correlation coefficient failed to support
the sub-hypothesis.
As only three of the seven null-hypotheses subjected to critical statistical analysis rejected the
null-hypothesis, and the remaining four supported them. It is reasonable to conclude therefore that
there is only a partial correlation between the procedural variables examined and safety per-
formance (see Table below).
Procedural Variables vs. Safety Performance Variables Test of
Significance: Operative Data C7 = C10
Provision of
Protective
Safety
Clothing etc.
Non-use of
Protective
Safety
Clothing
Protective
Equipment
etc.
Familiarity
with use of
Safety
Equipment
Provide
Safety
Manual -
no manual
Safety
Manual +
Induction
Safety
Induction -
no manual
Safety
Performance
p=0.001
sign
p=0.25
not sign
p=0.001
sign
p=0.20
not sign
p=0.05
not sign
p=0.001
sign
p=0.020
not sign
TABLE 4.5f:	 LEVEL OF ASSOCIATION - TEST OF SIGNIFICANT -
PROCEDURAL VARIABLES
4.5.6 Sub-hypothesis 6:
C 1 = SAFETY PERFORMANCE IS A FUNCTION OF ORGANISATIONAL (VARIABLES)
FACTORS - C10 = C8.
Null-Hypothesis 6.1: 
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY PERFORMANCE AND
WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIPS ON SITE.
Like most human relationships, workers and management site relationships were assumed to have
some influence on safety management and hence, safety performance on site.
Statistical analysis of the date supported the above assumption, but rejected the null-hypothesis.
Results of chi-square test and correlation coefficient found a very strong association between safety
performance and worker-management relationships (see Table 4.48 in Appendix. significant at
p=0.001).
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Null-hypothesis 6.2:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE UNION INVOLVEMENT 1N
SAFETY, AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
The general view that Trade Union involvement in safety on site would lead to accident reduction
was shared by 61 percent of the sample.
However, chi-square test and correlation coefficient of the data did not support the original view.
Rather, the statistical analysis supported the null-hypothesis that there is no relationship between
Trade Union involvement with safety and safety performance. The above argument though valid
statistically, is not in-keeping with industry's view at the time of the Longitudinal Study and other
research (see Leather (1983), Sawacha (1982) (unpublished) ).
Null-hypothesis 6.3:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUB-CONTRACTOR SAFETY
BEHAVIOUR AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Sub-contractors were perceived by 71 percent of the sample to be less careful and thoughtful about
safety on site than main contractors
Whilst this view was also supported by the correlation coefficient analysis, it was rejected by the
chi-square test (see Appendix K). This indicates that chance may have played a part in the overall
outcome of the analysis and a firm conclusion cannot be drawn from this result alone. The
null-hypothesis was supported by the chi-square test only.
The null-hypothesis 6.4:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HAVING SAFETY REPRESENTATIVES
ON SITE AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Chi-square test and correlation coefficient analysis reject the above argument (significant at
p=0.01, see Tables 4.51 in Appendix), thus indicating an association exists between having a well
trained and experienced safety representative on site and safety performance.
This outcome contrasts with the null-hypothesis 6.2 above, which moderately supported the
argument that there is no relationship between Trade Union involvement in safety and safety
performance. It is considered that the explanation given regarding the role of 'chance' remains
valid in the first instance and not the latter.
The relationship between safety representatives and safety performance is well-evidenced in the
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industry both at site level and in previous research which validates the current findings (See
Sawacha and Langford (1984) ).
Null-hypothesis 6.5:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND WORKERS'
CO-OPERATION ON SAFETY AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Evidence from the chi-square test and correlation coefficient rejects the null-hypothesis and found
an association to exist between management and workers' co-operation on safety and safety
performance (see Table 4.52 in Appendix K, significant at p=0.001).
This result is similar to that found in null-hypothesis 6.1 establishing a correlation between
worker-management relationships and safety performance on site (see Tables 4.48 in Appendix,
significant at p=0.001 respectively).
Null-hypothesis 6.6:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HAVING SAFETY COMMITTEES INPUT
/ ROLE IN SAFETY AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Statistical tests showed significant results indicating an association between safety committee
input/role in safety and safety performance (see Table 4.53 in Appendix K, significant at p=0.005).
This result therefore rejects the null-hypothesis stated above, and does not support the argument.
The result is also logical in that, like null-hypothesis 6.4 above, the outcome clearly illustrates
beyond reasonable doubt that both safety representatives and safety committees have an essential
role to play in enhancing safety performance in the construction industry. The only proviso is that
they are adequately trained and experienced in their duties as specified by the 1974 Act and all
associated Regulations, since 1974.
Null-hypothesis 6.7:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORKERS' BELIEFS IN OR
PERCEPTION OF THEIR COMPANY'S SAFETY EFFORTS AND THEIR SAFETY
PERFORMANCE.
Chi-square test and correlation coefficient supports the null-hypothesis (not significant, see Table
4.54 in Appendix), and it is logical that the perception of a company's safety efforts is not related to
safety performance. It should be seen to be serious, rather than just paying 'lip service', through
results.
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Null-hypothesis 6.8:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FREQUENT SAFETY TALKS BY
MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Statistical tests showed no significant results which supported the null-hypothesis (see Tables of
correlation coefficient and chi-square test 4.55 in Appendix) and that there is no relationship
between frequent safety talks and safety performance.
However, it is interesting to note the moderate correlation between safety talks given by managers
to operatives and safety performance, indicating some degree of association, albeit it not strong.
Null-hypothesis 6.9:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POSTER DISPLAY AND SAFETY
PERFORMANCE.
Chi-square tests and correlation coefficient rejects the above argument that there is no relationship
between display of safety posters on site and safety performance (not significant, see Tables 4.56,
Appendix K). The only proviso is that they must be legible, and kept clean at all times.
4.5 .6 (a)	 Conclusion of Sub-hypothesis 6:
SAFETY PERFORMANCE IS A FUNCTION OF ORGANISATIONAL (VARIABLES)
FACTORS - C10 vs. C8.
Statistical tests showed that several of the selected nine organisational variables had a strong level
of correlation with safety performance. These were:
(i) Worker-management relationships;
(ii) Sub-contractor safety behaviour;
(iii) Safety representative presence on site;
(iv) Management-workers' co-operation;
(v) Safety Committees safety input;
(vi) Safety talks by managers/supervisors;
(vii) Display of safety posters on site.
However, the other remaining variables did not show sufficient evidence for such a relationship.
These were:
(i) Trade Union involvement with safety;
(ii) Workers' beliefs in company safety efforts.
Both had significant correlation but low chi-square results.
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Despite the low score of the above two variables, it could be concluded that safety performance is a
function of organisational (variables) factors. Although the conclusion is logical, it must be
emphasized that the number of variables selected to test organisational variables are not in
themselves wholly definitive. Other variables could equally have been chosen to represent
organisational factors, without affecting the results. For example, site organisation, gang size or
make-up, management style etc. (see Table below for results).
Organisational Variables vs. Safety Performance Variables
Test of significance : Operative Date - C8 = C10
Worker
Mgt.
Relation-
ship
Trade
Union
involve-
ment
Sub-
contractor
Safety
Behaviour
Safety
Reps.
Worker
Mgt. Co-
operation
Safety
Cftee
Workers
beliefs of
Cos
efforts
Safety
Talks
Safety
Posters
Safety
Performance
p=0.001 Not sign p=0.02 p=0.01 p=0.001 p=0.005 Not sign p=0.01 p=0.005
TABLE 4.5g:	 TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE - ORGANISATIONAL
VARIABLES
4.5.7. Sub-Hypothesis 7:
Cl = SAFETY PERFORMANCE IS A FUNCTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
(VARIABLES) FACTORS = C10 vs. C9.
Null-Hypothesis 7.1:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLEAN AND TIDY SITES AND SAFETY
PERFORMANCE:
Chi-square test and correlation coefficient .showed very strong associations between clean and tidy
sites and safety performance (highly significant, see Table 4.57 in Appendix) and hence rejects the
null-hypothesis that there is no relationship between clean and tidy sites and safety performance.
The above argument is therefore invalid. This means that clean and tidy sites have the effect of
reducing accident levels.
Null-hypothesis 7.2:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JOB SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE AND
SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Chi-square test and correlation coefficient again showed very strong association between job skills
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and knowledge and safety performance, and therefore rejects the above null-hypothesis (significant
at p=0.001, see Tables 4.58 - Appendix K), This means that the more skilful and knowledgeable
about the job in hand the better the individual safety performance.
Null-hypothesis 7.3:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNTIDY SITES AND SAFETY
PERFORMANCE.
Again chi-square test and correlation coefficient showed very strong association between untidy
sites and safety performance, and hence invalidates the above null-hypothesis (see Table 4.59 -
Appendix, significant at p=0.01).
This result also validates the result found in null-hypothesis 7.1 above. The indications from these
results illustrates that clean and tidy sites can improve safety performance whilst untidy and less
well-organised sites have the opposite effect.
Null-hypothesis 7.4:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CO-OPERATION BETWEEN WORKERS
ON SITE AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Statistical analysis of the data showed no support for the null-hypothesis that there is no
relationship between co-operation between workers and safety performance. Therefore the above
argument is rejected.
On the contrary, the results showed strong correlation between workers co-operating with each
other and safety performance (see Table 4.60, Appendix K, significant at p=0.001).
The significance of this result is that where workers worked together in harmony with one another,
there is the likelihood that an improved level of safety performance will be achieved, as opposed to
where an atmosphere of non-co-operation prevails.
Null-hypothesis 7.5:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROVISION OF COMPANY
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE USE OF HARMFUL SUBSTANCES AND SAFETY
PERFORMANCE.
The null-hypothesis was supported by chi-square test and correlation coefficient, and the above
argument is therefore valid (not significant - see Tables). This argument was based on the provision
of COSHH and it is possible that the newness of the COSHH Regulations at the stage of research
may have accounted for the result. This is because the operatives may not have been too aware of
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the implications of the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations at the time.
Null-hypothesis 7.6:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANAGER/SUPERVISOR SAFETY
BEHAVIOUR (BY EXAMPLE) AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Null-hypothesis was rejected by chi-square test and correlation coefficient, and the above argument
is therefore invalid (see Table 4.62, Appendix).
This is a surprising result as both operatives and managers were consistent in their beliefs that
operatives would "toe the safety line" always, provided supervisors and managers showed a good
example.
Null-hypothesis 7.7:
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLANNED AND ORGANISED SITES
AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Chi-square test and correlation coefficient showed no support for the null-hypothesis, and the
above argument is therefore not valid (significant at p=0.001, see Table 4.63 - Appendix K).
The result is very logical as it supports the outcome for null-hypothesis 7.1 and 7.3 respectively in
that clean and tidy sites are more likely to be the ones which are well-planned and better organised
thereby enhancing safety performance.
Null-hypothesis 7.8: 
THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORKER CAREFULNESS AND
ALERTNESS ON SITE AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
Statistical analysis of the data did not support the null-hypothesis that there is no relationship
between worker carefulness and alertness on site and safety performance.
The above argument is thus invalid, as it is rejected by the results of chi-square test and correlation
coefficient (see Tables 4.64 - Appendix K),
4.5.7. (a)	 Conclusion of Sub-hypothesis 7:
SAFETY PERFORMANCE IS A FUNCTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL (VARIABLES)
FACTORS.
Out of the eight selected environmental variables, only one supported the null-hypothesis; the
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remaining seven had strong associations with safety performance and therefore suggest support for
the above sub-hypothesis.
The variables which showed support by virtue of chi-square test and correlation coefficient were:
(i) Clean and tidy sites;
(ii) Job skills and knowledge;
(iii) Untidy sites;
(iv) Workers co-operation with each other;
(v) Manager/supervisor's safety behaviour by example;
(vi) Planned and organised sites, and
(vii) Worker carefulness and observance or alertness.
(see Tables below)
Environmental Variables vs. Safety Performance Variables -
Test of Significance : Operative Date C9 vs. C10
Clean &
tidy sites
Job skills &
knowledge
Untidy
sites
Worker co-
operation
Company
COSHH
info,
Manager
etc. safety
by example
Planned &
organised
sites
Worker
carefulness
etc.
Safety
Performance
p=0.01
sign
p=0.001
sign
p=0.01
sign
p=0.001
sign
not sign p=0.01
sign
p=0.001
sign
p=0.01
sign
TABLE 4.5h TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE - ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES
NOTE: Figure 4.5 below shows the Established Correlation Coefficient of Operatives' Attitudes
Annotated on the Research Model.
4.6.	 C2 : The Pattern of Behaviour of Site Managers and its Comparison with Those of
Operatives - Test of Significance
The previous statistical analysis investigated the relationship between each of the selected variables
or factors and safety performance as illustrated in the research model (see Table 3.8 above in
Chapter 3). The results of the individual analysis are discussed above.
This section however, reports the pattern of behaviour of site managers as concluded from the
research data and compares it with the results of operative data analysis (see Appendix L). It also
investigates the differences in pattern of behaviour (if any) between site managers and operatives.
The level of significance between both sets of data was measured using the chi-square analysis, and
the results of the tests are discussed below.
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4.6.1. Main sub-hypothesis 8 : C2 = Attitudes of Operatives towards Behavioural
Environmental (Variables)/Factors differ from those of Site Managers
Null hypothesis 8.1: There is no historical difference in attitudes between operatives
and site managers = C3 vs. Cl & C2
Examining the research data in respect of age, experience, occupation and training of both
operatives and site managers, and those of previous researches as discussed in 4.5.1 above
indicates support for the above null hypothesis.
The impact of age, experience, occupation and training is similar for both parties, and are found to
be highly incidental to safety performance in most industries including the construction industry
(Refer Churns (1968), Schulzinger (1956), Grew (1958), Haddon, Suchman & Kline (1964),
Leather (1983) and Vant (1986) ).
Null hypothesis 8.2 : There is no economic difference in attitudes between operatives
and site managers = C4 vs. Cl & C2
(a) Chi-square analysis (test) indicates support for the view that bonus systems lead to reduced
concern for safety on site (where C4 vs. C 1 & C2, and X2 = 2.82 - not significant - see
Tables in Appendix L/1 ) . Leather 1983) had similar research findings.
(b) Statistical analysis of operative and S.M. data showed strong support and association for
the argument that 'Need to meet commercial requirements of profits influenced safety
organisation on site' (see L/1 ).
(c) The result of chi-square test of significance showed that the view that 'bonuses lead
supervisors to turn a blind eye to safety hazards' is valid, according to the response of
operatives and site managers (see Tables in Appendix L/1, where C3 = Cl & C2, and x 2 =
64.60 significant). Shimmin eta! (1982) and Leather (1987), also found similar results.
(d) Statistical test of operative and site managers' response data showed that 'more training in
safety leads to significant improvements in safety standards (see Tables in Appendix L/1,
where C3 = CI & C2, X2 = 21.68 significant at p = 0.001). Abeytunga (1979) reached a
similar conclusion.
(e) 'Safety bonuses improve safety performance'. This statement was supported by the
cross-data analysis of the operative and site managers, and found the result to be significant
(see Tables in Appendix L/1, where X2 = 25.75 significant, and C3 = Cl & C2).
(0 Chi-square test of significance validates the view that productivity drives with built-in
safety incentives improve safety performance. (see Tables in Appendix L/1 where X2 =
19.10, significant, at p = 0.001, and C3 = Cl & C2).
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4.6.2. Sub-hypothesis 9 : C2 = Attitudes of operatives towards psychological variables)
Factors differ from those of Site Managers 
Null hypothesis 9.1 : There is no psychological difference in attitude between
operatives and site managers = C5 vs. Cl & C2.
(a) Chi-square test showed no support for the argument that 'increased safety awareness
influences safety performance (not significant, see Tables in Appendix, where - X2 =
2.53, C5 = Cl & C2).
(b) Statistical analysis of operative and S.M. data showed support for the view that 'workers'
behaviour on site influences safety performance' (where C5 = Cl & C2, x 2 = 11.20
significant - see Table in Appendix L/2 ).
(c) Chi-square test showed very strong significance for the view that 'workers' perception of
the Building work as tough and dangerous influences risk-taking behaviour' in the building
industry (see Tables in Appendix L/2; where C5 = Cl & C2; X2 = 102.98, highly
significant) refer Leather (1987), Pirani (1976).
(d) Chi-square test showed that the view that 'safety training and up-dating increases safety
awareness and hence safety performance' (see Table in Appendix L/2 ; where X2 = 6.24,
significant).
(e) Statistical analysis showed no support for the view that 'safety is a matter of commonsense'
(where X2 = 1.58, not significant, C5 = Cl & C2) The argument that safety is a matter of
commonsense is not valid.
(0 Chi-square test indicated no support for the argument that 'site managers' safety attitudes
influenced workers' safety attitudes' (see Tables where X2 = 2. , not significant C5 = Cl &
C2).
4.6.3 Sub-Hypothesis 10 :  Attitudes of Operatives towards procedural variables differ from
those of Site Managers
Null hypothesis 10.1 : There is no procedural difference in attitude between operatives
and site managers.
(a) The argument that 'provision of protective safety clothing / equipment leads to safety
awareness was found to be significantly valid by the chi-square test (see Tables in
Appendix L/3; where X2 = 8.86 significant; C7 = Cl & C2). This is a logical finding as the
provision of those safety items alone in itself does not affect attitudinal influences, but only
provision of training and usage which does.
(b) Chi-square test showed support for the statement that 'workers failure to use protective
safety clothing and equipment etc., be sanctioned in order to improve safety discipline on
site' (see Table in Appendix L/3 where X2 = 3.45 significant - C7 = Cl & C2).
(c) Chi-square tests supported the argument that 'providing new workers with safety manuals,
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followed by induction, improves safety performance' (see Table in Appendix L/3, where X
2 = 7•34, significant, C7 = C 1 & C2).
(d) Statistical analysis showed support for the view that 'belief in receiving safety instructions
on joining a new firm improves safety awareness' (where X2 = 5.66, significant at p = 0.02,
C7 = Cl & C4. see Tables).
4 6 4 Sub-Hypothesis 11: Attitudes of Operatives towards Technical Variables differ from
those of Site Managers
Null hypothesis 11.1 : There is no technical difference in attitudes between operatives
and site managers
(a) Operatives and site managers' data analysis indicates that the above argument is highly
significant, and hence supports the null hypothesis (significant where x 2 = 22.38, and C6
= Cl & C2 - see Tables in Appendix L/4).
(b) Chi-square test showed a very high significance towards the argument that 'workers' ability
to spot safety hazards on site leads to reduced accidents.' This means that hazard
knowledge and hazard spotting/ identification should be encouraged as part of standard
safety training at all levels of the industry from operatives to senior management. Such
training and experience should pay rich dividends by creating risk-awareness and accident
reduction as suggested by the statistical test (where X2 = 41.54 high significant, and C6 =
C 1 & C2).
(c) Chi-square test showed no support for the statement that 'commonsense and building
experience alone is sufficient for driving dumpers and scaffolding erection on site'.
This result means that driver training to acquire the relevant driving skills are a prerequisite
for driving dumpers, mobile plant and for scaffolding erection. It rejects the view that
commonsense and building experience alone was enough (see Table in Appendix L/4
where X2 = 69.59, highly significant; C7 = C I & C2).
(d) The argument that 'hazard identification equals less accidents on site' was shown to be
highly significant by the chi-square test (where X2 = 21.05 significant - see Tables in
Appendix L/4, C7 = Cl & C2).
The same explanation for (b) above is applicable to this result. It could logically be proposed
therefore, that hazard knowledge creates hazard awareness, and that such awareness would lead to
hazard identification and result in fewer accidents.
4.6.5. Sub-Hypothesis 12: Attitudes of Operatives towards Organisation variables differ
from those of Site Managers 
Null-hypothesis 12.1 : There is no organisational difference in attitudes between
operatives and site managers.
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(a) Worker-management relationships on site was seen by operatives' and site management to
be highly significant. This was the result of chi-square analysis which indicated association
between worker/management relationships and safety performance (see Tables in
Appendix L/5, where X2 = 12.85, significant, and C8 = Cl & C2).
Similarly, statistical analysis of operative data (discussed above under null hypothesis 6.1),
showed a high correlation of 0.754, and a chi-square test significant at p = 0.001,
confirming the strong association between worker-management relationships and safety
performance.
(b) Comparison of data analysis of operatives and site management showed agreement towards
the argument that 'Trade Union involvement in safety reduces accidents on site' (see tables
in Appendix L/5, where X2 = 17.07, significant, and C8 = Cl & C2).
(c) Chi-square test showed that workers safe-working systems and management co-operation
was significant indicating comparison from operatives and site management (see Tables in
Appendix L/5 , where X2 = 25.42, highly significant C8 = Cl & C2).
The same explanation for argument (a) above can be said to apply to this result This
means that in order to achieve improved safety performance a workable level of
co-operation between operatives and site management must prevail as well as having safe
working systems in place.
(d) Chi-square test showed that operative data and site management data were in agreement
that 'having safety committees improves safety standards (see Table in Appendix, wherex2
= 22.61 significant and C8 = Cl & C2).
This confirms the argument in (b) above as valid for both cases.
(e) The result of data analysis of operatives and site management seems to suggest that when
operatives and site management discuss safety matters regularly, it has the effect of
improving safety awareness and hence safety performance (see Table , Appendix L/5,
where X2 = 4.58, just significant, C8 = Cl and C2).
(0	 Chi-square test of operatives and site management data showed agreement between both
groups that 'management safety attitudes determine or shape workers' safety behaviour as
far as safety is concerned (see Table in Appendix L/5, where X2 = 17.37 significant and C8
=C1 & C2).
4.6.6 Sub-Hypothesis : Attitudes of Operatives towards Environment or External Variables
differ from those of Site Managers
Null hypothesis 13.1 : There is no environmental difference in attitudes between
operatives and site managers.
(a) Statistical analysis of data showed that both operatives and site managers are in significant
agreement that 'unity building sites lead to accidents' (see Table in Appendix L/6, wherex2
= 17.06, significant, and C9 = Cl & C2).
Similar conclusions were found by Leather (1987) see reference.
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(b) Chi-square test confirmed very high significance between operative and site management
attitudes - thus agreeing that 'good job planning and site organisation lead to fewer
accidents' (see Table in Appendix L16 where x 2
 = 50.17, significant and C9 = Cl & C2).
(c) Chi-square test again showed that 'workers who know their jobs, and are thoughtful of the
way they work, have fewer accidents (see Table in Appendix L/6, where x2
 = 44.83,
significant and C9 =CI & C2).
Leather (1987) reached a similar conclusion (see ref. in bibliography).
4.6a Conclusions of Sub-hypothesis 8 : C2 = Cl : Attitudes of operatives towards
behavioural and environmental variables differ from those of site managers
The statistical analysis (chi-square tests) for this section compared the pattern of behaviour (safety
attitudes) of operatives to that of site managers in respect of the various 'behavioural and
environmental' variables as considered in the research model illustrated in Figure 3.8 above. It
investigates whether differences existed between the pattern of behaviour of operatives and site
managers towards those behavioural and environmental variables shown in Figure 4.5 above.
The results of the statistical analysis are shown in Appendix L/4 and Appendix L/ 5 at the back of
this thesis.
An examination of the results as detailed above in this Section 4.6, leads to the following
conclusions:
1.	 There are no differences between operatives and site management attitudes towards
historical variables in respect of:-
(a) Age;
(b) Experience (i.e., in-company and industry-wide experience);
(c) Occupation and trade/craft, and
(d) Training.
All the above were found to impact upon safety performance.
2.	 There are no differences between operatives' and site management attitudes towards
economic variables in respect of:
(a) Bonus systems - not significant;
(b) Effect of commercial needs - significant;
(c) Safety training - significant;
(d) Safety Bonuses - significant;
(e) Productivity drive with safety incentives - significant = 0.001.
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3.	 There are no differences between operatives' and site management attitudes towards
psychological variables in respect of:-
(a) Safety awareness and safety performance - not significant;
(b) Workers' safety behaviour - significant;
(c) Workers' perception of the building industry as tough, dangerous and risk-taking
behaviour - highly significant;
(d) Safety training and periodic up-dating - significant;
(e) Safety is a matter of commonsense only - not significant;
(f) Site managers' safety attitudes - not significant.
4.	 There are no differences between operatives' and site managers' attitudes towards
procedural variables in respect of:-
(a) Provision of protective safety clothing and equipment significant;
(b) Workers' failure to use protective safety clothing and equipment - significant;
(c) Provision of safety manuals to new entrants to the industry together with safety
induction - significant;
(d) Provision of safety instructions and up-date on transferring from one company to
another (each time) - significant, p = 0.02.
5.	 There are no differences between operatives' and site managers' attitudes towards technical
variables in respect of:-
(a) Having knowledge of hazards on site, and safety performance highly significant;
(b) Workers' ability to spot or identify safety hazards on site and accident reduction-
highly significant;
(c) Commonsense and building experience enough to drive dumpers and mobile plant
- significant only in terms of agreement that training and certification is relevant
when driving on site, and in the erection of scaffolding.
6.	 There are no differences between operatives and site management's attitudes towards
organisational variables in respect of:-
(a) Worker-management relationships - significant;
(b) Trade Union involvement in safety arrangements on site significant;
(c) Workers-management co-operation and safe working systems highly significant;
(d) Having safety committees in an organisation - highly significant;
(e) Managers' and supervisors' regular safety briefings on site significant;
(0	 Management's behaviour on safety (attitudes) as a source of influence on workers'
safety attitudes - significant.
7.	 There are no differences between operatives' and site management attitudes towards
environmental variables in respect of:-
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(a) Untidy building sites and accident occurrence - very significant;
(b) Good job planning and site organisation in relation to accidents - highly significant;
(c) Workers who know their jobs and who think about the way they work in relation to
accidents - highly significant.
4.7	 FURTHER ANALYSIS
OBJECTIVES
The main aim of the study is to strengthen the current analysis of the data and to meet the following
objectives.
i) To identify primary safety attitudes variables which were strongly correlated with safety
performance;
ii) To identify secondary variables which were loosely or unconnected to safety
performance;
iii) To apply multivariate analysis to isolate key variables which enables influences of the
variables upon one another to be partialled out.
ANALYTICAL APPROACH
The initial approach discussed above is based on bivariate analysis and involves correlating
individual variables with a safety performance factor and chi-square tests were used to test the
significance of the relationship. Without the use of multivariate analysis, intercorrelation between
variables have not been accounted for and redundant variables have not been identified.
As a result of this limitation, multivariate analysis is used to strengthen the data analysis as
indicated in objective three above in this section of further analysis.
COMPUTER HARDWARE/SOFTWARE
The multivariate analysis was conducted on an IBM compatible 80486 personal computer with a
processor speed of 33 MHz, RAM of 16 MB, 340 Mb hard-disk, SVGA colour display, preloaded
with MSDOS version 6.2 operating system and windows 3.1 graphical environment.
SPSS for Windows was selected as the main data analysis software due to the following reasons:
Very widely distributed in educational establishments, research institutions and industry
Windows interface render user-friendliness, ease of use, and facilitates data exchange
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between Windows applications
Offers a very wide range of analysis and presentation tools
Well documented with manuals and books published by an independent publisher which
ensures availability in bookstores
Proven and well developed software with technical support from distributor
Offers portability across various computer platform
Excel for Windows was also used on various occasions for data manipulation and presentation.
4.7.1	 PRIORI ANALYSIS
Operative attitudes data from 126 respondents were examined for accuracy of data entry, missing
values, and fit between their distributions. The 56 variables identified together with 2 variables
used in measuring safety performance were examined separately.
Preliminary Data Screening
Unusual Data
i) Data with exceptionally large values were suspected to be caused by entry error.
Variable C19, CARES, was found to contain a value of 22, variable C53, SENSE,
contained 22 and 44, and variable C87, PLAN, had value of 33. In all cases, the obscure
data were truncated by one digit and thus 22 becomes 2 and so on. Another possible
entry error was detected in variable C88, AVOID, with a value of 7. The case was
replaced by a value of 1.
ii) Cases with 0 values were assigned a value of 3 as 3 represent the 'don't know' category
in the questionnaire. Variables which contained 0 values include HELMET (C39),
TIDYSITE (C81), SAFEINSP (C89).
iii) Certain safety performance variables contain data values close to their variable labels,
for example, variable C97, PLATFORM, contained value of 97. A value of 7 was
assigned to replace the exceptional values. Other variables which contained similar
abnormal data include ROOFS (C98) and SHOES (C99).
Defining Data Variable
One new composite variable was created to represent the overall safety performance factor as a
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single measure which embraces the summation of all individual safety performance factor (C97 -
C109):
PERFORM = PLATFORM + ROOFS + SHOES + HEIGHTS + COLLAPSE + EYES + FALLS
+ LADDERS + HOLES + CRANE + TRANSPOR + FIRE + SHOCKS
All changes to the original data file were highlighted in the spreadsheet of Appendix I.
Fine-Tuning File Structure
As multiple regression analysis was expected to be employed, categorical variables without ranking
was deleted from the data file, leaving only ordinal variables present in the file in order to facilitate
further analysis to be carried out.
Normality
Skewness and Kurtosis of variables including the combination variable PERFORM are tabulated to
examine normality of variables. Significance tests for both Skewness and Kurtosis that test the
obtained value against the null hypothesis of zero can be carried out. The p-values for two-tailed
test are tabulated along with the Skewness and Kurtosis. (Refer Appendix )
The research involves a relatively large sample size and consequently conventional alpha levels
used for the evaluation of the significance were not employed in this study. Instead, the p-values of
the variables were examined together with their expected normal probability plots and detrended
expected normal probability plots. Variables with exceptionally large Skewness or Kurtosis, or
both, were further investigated with normal distribution overlaid frequency histograms.
Non-normal variables identified are as follows:
Data Transformations
Transformation equations were assigned to render the data distribution normal. The equations for
non-normal variables were determined by visual examination of the frequency histograms and trial
and error.
ASBESTOS
The data showed a high degree of positive Skewness (2.5749) and leptokurticity (9.2013). The
following transformation equation was used to obtain normality:
1
T_ ASBEST — 3+
25— ASBESTOS
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Std. Dev = .76
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The transformed variable, T _ ASBEST, shows a moderate degree of negative skewness (-0.539)
and leptokurticity (2.411).
LIKE
The Variable has a high degree of positive skewness (4.068) and a very high degree of
leptokurticity (24.738). A similar inverse function to equation (1) was applied to transform the
data:
1
T LIKE - 2+ 	
25- LIKE
The transformed variable, T _ LIKE, has skewness of 1.6 and a kurtosis of 1.326.
LIKE
	
T LIKE
SAFETY
The variable exhibits a high degree of positive skewness (2.271) and leptokurticity (6.100). An
inverse function was used to modify the variable:
1
T _SAFETY - 3+
2.5-SAFETY
The transformed variable, T _ SAFETY, reveals a negative skewness (-0.537) and a moderate
kurtosis of 2.158.
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The newly defined aggregate variable has strong skewness (2.728) and leptokurticity (8.854). A
trigonometric function was used for the transformation:
PERFORM X It )1
T_ PERFOR = 1{1+ sin
n 	 10
After transformation was applied, the variable T PERFOR has Skewness of 0.382 and a kurtosis
of 0.769.
Multicollinearity
The correlation matrix of the 56 variables in Appendix K1 demonstrates a moderate to high
intercorrelation among the variables (in excess of 0.30). As a result, correlating between individual
variables and the safety performance may lead to distorted result. Factor analysis was employed to
combat the problem. The full analysis will be presented in the next section.
4.7.2	 FACTOR ANALYSIS
Factor analysis (or Principle Component Analysis) was utilised to eliminate multicollinearity
problem discussed in the previous section by producing uncorrelated factors or components from
the original variables. Another advantage of employing the method is that large amount of
variables can be reduced to a small number of factors, which concisely describe the relationships
between the variables and the safety performance factors.
Factorability
Test of factorability was performed on SPSS for Windows. Using the Bartlett's Sphericity Test of
which the null hypothesis HO, supposes variables not correlated and therefore unsuitable for factor
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analysis, the value obtained was 3093 with a significance of 0.00000.
Another test applied to confirm the factorability was Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin's measure of sampling
adequacy. The ratio of the sum of squared correlations to the sum of squared correlations plus sum
of squared partial correlations was 0.57, which is just adequate for conducting factor analysis.
Extraction of Factors
Factor analysis was applied to the 56 safety attitude variables using principal components method
for factor extraction. As to decide the number of factor to retain, Kaiser's rule was used to extract
factors whose eigenvalues were greater than 1. In order to verify the Kaiser criterion, variable
communalities were calculated and shown in the Final Statistics section of the Appendix. Since 54
of the 56 communalities are either greater than 0.7 or very close to 0.7, the default criterion is
accurate in identifying the true number of factors.
19 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 which accounted for 71.7% of the total variance were
extracted, and listed overleaf. A scree plot of the eigenvalues was included in the Appendix which
presents the cut-off point graphically.
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Factor Matrix
5Factor 1	 Factor 2	 Factor 3	 Factor 4	 Factor
AGE
-.12346
-.04247 .53899 .47756 .14765
ASBESITE .06910 .24693 -.07871 -.02082
-.36278
AVOID .38744 .03571 .09705 .21393
-.03882
BANKSMAN -.06157 .02596 .01546 .04905
-.40667
BELIEVE .57358 .23441 .14737 -.21114 .06075
BLINDEYE .03694 .09871 .50958 -.39828
-.29246
BONUS .05479
-.08877 .32041 -.60888
-.10678
CAREFUL .16383 .06438 -.16134 .10202 .26601
CARES .20786 .06927 -.45423 .14209 .20768
CAUSE -.26288 .41404
-.38879 -.10663 .31447
COMMITEE .54582 .16070 -.22912 .18943 .00569
COOPERAT .41397 -.22450
-.03321 -.16648 .22674
DUMPER
-.17985 .09230 .20469 .22193
-.01444
ENOUGH .17090 .09098 -.43131 .05936 .26821
EQUIP .68687 .22216 .07304 -.12657 .18339
ERECTOR -.19451 .51553 -.05763 .08089
-.06385
EXAMPLES .14347 -.02120 .19318 .00839 .50282
HANDLE .29024 .09970 -.26145 .05353 -.38962
HELMET .49052 -.10522 .11461 .08249
-.12299
INDUSTRY -.17226 .00277 .46553 .54147 .10966
INVOLVE .27734 .34706 .02470 .16943 -.31534
JOBS .27660 .12995 .17523 .24257 .09153
LESSACCI .46628 -.22924 .22168 .28590 -.17852
MECHAN .46025 -.58190 .18006 -.04553 .05001
MONEY .14237 .21442 .18048 .30843 -.33607
OPERATE .56187 -.28866 .02734 -.06509 -.00265
PLAN .55836 -.00776 .11392 .31028 .12018
POSTERS .43874 .04898 -.07390 .04711 -.04387
PRODUCT .43900 -.16527 -.33317 .13129 -.21255
PROPER -.22404 .44979 .08736 .16402 .25306
PROTECT .59082 .22410 .06267 .07547 -.00594
REDUCE .24054 .42604 .10661 -.06729 -.30676
RELATION .26517 .20863 .15158 -.00163 .17797
RISKS -.12659 -.00051 .05830 -.28110 .23857
RISKY
-.30923 -.07674 .34461 -.03288 .32817
SAFEACT .35663 .07672 -.33280 .23295 -.15619
SAFEBOOK .71314 .29091 .14482 -.19314 .24038
SAFEINSP -.08582 .36656 -.32297 .04348 .29315
SAFEREP .58229 .12618 -.02638 .08967 -.15956
SCAFFOLD .54183 -.20219 .07982 -.19183 .16941
SENSE
-.29053 .31522 .06245 .19152 .01390
SERVICE .01493 -.03674 .36038 .60948 .21231
SITE
-.08266 .27821 .24192 -.17791 .03860
SKILLFUL .15278 -.28260 .00948 -.02374 .21046
SUBCONT .40461 .04118 .07501 -.20963 -.06411
SUPERV .07668 .47792 .34555 -.07736 -.02052
T_ASBEST .25336 .04216 .01391 .08500 -.02066
T_LIKE .28272 -.16668 -.23953 .09604 -.16019
T_SAFETY .01079 .44786 -.17425 .12244 -.03568
TALK .73257 .34895 .17287 -.21132 .19484
TELL
-.33395 .15010 -.08642 .21895 .07208
TIDYSITE .59277 -.24674 .02872 .12171 -.09802
TOXIC .09139 .16925 .13961 -.05866 -.18700
TRAINING .51302 -.15928 -.15586 .18243 .16681
WEAR .42839 .18587 -.12536 -.12465 .27008
WORKMATA .02376 .39023 .21027 -.23491 -.03411
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Factor 6	 Factor 7	 Factor
	 8 Factor	 9 Factor 10
AGE .21635 -.28814 -.11424 -.24324 .07506
ASBESITE -.15399 .06431 -.11547 -.12454
-.12903
AVOID -.42617 .23526 -.01665 .15322 .11854
BANKSMAN .02605 .26244
-.02140 .10064 .13201
BELIEVE .04600 -.15458 -.15952 -.03233
-.08834
BLINDEYE .12323 .00491 .04702 .16626 .21611
BONUS .11301 .06620 -.31066 -.05181 .14671
CAREFUL -.03553
-.09686 .09420 .58590 -.20612
CARES .26108 .25542 -.24881 .15039 .15721
CAUSE .24092
-.24346 .07331 -.06939 .05525
COMMITEE -.23000 -.18317 -.05704 -.03263 -.12473
COOPERAT -.04010 .05647 .13457 -.30123 -.23191
DUMPER .43646 .39656 .15825 .06734 -.05789
ENOUGH -.17673 .07514 -.10535 -.10967 .30916
EQUIP .13166 .10507 -.28192 .00667 -.25166
ERECTOR .00902 .35311 .14161 -.06052 .02021
EXAMPLES .22348 .26846 .17585 .09503 .21747
HANDLE .21888 .15886 .00903 -.25447 -.05015
HELMET .34963 .02222 -.25931 .15243 .05254
INDUSTRY .21628 -.29043 -.16259 -.18832 .00760
INVOLVE -.20734 -.26423 .12649 .12993 .02113
JOBS -.52520 .10573 -.25667 -.03825 -.03007
LESSACCI -.19112 .20862 -.10376 .10755 .27987
MECHAN .03901 .04440 .28797 .14251 -.07246
MONEY -.03117 -.09747 .09830 -.05626 -.31341
OPERATE .04945 .03256 .28779 -.05272 .20522
PLAN -.08084 .36216 -.00235 .14030 .03386
POSTERS .23125 -.02953 .16368 -.11035 .41998
PRODUCT .13236 .17362 .01727 -.16271 .02646
PROPER -.27898 -.03210 -.13529 .18141 .08898
PROTECT .29750 .20924 -.20569 -.12379 -.33161
REDUCE -.00220 -.19446 .06933 .23001 -.02653
RELATION -.20053 .13422 .35755 -.24031 .29310
RISKS -.02793 .26931 .19026 -.02957 -.09294
RISKY -.02025 .16108 .02394 -.09005 -.24196
SAFEACT .26738 -.16320 -.06236 .21725 .01588
SAFEBOOK .14289 .03803 -.01930 -.09835 -.13262
SAFEINSP .22605 -.26855 .26272 .04633 .04045
SAFEREP .04328 -.23479 .33558 -.12412 -.00995
SCAFFOLD -.32696 -.18715 .16987 .03593 -.19071
SENSE .09311 .43223 .16846 .12803 -.00064
SERVICE .05302 -.12585 .15307 -.09077 .00833
SITE .18050 -.16206 -.12468 -.11446 .36778
SKILLFUL -.01948 -.26659 -.11435 .54176 .18297
SUBCONT -.03996 .03203 .41778 .01066 .21444
SUPERV .09849 -.04519 .09153 .27298 .10358
T_ASBEST -.04843 -.15369 -.00357 -.24314 .36160
T_LIKE .26884 -.03246 -.11665 .11428 .10776
T_SAFETY -.22616 -.00761 .06199 -.16190 .09997
TALK .09914 .02171 -.14418 -.03705 -.18918
TELL -.00900 .37065 .03934 .15378 -.05302
TIDYSITE -.08020 .14675 -.06010 .00123 .04818
TOXIC .09443 -.05523 .50111 .20075 -.25823
TRAINING .09888 -.15435 -.00241 .15816 .01421
WEAR -.14666 .04439 -.04131 -.21326 .08170
WORKMATA -.12988 .04744 -.22903 .20719 .18292
Factor 11 Factor 12 Factor 13 Factor 14 Factor 15
AGE .03909 .21135
-.03623 .07112 .09678
ASBESITE .03840 .31948 .36946 .25035
-.26773
AVOID .08859 .16046 .01775 -.14159
-.17948
BANKSMAN .32868 -.07745
-.07514 -.21383 .36007
BELIEVE .26198 -.06494 -.14330 -.02445
-.24313
BLINDEYE -.13132 .15013 .14855 -.18275
-.02189
BONUS -.13488 .00258 .15588 -.03255 .00419
CAREFUL -.05482 .09286 .03628 .03339 .32225
CARES -.10527 .15081 -.23452 .10061
-.03352
CAUSE .02002 .06411 .15909 .03584
-.05202
COMMITEE .18583 -.04752 .15690 .08701
-.12946
COOPERAT -.03361 .12558 -.17625 .23501 .19300
DUMPER .09488 -.22497 .04666 .06747 -.26221
ENOUGH .12238 .22218 -.22405 .15310
-.07261
EQUIP -.13184 -.11132 .07961 -.05624 .03359
ERECTOR .10468 .11458 -.04724 -.06150 -.30806
EXAMPLES .06985 .10081 .16356 .21901 .02828
HANDLE .23200 .27575 .21903 .22752 .14707
HELMET .11015 -.17199 -.00579 -.07625 .01863
INDUSTRY .03998 .20845 -.02287 -.16249 .02297
INVOLVE -.04021 -.21849 -.05130 .15504 .11651
JOBS -.23245 .11945 -.09871 .04152 .00469
LESSACCI -.21313 -.18806 .02400 .09587 .00660
MECHAN .07551 -.00706 -.05763 .01618 -.09826
MONEY -.00297 .12113 -.24912 -.15086 .04468
OPERATE -.19716 .06298 -.19011 .07061 .16530
PLAN -.19428 -.07793 .08774 -.10951 -.12040
POSTERS .10239 -.00227 -.32409 -.13069 -.17352
PRODUCT .09497 .19032 .08345 -.34886 -.09739
PROPER .32041 -.11319 -.17765 .00824 .04332
PROTECT -.16634 -.12209 .00712 -.04308 .07918
REDUCE -.00548 .21259 -.15684 .01273 .17979
RELATION -.08808 -.07276 .20882 -.03272 .01855
RISKS -.20367 .31731 -.02179 -.13820 .22938
RISKY .07385 .39788 -.06369 -.21353 -.10931
SAFEACT -.15620 .15928 .16026 -.19262 .09247
SAFEBOOK -.04492 -.12097 -.05051 .04917 -.03513
SAFEINSP -.23206 -.05533 -.09016 -.17788 -.07922
SAFEREP .03768 -.25897 -.12622 .12811 -.01898
SCAFFOLD .27334 .14758 .06341 .03669 -.04076
SENSE .27101 -.16917 .06948 .03203 .06016
SERVICE .08944 .01721 .13359 .04884 .07380
SITE .30289 .05324 .20798 .29848 .21807
SKILLFUL .11011 -.02411 .29498 .01474 -.17771
SUBCONT .22172 .10885 -.05848 -.19241 .15960
SUPERV -.22154 .12552 .01547 .01664 .01823
T_ASBEST -.46001 -.03942 .03000 .11313 -.15460
T_LIKE -.03334 .33606 -.16760 .16427 .03859
T_SAFETY -.27885 .06155 .33665 -.22623 .19498
TALK .02134 -.07410 -.02511 .06362 .07801
TELL -.12804 .01441 .01732 .26931 .22503
TIDYSITE .10476 .12135 .10226 .21640 .11481
TOXIC -.07863 .16529 .07350 .22801 -.27526
TRAINING .11083 .21792 .24179 -.21336 -.05252
WEAR .26690 -.15720 .15077 -.28873 .17319
WORKMATA .05587 .26962 -.32356 .03885 -.11827
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Factor 16 Factor 17 Factor 18 Factor 19
AGE
.06718 .13754 .03042 -.17368
ASBESITE .13500
-.14682 .07279 .20558
AVOID .11562 .14650
-.12352 -.01770
BANKSMAN .24499
-.18693
-.12890 -.17614
BELIEVE .15847
-.02266
-.05415 -.14555
BLINDEYE .06963 .18661 .03365 -.09659
BONUS
-.00158 .19807
-.07129 -.01933
CAREFUL .21588 .09578 -.00592 -.13612
CARES
-.18339 .21500 .07897 .03916
CAUSE .17514 .11772 .00527 .17350
COMMITEE
-.04624 .14049 .10200 -.22519
COOPERAT .06252 .26376
-.28172 .11439
DUMPER
-.00362
-.06821 .03523 -.03877
ENOUGH .07469 .01588 .19470 .03613
EQUIP
-.01359 -.06254 -.07180 -.00204
ERECTOR .09800 .13655 .22861 -.14584
EXAMPLES
-.05943 .14873 .04463 -.03551
HANDLE
-.05677 .02795 -.06017 -.08146
HELMET .06057 -.04939 .31280 .20128
INDUSTRY .08717 .18091 .09542 -.06437
INVOLVE .05004 .38537 .24314 -.03261
JOBS .07406 -.14959 -.10775 -.12784
LESSACCI .00971 .06567 .20017 -.04573
MECHAN
-.05737 .00858 .11524 .15857
MONEY
-.10352 -.04610 .10462 .47114
OPERATE
-.00431 -.23763 .20007 -.09531
PLAN .03308 .16459 -.24825 .06293
POSTERS
-.10354 -.03356 -.23176 -.03968
PRODUCT -.05534 -.10234 -.02634 -.15964
PROPER -.24484 -.20030 -.02845 -.19058
PROTECT .04979 -.07848 .07558 -.08056
REDUCE .09451 -.19520 -.07148 .12722
RELATION .16657 -.26457 .12200 .17362
RISKS .14486 -.09108 .40018 -.11846
RISKY .05187 -.02758 -.00346 .02843
SAFEACT -.17836 .10777 -.08089 .12652
SAFEBOOK -.04891 -.07296 -.06932 .06262
SAFEINSP .09151 -.21503 -.12335 -.07106
SAFEREP .09725 .06061 .16310 -.05686
SCAFFOLD -.01957 -.00207 .14411 .00379
SENSE .25552 .06412 -.03443 .19020
SERVICE .05189 -.10765 -.19041 .14328
SITE -.15576 -.12956 .02429 .00594
SKILLFUL .27482 -.11557 -.08557 .14551
SUBCONT -.12006 .25777 -.17662 .11288
SUPERV -.24982 -.07942 .00803 -.12236
T_ASBEST .12389 -.07566 -.08021 .08687
T_LIKE .52074 -.04526 -.07024 -.08701
T_SAFETY -.06220 .09248 -.05371 -.03770
TALK .07391 -.05324 -.01278 .00193
TELL -.18201 -.01649 -.01275 .11683
TIDYSITE -.18954 -.17707 -.17373 -.05321
TOXIC -.09060 .00285 -.16007 -.24475
TRAINING -.33999 -.12876 .22088 .00383
WEAR .09280 .11677 .01759 .07660
WORKMATA -.10470 .03106 .00623 .26214
4.7.3 APPLIED FACTOR NAMES
The factor analysis generated 19 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. These group of factors
are shown in the factor matrix in Section 4.8.4 above, and portrays various levels per variable
analysed. In order to give meaning to these results of factor analysis, and to relate them to the
research model, it is necessary to assign identifiable names to the group of factors in each league of
variables within each factor group. This is because the factors are aggregations of individual
variables. The variables with co-efficient values of 0.46 and greater, are considered significant at
0.95 percent confidence level.
The dominant variables have common characteristics relating to the Organisational aspects of
safety in construction. Where no dominant variable is found, then such factor is discounted in the
subsequent analysis. Discussion of the results can be seen in Chapter Five below.
1.	 FACTOR 1: Organisational Policy
Dominant variables listed within this category are those with factor co-efficient value of
0.46 and above.
These are:- Believe; Committee; Equip; Operate; Plan; Protect; Safebook; SafeRep;
Scaffold; Talk; Tidysite; Training; Helmet; Lessacci; Mechan; and have a score ranging
from 0.46 to 0.73 - significant.
The above results reaffirm the significance, and primary influence which the identified
dominant variables play in safety organisation and performance.
The results demonstrate the following:
a) BELIEVE: Where operatives believe that the company and management care
much about their personal safety, they are more willing to co-operate in ways that
improve safety performance in the organisation.
b) COMMITTEE: Companies with effective safety committees are more likely to
take steps that improve safety performance than those companies without. This
means that safety committees can play a positive role in the improvement of safety
performance.
c) EQUIP: This result indicates that the provision and use of the correct type of
equipment for a job, and the provision and use of safety protective clothing and
equipment are a pre-requisite for improved safety performance. They should be
trained in correct usage.
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d) OPERATE: Companies must have a clear policy of only using trained plant
operators to operate plants on site, and operatives without suitable training to
operate particular plant types should have the right to refuse instructions to do so,
as part of safety policy.
e) PLAN: The result indicate that sites which are properly planned, jobs are more
likely to improve safety performance by reducing the causes of most accidents on
site.
f) PROTECT: This result confirms the significance of operatives wearing safety
protective clothing and equipment on site. It also agrees with the suggestion that
operatives who refuse to wear them should be punished some how by
management. The company must provide them to maintain standards, and effect
usage.
g) SAFEBOOK: This result confirms the importance of providing every construction
worker with a safety booklet or manual on joining a company, as company policy.
It shows that a brief safety induction to every new recruit on their first day or week
in a company will positively influence safety on site.
h) SAFETY REP: The result indicate that having a well trained and efficient Safety
Representative on site can improve safety performance on site. This is because
they can undertake fault spotting, and insist on corrective or remedial action being
taken, thereby reduce factors likely to cause accidents or incidence.
i) SCAFFOLD: The result indicate that a single contractor should be responsible for
scaffolding on a multi-contractor site, and that regular inspections and spot-checks
are imperative for good safety performance outcome on sites. It also confirms that
scaffolding erectors should be trained and that commonsense and building
experience alone is not sufficient.
j) TALK: This result indicate that site managers and supervisors must engage in
regular safety talks with operatives on site. It shows that sites where supervisors
and managers talk regularly to operatives have better safety outcomes.
k) TIDY SITE: Operatives believe that clean and tidy sites improve safety
performance, and that the opposite is equally true.
1)
	
	 TRAINING: The result confirms that good training, and joint training of
operatives and site supervisors are relevant to good safety awareness, and that
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those can lead to improved safety on site.
m) HELMET(etc): The provision of safety boots, helmet, and all safety equipment by
the company is seen as significant by operatives. This result ties-up with the
findings in (c) and (f) above.
n) LESSACCI: This result indicates that less accidents occur with workers who
know their jobs, and think about what they are doing during the work operation.
This means that the knowledge and competence of the operative of the job they
do, and their thoughtfulness about safety whilst doing it can influence their
personal safety performance. This result also illustrates that worker's co-operation
with each other while working together can lead to less accidents. It may be that
they watch out for each other in order to get the job done.
o) MECHAN: The statement that workers should not be instructed to operate
mechanical plants without adequate operating and related safety training is up held
by the result. This result strengthens the outcome in (1) above indicating that a
sound training policy is essential to good safety performance in the industry.
le	 FACTOR 2: Supervision and Equipment Mismanagement: 
Dominant variables under this category include the following: Erector; Mechan; and
SuperV. They have values of co-efficient ranging from 0.46 to 0.58 respectively (see
table below).
a) ERECTOR: The result refutes the suggestion that "steel-erectors do not need
training to become one". Again, this outcome confirms the findings in (d), (i) and
(1) above.
b) MECHAN: This result has an inverse value of .58 which means that unsuitable
and defective mechanical plants on site use are a recipe for safety disaster on site,
as they can lead to accidents or incidence on site. This result is relative to the
result described in (o) above.
c) SUPERV: This result indicates that supervisors positive safety behaviour on site
can influence operative safety attitudes. Because the supervisor is careful about
safety, it signals to the operative that the supervisor is serious about safety on site,
and that they are not likely to tolerate unsafe actions, or behaviour.
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3.	 FACTOR 3: Industry Norms
Dominant variables which fall within this league are: Age; Blindeye and Industry, and
have coefficient values of 0.466 to 0.539 (see table )
a) AGE: The result indicate that the older the worker, the less risks they are likely to
take in the workplace.
b) BLINDEYE: This result has a coefficient value of 0.51, and indicates that
supervisors are more likely to turn a blindeye to worker's taking unsafe chances in
job where productivity bonus are offered. This may be due to the pressure to
achieve or meet performance targets set by agreed programmes.
c) INDUSTRY: This result have a co-efficient value of 0.47 and therefore
significant. This result indicates that the nature of the industry itself generates its
own form of risks which must be taken into account in design, construction and
training programmes.
4.	 FACTOR 4: REWARD
The variables found to be dominant in this league are: Bonus; Industry; Service; and
Age; and have values of co-efficient ranging from 0.48 to 0.61.
Whilst industry, service and age have positive influences and are related to each other in
terms of familiarity with the industry processes, Bonus has inverse value. Bonus here
refers to safety bonus as opposed to productivity incentive bonus.
The result shows that payment of specified safety bonus will influence operatives to
work more safely in order to get it, whilst productivity bonus leads to some risks being
taken by faster working methods than working at their usual pace and care.
On the other hand, the older an operative, and the longer time spent in the industry, the
more likely such an operative may adopt safer working methods. This is provided
valuable experience and safety training have been regular throughout.
5.	 FACTOR 5: Management Behaviour
Leadership by example is the only primary and dominant variable in this group of
factors.
The result of 0.50 co-efficient value indicate that where managers and supervisors
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display strong and positive safety leadership by good example, the operatives are more
likely to follow suit, and attempt to work safer as their leader.
6.Occupation
This outcome demonstrates that the nature of the job done has a dominant influence. It
indicates that most accidents on site can be avoided if workers understand their jobs, and
by being a little more careful and observant about what they are doing on site.
8. FACTOR 8: TOXIC
Failure to provide suitable and adequate protection against exposure to asbestos, and
other toxic substances on site is seen as a significant variable in safety. The result has a
co-efficient value of 0.50 and is dominant.
9. FACTOR 9: Qualities
Personal carefulness and having the right skills for the job in hand is indicated to be a
dominant factor of influence in safety.
The result shows that the more skilful and careful a worker is about the job in hand, the
less likely they are to have an accident initiated by their actions.
	
11.	 FACTOR 11: MATERIALS
SEE (8) ABOVE.
	
16.	 FACTOR 16: LIKE 
This result indicates that likeness of the job in hand is a dominant variable. It means that
if a person likes the job they are doing, they take more interest, and are more careful
whilst doing it. Coefficient value 0.52.
19.	 FACTOR 19: MONEY
This result indicates that payment systems, and the value of financial earnings are
dominant variables.
If money is paid as an incentive to increase productivity, and meet deadlines, then it
produces the likelihood of accelerated safety performance. On the other hand payment of
safety bonus has an opposite influence.
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Others variables in factors 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 17 were found to be redundant and as
such were discounted from analysis.
This means these variables have very little or no influence to safety performance.
Detailed discussion of the results and their implications are discussed in Chapter 5.
Below shows a summary of the factors and their significant constituents in descending
order:
POLICY SUPERVIS NORMS REWARD MANAGEMT OCCUPATN TOXIC QUALITY MATERIAL LIKE MONEY
Talk
Safebook
Equip
Tidysite
Protect
Saferep
Believe
Operate
Plan
Commitee
Scaffold
Training
Helmet
Lessacci
Mechan
Mechan
Erector
Superv
Age
Blindeye
Industry
Service
Bonus
Industry
Age
Examples Jobs Toxic Careful
Skilful
T_asbest Tlike Money
TABLES 4.7 SUMMARY OF FACTORS AND THEIR CONSTITUENT VARIABLES
4.7.4	 MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Two standard multiple regression analyses were performed in the study. The first analysis involves
examining linear relationship between the composite safety performance factor, T PERFOR, as the
dependent variable and the 11 composite safety attitude factors described earlier as independent
variables. The second analysis attempts to investigate possible linear relationship between the
severity of accidents, HOWMUCH, as the dependent variable and the other 11 composite safety
attitude factors as independent variables. The analysis was carried out using linear multiple
regression technique available in SPSS for Windows.
Safety Performance
The result of the regression analysis between the accident rate variable and the 19 safety attitude
factors is shown below:
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Analysis of Variance
DF	 Sum of Squares	 Mean Square
Regression 11 19.25341 1.75031
Residual 114 182.90532 1.60443
F =
	1.09092 signif F =	 .3749
Variable B SE B	 95% Confdnce Intrvl B Beta
POLICY -.051548 .032376	 -.115684 .012589 -.167300
LIKE -.137717 .446851	 -1.022924 .747491 -.028849
MONEY .075393 .212890	 -.346341 .497128 .034572
SUPERVISION .100133 .113259
	
-.124233 .324499 .085872
NORMS -.092452 .091117	 -.272954 .088050 -.164598
REWARD .034914 .071557	 -.106839 .176667 .080313
MANAGEMENT .246188 .252758	 -.254523 .746899 .093564
OCCUPATION .335423 .233925	 -.127981 .798828 .137052
TOXIC .209668 .218397	 -.222975 .642310 .087655
QUALIFIES .231821 .142058	 -.049595 .513237 .156245
MATERIALS -.328102 .335844	 -.993407 .337204 -.090023
(Constant) .516425 1.121028	 -1.704323 2.737172
Multiple R	 .35346
R Square	 .12493
Adjusted R Square	 .04050
Standard Error	 5.22392
Analysis of Variance
DF Sum of Squares	 Mean Square
Regression 11 444.15134 40.37739
Residual 114 3110.98750 27.28936
F=	 1.47960 Signif F =	 .1486
Variable B SE B	 95% Confdnce Intrvl B Beta
POLICY
-.002728 .133524	 -.267238 .261782 -.002111
LIKE
-1.819634 1.842885	 -5.470376 1.831108 -.090896
MONEY .605771 .877995	 -1.133530 2.345073 .066239
SUPERVISION -.262377 .467100	 -1.187699 .662945 -.053656
NORMS
-.875657 .375781	 -1.620077 -.131238 -.371757
REWARD .455048 .295112	 -.129566 1.039662 .249610
MANAGEMENT .332635 1.042414	 -1.732380 2.397649 .030146
OCCUPATION 1.651785 .964747	 -.259372 3.562941 .160940
TOXIC .326589 .900705	 -1.457700 2.110878 .032558
QUALIFIES -1.139033 .585871	 -2.299639 .021573 -.183065
MATERIALS .210828 1.385077	 -2.532999 2.954656 .013794
(Constant) 27.218906 4.623302	 18.060179 36.377632
Severity of Accidents
A linear multiple regression analysis was performed to investigate the influence of safety attitudes
towards the severity of accidents and the results are shown below:
Multiple R	 .30861
R Square
	 .09524
Adjusted R Square	 .00794
Standard Error	 1.26666
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Outliers and Influential Data Points
The Mahalanobis' distances, Cook's distances and leverages of data points are shown in the
Appendix. No outliers were detected ( Mahalanobis' distance < 38.21 ) and Cook's distance and
leverages are small ( < 0.17 and <0.31 respectively ). Thus no cases were required to be deleted
prior to the analyses.
Residual Plots
Residual plots of the analyses have been included in the Appendix for examination of potential
problems with the regression model. The data points in the two plots appear to be random and do
not show any form of heteroscedasticity. The results therefore do not violate assumptions of
multiple regression.
4.7.5 INTERPRETATION OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Safety Performance
A standard multiple regression analysis was conducted satisfactorily with over 95% confidence
indicated by the R-square value of 0.125. As a consequence, the result of the linear regression was
significant in estimating a linear relationship between the transformed safety performance variables
and the 11 factors obtained from the previous factor analysis.
The relationship derived using SPSS is as follows:
T PERFOR = 27.2189 - 0.0027POL/CY - 1.8196L1KE + 0.6058MONEY -
0.2623SUPERVIS - 0.8757NORMS + 0.4550REWARD +
0.3326MANAGEM7' + 1.6518 OCCUPATN + 0.3266T0XIC -
1.1390QUALITY + 0.2108M4 TERL4L
Using hypothesis ( H. ) testing of coefficient of variables, the 95% confidence interval indicates a
weak result in certain factors. For any confidence interval of factor containing zero, an insignificant
contribution to the equation can be interpreted. By discounting all factors with such coefficient, we
obtain the following equation:
T PERFOR
95%	 Lower:
Confidence limits	 Upper:
= 27.2189
18.0602
36.3776
0.8757 NORMS
-1.6200
-0.1312
From the above equation a linear relationship between Industry Norm and Safety Performance has
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been deduced. The above equation also indicates 95% confidence of the variable coefficient, and
the constant in the equation. By substituting the original variables into the factor of Industry Norm,
we can obtain a further equation in terms of AGE, BLINDEYE (payment system, e.g., effect of
bonus) and INDUSTRY.
T PERFOR = 27.2189- 0.8757 NORMS
= 27.2189 - 0.8757(0.5390AGE + 0.5096BLINDEYE + 0.4656INDUSTRY)
:	 = 27.2189 - 0.4712 AGE - 0.4462 BLINDEYE - 0.4077 INDUSTRY
4.7.6
	 SEVERITY OF ACCIDENTS
The results of the standard multiple regression did not confirm a linear relationship between the
severity of accidents and the eleven factors. The R-square value obtained from the analysis indicate
a less than 95% confidence in the results ( R-square < 0.1 ). Consequently, the coefficients obtained
in the analysis are not sufficiently reliable to conclude a linear relationship between the factors and
the severity of accidents.
As a result of the above findings in the further analysis. the research model has to be revised to
reflect the inherent structure of the influences upon safety performance. A revised model is shown
in the discussion chapter followed.
4.8
	
C2 - COMPARISON OF BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS (ATTITUDES) SITE
MANAGERS. CONTRACT MANAGERS AND SAFETY
ADVISERS/MANAGERS : TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE 
As section 4.6 above, this section reports the patterns of behaviour of site managers, contract
managers and safety advisers/managers. It investigates the differences in patterns of behaviour
irrespective of variables contained in the model, (see Figure 3.8 & Figure 4.5 above), and compares
the three parties mentioned.
The measurement statistics used were the chi-square test of significance, and the results are in
Appendix M/1 - M112, and discussed below.
4.8.1 Main Sub-Hypothesis 'C[7__Cli  = C23  = C23 Attitudes of Site Managers
towards behavioural and environmental (variables) Factors differ from those of
Contract Managers and Safety Advisers/Managers
Null hypothesis 14.1 : There is no historical difference in attitudes between site
managers, contract managers and safety advisers/manager - C3 vs C2 - (a, b & c).
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An examination of management data showed similar results to those of the operatives and site
managers, which leads to the conclusion that no differences exist between site managers, contract
managers, and safety managers as regards historical variables of age, occupation, experience and
training as far as their impact on safety performance was concerned (see Null-hypothesis 1.1 and
8.1 Sections 4.5.1 and 4.6.1 above).
Null-hypothesis 14.2 : There is no economic difference in attitudes between site
managers, contract manager and safety advisers etc (see Appendix M/1 & M/2).
(a) An examination of the results of chi-square tests showed the following outcome:
Differences exist between site managers' attitudes and those of contract managers and
safety advisers, towards the statement that 'bonus schemes influence safety organisation
on site'.
The result showed site managers' support for the argument that 'bonus systems influence
safety organisation on site' ( x2 = 0.09, p = not significant - see Tables in Appendix
M/1).
On the other hand, both contract managers and safety advisers rejected the argument
(Contract Managers x2 = 5.44, and safety advisers x2 = 8.30, both significant - see
Tables in Appendix M) - the attitudes of Site Managers is different to those of Contract
Managers and Safety Advisers.
It is of some concern that whilst operatives and site managers share similar views about
the likely impact of bonus systems on safety performance, this opinion was not shared by
contract managers and safety advisers responsible for safety policy.
The explanation may be found in the distance between those involved in the day-to-day
site environment, and thus experiencing the productivity incentive issues (operatives and
site managers), and those not directly involved with those on site, i.e. contract managers
and safety advisers).
(b) Chi-square tests showed total support for the view that 'injury related accidents affect
productivity and financial performance - see below:
(i) Site Manager: x2 --= 0.31 - not significant;
(ii) Contract Managers: x2 = 2.93 -"
(iii) Safety Advisers: X,2 = 2.86 -"
(See tables in Appendix M/1 (2).
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that is: S.M. = C.M. = Safety Ad = No difference.
This result is not surprising due to the factual nature of the suggestion. It is therefore the
only logical outcome in this case.
(c) The view that 'bonus systems lead to supervisors turning a 'blind eye' to safety hazards
on site' was supported again by site managers, but rejected by contract managers, and
safety advisers. This indicates a difference in attitudes between site managers and
contract managers and safety advisers.
Again explanations given in (a) above may also apply here. (see Table 3 in Appendix
M/1. S.M. difference in attitudes to C.M. and S.Ads.)
(d) Chi-square tests showed agreement between contract managers, and safety advisers in
opposing the view that 'more safety training leads to better safety standards'.
This view was supported by site managers (see Tables where S.M. =2 = 1.62, - not
significant; C.M. =2 = 7.58 - significant; and safety advisers = x2 = 7.53 - significant
- (see Table 2 in Appendix M/1) - S.M. is different in attitude to C.M. and Safety
Advisers.
(e) The view that 'need to achieve commercial advantage or profits at tender influenced site
safety organisation' was again supported by site managers, and rejected by contract
managers, and safety advisers - (see results of chi-square tests in Table 5 in Appendix
M/1, where S.M. = X2 = 2.79 - not significant; C.M. = X2 = 4.92 - significant; safety
advisers = X2 15.32 - very significant). S.M. different in attitude to C.M. and S.A.
(0 The results of statistical analysis showed site managers supported the argument that 'A'
percentage of safety provision on job cost allowed in tender sums would improve safety
arrangements on site. However, this view was not supported by contract managers or
safety advisers (see Table 6 in Appendix M/1; where S.M. =x2 = 1.28 - not significant;
C.M. = X2 = 5.09 - significant and safety advisers x2 = 5.09 - significant) - S.M. is
different in attitude to C.M. and S.Ads.
Again contract managers and safety advisers have similar attitudes but opposite to those
of site managers.
(g) Chi-square tests again confirm site managers' support for the view that 'client's
contribution to the enforcement of safety provisions in tenders will improve safety
organisation on site'.
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Similarly, the above view was equally rejected by contract managers and safety advisers
(see Tables 7 in Appendix M12). Where S.M. - X2 = 0.76 - not significant, C.M. - X2 =
4.45 - significant and safety advisers - X2 = 4.51 - significant).
There is a difference in attitude between site managers on the one hand, and contract
managers and safety advisers on the other.
(h) Statistical tests indicated unanimous support by all three groups (S.M., C.M. and S.A.)
for the argument that 'contractor compliance with contract safety provision promotes
better safety performance' (see Table 8 in Appendix M/2; where S.M. - x 2 = 8.00 -
significant; C.M. - X2 = 8.25 - significant; and safety advisers - X2 = 12.71 - very
significant), indicating no difference in attitudes.
This is a very logical result since contract conditions play a significantly dominant role
in all construction matters. However, contract provision must be capable of being
enforced in order to be effective on all parties to the contract.
(i) Chi-square tests showed total agreement by all three groups with the suggestion that
'workers' safety consciousness on site influences productivity targets', and thus
concluding that S.M. = C.M. = S.A. (see Table 9 in Appendix M/2; where S.M. - x 2 =
0.25 - not significant, and safety advisers (S.A.) - X2 = 1.54 - not significant). This
showed no difference in attitudes.
(j) Chi-square tests again showed total agreement by the group towards the argument that
'awarding safety bonus lead to improved safety performance' and thus S.M. = C.M. =
S.A. (see Table 10 in Appendix M12; where S.M. - X2 = 1.87 - not significant; C.M. - y2
= 0.73 - not significant, and S.A. - X2 = 1.90 - not significant). This showed no
difference in attitudes.
Null-hypothesis 14.3 : There is no psychological difference in the attitudes between
site managers, contract managers, and safety advisers etc. 
(a) Statistical tests showed total agreement with the argument 'individual safety awareness
improves safety performance on site' and thus support the null hypothesis (see Table 11
in Appendix M/3; where S.M. - X2 = 1.31 - not significant; C.M. - X2 = 0.00 - not
significant, an S.A. - X2 = 1.67 - not significant).
(b) Chi-square tests showed total agreement with the statement that 'workers' irresponsible
site behaviour undermines safety performance on site'. This unanimous result indicates
support for the null hypothesis (see Table 12 in Appendix M/3; where S.M. -x 2 = 0.00 -
not significant; C.M. - X2 = 0.40 - not significant, and S.A. - X2 = 0.54 - not significant).
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(c) Chi-square tests showed differences in attitudes between site managers on the one hand,
and contract managers and safety advisers on the other, towards the opinion that
'workers' perception of the building industry as tough and dangerous influences 'macho'
behaviour and risk-taking'.
Again there is general agreement between operatives and site managers, but which is
apposite to those of contract managers and safety advisers, see Pirani (1976) and Leather
(1987) etc and Table 13 in Appendix M13; where S.M. - X2 = 5.32 - significant; C.M. - X
2 = 2.37 - not significant, and S.A. - X2 = 2.36 - not significant).
(d) Results of chi-square showed unanimous agreement with the opinion that 'pressure to
achieve programme and lack of safety up-dates undermines safety on site' (see Table 14
in Appendix M13; where S.M. - X2 = 10.01 - significant, C.M. - X2 = 5.60 - significant,
and S.A. - X2 = 11.35 - significant.
This result indicates total support for the null-hypothesis that 'there is no difference in
attitude between site managers, contract managers, and safety advisers towards
psychological variables - (see Figure 4.5 above).
(e) Safety is mostly a matter of commonsense. Chi-square test indicated that there was
agreement between site managers an safety advisers and a differing of opinion with
contract managers (see Table 15 in Appendix M13; where S.M. -2 = 4.32 - significant;
S.A. - X2 = 10.08 - significant; contract managers - x2 = 0.82 - not significant).
The above opinion was strongly voice by operatives, site managers and safety advisers
during the pilot interviews. It is therefore not surprising that the view was confirmed by
the statistical analysis. Any difference would have meant a role of chance at play as a
normal occurrence when a large sample such as this one is subjected to statistical
analysis.
(f) The view that 'individual carelessness is responsible for most accidents on site' was
showed by chi-square test to be agreeable to site managers and safety advisers, but not to
contract managers (see Table 16, in Appendix M13; where S.M. -x 2 = 9.09 - significant;
contract managers - X2 = 0.00 - not significant, and safety advisers - X2 = 13.67 - very
significant) - again indicating differentiation of attitudes.
(g) Chi-square tests showed total agreement between the group towards the opinion that
'urgency to achieve programme timescales forces site managers to pay less attention to
safety on site (see Table 17 in Appendix M14 where S.M. - X2 = 16.73 - significant;
C.M. - X2 = 4.14 -just significant, and safety advisers - X2 = 16.89 - significant).
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This result indicated no difference in attitudes and supports the null-hypothesis.
(h) Chi-square test showed that differences in attitudes existed between site managers and
safety advisers on the one hand, and contract managers on the other, towards the
statement that 'construction team co-operation on site influences accident reduction'.
This result again indicated closer similarities in attitudes between site manager and
safety advisers than with contract managers and safety advisers.
The explanation for this occurrence may be that site managers interact more closely with
safety advisers than with contract managers, and have much closer involvement with
safety issues affecting the site environment, than with contract managers (refer table 18
in Appendix M14; where S.M. - X2 = advisers - X2 = 35.69 - highly significant).
The result reject the null hypothesis.
(i) Chi-square test indicated general agreement that 'site management safety behaviour on
site is a major influence on workers' safety behaviour on site' (see Table 19 in Appendix
M13; where S.M. - X2 = 2.32 - not significant; C.M. - X2 = 1.03 - not significant; S.A. -X
2 = 2.52 - not significant.
This indicates no difference in attitude between the group and supports the null
hypothesis.
a) Chi-square test showed that site managers' attitudes differ from those of contract
managers and safety advisers in respect of the statement that 'poor co-operation between
sub-contractors on site undermines safety' (see Table 20 in Appendix M14; where S.M. -
X2 = 0.60 - not significant; C.M. - X2 = 4.08 - not significant; S.A. - X2 = 3.91 - just
significant.
The result supports the null-hypothesis. This outcome is consistent with the findings of
Apau (1980) see reference.
Null-hypothesis 14.4 : There is no procedural difference in the attitudes between
site managers. contract managers and safety advisers etc. 
(a) Investigating near-accidents was identified by the pilot survey for the research as a
means of preventing future or potential accidents. As a result the proposal that
'investigating near-accidents leads to prevention of future accidents', was made to test the
group's feelings about the statement.
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Chi-square tests showed agreement to the statement by site managers and safety
advisers. Again, contract managers indicated a difference in attitudes (see Table 21 in
Appendix M15; where site managers - X2 = 3.51 - moderately significant; control
managers - X2 = 1.82 - not significant; safety advisers - X2 = 10.82 - significant.
The result therefore showed a difference existing between contract managers, site
managers and safety managers, it hence rejects the null-hypothesis.
(b) Chi-square tests showed no difference in attitudes between the management group
towards the statement that 'considering safety procedures at tender stage is unnecessary'
(see Table 22 in Appendix M/5; where site managers - X2 = 0.08 - not significant;
contract managers - X2 = 1.91 - not significant; safety answers - X2 = 2.32 - not
significant).
This result supports the null-hypothesis.
(c) Statistical tests indicated no differences to exist in attitudes between site managers and
contract managers and safety advisers in respect of beliefs that 'the provision of
protective safety clothing etc. by firms is necessary to improve safety standards on site'.
This is the opinion of the group as indicated by chi-square test results as follows:
Site managers - X2 = 0.70 - not significant;
Contract managers - X2 = 1.91 - not significant;
Safety advisers - X2 = 1.96 - not significant (see Table 23 in Appendix M/5).
(d) Chi-square tests showed differences in site managers attitudes to those of contract
managers and safety advisers, in respect of the argument that 'considering safety
procedures and work methods at tender improves safety performance' (see Tables 24 in
Appendix M/5; where site managers - X2 = 0.09 - not significant, contract managers - X2
= 9.14 - significant; safety advisers - X2 = 9.28 - significant).
(e) Chi-square tests indicated no differences in attitudes between site managers, contract
managers and safety advisers in respect of the argument that 'providing all employees
with safety manuals or booklets improved safety performance'.
The results showed unanimous support for the null-hypothesis (see Tables 25 in
Appendix M/5, where: site managers - X2 = 6.72 - significant; contract managers - X2 =
30.29 - very significant; safety advisers - X2 = 196.87 - highly significant.
165
Null-hypothesis 14.5 : There is no technical difference in attitudes between site
managers, contract managers and safety advisers etc
(a) Results of chi-square test indicated no difference between site managers attitudes and
those of contract managers an safety advisers towards the statement that 'workers should
be discouraged from operating mobile plant and equipment for which they have received
no training'.
This result supports the null-hypothesis of no difference in attitudes between members of
the three management groups (see Table 26 in Appendix M16; where: site managers -x2
= 0.36 - not significant; contract managers -x 2 = 1.42 - not significant; safety advisers -
X2 = 1.42 - not significant.
However, contract managers' attitudes are closer in this case to those of safety advisers
than site managers, as chi-square test x2 for both = 1.42 - not significant.
(b) There is general agreement between site managers and contract managers to the
statement that 'provision of safety information to workers is lacking in the construction
industry, but safety advisers differed (see chi-square tests in Table 27 in Appendix M16;
where: Site Managers - X2 = 1.66 - not significant; contract managers - X2 = 0.12 - not
significant; safety advisers - X2 = 3.19 - significant.
This result indicates that differences in attitudes exist and therefore rejects the null-
hypothesis.
(c) Chi-square test showed unanimity towards the argument presented that 'the training of
contract managers in health and safety is inadequate for effective safety administration'
(see Table 28 in Appendix M16; where Site Managers - X2 = 0.04 - not significant;
contract managers - X2 = 0.73 - not significant, and safety advisers - X2 = 1.34 - not
significant).
(d) Difference exists between site managers' attitudes to the statement that 'wearing
protective safety clothing and equipment reduces workers' efficiency on site' and those of
contract managers and safety advisers' (see Table 29 in Appendix M/6; where site
managers - X2 = 0.58 - not significant; contract managers -x 2 -= 4.91 - significant; safety
advisers - X2 = 9.52 - significant).
This result rejects the null-hypothesis.
(e)
	
Chi-square test indicated total agreement to the suggestion that 'present methods of
tendering discriminate strongly against more safety-conscious contractors (see Table 30
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in Appendix M/6; showing chi-square X2 for site managers = 1.03 - not significant;
contract managers = 0.37 - not significant, and safety advisers = 2.87 - not significant.
The result supports the null-hypothesis).
(0 Result of chi-square showed general agreement for the argument that 'pressure of work
and fatigue leads to accidents on site' (see Table 31 in Appendix M16; where x 2 = site
managers = 9.99 - significant; contract managers = 4.95 - significant; safety advisers =
7.47 - significant).
The results support the null-hypothesis that there is no difference in attitudes between
site managers and those of contract managers and safety advisors towards technical
variables: S.M. = C.M. = S.A.
Null-hypothesis 14.6: There is no organisational difference in attitudes between site
managers and those of contract managers and safety advisers etc.
(a) Chi-square test showed difference to exist in attitudes of site managers to those of
contract managers and safety advisers in respect of the argument that 'more accidents
occur when worker-management relationships are bad'.
The result indicated that site managers - X2 = 0.21 - not significant, whereas those of:
contract manager - X2 = 5.07 - significant; safety advertisers - x 2 = 8.62 - significant
(see Table 32 in Appendix M/7). This rejects the null-hypothesis.
(b) The result of chi-square test showed that site managers and contract managers are
different in attitude to safety advisers in respect of the argument that 'Trade Union
involvement in safety reduces accidents on site' (see Table 33 in Appendix M17), where
chi-square X2 for: site managers = 2.62 - not significant; contract managers = 1.75 - not
significant, but safety advisers = 9.06 - significant; thereby rejecting the null-hypothesis.
(c) The result of chi-square test showed total agreement between the groups with the
statement that 'having safety representatives on site improves safety standards and
performance' (see Table 34 in Appendix M17), where x2
 for: site managers = 0.31 - not
significant; contract managers = 0.56 - not significant; safety advisers = 1.80 - not
significant, and thereby supporting the null-hypothesis.
(d) The result of chi-square test showed total support to exist between the groups towards
the statement that 'site managers and safety representatives have responsibility for safety
on site' (see Table 35 in Appendix M/7), where x2
 for: site managers = 3.66 - just
significant; contract managers = 44.08 - highly significant; safety advisers = 7.45 -
significant, and supports the null-hypothesis.
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(e) The result of chi-square test showed no difference exists between the groups relating to
the statement that 'management and workers' co-operation highly essential for safe
working'. (see Table 36 in Appendix M17); where X2 for: site managers = 1.79 - not
significant; contract managers = 0.00 - not significant; safety advisers = 2.99 - not
significant, and hence support the null-hypothesis.
(0 The result of chi-square test showed that there is a difference in attitude between site
managers and contract managers and safety advisers regarding managers and supervisors
who do not talk enough about safety to their workers (see Table 37 in Appendix M17);
where chi-square X2 for: site managers = 0.06 - not significant; contract managers = 6.39
- significant; safety advisers = 8.75 - significant, and thus rejected the null-hypothesis.
(g) The result of chi-square test showed that no difference in attitudes exist between site
managers, contract managers and safety advisers regarding "having safety committees
improves safety standards of an organisation. (see Table 38 in Appendix M18); where
chi-square X2 for: site managers = 4.81 - significant; contract managers = 6.02 -
significant; safety advisers = 7.63 - significant, and supports the null hypothesis.
(h) The result of chi-square test showed that there is a difference in attitudes between site
managers and safety advisers and some contract managers regarding the statement that
'more Factory Inspectors in the Building Industry can improve Health and Safety
performance' (see Table 39 in Appendix M18); where x 2
 for: site managers = 18.75 -
very significant; safety advisers = 31.14 - very significant, and contract managers = 0.88
-not significant, and so rejects the null-hypothesis.
(i) The result of chi-square test showed that no difference in attitudes exist between the
groups towards the statement that 'management attitudes determine workers' safety
behaviour on site' (see Table 40 in Appendix M18); where chi-square X 2 for: site
managers = 3.66 - just significant; contract managers = 4.51 - just significant and safety
advisers = 6.11 - significant, thus supporting the null-hypothesis.
(j) The result of chi-square test showed differences in attitudes exist between the group
towards the statement 'poor co-ordination of sub-contractors' work on site influences
safety performance on site' (see Table 41 in Appendix M/8); where chi-squarex2 for: site
managers = 1.37 - not significant; contract managers = 0.73 - not significant and safety
advisers = 9.87 - significant, and therefore rejects the null-hypothesis.
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Null-hypothesis 14.7 • There is no Environmental difference in attitudes between
site managers. contract managers and safety advisers etc. 
(a) The result of chi-square test showed that no differences in attitude exist between the
groups regarding the statement that 'a single-contractor responsibility for all scaffolding
on a site is important for the improvement of safety standards/performance' (see Table 42
in Appendix M19); where x2 for: site managers = 0.25 - not significant; contract
managers = 0.00 - not significant; safety advisers = 0.34 - not significant and so supports
the null-hypothesis.
(b) The result of chi-square test showed that no differences in attitudes exist between the
groups towards the statement that 'untidy building sites do not lead to accident
occurrence' (see Table 43 in Appendix M19); where x2 for: site managers = 0.03 - not
significant; contract managers = 2.75 - not significant; safety advisers = 2.85 - not
significant, and supports the null-hypothesis.
(c) The result of chi-square test showed that differences in attitudes exist between site
managers and contract managers to those of safety advisers, towards the proposition that
'providing good quality welfare and first-aid facilities on site improves safety standards'
(see Table 44 in Appendix M19); where chi-square 7C2 for: site managers = 0.96 - not
significant; contract managers = 2.50 - not significant, and safety advisers = 6.48 -
significant, thus rejecting the null-hypothesis.
(d) Chi-square test again showed that differences in attitudes exist between site managers
and contract managers and safety advisers in respect of the statement that 'providing
workers' thermal or warm clothing in winter can lead to accident reduction on site' (see
Table 45 in Appendix M19); where chi-square x2 for: site managers = 1.16 - not
significant; contract managers = 0.95 - not significant and safety advisers = 4.43 - just
significant; thus rejects the null hypothesis.
(e) Chi-square test showed that differences in attitudes exist between site managers, contract
managers and safety advisers in respect of the statement that 'good job planning and site
organisation improves safety performance' (see Table 46 in Appendix m/9) where chi-
square result x2 for: site managers = 0.15 - not significant; contract managers = 4.73 -
significant and safety advisers = 6.26 - significant thus it rejects the null hypothesis.
(0 Chi-square test showed that differences in attitudes exist between site managers and
safety advisers from those of contract managers in respect of the statement that 'an
inadequate supply of the right type an quality of tools, plant and equipment, leads to
accidents and damage on sites', (see Table 47 in Appendix M19), where chi-square result
)(2 for: site managers = 3.00 - just significant; safety advisers = 3.82 - just significant and
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contract managers = 0.17 - not significant.
(g) Chi-square test showed no difference in attitudes between the group in respect of the
statement that 'attitudes of older workmates to safety and health are a source of major
influence to new recruits in the construction industry' (see Table 48 in Appendix M/10),
where chi-square x2 for: site managers = 2.21 - not significant; contract managers = 0.29
- not significant and safety advisers = 2.38 - not significant. Thus it supports the null
hypothesis.
(h) Chi-square test showed that differences in attitudes exist between site managers and
those of contract managers and safety advisers in respect of the statement that
'inadequate control and supervision of workers on site is a major factor in accident
occurrence', (see Table 49 in Appendix M110), where chi-square result x 2 for: site
managers = 0.00 - not significant; contract managers = 4.13 - significant and safety
advisers = 4.79 - significant, thus rejecting the null hypothesis.
(i) Chi-square test showed that no differences in attitudes exist between the groups, in
respect of the statement that 'workers and managers can reduce the causes of most
accidents on site by being a little more thoughtful about safety provisions on site' (see
Table 49 in Appendix M/10), where chi-square 7C2 for: site managers = 7.24 - significant;
contract managers = 9.10 - significant; safety advisers = 13.91 - significant, and thus it
supports the null hypothesis.
Null-hypothesis 14.8 : There is no difference in attitudes between site managers,
contract managers, and safety advisers, towards safety performance factors 
(variables) 
(a) Chi-square test showed that differences in attitudes exist between site managers, an those
of contract managers and safety advisers, in respect of the statement that 'regular safety
assessments on a competitive basis increases safety awareness' (see Table 51 in
Appendix M/11), where chi-square result is X2 for: site managers = 1.38 - not significant;
contract managers = 5.99 - significant; safety advisers = 5.97 - significant, and thus it
rejects the null hypothesis.
(b) Chi-square test again showed that differences in attitudes exist between site managers
and those of contract managers and safety advisers, in respect of the statement that 'the
Health and Safety Inspectorate have inadequate resources to enforce safety requirements
in the construction industry' (see Table 52 in Appendix M/11); where chi-square resultx2
for: site managers = 0.01 - not significant; contract managers = 4.95 - significant; and
safety advisers = 6.30 - significant, and thus it rejects the null hypothesis.
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(c) Chi-square test showed that no differences exist in attitudes between the groups in
respect of the statement that 'hazard identification, analysis an up-dating by management
would lead to improved safety performance on site (see Table 53 in Appendix M/11);
where X2 for: site managers = 7.24 - significant; contract managers = 4.07 - significant;
safety advisers = 8.73 - significant, and hence supports the null hypothesis.
(d) Chi-square test showed again that no differences exist in attitudes between the groups in
respect of the statement that 'efficient hazard identification and analysis as a key
management function is a key factor in encouraging improved safety performance' (see
Table 54 in Appendix M/11); where chi-square x 2 for: site managers = 7.84 - significant;
contract managers = 9.64 - significant, and safety advisers = 13.39 - significant, which
thus supports the null hypothesis.
(e) Chi-square test showed that differences in attitudes exist between site managers and
safety advisers and those of contract managers, in respect of the statement that
'displaying all accident information on site would prevent risk-taking by workers' (see
Table 55 in Appendix M/11), where chi-square result X 2 for: site managers = 7.08 -
significant; safety advisers = 9.38 - significant, and contract managers = 0.00 - not
significant, and thus rejects the null hypothesis.
(0 Chi-square test showed no differences exist in attitudes between the groups in respect of
the statement that 'alcohol and drugs are not major problems for safety on site' (see Table
56 in Appendix M/11); where X2 for: site managers = 0.04 - not significant, contract
managers = 0.08 - not significant and safety advisers = 0.26 - not significant, and thus
supports the null hypothesis.
(g) Chi-square test showed that differences in attitudes exist between site managers, and
those of contract managers and safety advisers in respect of the statement that 'all
companies in the building industry should have alcohol and drugs policies as part of
safety policies' (see Table 57, Appendix M/12), where X2 for: site managers = 0.06 - not
significant; contract managers = 3.98 - just significant; safety advisers = 4.53 -
significant; and thus rejects the null hypothesis.
(h) Chi-square test showed that no differences in attitudes exist between site managers,
contract managers and safety advisers towards the statement that 'lack of consultation
between clients, engineers, designers, managing contractors and sub-contractors,
undermines safety provision, and safety performance of contract' (see Table 58 in
Appendix M112), where chi-square result X2 for: site managers = 6.00 - significant;
contract managers = 12.76 - very significant; safety advisers = 31.64 - highly significant,
and hence support the null hypothesis.
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(i) Chi-square test showed that differences in attitudes exist between contract managers, and
those of site managers, and safety advisers in respect of the statement that 'safety
provision in tender documents are too vague for promoting better safety on site' (see
Table 59 in Appendix M112); where chi-square x 2 for: site managers = 2.25 - not
significant; contract managers = 0.13 - not significant; safety advisers = 4.19 -
significant, and hence rejects the null hypothesis.
(j) Chi-square test showed that differences in attitudes again exist between site managers,
contract managers, and safety advisers in respect of the statement that 'most accidents
occur on multi-occupied sites due to inadequate control of sub-contractors' (see Table 60
in Appendix M112); where chi-square result x2 for: site managers = 2.25 - not
significant; contract managers = 0.13 - not significant and safety advisers = 4.19 -
significant, and thus rejects the null hypothesis.
4.8a Conclusions of Sub-hypothesis C (C2a = C2b = C2c) : Site Managers' Attitudes towards 
behavioural and environmental variables differ from those of contract managers and
safety advisers
The previous statistical analysis for hypothesis B above examined the differences between
operatives and site managers' attitudes towards behavioural and environmental variables as shown
in the research model in Figure 3.8 above, and found similarities to exist between most of the
variables compared, using the chi-square test of significance as sole measure or test (see Section
4.6 above).
Similarly, this section (4.8) examined the difference between site managers' attitudes towards
behavioural, environmental and safety performance variables compared to those of contract
managers and safety advisers.
The aim of this comparison was to see if differences existed between their individual group
attitudes and what impact such differences may have had upon the variables examined.
The results of the analysis using chi-square test of significance (x 2) are detailed in the Appendix of
this study, and discussed in section 4.8 above. An examination of the results indicated that
predominant similarities existed between the attitudes of site managers, contract managers and
safety advisers towards the variables as discussed in Chapter Three above. However, it showed
that differentiation of attitudes between the groups also existed towards certain behavioural,
environmental and safety performance variables, but only to a lesser degree (see discussions above
in 4.8).
Where similarities existed, the results indicated total and unanimous support for the tested
variables.
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A summary of the variables examined for attitudinal comparisons are as follows:
(a) Site managers believed that economic and environmental factors had a major impact on
safety on site - more so than the rest of the variables (see Figure 4.5).
The next most influential variable was psychological factors, followed by procedural and
organisational variables.
For site managers, technical factors had least impact upon safety performance.
Site managers' attitudes also differed most from those of contract managers, and safety
advisers in terms of economic and environmental factors than in areas of procedural and
technical factors.
(b) Contract managers, and safety advisers differed in attitude to site managers in areas of
economic and environmental factors.
(c) There were strong similarities in attitudes among the groups in terms of psychological
factors, technical factors, organisational factors and in safety performance factors.
(d) Although some differences in attitudes exist from the statistical analysis, these were not
sufficient to support the sub-hypothesis C, and its null-hypotheses.
The results of statistical analysis indicated that the pattern of behaviour of site managers
was more similar to that of the safety advisers than to that of the contract managers.
The reason for this may be found in the level of liaison between site managers and safety
advisers. In other words, safety advisers have more influence on site managers than
contract managers, as far as safety standards and performance are concerned.
The outcome is quite logical in that the roles of the contract managers are very different
from those of the safety advisers as far as they relate to the site manager on site. As
such, role differences are likely to lead to differences of attitudes and ultimately,
differences in levels of impact and influence upon the site managers' behaviour towards
safety on site.
Note: Regional and Cultural difference 'or' attitudes may play a role in influencing safety
behaviour in the construction industry. For example, there may be cultural or regional
differences amongst workers in Scotland, Wales, the Midlands, and London, which may
shape safety attitudes or behaviour in construction sites.
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However, this study whilst aware of the potential differences which such Regional and
Cultural factors may cause, the author did not consider them in the research. Regional
and cultural differences are therefore discounted.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Discussion of the Results
CHAPTER FIVE
5	 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discussed the research findings resulting from the data analysis described in Chapter
Four. More particularly, it pulls the results of the research together in accordance with the central
elements or variables of the research model as detailed in Chapter Three (Figure 3.7). and prelude
to the research conclusions in Chapter Six.
The central aim of the research was to compare the results with the predictive
classifications discussed in Chapter Two (Literature Reviews), and Chapter Three (Review of Past
Research Models), and to confirm or reject the research hypothesis
The main hypothesis is broken down into several sub-hypotheses as reported in Chapter Four
above. The opposite to these sub-hypotheses are assumed to be null-hypotheses (of no relationship)
and these are similarly considered above in Chapter Four.
The main statistics used for the data analysis are those of correlation coefficient, chi-square
analysis or test of significance, and multivariate analysis. The results of correlation, chi-square tests
and multivariate analysis are shown in Tables contained in the Appendix at the back of this work,
for the purpose of reference. The results of chi-square tests which have significance levels of p =
0.05 are considered valid and acceptable as significant for the purposes of this research. In other
words, those scores of 0.05 and above, are seen as establishing a good degree of association
between one variable and another. Those with scores more than 0.250 may be considered as having
a good degree of relationship, but are not considered as conclusive.
Although it is of the utmost practical and theoretical interest to establish the relationships which
exist between employee and management attitudes towards safety and safety performance,
nevertheless, any outcome should be viewed only as tentative. This is mainly due to the sample
size (325) drawn from only kn companies, and representing only a tiny snapshot of an industry as
vast as the construction industry.
Notwithstanding the above observations, any relationships established should be considered
important enough to serve as useful pointers to all those interested in safety behaviour; be they
policy-makers or safety practitioners at the company or site levels, or from the point of view of
academic or future research interests
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The results of the analysis in overall terms, have shown variable and significant levels of
associations to exist between factors of safety attitudes, and safety performance. Whilst some
degree of relationships are shown - the writer suggests however, some degree of caution, as chance
have played some part in the relationships deduced from correlation coefficient, and chi-square test
of significance. The results of multivariate analysis however, have reinforced the outcomes derived
from correlation analysis and have furthermore highlighted the most dominant variable (factors)
which impact upon safety performance.
5.1.2. Historical Factors (Variables)
The most prominent historical or biographical factors to emerge from this study which had impact
upon safety performance consisted of the following:
i) company type and contract formation;
ii) training;
iii) age and experience.
a)	 Company Type and Contract Formation
Of the ten companies in the sample, most were classified by operatives and site managers as main
contractors (72.22 percent); sub-contractors (21.43 percent) and only 6.35 percent were considered
as self-employed.
Significantly, the majority of the sample indicated that they were working under a management
contracting project arrangement (54.76 per cent). This awareness of contract packaging or
formation shown by this group is quite significant in that any degree of contracting awareness may
lead to an awareness of safety liability in terms of the individual and the company. This is because
the form which a contract package takes determines the planning mode which a project adopts, and
this has implications for the management of the health and safety at site planning level. All this
affects the co-ordination of sub-contractors' input to the project itself.
Lomax (1989/9a. "The Builder") and Sidwell (1982) indicate that:
"the relationship between contractual arrangement, and project success is
essentially dependent upon the level of management control."
Hinze (1987) concluded in his research that:
"Management control and good management on site, are essential for good safety
performance."
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b) Trade and Training
The largest individual group in the operative group was general labourers (36.51 percent), followed
by carpenters and joiners (20.63 per cent) and bricklayers (12.70 per cent). Also the largest
untrained group in this sample which acquired its skills mainly via experience and with a minimum
of general training was the labouring group (49 per cent). The single most significant route
followed by craftsmen was indicated as post-school apprenticeship (30.16 per cent) and then
full-time and part-time attendance at technical colleges (7.14 per cent and 4.47 per cent
respectively).
On the other hand, most site managers in the sample rose from the ranks of carpenters and joiners
(31.08 percent), followed by graduates (28.38 percent), and 22.97 percent had technical college
education ranging from ONC/D to HNC/D etc., and City & Guilds.
Interestingly, most Contract Managers were Technical College-educated (30.36 percent), followed
by University graduates (25 percent), and those who originated from the background of carpenter
and joiner (23 percent), bricklayer (12 percent), roofers and electricians (2 percent) and general
categories (5.36 percent).
It is significant to note that aside from graduates and technical college-educated, carpenters and
joiners form the single largest craft or trade group to have risen to management status in the
construction industry 31 percent - site managers, 23 percent contract managers and 22 percent
safety advisers).
An examination of the above statistics indicates a poor showing for operatives of the labouring
group in terms of structured training including safety training. From the above results, it is not
surprising that 'learning by experience' rather than via a formal and well-structured training scheme,
followed at training centres or college, failed to feature in the scheme of things, since the largest
individual operative group was labourers (46 per cent). A large untrained labour force would
therefore have serious implications for safety performance on site at the operative level.
c) Membership of Professional Institutions
The data analysis showed that operatives did not belong to professional institutions, but rather
belonged to craft-based organisations.
On the other hand, a high proportion of managers belonged to professional institutions. The
explanation for this is that achievement of professional status became a symbol of professional
attainment and experience as well as competence. For example, the results showed that for site
managers, 28 per cent were graduates, followed by 27 per cent members of the Chartered Institute
of Building, and 12 per cent had either HNC/D, ONC/D or B.TECH etc.
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Despite these qualifications, the interviews indicated that safety education and experience were
gained after qualifications, rather than as part of the course taught. The majority of the group had
indicated a preference for safety being included in all professional qualifications as a proper
examination subject.
Similarly, for Contract Managers, 	 27 percent were CIOB members;
16 per cent were RICS members;
13 per cent were graduates, and
9 per cent were ICE members.
Of the remainder, 39 percent had HND/C; 18 per cent City & Guilds qualifications of one type or
another, and 16 percent had OND/ONC respectively.
Most importantly, 39 per cent of all Contract Managers indicated having received Health and
Safety instructions as a taught subject in their training course.
Finally, all Safety Advisers belonged to professional institutions as follows:
IOSH	 =	 55 percent
CIOB	 =	 33 percent
MIIRISK	 =	 7 percent
ICE	 =	 2 percent
Others	 =	 4 percent
All had safety as a taught/examination subject.
The significance of this is that if safety was to be adequately managed in the construction industry,
then all management in the industry must be well trained and educated in all aspects of safety.
Results of statistical analysis also showed a strong correlation between training generally, and
safety training in particular to be significantly associated with safety performance (refer Tables
4.17 (p = 0.05); Table 4.25 (p = 0.01) in Appendix K). The results indicate that site managers and
Contract Managers are lacking in safety training in the early stages of management compared to
Safety Advisers or Managers.
AGE AND EXPERIENCE
The results showed age and experience as perhaps the most significant factor in accident causation
involving the construction worker. Vernon (1944) stated that 'usually the two are so closely bound
together that it is impossible to disentangle them'.
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This result is significant since the age and experience of the average construction worker from
operatives to management was between 21 years and 45 years. Schulzinger (1956) demonstrated
that accidents are most frequent in the age range of 17 (seventeen) to 28 (twenty eight) and that
they decline steadily after that to reach a low point in the late fifties (50) and sixties (60).
Furthermore, the tendency for individuals to experience more frequent injuries during their early
years in the labour force, is one of the most consistent findings in the accident or safety field
(Haddon, Suchman and Kline (1964)). Grew (1958) also reached similar conclusions. Also that
older men are unable to meet the demands of such job types, unless they are modified to match
their capabilities.
Whilst the above findings may be generally true of all industries, it is particularly pertinent to the
construction industry, as the research results showed. It showed that those under 30 years old
complained more about the general conditions of their work, and its environment than their older
counterparts (of 46 years or older), for whom the physical conditions of construction were viewed
by many as requiring energy rather than technique or flair.
For construction, and particularly as far as this study is concerned, the result showed the most
dominant age group for site managers to be between 30-40 years; for Contract Managers- 41-45
years and 36-40 years, and for Safety Advisers - 41-50 years, followed by those of 36-40 years old.
The least represented age group were those between 25-30 years old who were in the minority in
all the above management categories.
An explanation for this result may be that the older generation of managers took longer to acquire
the necessary knowledge and skills to gain promotion than the younger generation who are more
likely to have university or Technical College education. For these, early academic, technical and
professional qualifications may enhance speed of learning and experience, and hence early
promotion to managerial levels. These groups tend to be more adaptable to industry changes than
their older counterparts (management pilot interviews, 1984).
5.1.3. Economic Factors (Variables).
The results of correlation coefficient and chi-square test of significance (see Appendix K, Tables)
had revealed certain interesting results seen from data analysis reported in Chapter Four above.
The most significant findings were as follows:
a)	 Strong association exists between paying 'danger money' and safety performance
(correlation coefficient = 0.366 and p = 0.001 - see Appendix K - Table 4.16)
Fifty six percent (56%) of operative sample indicated opposition to any form of 'danger money'
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being paid in the construction industry. The perception was that paying any form of 'danger money'
was tantamount to an inducement to take risks, and that such an inducement ran counter to the aims
of safety promotion on site, and in the construction industry generally.
The construction site is obviously a more dangerous place to work in than the typical factory floor
where the process of production is not only systematic, but also takes place in a more controlled
and constant working environment. The construction site is often at the best of times- chaotic, as
various operations/activities take place simultaneously due to the proliferation of sub-contractors,
and this makes management control of these activities often impossible. As such, any additional
incentive to take risks through payment of 'danger money' will only exacerbate an already troubled
environment or situation.
b) Banksmen training was found to be inadequate by the result. However, the result indicated
that there was no relationship between banksman training and safety performance. Despite this
result, safety advisers, contract managers and site managers had indicated that 'banksmen's training
was highly significant.
However, education of the operative groups on the role of the 'banksman' is critical to successful
safety procedures on site.
c) Bonus payments: The results showed that there was a relationship between bonus
payments and safety performance. The explanation for this was that bonus payments lead
operatives to achieve higher production through performing unsafely at the site level. It is therefore
an incentive to work faster than was usually the case, and in the process, unsafe methods of work
by chance-taking became the norm, and hence accidents (Leather (1983), Peterson (1982)).
Peterson (1982) observed that
'people commit unsafe acts because they have been rewarded in the past for doing
so; that is, operatives received bonus payments for extra productivity that may
have been achieved by performing unsafely.'
The result of the research concurs with the above. It indicated that bonus payments also influenced
supervisor behaviour towards safety (ref: Table 4.18, Appendix K- correlation coefficient 0.701; p
= 0.001, also see Leather (1983); Shimmin eta! ( 1982).
Rather than paying bonuses as an incentive for higher productivity without due regard for safety,
the research indicated that 'safety bonuses' should be paid instead, as they have a significant and
positive association with safety performance, since they combine productivity and safety
performance as a goal for reward. A Safety Bonus was found to enhance safety performance and
productivity (see Table 4.19 - Appendix K, correlation co-efficient = 0.839, p = 0.001).
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Generally, operatives' bonus schemes in the construction industry were perceived as a constraint to
good safety behaviour, and were believed by site managers to have an impact upon the
achievement of a favourable level of safety performance on site.
Similarly, contract managers and safety advisers felt that bonus schemes interfered with safety
organisation on site. Leather (1983) concluded that:
" ... that management was indeed concerned with the problem of bonus. That is, a
staggering 67% of foremen, and 42% of housing managers in the Public Sector
Group consider bonus targets to be a major contributing cause of risk-taking,
and corner-cutting by the direct labour operatives."
He went on to state that:
"In the private sector ... some 55% of foremen thought its [bonus] influencemight
work in that direction."
For this research, 74 per cent of safety advisers/officers, 55 per cent contract managers, 51 percent
site managers and 63 per cent operatives expressed similar views as Leather's (1983) conclusion.
This result is therefore considered as highly valid and significant.
d) Risk-taking was seen as a common nuisance, and it hampered safety promotion efforts in
the construction industry, whilst statistically a high association exists between 'risk-taking' and
safety performance. Nevertheless, risk-taking was considered as an industry 'norm'
construction culture, since the industry was perceived as dangerous.
If the industry was seen as a dangerous environment, then risk-taking was considered an inevitable
consequence that needed to be combated by safety practitioners. It should be driven home to
workers that because the industry is dangerous, all the more reason why risk-taking ought to be
minimised, so as to reduce or avoid the risk of accidental injuries to the individual worker or group.
It is clear from the results that increased productivity, and good safety performance can go
hand-in-hand (see Table 4.21 - Appendix K, correlation coefficient = 0.803, p =0.001).
5.1.4. Psychological Factors (Variables)
a)	 Personal and Group Care for Safety on Site
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Examination of the statistical analysis indicates that relationships exist between personal care for
own safety and safety performance (see Table 4.23 - Appendix K, where correlation coefficient
was 0.718, with a chi-square p = 0.001). This means that where the individual showed concern for
personal safety, and reflected this concern in their approach to their work, safety performance or
the chance of that individual having an accident, would reduce, compared to others who neglected
their personal safety in the course of their work.
Similarly, care for workmates' safety was not considered as essential as care for one's own safety.
The results showed that no association existed between workmates' safety and safety performance.
The explanation for this low score may be that personal safety was put first before that of others,
simply because construction work was seen as a group, but nevertheless a competitive activity. In
any group activity, it may be that human instinct dictates that personal survival comes first unless
where the safety of the individual is dependent upon the safety or survival of the group.
Construction work is generally a team or group activity; as such, the well being of members of the
team or group would be viewed as essential to team spirit and group performance. Since the group
is composed of individuals, it may be safe to assert that a group composed of safety conscious
individuals would make a safety conscious group, and thus enhance group safety performance.
From this, it is significant to propose that group training in safety must highlight the importance of
developing a group sense of shared responsibility between the individual, group and management,
where safety was concerned.
b) The Impact of the Health and Safety Act, 1974
The Health and Safety Act was shown to have significant impact on safety performance and an
association was indicated statistically to exist between the two variables (Tables 4.24- Appendix
K).
For this reason, knowledge of the 'Act' must be considered of primary importance where operative
training is concerned.
Amongst the operatives' sample (N = 126), knowledge of the Act was indicated as a significant
source of influence on the creation of safety awareness in the construction industry (63%). This
outcome also confirms the result of research by the author in 1982 (Sawacha & Langford, pub.
1986).
c) Training and Experience
Skill training, safety training and experience were seen as the most significant source of influence
in terms of good safety performance in the construction industry. The research results showed a
correlation and significance between the above and safety performance (see Tables 4.25/27 in
Appendix K), and section 5 2 above for detail discussion.
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Various research has also shown that knowledge and experience of the task or job was significant
for an efficient safety performance (Shimmin eta! 1982; Leather(1983), Perusse & Hale (1980).
d)	 Supervisors' Safety Behaviour
The research statistical analysis showed that a relationship exists between supervisors behaviour
and safety performance (see Table 4.28 - Appendix
Operatives' expectation of their supervisors' safety attitudes is relatively high, and they see their
supervisors' safety attitudes and behaviour as being a major source of influence upon their own
safety behaviour on site. Amongst the operative group, responses indicated 77 per cent perceived
their supervisors' safety behaviour on site as highly essential for them as a role model.
Other researches had reached similar conclusions in the past which makes this finding valid, for
example, Davies and Stachi (1964) found that
"frequent daily contact between workers, supervisors on safety and other job
matters, is most important to accident control efforts. Top management's attitudes
towards safety is also a significant factor."
Andriessen's (1978) study reached a similar conclusion. It states that:
"Workers will work more safely with a supervisor who is seen as someone who
respects his workers and their contribution, and who is stimulated by a distinct
company policy on safety. Because they see that their supervisor regards safety
equally important as production, they can also expect that he will react positively,
when they work safely. (see pg. 61 above for detailed discussion of the study)."
The above confirms the outcome of this research as valid and significant
5.1.5 Technical Factors
The most significant technical factors found to impact upon safety performance were:
a) Awareness of asbestos as a health hazard (p = 0.05)
b) Recognition of asbestos (p = 0.001)
c) Information on asbestos available to the workforce (p = 0.001)
d) Proper use of scaffolding and ladders (p = 0.005)
e) Adequate daily scaffolding inspections (p = 0.001)
D	 Building experience and use of common-sense in scaffolding erection (p = 0.001)
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g) Training skills of steel-erectors (p = 0.05)
h) Plant driver training (p = 0.05).
The most significant factor in safety performance is the human factor the human factor used
therefore to eliminate or avoid accidents, but there must first be an awareness of what causes
accidents in the work situation or environment.
The above constitute some of the causes of accidents as far as this research is concerned. The
more common causes of accidents are tabulated in the Appendix - Table 4.15b - see Appendix N).
The research found that despite the awareness of asbestos as a source of health hazards (expressed
by 98%) of the sample, only 55 per cent felt confident that they would recognise it if exposed on
site. Most surprisingly 58 per cent thought that they would be to blame should they handle
asbestos, or work with it without adequate protection, despite believing that the company had
overall responsibility for informing employees of the presence of asbestos in the workplace or site.
Asbestos information to operatives by management was indicated as lacking by 77 percent of
operatives.
Ladders and scaffolding were similarly found to be a great source of accidents in the construction
industry. As such most operatives (79 per cent) indicated that only technical trained persons should
erect them, and carry out regular safety checks and inspections if accidents were to be avoided.
They felt that common-sense and building experience alone should not be the qualification for
erecting it on site. Eighty four percent (84%) believed that good technical/skill training and
experience were the only criteria which should be recognised, and that all erectors of scaffolding
and inspectors should be certified as such. A similar view was indicated for steel erectors.
The operation and use of mechanised plant and equipment was also found to be a major source of
accidents on site. Despite that, operatives indicated that supervisors and site managers would
instruct uncertified persons to operate, use or drive them on site when the usual operator was found
to be absent on site to do so. Ninety-two per cent (92%) of operatives were unhappy with their
supervisors operating or using them before they were adequately trained.
The same opinion was expressed about operating site transport. Some form of certification was
considered necessary before anyone was allowed to operate or drive a dumper or other mobile
vehicle on site. Sixty four per cent believed that experience and common-sense alone was
inadequate.
An effective remedy to avoid the shortcomings expressed above would be a consistent policy of
hazard identification and assessments on individual sites throughout the construction industry.
Research has found that 'hazard identification or assessment are considered to be a highly
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significant factor in attitudes towards risks in general and safety performance in particular (Robaye
(1963), Hale and Hale (1970)).
A point of view generally held by safety advisers/officers in this research, and as evidenced by
previous research is that the results of hazard identification and assessment exert considerable
influence upon the choice of action taken (CITB, 1972; APAU, 1980). Further discussion of
previous research are detailed on page 47 above, which validates this research result.
5.1.6 Procedural Factors
Procedural factors were found to influence safety performance, and those indicated as most
significant variables were as follows:
a) Provision of protective safety clothing and equipment (p = 0.001);
b) Non-use of protective safety clothing and equipment;
c) Issuing of suitable quality, and adequate safety equipment;
d) Provision of adequate training on the use of protective safety clothing and equipment;
e) Provision of a safety booklet/manual, together with induction training for new recruits to
the industry (p = 0.001 ) .
The provision of good quality safety equipment and clothing is seen to have a significant influence
on safety awareness and performance. However, workers must be trained and familiarised with
methods of use in order to have maximum impact upon the individual's safety performance. Having
trained workers on the use of protective safety clothing and equipment, they should be encouraged
and cajoled as necessary to ensure they use them as specified and maintain them properly to give
maximum protection. Workers indicated that the failure to wear/use them ought to be a punishable
offence through sanctions imposed on the offender. They suggest that such a sanction should be
written into Contracts of Employment - a view expressed by 68 per cent of workers in the sample
(N = 126). The study showed that management did not give enough importance to the training of
operatives on how and where to use protective safety equipment and clothing. Rather, whilst they
were good at the provision of this clothing, workers were left to use their own discretion most of
the time. Sixty one per cent of respondents expressed the need for training on the use of supplied
clothing and equipment as being a high priority on site.
As part of the training in safety, 90 per cent of operatives felt the need for the provision of safety
manuals or booklets to all workers on site throughout the construction industry. Their belief was
that the issue of safety manuals or booklets promoted (created) and reinforced safety awareness,
improved company image by showing that the company cared about safety and lead to improved
safety performance. The result indicated that, to ensure maximum safety impact, all new recruits
would be given induction training in safety on entering the industry and also each time a worker
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changed companies, irrespective of the individual's experience or status.
It was agreed by 89 per cent operatives that induction training must make reference to a safety
manual or booklet provided by the company each time if safety awareness was to be sustained for
the key purpose of enhanced safety performance. Finally, (APAU, 1980) concludes that the three
ways of preventing accidents are:
(a) By making the working environment as safe as possible;
(b) by protecting the workers from hazards by the provision of protective clothing etc. and
(c) by training; all confirmed by this study.
5.1.7 Organisational Factors
Organisational variables were found to have significant influence on safety performance (see
Section 4.5.6 above) for statistical results. The most significant variables found to have associations
with safety performance were:
(a) Worker-management relationships (p = 0.001);
(b) Sub-contractor safety behaviour on site (p = 0.02);
(c) Safety representative presence on site (p = 0.001);
(d) Management-workers co-operation on safety issues (p = 0.001);
(e) Safety committee input to safety policy and programmes (p = 0.005).
(f) Regular safety talks by supervisors/management to workers (p = 0.001);
(g) Displaying good quality safety posters on sites (p = 0.005).
(h) Job skills and knowledge (p = 0.001). Tables 4.58; Appendix K).
Like most human relationships, workers and management relationships on site were found to have
a significant association with safety performance (see Tables 4.5.7 - Appendix K). Operative
perception indicated that good worker management relationships on site promoted good safety
performance, and that the reverse was equally true (this was the view of 78 per cent of operative
response and supports the results of the statistical analysis as shown in the conclusion of section
4.5.6 in Chapter Four above.
Various research confirmed all the findings of this section as listed above ((a)-(g))- Hinze (1978);
Levy and Green (196Z), Andriessen (1978) and Leather (1983) etc. For detailed discussion of these
research refer pages 48 - 62 in Chapter Two above.
5.1.8 Environmental Factors
The most significant environmental factors found to influence safety performance in this study
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were:
(a) Site conditions, e.g., clean and tidy or untidy (p = 0.001); (refer Tables 4.57/59 in
Appendix K);
(b) Worker's co-operation with each other on site (p = 0.001); (see Table 4.60 -
Appendix K)
(c) Planned and organised sites - (p = 0.001) (See Tables 4.63 - Appendix K), and
(d) Workers' individual carefulness about safety on site (p = 0.001) (see Table 4.62 -
Appendix K)
Again, these results listed above are validated by previous research as discussed in Chapter Two
above, particularly those of USE Report (1976) as discussed on page 62, para 4; APU (1980) page
63; and Leather (1983) etc.
5.2 ATTITUDINAL/BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS OF OPERATIVES AND SITE
MANAGERS
This section reports the pattern of behaviour of operatives' attitudes compared with those of site
managers.
The purpose of this section is to investigate any similarities or differentiation between them as far
as the chosen research variables are concerned. The basis of comparison remains the chi-square test
of significance calculated by using MINITAB statistical package as described in Chapter Four
above.
It is important to note that since no other studies which compared operative and site managers'
attitudes was found at the start of the study, any conclusions reached should be considered as
tentative. This is mainly because the results can not be validated using previous research findings
whereby direct comparisons would be possible. Nevertheless, statistical validation can be
acceptable as far as research purposes are concerned. As such, the findings in this section can be
acceptable as valuable information contributory to this field of research.
5.2.1 Outcome Or Analysis of Attitudinal/Behavioural Patterns of Operatives and Site
Managers
The pattern of behaviour of operatives and site managers were established after the first detailed
analysis of individual data for each of the groups, to test whether there were any similarities or
differences in their attitudes towards the attitudinal variables as indicated in the research model
detailed in Figure 3.8 above.
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The pattern of behaviour of operatives and site management were established after the initial
analysis of data provided by each of the groups. The first analysis was to investigate and establish
general attitudes towards the chosen variables and to see if they had any significant relationships
with safety performance. After this first analysis was completed, the results of the analysis were
then paired and subjected to chi-square analysis (test of significance) using MINITAB, to see if any
pattern of behaviour (attitudinal) exist between operatives and site management as far as the
selected attitudinal variables were concerned.
The general findings can be described as follows:
a)	 Historical Factors
Results of the whole sample of operatives (N = 126) and site management (N = 74) showed that
operatives' attitudes were not dissimilar to those of site management in respect of factors such as
age, training, experience, and knowledge of companies for which they worked, as discussed in
5.1.2. above.
The effect of age, training, experience and company type towards safety performance were
influential to both groups (Leather (1983); Hinze (1987)
The age range for operatives and site management were on average between 28 years and 45 years.
However, their levels, and types of duties performed, and their levels of responsibilities differed,
despite being exposed to the same site environment. It is therefore logical that the impact of age
upon safety performance would not vary, although operatives are more likely to be exposed to the
rigours, and hence the danger of the site. This is because operatives by virtue of the nature of their
work, would be more directly exposed to the activities which possessed these safety hazards,
and hence have direct attitudes to safety.
Site management is found to be better trained than the operatives; again because of the level of
their overall responsibilities for the site, and their managerial training and experience. Because of
the advantageous position which they hold and their type of training and experience, would have a
more in-depth appreciation of safety hazards around the site, and thus better equipped to avoid the
pitfalls arising from the condition of the site and task performance.
Finally, the manager controls the site activities and as a result, the tempo of site activities.
Management control has been found by previous research to influence safety performance
(Andriessen (1978), Leather (1983), etc. Despite the differences in their training background, age
and experience has similar influence upon them.
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b)	 Economic Factors
Results of the statistical analysis showed that predominantly no differences exist between operative
and site management attitudes towards the economic variables examined in the research (see
Tables in Appendix - L).
Examination of the results showed that most variables were found to be mutually significant
according to chi-square test of significance, which ranged from p = 0.05 to p = 0.001 indicating that
association was common between the group (see Tables).
For example, the proposition that 'bonus systems lead to reduced concern for safety on site' was
found not to be significant by both groups, thus signifying similarity in attitudes towards bonus
systems and safety on site.
On the other hand, other variables indicated associations to exist. These were that:
a) Need to meet commercial or profits influenced safety organisation on site- p =
0.001
b) Bonus systems lead supervisors to turn a 'blind eye' to safety hazards on site -
significant at p = 0.001.
c) More training lead to safety improvement on site - p = 0.001.
d) Safety bonuses improve safety performance - p = 0.05 and
e) Productivity with safety performance - p = 0.001.
All the evidence from the literature review confirms the idea that these are the economic factors
which influence safety performance. As such, more attention should be paid towards them in
training, construction education and contracts or tendering documentation. By so doing, it is
assumed that steps would be taken in the long run to limit their effects on safety performance
across the construction industry.
c)	 Psychological Factors
Again, like b) above psychological variables were shown to have significant association to safety
performance, and that there was mutual agreement between operatives and site management.
The factors found to be significant are shown in the Tables in Appendix - L, and pertain to:
As site management spends more time in communication with the operative group than any other
managers, it is logical to expect that both groups will influence each other's attitudes on factors
affecting their work on site, and hence the similarities in attitudinal behaviour in terms of
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psychological variables. Because of this result, it is logical to propose that the more joint safety
training is encouraged, the more positive attitudes will prevail amongst operatives and site
management, which will enhance safety performance on site.
d)	 Procedural Factors
Operative and site management were found to have similar opinions or attitudes towards
procedural factors in the construction industry.
They jointly indicated their agreement to the fact that the provision of protective safety clothing
and equipment was significant, as p = 0.02.
Similarly, the results indicated that, where workers failed to wear them, they should be punished
through sanctions.
Also if workers were equipped with safety manuals or booklets during safety induction on entry
into the industry, it is the belief of operatives and site management alike, that safety on site would
improve as a result.
These results reflect the nature of the operative, and site managers' work compared to other
managers. Site managers seem to spend more time within the site environment interacting with
operatives and other parties of the construction process. As such both groups have more to benefit
from the provision of safety protective clothing etc. and safety manuals or booklets. For this reason,
it is inevitable that they should have slar attitudes, siuee attitudes are s'aaped by environment,
common or shared experience and regular communication between the group; particularly when the
communication is controlled by the working environment.
e)	 Technical Factors
Examination of the results showed that operatives and site management considered technical
variables to be very significant, and had similar levels of attitudes towards them (see Tables in
Appendix).
Both operatives and site managers are expected to have knowledge of safety hazards, and what
steps should be taken to avoid them. The most current and significant approach to avoiding hazards
is through hazard identification.
Current thinking is that although the site manager has overall responsibility for the control of the
site, and the diverse nature of activities taking place within it at any given time, he/she alone should
not be trained in hazard seeking. It has been suggested that all members of the construction process
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on site should be able to conduct their own hazard identification so long as they have a contractual
involvement to undertake activities within the site (Apau (1980)).
Since site managers and operatives are exposed to similar hazards (though to varying degrees of
exposure), it is only logical that they should have shared attitudes towards hazards and other
technical variables arising from the site condition or environment. Shared attitudes, it is hoped,
would induce better safety on site.
Organisation Factors
One of the most important variables to emerge from this study as having the most significant
impact upon safety performance was organisation others being psychological and environmental
variables.
The reasons for this may be that because management activities on site consist of planning and
co-ordinating, communication (with all those involved with the site), problem-solving, monitoring,
controlling and decision-making, their position or presence on site influences all aspects of the
construction process. Similarly, psychological variables are a result of human activities and
behaviour, whilst the environmental variables are source of influence to persons and the
construction site itself.
For this reason, it is inevitable that those organisation factors examined in the study should affect
both site management and operatives. Site managers control the site organisation, which invariably
controls the operative. As such their attitudes are intertwined and thus likely to be similar in most
respects other than in managerial duties which are a managers' prerogative.
The results showed that apart from differences in duties and responsibilities, organisation factors,
influenced both operatives and site managers alike (see Tables in Appendix L), where all variables
examined indicated high correlation and significance, thus confirming their similarities of attitudes.
g)
	
Environmental factors
Of all the environmental variables examined in the study, only three emerged to indicate that
significant similarities in attitudes exist between operatives and site managers. These were:
i) The effect of untidy sites upon safety performance;
ii) Good job planning and site organisation/layout, and
iii) Workers who know their jobs and are thoughtful of the way they carry out their
work - are less likely to cause accidents
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All three variables scored very high significance on the chi-square test of significance where p = 0.
001 .
The results showed that untidy sites caused accidents; good job planning and site organisation had
the effect of reducing accidents, and that workers who know their jobs (skilled), and who are
thoughtful of the way they did their work, have less accidents (see Tables in Appendix L); Leather
(1983); Andriessen (1987), etc.
53. PATTERN OF ATTITUDINAL BEHAVIOUR OF SITE MANAGERS, CONTRACT
MANAGERS AND SAFETY ADVISERS ETC.
Like 5.2 above, this section reports the pattern of site management, with those of contract managers
and safety advisers/officers/managers. The purpose being to see if there were significant
similarities or differences between the groups (see 5.2 above). The results of the analysis are
discussed below.
a) Historical Factors
Examination of the literature review and the research data indicates similar findings as those
discussed in 5.2 1 a) above.
However, it is important to note that in spite of the existence of a considerable number of studies of
managerial behaviour (Minzberg (1973), McGregor (1960), Likert (1961), Maslow (1954),
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) etc.) direct comparisons are not possible, since these studies related to
different subject areas, and therefore, methodologies differed markedly to this study. Therefore
direct comparison was only made with studies of safety behaviour as discussed in the literature
reviews, and the research data discussed in Chapter Four above.
Generally, the factors of age, training and experience were found to be similar to those of site
managers as discussed above (see Sections 4.7.1 and 5.2.1 a) above).
b) Economic Factors
An examination of the results indicated that differences exist between the attitudinal behaviour of
site managers and those of contract managers, and safety advisers etc. (see Tables of analysis in
Appendix M, and section 4.7.1a) above).
The most significant differences occur in site managers' perception of the affects of: bonus
schemes, safety training, commercial influences upon tendering strategies, cost of safety in jobs or
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contracts, and client contribution or non-contribution to the enforcement of safety inputs in
contracts.
i) Bonus systems upon safety performance;
ii) Safety training upon safety performance;
iii) Commercial influences upon tendering strategies;
iv) Cost of safety allowed for in jobs/contracts and its effect upon safety performance,
and
v) The client's level of contribution or non-contribution to the enforcement of safety
inputs in tendering, and contract procurement.
Contrary to the above, contract managers and safety advisers etc. have similar attitudes in respect
of all the above elements.
The possible explanation for these differences might be in the differences in the roles and
responsibilities of site managers and those of contract managers and safety advisers etc.
These differences could have implications for safety management at the contract stage, as well as at
the site level, as different decisions are made in accordance with company safety policies,
commercial or financial consideration of the environmental influences that affect the site
management decisions These decisions might impact upon safety performance throughout the
construction process or contract.
However, there was mutual agreement or similarities of attitudes amongst the groups in issues
related to operatives or workers' safety awareness, and the awards of safety performance, and their
positive influence upon safety performance.
In order to counter the effect of the differences in attitudes or perceptions discussed above, perhaps
a more co-ordinated approach is needed in the relationships and roles of site managers, contract
managers, and safety advisers at pre-tender stage, and throughout the contract/project planning and
co-ordinating phases of the construction process. Such an approach might lead to positive signals
from management to operatives that management was serious about safety on site (refer Andriessen
(1978); Leather (1987)).
c)	 Psychological Factors
Great differences exist in the pattern of attitudes/behaviour among the groups as far as
psychological factors are concerned. Again the margin of variations amongst the groups' attitudes
towards the psychological factors examined is quite significant (Refer Tables of Analysis in
Appendix M).
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Similarities of attitudes or perceptions only occurred in four elements out of the ten examined, and
these were as follows:
There were dissimilarities as far as attitudes towards investigation of 'accident near-misses' and
consideration of safety methods statement at the tender stage of a contract are concerned.
Again, site managers showed differences in attitudes to those of safety advisers and contract
managers.
The same explanations given above might apply here (see b) above).
It is interesting to note that so far, contract managers and safety advisers appear to share similar
attitudes compared to site managers and this is significant as far as the research is coacerrked.Mz.
be there is more interaction between contract managers and safety advisers, despite differences in
role. If this is consistent with industry norm, then perhaps a rethink is appropriate, so as to enhance
measures currently taken to improve safety performance in the construction industry.
d)	 Technical Factors
There are no differences in the pattern of attitudinal behaviour towards technical factors amongst
site managers, contract managers and safety advisers etc.
This is significant because the items considered under this heading relate to practical issues which
are consistent across the industry, as they are experienced daily by the construction management
groups either on site, or in construction offices, and have implications for organisation and safety
policies (see Tables of analysis in Appendix M).
It is significant to note that the most prominent elements in technical factors which might influence
safety performance are:
i) operation of mobile plant or equipment by those not trained or certificated to operate them.
ii) provision or lack of provision of safety information to the workforce;
iii) training of managers in safety, particularly contract managers and site management;
iv) wearing or using protective clothing and equipment as required or specified by safety
standards;
v) current tendering methods and safety in Contract implementation, and
vi) work pressure and fatigue.
These were found to be significant influences on safety performance. The results indicate that it is
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customary for some site management groups (i.e. supervisors, forepersons and managers) to
instruct untrained or uncertificated persons on site, to operate equipment or plant, when the
qualified or competent operator was absent from the site for one reason or another. There may
also be the motive to save costs, so rather than employ a temporary operator or transfer one from
another site in the short-term, they would 'make-do' with a volunteer on site. Operatives indicated
that they would prefer only certificated and trained operators to handle mobile plant or equipment
on site.
If the above result is a true reflection of industry norm, then it has serious implications for safety
performance in the construction industry.
e)	 Organisation Factors
Again, similarities in attitudinal behaviour are predominant amongst site managers, contract
managers and safety advisers with regard to those organisation variables examined in the study (see
Tables in Appendix M).
Interestingly, the most prominent factors of organisation variables found to significantly influence
safety performance were those involving persons or groups who had one level of authority in the
company or contract organisation or the industry at large. These are as follows:
i) Worker-management relationships and co-operation on site.
ii) Trade Union involvement in safety matters at company (organisational) level or
more directly at site level, e.g. safety committees and Safety Representatives in
Safety Audit implementation.
iii) Integration or differentiation of site managers' and safety advisers' etc. duties and
responsibilities at contract procurement stage, and site organisation processes.
For example, their duties and responsibilities should be clearly defined and areas of co-operation
earmarked to speed decisions on matters of safety on site. Direct involvement of the safety adviser
or consultant etc. should be encouraged, rather than left as advisory roles only; this of course
would depend on the size and complexity of the project
iv) Managers' and supervisors' frequency of talking about safety to operatives or
site-based workers. Previous research found that managers/supervisors who talk
frequently about safety to their workforce on site, have better safety performance or
less accidents on site. Wilkinson (1975) states that managers, particularly safety
managers must learn to talk about safety to their supervisors in top management
terms if they are to get attention. Davies and Staehl (1964) also found that frequent
daily contact between workers and supervisors on safety and other job matters is
most important to accident control efforts. Top management's attitude towards
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safety is also a significant factor."
Leather (1983) on the other hand found that:
"Supervisors who never talked to their workers about safety are also never seen
conducting a safety inspection.
Supervisors who do not talk to their employees about safety are observed
differently regarding the conduct of safety inspections, depending on whether the
employees perceived them to be serious about safety or just following instructions
II
(see Literature Review p 58).
v) More Factory Inspectorate's activities in the building industry improves safety
performance.
vi) Management safety attitudes determine workers' safety behaviour on site (refer
Barrow (1977) in Chapter Two, para 5, p56 above; Cohen et al (1977) p67;
Andriessen (1978) p61, above, and finally,
vii) Poor co-ordination of sub-contractors' work on site influences safety performance
adversely (refer Apau (1980)).
These findings are supported by other research discussed in the Literature overview in Chapter
Two above.
0
	
Environmental Factors
Various studies have in the past shown the significance of environmental factors in accidents or
safety performance in the construction industry (Hale and Hale (1972); Blum and Naylor (1968);
Leather (1983); Kay (1978) etc.
This study however, apart from confirming the findings of the above studies, indicates that
differences of opinion or attitudes prevailed between site managers, contract managers, and safety
advisers as far as those environmental factors examined in this research are concerned (see Tables
in Appendix
Those factors which showed strong similarities of attitudes amongst the groups were those
indicating that:
i)	 Having a single contractor responsibility for scaffolding on a site was important for
the improvement of safety performance on the site.
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The implication of this outcome is that where medium to large construction projects involve the use
of scaffolding, a single scaffolding contractor ought to be appointed to take this responsibility, and
that such a contract would improve the safety standards of scaffolding and hence safety
performance. The result suggests that where a single contract responsibility for all scaffolding is
maintained, better scaffolding co-ordination is also achieved.
ii) Untidy building sites lead to accidents (see Literature Review in Chapter Two
above).
iii) Older workers' safety attitudes were a source of influence to new recruits to the
construction, and
iv) Workers and managers can reduce most accidents on site by being a little more
thoughtful about safety provision in their jobs. (Leather (1983)) also reached a
similar conclusion).
As far as the differences in attitudes are concerned, the results showed that site managers, and
contract managers had closer similarities than with safety advisers. These were on factors such as:
i) Provision of quality welfare and first-aid facilities improved safety standards
(Atherley (1973); Miller (1973); McKenna (1978)).
ii) Provision of workers with thermal or warm clothing in winter reduced accidents.
Ergonomist had indicated the effect of weather conditions (i.e., severe heat or cold) to affect human
concentration or judgement which can lead to accidents.
They profess that: "Ergonomic factors have an influence of some degree on importance; indeed
ergonomists see this factor as one of the key causes of industrial accidents." (Wearne (1982),
Wilson (1979), and Singleton (1974)).
iii) Good job planning and site organisation improves safety performance (see
Literature Review).
iv) Inadequate supply of quality plant or tools of the right types leads to accidents.
v) Inadequate supervision and control of workers on site is a major cause of accident
occurrence on site.
Of all the environmental factors, the most significant as far as influence upon safety performance
was concerned are:
i) Workers' and managers' continued thoughtfulness about safety performance;
ii) Behaviour of older workers;
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iii) Dirty or untidy sites, and
iv) A single contractor responsibility for scaffolding on site
h)	 Safety Performance Factors
Ten individual elements of safety performance were examined to see if similarities or differences
of attitudinal behaviour exist amongst site managers, contract managers, and safety advisers. Of
these elements, four showed similarities of attitude common to the group; three showed similarities
common to contract managers and safety advisers; two with similarities between site managers and
safety advisers; and one with similarities between site managers and contract managers (see Tables
of Analysis in the Appendix M). Again the results suggest that contract managers' attitudes to
safety are closer to safety advisers than Site managers.
Those elements showing strong similarities in attitudes amongst the groups according to the result
are:
i) That hazard identification, analysis and up-dating by management would lead to
improvement of safety performance.
The only condition being that it becomes a safety requirement throughout the construction industry,
and enforced by the Health and Safety Inspectorate annually. Alternatively, it should be
self-regulatory as part of safety audits, with annual returns sent to the HSE for verification. Those
companies who fail to make detailed Returns could then be queried or penalised through fines.
ii) Hazard identification should be a statutory requirement as a way of improving
safety standards.
iii) That alcohol and drug abuse are a problem for safety in the construction industry,
and that there was a need to highlight it as a problem, and deal with it as such.
iv) That lack of proper consultation amongst clients, designers/engineers, managing
contractors, subcontractors and managers throughout the project development
phases undermines safety performance on site.
The above findings are confirmed by various studies discussed in the literature reviews in Chapter
Two of the above.
Secondly, contract managers and safety advisers' attitudes are much closer with regards to the
opinions that:
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i) Regular safety assessments on a competitive basis increase safety awareness and
might lead to improved safety performance. Such an assessment should be part of
safety bonus understanding across the industry.
ii) The Health and Safety Inspectorate have inadequate resources to enforce safety in
the construction industry and that,
iii) All companies in the Building Industry should have alcohol and drugs-free
policies.
Thirdly, common attitudes prevailed between site managers and safety advisers in regards to beliefs
that:
i) Displaying all accident information on sites prevents risk-taking by workers, and
ii) Safety provisions in tender documents are too vague for promoting better safety on
site.
Lastly, site managers, and contract managers believe that most accidents occur on multi-occupied
sites due to inadequate control of sub-contractors
The explanation being that poor control of sub-contractors on a multi-occupied site is the result of
poor co-ordination and inadequate managerial resources, particularly on very large and complex
projects.
These results have demonstrated that major differences of attitudes exist between site managers,
contract managers and safety advisers.
It is significant to note that where differences to safety prevail amongst the groups or between one
group and the other, the difference(s) might lead to conflicting management safety behaviour that
will have implications for safety management.
It might therefore be necessary to minimise those factors of attitudinal differences so that controlled
steps are taken through joint training, using psychologically based techniques.
5.4 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
The results of factor analysis confirmed to a large degree those of correlation analysis as discussed
in Chapter Four above (see factor matrix - Chapter 4 above and Appendix K). It also produced
uncorrelated factors or components from the original variables applied to the correlation analysis
using MINTAB.
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The outcome of this analysis is that it reinforced the earlier findings of the initial analysis of the
operative data comparing safety attitudes and safety performance. This indicates beyond doubts
that the initial analysis (correlation) are quite acceptable as far as the research is concerned.
However by subjecting the data to Factor Analysis, the primary result revealed that the most
prominent (dominant factor) to emerge is that oforganisational factors (variables) as defined in the
research model illustrated in Figure 3.7. This result is quite significant as it covers aspects of
Organisational Policy, and Industry Norms found to be prevalent in the construction industry (see
paragraph 4.7.3 above).
Further exposure of the data to Multiple Regression Analysis using SPSS (see paragraph 4.7.4 and
4.7.5 above) confirmed the most dominant relationship established to be between Industry Norm
and Safety Performance. The most predominant factors influencing safety performance being:
a) Age of the workers;
b) Payment systems; particularly bonus, and
c) Organisational policy and management.
5.5 SUMMARY
This Chapter discussed the results of the data analysis described in Chapter Four above. It
described the factors or variables most significant to safety performance in the construction
industry. Furthermore, it described the pattern of attitudes between operatives and site management
and those of site management, contract managers, and safety advisers/officers.
The results showed that the variables detailed in the research model (Figure 3.7) have various
degrees of association to safety performance in the construction industry.
Further analysis of the results showed that similarities and differences of attitudes prevailed
between operatives and site managers, and that similarities and differences also exist quite
significantly amongst site managers, contract managers, and safety advisers. Finally, it showed that
operatives' pattern of behaviour were more closely connected to those of site managers and that
contract managers' pattern of behaviour was generally more closely connected to those of safety
advisers than site managers.
The reasons for the closeness of attitudinal relationships were not investigated as an objective of
this study, and as such it was considered safer not to hazard any subjective analysis or guesses.
Perhaps future researchers may find it rewarding to look in more detail, the pattern of
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attitudinal behaviour amongst the research constructs, and then explore reasons for any observed
similarities or differences which might be found to exist.
Finally, by applying further analysis, using multivariate analysis, the research succeeded in
highlighting the most influential factors driving safety performance in the construction industry.
These are:
(1) Organisational Policy; and
(2) Industry Norms.
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CHAPTER SIX
Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations for Further Research
CHAPTER SIX
6	 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The aims of the Research have been to:
1. Identify the incidence and diversity of the most common source or cause of accidents on
construction sites (see Table 4.15 (b) in Appendix )
2. Identify the more common factors associated with safety behaviour in construction
workers;
3. Identify where possible, the extent and effects of company safety policy items associated
with employee occupation, age, marital status, length of service etc.;
4. Investigate generally, safety behaviour characteristics in relation to employee and
organisational variables, such as indicated by the research model (Figure 3.7).
5. Review the theoretical and practical implications of safety attitudes (opinions), and safety
performance or accident control in the light of the research findings.
6. Suggest or recommend safety systems and procedures where possible, towards the
prevention and control of some of the safety behaviours identified by the research as
having a strong correlation with safety performance; and finally,
7. Make recommendation(s) based on the research outcome, for further research.
The first two chapters of this thesis discussed the problem, of health and safety in the construction
industry. It highlighted some of the consequences and implications of accident influences upon
personal morale, financial and human cost to industry and society. etc.
Chapter Two reviewed past and current literature considered relevant to this study, including some
definition of risk, accident details and it also covered broadly the historical development of health
and safety at work, and the definition of accidents.
Chapter Three reviewed some past research models, and discussed the framework for this
study, including the development of the research model, and its attendant hypotheses.
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The variables considered for the research were discussed under eight main headings and detailed in
the research model presented in Figure 3.7, described in Chapter Three.
The reviews of past models, the development of the research model and the discussion of the
relationship between the identified variables lead to the central hypothesis discussed in 3.4 and 4.5
above, and which was:
Central Hypothesis
"Safety performance is a function of operatives' and management's attitudes and dependant upon
safety behavioural and environmental factors in the construction industry."
In turn the central hypothesis lead to the following sub-hypothesis:
1	 Main Sub-Hypothesis - A 
A.1	 Safety performance is a function of operatives' personal historical factors
(variables) in respect of age, experience, trade or occupation, and training = CI,
A.2	 Sub-Hypothesis 2 (Cl)
Safety performance is a function of economic factors (variables)
C10 =C4.
A.3	 Sub-Hypothesis 3 (Cl)
Safety performance is a function of psychological factors (variables)
C10 =C5.
A.4	 Sub-Hypothesis 4 (Cl)
Safety performance is a function of technical factors (variables)
C10 =C6
A.5. Sub-Hypothesis 5 (Cl)
Safety performance is a function of procedural factors (variables)
C10 =C7
A.6. Sub-Hypothesis 6 (Cl)
Safety performance is a function of organisational factors (variables)
C10 =C8.
A.7. Sub-Hypothesis 7 (Cl)
Safety performance is a function of environmental factors (variables)
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C10 = C9
2.	 Main Sub-Hypothesis B (C2)
B.1	 Operative attitudes towards behavioural and environmental factors (variables)
differ from those of site managers: Cl vs C2.
B.2	 Sub-Hypothesis 9 (C2)
Operative attitudes towards psychological factors (variables) differ from those of site
managers.
B.3	 Sub-Hypothesis 10 (C2)
Operatives attitudes towards procedural factors (variables differ from those of site
managers.
B.4	 Sub-Hypothesis 11 (C2)
Operative attitudes towards technical factors (variables) differ from those of site managers.
B.5	 Sub-Hypothesis 12 (C2)
Operative attitudes towards organisational factors (variables) differ from those of site
managers.
B.6	 Sub-Hypothesis 13 (C2)
Operative attitudes towards environmental factors (variables) differ from those of site
managers.
3.	 Main Sub-Hypothesis C (C2a = C2b = C2c )
Site managers' attitudes towards behaviour and environmental factors (variables) differ
from those of contract managers and safety advisers etc.
The research Model was applied to 325 constructs or subjects who were based on various
sites and working for ten independent companies selected at random, to examine the evidence of
the mentioned hypothesis and sub-hypothesis.
These constructs consisted of the following:
i) Operatives (N = 126)
ii) Site Managers (N = 74)
iii) Contract managers (N = 56), and
iv) Safety advisers/officers (N = 55).
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Data was collected through interviews (45), and questionnaires, which were administered
personally by the author (45), and by postal services (280).
The results of the research hypothesis were based on four objectives measures as thus:
(i) Item analysis applied to the Likert-type questionnaire with results formulated
according to respondents' frequency and percentage response;
(ii) Correlation coefficient to test the degrees of association between the research
variables;
(iii) Chi-square analysis as a test of significance of the results.
(iv) Multivariate analysis to strengthen (ii) above and to identify primary (dominant)
variables (factors) which strongly correlated with safety performance, etc.
The following are the main conclusions drawn from the results of this research:
6.2 TEST FOR MAIN SUB-HYPOTHESIS' A' AND RELATED SUB-HYPOTHESIS:
"Safety performance is a function of operatives' personal historical factors
(variables) in respect of age, experience, trade or occupation, and training."
Results of the sub-hypothesis 4.5.1 in Chapter 4 (see Appendix K, and the Literature Reviews of
past research support the first proposition of hypothesis A, confirming that operatives' age,
experience, trade or occupation and training are the most dominant and prominent personal factors
which impact upon safety performance.
The literature reviewed for the study showed that the most significant factors of all accidents relate
to the age and experience of the worker (Vernon, (1944), Hale and Hale (1972), Schulzinger
(1956), Grew (1958) etc.
C.4 - Economic Factors: were shown to feature significantly towards safety performance as
indicated in 4.5.2.
The most prominent indicators were showed to be attitudes towards risk taking induced by the offer
of payment of 'danger money' (p = 0.001); lack of enthusiasm for banksman training (p = 0.05);
incentive bonus payment systems (p = 0 001); push for increased productivity (p = 0.001) and the
provision of safety bonus (refer Table 4.5.2a).
C.5 - Psychological Factors: were showed by the results to be a great source of influence on
safety performance (see Table 4.5.3a).
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C.6 - Technical Factors: were shown to be significantly associated with safety performance (refer
Tables 4.5.4a). The results of the analysis of sub-hypothesis 4, indicated that awareness of safety
hazards on site were highly significant in safety performance.
C.7 - Procedural Factors: covered items of safety provision on site for example, protective
clothing, equipment, and its correct use; provision of safety booklets or manuals and induction
training etc. (refer Table 4.5.5a).
The results shown in this table confirm the relevance and significance of their influence upon
safety performance.
C.8 - Results of the analysis showed that organisation factors played dominant roles in safety
performance in the construction industry (refer Table 5.5.6a). These showed significant scores
ranging from p = 0 005 to 0.001 and 0.02 respectively, and confirming their levels of individual
relationships.
The most significant factors being worker-management relationships on site; worker-management
co-operation on safety matters and others which might impinge on safety; sub-contractor safety
behaviour; trade union involvement in safety committees, and workers' perception of company
safety efforts (and records). These confirmed sub-hypothesis 6.
C.9 - Finally, Environmental Factors: were shown by the results to have a strong relationship
towards safety performance (refer Table 4.5.8a).
The most dominant environmental factors were job skills and knowledge of the job in hand (p =
0.001); planned and organised sites (p = 0.001), followed by site conditions being clean and tidy or
untidy (0.01) and workers' individual carefulness.
Figure 4.5 shows the established correlation coefficients of operatives' attitudes towards safety
performance, leading to confirmation of the main hypothesis A.
The above relationships between operative safety attitudes and safety performance coincides with
the findings of Leather (1983), Andriessen (1978), Hinze (1987), Kline (1964), Hale and Hale
(1970), Perusse and Hale (1980) etc.
6.3 TEST FOR MAIN SUB-HYPOTHESIS 'B' AND THE RELATED
SUB-HYPOTHESIS
(see B.1 to B.6 above)
206
Results of literature reviews in Chapter Two revealed the influence which age, experience and
training had on workers in industries generally, and construction in particular.
On the basis of these findings and the similarities of age range between the groups, it can be
accepted that similarities exist between the groups as far as those historical factors examined in this
study are concerned. The strong association between age, experience, occupation and training of
workers and safety performance was confirmed by Vernon ( 1944), Hale and Hale (1970), Hinze
(1987), Churns (1968), Schulzinger (1956), Grew ( 1958), Haddon, Suchman & Kline (1964), Vant
(1986), Abeytunga (1979) etc. This confirms sub-hypothesis B 1. above.
Chi-square results showed significant association indicating that no fundamental differences exist
between operatives and site managers as far as economic variables are concerned, except that their
goals differed as far as the economic variables examined were concerned (refer Tables in Appendix
L) and Chapter 5 above for detailed discussion of results of prominent economic factors.
Similar to the findings of this research, other researchers had found that economic variables
influenced workers' safety performance. Shimmin et al (1982); Leather (1983); Vant (1986), and
hence confirms the sub-hypothesis.
Significant association was found between operatives' and site managers attitudes towards
psychological factors, indicating no differences in attitudes between the groups (see Tables in
Appendix L).
Results of chi-square analysis discussed in Chapter 5 above and, findings of other researchers
discussed in the literature reviews in Chapter Two confirmed the findings of this research. Such
works include Hale & Perusse (1980); Shimmin et al (1982), Andriessen (1978), Leather (1983).
This confirms sub-hypothesis B.2 as valid.
The results of chi-square analysis showed that there was no difference between operatives' and site
managers' attitudes towards procedural factors and thus confirms the proposition of sub-hypothesis
B.3 above.
Similar to the results of sub-hypothesis B.3 above, there were no differences between operatives'
and site managers' attitudes towards technical factors (see Tables in Appendix L).
Similar findings by Apau (1980) showed that there was strong association between the technical
factors examined in this research, and hence confirms the research findings, for sub-hypothesis B.4
above.
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Organisation factors were found to have strong association with safety performance by results of
correlation coefficient analysis and chi-square test of significance (refer Tables in Appendix L).
Chi-square tests also showed that there was no difference between attitudes of operatives and site
managers towards the organisational factors examined in this study (refer Tables of results in
Appendix L), and discussions in Chapter 5 above.
It might be important to note that similar findings were attained by Hinze (1978), Hill and Trist
(1953), Andriessen (1978), Leather (1983), HSE Report (1976). These results provide ample
confirmation for the proposition contained in sub-hypothesis B.5 above.
Three main factors in particular were identified as having strong association to safety performance
as far as environmental factors were concerned according to the results of chi-square actaZysis <see
Tables in Appendix L).
These were:
(i) The influence of site conditions upon safety performance was dependent upon whether the
site was untidy or clean; untidy sites caused more accidents, and clean sites might reduce
accidents.
(ii) Good job planning and properly organised sites, and
(iii) The safety behaviour of workers as to whether they know their jobs and were thoughtful of
the way they performed their jobs.
Sites which were well planned (layout) and had good organisations were found to be more likely to
have less accidents than those which were not, and finally workers who knew their jobs and
performed their tasks more confidently and provided they were thoughtful of the way they carried
out these tasks on site, were less likely to suffer accidents (see Tables of results in Appendix L)
Similar findings were achieved by Leather (1987), Apau (1980) etc., as discussed in the
literature reviews in Chapter Two above. These results confirmed the findings of this research.
6.4 TEST FOR MAIN SUB-HYPOTHESIS 'C' AND RELATED SUB-HYPOTHESIS:
(Refer 4 7.1. (Chapter 4); sub-sections 14.1 to 14.8- null hypothesis), and 5.3 (Chapter 5),
paras. a, b, c, d, e, f, g and H - discussion of results testing main sub-hypothesis C, which
states that:
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C.1	 Attitudes of site managers towards behavioural and environmental factors (variables) differ
from those of contract managers and safety advisers etc.: C2a vs C2b vs C2c.
C.2. Sub-hypothesis 14a: site managers attitudes towards historical factors differ from those of
contract managers and safety advisers.
C.3	 Sub-Hypothesis 15.b: Site managers' attitudes towards economic factors differ from those
of contract managers and safety advisers.
C.4	 Sub-Hypothesis 16c: Site managers' attitudes towards psychological factors differ from
those of contract managers, and safety advisers.
C5	 Sub-Hypothesis 17c: Site managers' attitudes towards procedural factors differ from those
of contract managers and safety advisers
C.6	 Sub-Hypothesis 18c: Site managers' attitudes towards technical factors differ from those
of contract managers and safety advisers.
C.7	 Sub-Hypothesis 18c: Site managers' attitudes towards organisation factors differ from
those of contract managers and safety advisers
C.8	 Sub-Hypothesis 19c: Site managers' attitudes towards environmental factors differ from
those of contract managers and safety advisers
C.9	 Sub-Hypothesis 20c: Site managers' attitudes towards safety performance factors differ
from those of contract managers and safety advisers.
The above sub-hypotheses labelled C.1. to C.9. were devised to test the main sub-hypothesis C, to
validate or otherwise the proposition that "site managers' attitudes towards behavioural and
environmental factors (variables) differ from those of contract managers and safety advisers etc."
Examination of the results of chi-square analysis as contained in Tables detailed in Appendix M)
and discussed in Section 5.3 (a-h) above, demonstrates that there are significant similarities and
differences in attitudes towards the listed variables between site managers, and contract managers
and safety advisers.
This means that the results of the tests are inconclusive, although it is evidenced that there are more
similarities in attitudes amongst the groups than there were differences between them.
Despite the mixed outcome, the overall results showed that contract managers attitudes were found
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to be closer to those of safety advisers than with site managers (refer Tables).
Finally, result of multivariate analysis confirmed organisational policy, and industry norms
(including payment systems) to be the most dominant factors influencing safety performance.
However, it is important to note that the chi-square test used for comparing the behaviour patterns
of operatives, site managers, contract managers and safety advisers, may be inadequate for a
research work of this importance or level. It was also very time-consuming as several stages of data
manipulation were undertaken, before a final analysis was achieved Perhaps a multi-dimensional or
cluster analysis technique might have proved more useful and conclusive in terms of the findings
achieved for that section of the research.
6.5 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Probably the most plausible conclusion which must be reached from this brief review of the
research hypotheses is that the results of this research were far more complex than was originally
envisaged. Thus in retrospect, the hypotheses appeared to have over-simplified the results.
The hypotheses, it would be remembered, were formulated following an in-depth review of other
studies of the safety and risk fields as discussed in Chapters Two and Three above.
If the hypotheses were incorrect, or over-simplified, it was either because the in-depth review of
past literature and studies was not conducted systematically enough, or because the empirical
evidence available from those previous studies reviewed was incomplete, or had not reached a
well-developed stage to be directly relevant to this study.
The possibility that the analysis of the past studies was not systematic enough, or not fully
developed at the time, cannot be rejected altogether. There are however, indications that some of
the outcomes of the models reviewed in Chapter Three were not completely relevant to this study,
and were thus unreliable as far as this research aim was concerned. For instance, when those
models were discussed, a number of methodological short-comings were indicated in each of the
studies reviewed, except those of Abeytunga (1979); Hale and Hale (1972), Darwish (1987) and
Leather (1983). Furthermore, in the light of the results of this research, a number of further
shortcomings can be indicated, which were not too obvious at the time.
For example, by restricting their data collection to only one sample, the researcherswhose studies
were reviewed in Chapter Three, each applied only one list of elements. Since this list had varied
from one study to the other, and most probably as a result of the levels of homogeneity amongst
elements varied from one list to another, some aspects of the research outcomes differed from one
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study to the other. The results of this research however, suggest that safety attitudes and safety
performance factors involved more complex mechanisms.
Two of the studies reviewed in Chapters Three (Leather, 1983; and Darwish, 1987) had relied
mainly on the use of Likert-scale instruments to collect data, and then subjected the data collected
to measures of frequency, percentage, and correlation analysis. The results of this research suggest
that Likert-scales, frequency/percentage measures and correlation analyses were fairly accurate
methods of summing-up the main trends within a sample, since the correlation analysis outcome
were generally confirmed by the multivariate analysis.
However, the model derived from the review of past studies, and which was used for this research
suggests that the three key elements of the research model, that is, the "safety attitude retainers"
(the research subjects), the "attitude generators" (the safety attitude factors), and the safety
performance factors, were inter-related. This is substantiated by studies by Leather (1983), Darwish
(1987), Hale and Hale (1972) etc., where the key elements had similar significant constructs.
There are indications therefore, that the model proposed in Chapter 3, though simple, does
encompass results from other studies (Leather,(1983), Andreisson, (1978), HSE, APAU 1976) etc.,
as well as the results of the research. The model could most probably serve as a very useful basis
for future research. However, apart from some similarities with some elements of safety attitudesin
Leather (1983), Darwish (1987), there is nothing in the model which compared to other models
reviewed in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, outcomes from Leather (1983) indicated relationships did
exist between -
Inputs (which were individual orientation to safety, inter- and intra-group relations, and
organisational management style and practice);
PAS (Potential Accident Subject);
Outputs (Attitude Behaviour), and
Accident and Feedback (training needs, legal sanctions and organisational changes).
Leather postulated that all the above elements were monitored by self (the individual), workmates,
safety officers/reps, management, and outside agencies (HSE etc.), all bear similarities to the model
of this research (refer: Fig 3.8, p93 above). In any case, consideration of all the shortcomings and
differentiations which exist between the models reviewed, and the model for this research, as
discussed above, only one thing was certain - and that is further research is needed in order to
define some aspects of the model more precisely. Such a research would require a model which
was not too simple and straightforward, as this research model. A revised model would therefore be
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necessary. It is suggested that such a model ought to include, amongst the elements for
investigation, the client's input or influence upon safety, and more broad safety performance factors
than accident records and near-misses. Such a model it is believed, would produce more detailed
hypotheses, and null hypotheses, that would aid further clarification or understanding of the re-
lationships between safety attitudes and safety performance.
6.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
There are many potential areas for future research. For example, as pointed out earlier, some
aspects of the model for this research remained to be tested, and other aspects need to be
formulated in more specific terms. There are also more detailed behavioural implications for any
research of this kind, and of such a complex phenomenon such as safety attitudes/behaviour, and
safety performance. It might prove very useful to investigate these implications. These potential
areas for further research are discussed separately in this section, including a proposed revised
model shown in below.
6.6.1 Research on the Model
It was mentioned in Chapter 3, that many other possibk anzJytical appoad yes pievaiied, any of
which could be applied to the data analysis. Since the model postulates different levels of
generality (or conversely, of specificity), it might be useful to consider whether these different
levels correspond to different strengths of correlation. Principal component analysis performed on
component scores would be one way of investigating the various levels of generality or specificity
or even of differentiated considerations, rather than the use of item-analysis. Likert-type scaled
questionnaires could still be used for collecting the data for the study, but for one sample type only.
For example, "operative attitudes to safety on site" (as carried out by Leather (1983), or "client's
safety attitudes and their relationships to effects on safety performance", or even "safety officers'
attitudes to safety performance".
Investigating only one sample at a time may be possible to conduct a "before" and "after" study on
the one simple on a set of chosen sites, over a period of about two years.
Cluster analysis, and multi-dimensional scaling methods could be used to analyse the data, again
collected via "Likert-scale" instrument.
Other strategies could also prove to be worthwhile. For example, "critical incident techniques" as
suggested by Tarrant, (1970), could be used to test the safety temperature, on selected sites as
utilised by Leather (1983), and might throw some more light on the outcome of Leather's model for
operatives' study, and on the model proposed for this research.
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Throughout this research, a number of individual characteristics of respondents and features of the
industry, which were different between samples have been indicated. Age, sex, education, craft,
trade or professional background, marital status, knowledge and experience in health and safety
matters, pay systems etc., were all respondent and industry characteristics, on which samples
differed. There were also differences between the operative safety performance grids and those of
management used in the four samples (i.e., operatives, site managers, contract managers, and safety
officers/advisers).
This research was not designed to rigorously control these variables. Different experimental
designs would be needed in order to perform a more systematic test of the potential influences of
these variables. Nevertheless, the comparisons executed have shown the potential influences which
exist between safety attitudes, and safety performance as discussed in Chapters Four and Five
above. Notwithstanding the achievements of this research so far, the author believes that the data at
hand could be submitted to more stringent analysis by looking at the opposite hypotheses, or
null-hypotheses. It is possible that such analyses might shed more light on the research outcome so
far achieved. A possible research model is also introduced as a suggestion to aid future research
thinking (see Fig 6.1).
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6.7 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
This research study has some interesting implications for client/client representatives, for safety
practitioners, operatives and Trade Union officers, management in the industry, and all those
interested in research concerning the safety behaviour aspects of the construction industry.
(a) For instance, the research has shown that safety-conscious contractors are disadvantaged as
result of current tendering systems, formulated in the main by clients and their advisers without
serious concern for safety organisation in the work situation. It suggests that for industry to
safeguard the safety-conscious contractor, the client must ensure that safety administration is
accounted for in the final successful tender bid. It proposes that allowing a percentage sum for
safety organisation at tender stage will force all tenderers to consider pricing for safety in their final
bid, and that the client must have the opportunity of enforcing it in the contract.
(b) Safety practitioners must therefore be drawn into the tendering team of the contracting firm
to give safety advice. Their role will be to ensure that all aspects of safety requirements are
considered, and priced for in the firm's tender bid. Such a bid if successful, would have allowed
adequately for financing safety without elaborately cutting the cost of safety to ensure profitability.
Research subjects are all unanimous that alcohol and drug policies were now necessary in the
industry, and this view has implications for the policy makers etc.
(c) Operatives and Trade Unions etc. must play an effective role in ensuring that workers tow
the line as far as compliance with all aspects of safety requirements on site are concerned,
including mandatory use of safety protective clothing/equipment, and avoiding unnecessary
risk-taking, or acts of carelessness etc. Employees must realise that working safely really helps to
reduce the number of accidents, and that the safety promoting site manager or supervisor influences
worker safety awareness.
(d) Management must realise that they alone cannot ensure total safety provisions on site,
without the establishment of good relationships with operatives, Unions, their safety officers,
sub-contractors, and other parties for the construction process.
The research has shown that poor co-operation between members of the construction team, and
poor co-ordination of safety, particularly on multi-occupied sites has serious consequences for
safety performance. As such, this finding has serious implications for all those who may have
responsibility for the co-ordination of sub-contractors' work, or work of other groups of workers on
small, medium and large sites. It is also important to promote the essence of safetyvia the group,
including the supervisor, with discussions or communications playing a vital part.
(e) Pay systems and reward systems, that is, productivity bonus payments encourage some
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degree of chance-taking in order to get the job done quickly, and to enhance earnings. Similarly,
jobs with high bonus systems requiring urgent programme completion, may motivate supervisors
and site managers to turn a 'blind eye' to safety hazards, which may or may not lead to accident
occurrence. As a remedy, the research indicates that safe-working and productivity must go
hand-in-hand, and that this can be achieved by the implementation of reward systems that
compensate the worker for safe-working and achieving the desired levels of production. In other
words, an incentive for safe working must be devised by management and work study practitioners.
Interestingly, the longitudinal study revealed that most companies in the sample already make such
awards or rewards.
(0 For the industry, construction companies must recognise that their most valuable asset is
their human resource: as such they need to be maintained and updated like machines (etc.), by
regular skills and safety training, and health and safety updates via in-company and on-site safety
communication. Companies must invest expeditiously in health and safety, and skills, as these bear
significant relationships to good safety performance and company profits.
(g) Finally, it cannot be stated at present whether the safety attitudes dimension in the
construction field can develop into a stable mechanism or not. There may be a parallel worth
investigating between attitude formation and attitude change on the one hand, and safety
performance mechanism on the other. Currently, there are indications too, that safety education and
training of site managers is inadequate for them to carry out efficient safety inspections on site. If
this research indication is acceptable, and since the research indicated that twenty-eight percent
(28%) of site managers are University graduates, and twenty-three percent (23%) technical
college-educated, it might be worthwhile finding out whether training or tuition in health and safety
bring about a change in safety behaviour. For instance, the hypothesis can be postulated that,
"University/technical college health and safety courses or curriculum is inadequate for promoting
safety performance on site". A "before" and "after" study could be undertaken of undergraduates
and students of construction during attendance at college, and on starting work on site for one year
or more.
6.8 THE RESEARCH LIMITATION
The main limitation of this research apart from those shortcoming of the research model discussed
above, is the difference in design between aspects of the operative questionnaire and those of site
managers, contract manager and safety advisers, etc.
For example, operative questionnaire was designed to determine operative accident experienced as
a measure of safety performance; whereas, those of management did not have such a provision. A
more direct comparison of safety performance and safety attitudes between operatives and
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managers, or between site managers and contract managers/safety advisers would have been more
probable, and may be seen to have more immediate benefit to the practising managers or advisors
in the construction industry.
Notwithstanding the above, since the current research findings generally correspond with those of
other research studies discussed in this thesis, the chosen hypothesis are considered valid.
However, it is suggested that future researchers who wish to build upon this work should take note
of this limitation, or any others they choose to find in the body of the work.
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APPENDICES
LETTERS
DepadmmntofMechankalEngineering
incorporating the
Division of Building Technology
and the Construction Study Unit
Head of Department : Professor AJ. Reynolds
EOOS/PM
APPENDIX A
BIPMEL
UnIIVEPSIITY
Uxbridge Middlesex UB8 3PH
Telephone: 0895 37188 Ext. 713
Dear Sir,
Research into - Safety Attitudes and Safety Performance in the 
Construction Industry 
Just over two years ago, you and your organisation contributed immensely
towards the successful conduct of a research project into 'Oper'ative's/
Management attitudes towards Safety Representatives and Safety Committees,
in the Construction Industry'. During that time, some of you assisted in the
distribution and collection of questionnaires on our behalf, which were designed
to survey Management and Operative's attitudes; others took part in structure o4
Interviews - all of which helped to achieve some tentative conclusions, namely;
that:-
(a) - a relationship exists between expressed attitudes of Operatives/Management,
and accident occurrence in the construction industry,
(b) - that Operatives' and Management attitudes towards Safety Representatives
were highly favourable, and
(c) - that Operatives and Management have ambivalent attitudes towards safety
committees.
In view of these encouraging results, a further two year in-depth study to compare
'safety attitudes with safety performance in the Construction Industry' is now
being undertaken.
Since you have indicated that you would be willing to co-operate in any future
research of this kind, I am now writing to you, officially, to request your
continued assistance in furthering the aims and objectives of this research.
Should you wish me to visit your organisation at this early stage of the research
to discuss matters of mutual interest or to ascertain what sort of help you could
offer, I would be pleased to hear from you to that effect.
However, I would be grateful if you could indicate your continuing willingness to
assist with this.study.
A copy of detailed summary findings and conclusions will be sent to all
Individuals/organisations who co-operated with the study, at the end of the
research.
I look forward to hearing from you soon.
Yours faithfully,
Edwin Sawacha
rti L 1:-.111/JI-A
PLMEL
unlIVEPSIITY
Uxbridge Middlesex UB8 3PH
Telephone 0895 37188 Ext . 713
#aciy?
Department of Mechanical Engineering
incorporating the
Division of Building Technology
and the Construction Study Unit
Head of Department : Professor A.J. Reynolds
BOOS/PM
November 1984
Dear Sir,
Research into - Safety Attitudes and Safety Performance in the 
Construction Industry 
I am currently engaged in a two year research programme leading to
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the above subject matter.
As the research is at a relatively early stage, I would appreciate
it if you could circulate the staff of your department/organisation
with this letter and encourage any who have similar interests to
contact me. Obviously, I do not wish to stray into fields which are
already being researched and so any feedback from this letter would
be much appreciated, as would any opportunities for collaboration.
I am particularly interested in the fields of construction safety and
safety performance, (in Building and Civil Engineering, Building Services
Engineering, and generally in all aspects of Safety, Planning, Education
and Training, Organisation and Management).
Any interested researchers, Safety Consultants, Safety Officers,
Contract/Construction Site Managers, etc. with an interest in safety
generally and particularly in safety attitudes and performance can
contact me at the above address for a more detailed exchange of
information and/or discussion of the research objectives, methods and
any ideas of mutual interest in such research areas.
Yours faithfully,
Edwin 0.0. Sawacha
a.a.	 ...JAN /.0.7-••
Brunel
THE UNIVERSITY OF WEST LONDON
Department of Mechanical Engineering
Head of Department : Professor AJ. Reynolds
Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH
United Kingdom
Telephone Uxbridge (0895) 74000
Telex 261173 G
Dear Sir
Re: Research into "Safety Attitudes and Safety Performance" in the UK
Construction Industry 
I am writing to thank you and your staff for the immense effort and time
which you have put into helping to make data available for this research.
Your overall assistance and contributions to the research are mostly
invaluable, and I am personally grateful to you. Data is now being
analysed, and when completed, a copy of the summary findings will be made
available to you for infaiination.
Thank you so much for your continued co-operation. If you have any further
information or ideas to contribute to the research, Tou ate mmtwalcume to
do so.
Yours sincerely,
Edwin Sawacha.
UMIST
The University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology
PO Box 88, Manchester M60 1QD, United Kingdom
Telephone 061-236 3311
Telex 666094
ARD/SFR	 DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING
15 January 1985
Mr Edwin 0 0 Sawacha
Department of Mechanical Engineering
Brunel University
Uxbridge
Middlesex
UBB 3PH
Dear Mr Sawacha
A colleague and I have recently made an application to the SERC for
a research grant to cover work in the area of behaviour/motivation
on construction sites. This is to be particularly directed towards
wastage of building materials but will have implications for
attitudes to site safety and to quality control.
Perhaps you could contact me in April, by which time we shall
know whether the research is to proceed.
Yours sincerely
a g,
DR A R DUFF
Lecturer in Building
Yours sincerely
)(v\i„,1,,,y.
ph
DIRECTOR
DOUGLASS WISE
UNIVERSITY OF YORK
THE INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED ARCHITECTURAL STUDIES
THE KING'S MANOR, YORK
5 February 1985
	 Y01 2EP	 Tel. 0904 24919
Dear Mr Sawacha
Thank you for your letter of the 1 February 1985.
I regret we are not able to help you as we have not undertaken any work on
the problems of construction safety and safety performance.
I am also at a loss to recommend contacts, but I would have thought the
Chartered Institute of Building would be the obvious one.
Mr Edwin 0 0 Sawacha
Dept of Mechanical Engineering
Brunel University
Uxbridge
Middlesex UB8 3PH
DW/j eh
Director Professor Douglass Wise OBE BArch DipTP RIBA	 Assistant Director Stuart Sutcliffe RIBA 	 Secretary Joan Harris
Radcliffe Reader in Architectural History and Conservation Derek Linstrum DipArch PhD FSA RIBA	 Librarian Keith Parker BA ALA
Research Director Jeremy Taylor MA PhD RIBA	 Photogrammetric Unit: Chief Surveyor Ross Dallas BSc
Health &	 London South Area1 Long Lane
Safety
	
London
SE1 4PG
Telephone 01-407 8911Executive
MrE C C Sawacha
Department of Mechanical Engineering
Brunel University
Uxbridge
Middlesex
BBB 3PH
Your reference
Our reference
Date
28 ; 1, fY 85
Nor Mr Sawacha
Iam replying to your recent letter addressed to Mr Fountain which has been passed
tome for reply.
Might I suggest that you consider two sources of information for your research.
The Construction SectOr Report for 1981-1982 contains bibliographic
md historical data about the Industry. A copy is enclosed.v
A fuller, and more up-to-date list of HSE publications is contained
mthe Publications in series list, for January 1985, a copy of which is enclosed.
[hope these will be of use to you, and I wish you well in your thesis.
'ours sincerely
kt0 K&,c,
AN ROBERTSON
M Inspector of Factories
)EPARTMENT OF ENGINEERING
UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK
COVENTRY CV4 7AL
TELEPHONE COVENTRY (0203) 24011
preplypleasequote: BGB/ht	 11 February 1985
Mr. Edwin 0.0. Sawacha
Department of Mechanical Engineering
Division of Building Technology and
Construction Study Unit
Brunel University
Uxbridge
Middx UB8 3PH
Dear Mr. Sawacha
Research into Safety Attitudes & Safety Performance in the Construction
Industry
Your letter of the 4th February 1985 has been passed on to me for comment.
I read with interest your ambitious aims of researching into a particularly
difficult and politically sensitive field. I and members at Birmingham
University (Messrs Seymour and Birch at the Department of Transportation)
are indeed interested in this topic, Our main concern at the moment being
the quality and safety standards of Falsework and Formwork construction and
the implications for the management organisation(s). I (we) would be pleased
to discuss with you issues arising from your research, perhaps in the not
too distant future when your objectives are clarified and research is
proceeding.
Yours sincerely,
Bryan Burrows.
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AND
STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING
THE UNIVERSITY,
MAPPIN STREET,
SHEFFIELD.
Si 3JD
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT
PROFESSOR T. H. HANNA
B.Sc., Ph.D., C.Eng., F.I.C.E.
TEL 0742 78555 EXT. 5053 & 5081
TELEX UL SHEF G 54348
wax. 1. .1.•
	 /X 11 • -1
THE UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD
THH/SM	 11 February 1985
Mr Edwin 0 0 Sawacha
Department of Mechanical Engineering
Brunel University
Uxbridge
Middlesex
UB8 3PH
Dear Mr Sawacha
Thank you for your letter of 4 February concerning your research
into safety attitudes and safety performance in the construction
industry. I am afraid that there are no members of staff in this
Department directly involved in research of this nature. We give a
few lectures to our undergraduate students in certain aspects of
safety on construction sites. I think your best approach is to
have discussions with all the major contracting organisations in
the UK. You might also write to the Secretary of the Institution
of Civil Engineers. As you will be aware, there was a committee
headed by Lord Penny looking into certain aspects of structural
safety. I think that would be your best starting point if you
have not already done so.
Yours sincerely,
--r
T H Hanna
RANmiNEBummNo,
THEUNIvilmr6
GLASGOW 012 8LT
TEL: 01-339 8855 Evr. 7211
DEPARTMENT OF
CIVIL ENGINEERING
MFEVAILLLA 1.1.1)
13th February, 1985.
Mr. Edwin 0. 0. Sawacha,
Department of Mechanical Engineering,
Brunel University,
UXBRIDGE,
Middlesex,
UB8 3PH.
Dear Mr. Sawacha,
,Safety Research
I refer to your letter of 1st February addressed to
the Head of the Department of Civil Engineering and
enquiring about staff interested in safety research.
Professor H. B. Sutherland has asked me to reply to your
letter.
I regret that, at present, there is no one in the
Department who takes an active interest in Safety Research.
Yours sincerely,
r\kmotAAAA,../A2z
Dr. I. McConnochie,
Lecturer in Civil Engineering.
Ref: ARS/CW
Science Laboratories, South Road,
Durham, DH 1 3LE, England
Telephone: Durham 64971 (STD code 0385)
University of Durham Department of Engineering
14th February, 1985
Mr. E.O.O. Sawacha,
Department of Mechanical Engineering,
Brunel University,
Uxbridge,
Middlesex.
B8 3PH
Dear Mr. Sawacha,
I regret that we do not teach specifically towards safety in the construction
industry, except that our introduction to management course includes material on
health and safety at work and the factory inspectorate. No member of staff is
involved in research into construction safety.
Yours sinerely,
AR Cct)C,
Dr. A. R. Selby
THE POLYTECHNIC OF WALES
POLITECHNIG GYM RU
Director J. D. Davies
OBE, MSc, PhD, DSc, CEng, FICE, FIStructE
Mr. E. 0. O. Sawacha,
Department of Mechanical Engineering,
Brunel University,
Uxbridge,
Middlesex UB8 3PH.
Department of
Civil Engineering and Building
Head of Department
R. D. M cMurray BSc, CEng, FICE, FCIOB
Pontypridd Mid Glamorgan CF37 1 DL
Telephone(0443)405133
Date: 14th February 1985.
Our ref: Ec/GOR/KM
Dear Mr. Sawacha,
Research into - Safety Attitudes and Safety Performance in the 
Construction Industry 
With regard to your letter of 4th February, it is regretted that
there are no research ongoing projects in the Department dealing
specifically with safety in the construction industry at the present time.
A copy of the Polytechnic Research Report for 1981-83 is enclosed
which you might find of interest.
Y urs sincerely,
2
D. McMurray I• 
Head of Department 
Edwin 0.0. Sawacha, Esq.,
Department of Mechanical Engineering,
Bnmel University,
Uxbridge,
Middlesex UH8 3PH.
THE UNIACTEITY
01 ASTON
IN -BIRMINGHAM
Gosta Green, Birmingham B4 7ET/Ter 021. 359 3611 Ex
Department of Civil Engineering and Construction
15th February, 1985
Dear Edwin,
Safety Attitudes and Safety Performance 
No-one atAston is delving into your field at the moment.
	 You will know that
the problem is one of confidentiality - because events which hazard individuals
may carry with them legal liability. 	 Safety performance therefore attracts
little cooperation at the shop floor of the industry.	 I have had final year
students in recent years who created their own check list of visible departures
from safety standards (go through the RoSPA handbook). They then compiled
statistics about the degree of nonconformity by sampling sites. 	 The outcome
is not complimentary to the industry. 	 The conclusion was that enforcement
is not sufficiently well manned nor were penalties sufficiently high to
encourage self-regulation.
I think, however, that in aspects of character and attitude (neither of which
is directly connected with liability) you may strike a rich vein.	 Brunel is
experimenting with psychoanalytical classification.	 Attitude surveys, given
good guidance, can be very productive procedures.	 Is an accident prone
individual identifiable? Does the attitude to safety change in the face of
some dangerous event? You might, over two years, be able to do a "before and
after" study somewhere within your catchment.
l Investigate how much safe working is inducted during craft training. 	 After
all sound norms	 of behaviour create a sound climate for work.
Best regards,
Professor W.B. Jepson
University of Bath
E Happold
	
School of Architecture
Professor of Building Engineering 	 and Building Engineering
M Brawne
	
Claverton Down
Professor of Architecture 	 Bath BA2 7AY
P Smithson
	 Tel: (0225) 61244
Part-time Professor of Architecture
	 Telex 449097
18 February 1985
E 0 0 Sawacha Esq
Department of Mechanical Engineering
Brunel University
Uxbridge
Middlesex UB8 3PH
Dear Mr Sawacha
Thank you for your letter of 1 February 1985.
It is true that we do a little teaching about safety attitudes and
performance in the construction industry but I am afraid nobody is
researching into that field.
I am sorry I cannot be of more help but I hope that your
investigations are successful.
Yours sincerely
ff
EDMUND HAPPOLD
University
of Strathclyde
Department of Civil Engineering
John Anderson Building,
107 Rottenrow, Glasgow G4 ONG Tel: 041-552 4400 Ext.
Mr. Edwin 0.0. Sawacha,
Department of Mechanical Engineering,
Brunel University,
Uxbridge,
Middlesex, UB8 3PH. 19th February, 1985.
Dear Mr. Sawacha,
Research into - Safety Attitudes and Safety Performance
in the Construction Industry 
Your letter dated 4th February 1985 has been passed on to me by the Chairman
of our Civil Engineering Department.
Although I do have an interest in Safety on Construction Sites from both a
Construction and Management viewpoint I am afraid that I am not able to offer
you any further help in this instance. As far as I am aware very little
academic research has been carried out in this area, although some attempts
have been made by non-engineers.
I wish you well in your endeavours.
Yours sincerely,
A.A.R. Stanbury.
University
of Ulster
at jordanstown
Shore Road Newtownabbey Co. Antrim 131 17 0013 Northern heldnd
lelephone Whiteabbe n (0231) 65131 lelex 747493
Department of Building.
HH/KW
26 February, 1985.
E. 0. O. Sawacha, Esq.,
Department of Mechanical Engineering,
Brunel University,
Uxbridge
Middlesex
UB8 3PH.
Dear Sir,
With reference to your letter of 4th February, I would like to inform
you that we do not have any research in this field in progress at
present.	 However, I would suggest that you contact:
Mr. W. Lambe
Safety and Administrative Officer
The Federation of Building and
Civil Engineering Contractors (N.I.) Ltd.,
143, Malone Road,
BELFAST
BT9 6SU.
Wishing you success with your research.
Yours faithfully,
PAL RESEARCHER
'HILIP J. LEATHER
kNCED BUSINESS CENTRE
HOUSE
MARIAN WAY
'INGHAM
6BH
lhone: (0602) 413259
RESEAROADWUOR
MR. C. BROTHERTON
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM
UNIVERSITY PARK
NOTTINGHAM
NG7 2RD
Telephone: (0602) 506101 Ext. 3193
THE ADVANCED BUSINESS CENTRE UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM STUDY GROUP
Ir. Edwin 0. O. Sawacha,
ept. of Mechanical Engineering,
aunel University,
Ixbridge,
dddlesex UB8 3PH 8th March 1985
ear Mr. Sawacha
esearch into Safety Attitudes and Safety Performance in the ConStructio
'Ildustry
)rofessor Shimmin has passed on to me the letter you sent to her -
a. at least which she received - earlier this year. I was formerly
.n the Dept. of Behaviour in Organisations, at Lancaster, before
aking up my present appointment here in Nottingham.
'or a number of years I have been working on "attitudes to safety in the
!onstruction industry", although I would not go so far as to say that
am an "expert" on the subject. For an idea of where this work has
een leading me you might usefully have a look ,
 at Construction News.
tursday December_15. 1983 pp. 12 and , A6 there is an article there
rhich reports on some of my findings. Alternatively, you might look
t a copy of the Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Aston
ealth and Safety Society, 29th October 1983 (held in Birmingham).
'ou may need to contact the University of Aston to obtain this latter
eference.
do have a number of more substantial papers in the pipeline, but
they are not published yet.
dven the complexity of the subject, and also of my own thoughts on it,
cannot see how I can be of any further help to you unless either
1) you can let me know a little more specifically what you are
.00king for, or (2) you could come up to Nottingham for a chat. I
muld be only too prepared to help you if you could manage either.
'ours faithfully	 ni i i -lciecl itier	 Dr. Philip J. Leather
rn lip
APPENDIX D.14
The University of Birmingham
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING
The Univeraity of Birmingham, P.O. Box 363, Birmingham B15 2TT
Telephone 021-472 1301
M. J. Hamlin, BSc, DIC, MSAICE, FIWE, Professor of Water Engineering and Head of Department
W. H. Wittrick, ScD, MICE, FRAeS, FAA, FRS, Beale Professor of Civil Engineering
B. P. Hughes, DSc, FIStructE, MICE, Professor of Civil Engineering
Our Ref:- MJH/GDR
Your Ref:- EOOS/PM
	
21st March 1985
Mr. E.O.O. Sawacha,
Department of Mechanical Engineering,
Brunel University,
Uxbridge,
Middlesex. UB8 3P1-I
Dear Mr. Sawacha,
Research into safety attitudes and safety performance in the construction industry 
I have circulated your letter dated the 4th February to a number of my
colleagues. Mr. D.E. Seymour would be willing to talk to you about
falsework research and if you have any interest in this area perhaps
you would write to him at this address.
Yours sincerely,
Professor M.J. Hamlin.
c.c. Mr. D.E. Seymour.
APPENDIX D.15
The Federation of Building and Civil Engineering Contractors
(Northern Ireland) Ltd.
Director
Gordon Burnison, LL.B., F.C.I.S., F.C.I.Arb.
Barrister at Law.
Telephone: Belfast 661711
143 Malone Road,
Belfast,
BT9 6SU
Our Ref: AWL/hb
	 16th May, 1985
For the attention of Mr. E. O. 0. Sawacha, 
Department of Mechanical Engineering. 
Dear Mr. Sawacha,
Further to your letter of 10th May, 1985, I now have
pleasure in attaching the Annual Report for l98 in respect
of the Federation.
I have taken the opportunity of circulating your brief
paper which gives an insight into the background and scope
of the Research intentions to approximately seven or eight
firms in the Construction Industry whom I know have got Safety
Officers.
I trust that they will be of some assistance to you.
Yours
	
cerely,
W. Lambe,
Safety & A ministrative Officer.
Brunel University,
Uxbridge,
Middlesex,
UB8 3PH.
Enc.
Registered in N.I. No. 1944	 Regd. Office: 143 Malone Road, Belfasti3T9 6SU	 VAT Regd. No. 353 1185 74
.0 DU
Mr E Sawacha
Brunel University
Dept of Mechanical Engineering
Uxbridge
Middlesex
UB8 3PH
sermrrefewmp
()iirrplewme
pato	 IC May 1985
Health &
Safety
Executive
arrnnukA 0.10
Magdalen House
Stanley Precinct
Bootle L20 30Z
Merseyside
Telephone Direct Line 051-951
Switchboard 051-951 4000
Dear Mr Sawacha,
SAFETY ATTITUDES AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE IN CONSTRUCTION
Thank you for your letter of 9 May 1985 informing me of the research you are
conducting into this subject. I look forward to reading your findings but I
doubt whether I am the most appropriate person in HSE to give you the type of
help you may require. A better contact for you might be Mr Bernard Freeman
who is the Chairman of the CONIAC Attitudes Working Party and is the HSE National
Industry Group Leader for Construction. I have passed your letter to him for a
substantive reply on historical data, relevant literature and accident statistics
and I wish you every success in your research project.
Yours sincerely,
MA FOUNTAIN
FI6
Yours sincerely
\t/DR A R DUFF
UMIST
The University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology
PO Box 88, Manchester M60 1QD, United Kingdom
Telephone 061-236 3311
Telex 666094
ARD/SFR	 DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING
30 May 1985
Mr E 0 0 Sawacha
Dept of Mechanical Engineering
Brunel University
Uxbridge
Middlesex
UB8 3PH
Dear Mr Sawacha
Thank you for your letter of 23 May. Unfortunately we have not
been successful in obtaining funds from SERC to support our
research into behaviour modification on construction sites.
There is, however, I am told a good chance that a further
application similar to the last but with some slight modifications
would be successful in obtaining the necessary funds.
I shall, in spite of the delay to our own research activity, be
happy to discuss any aspects of your research you feel would be
useful. You might be interested in attending a meeting of a
Special Interest Group of the Association of Researchers in
Construction Management which is due to take place at UMIST in
July. Mr Newcombe, Mr Langford and Mr Rowlinson have all been
circulated with details of this meeting and you can obtain these
from them if you wish. You would, presumably, be expected to
become a member of the Association in order to attend this meeting
but this is not an expensive item. In this way you would not only
be able to discuss your research with me but also be making contact
with several other researchers in the field of human performance.
If, however, you would prefer a discussion just between ourselves
then please feel free to ring me and make such an arrangement for
any convenient time.
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
DEPARTMENT OF ENGINEERING SCIENCE
PARKS ROAD • OXFORD • OX I 3PJ • TELEPHONE (0865) 59988
Head of Department: C. P. WROM : M.A., D.Sc., F.Eng., M.I.C.E., Professor of Engineering Science
CPW/JFB	 15th August 1985
Mr. E. 0. 0. Sawacha
Department of Mechanical Engineering
Brunel University
Uxbridge
Middx UB8 3PH
Dear Mr. Sawacha,
Your letter of 7th February has found its way to me as Head of
Department. By chance I am a civil engineer and have to report that
we are unable to give you any help at all. The few colleagues I
have in civil engineering have not got any research work in the
fields of Safety Attitudes and Safety Performance.
Yours sincerely,


SECTION TWO: ECONOMIC FACTORS.(2)
**********AAAAAA******************
WnE:PLEASE TICK ONLY ONE BOX[y(FOR EACH QUESTION
IN THIS SECTION. ONLY TICK THE ANSWER WHICH BEST EXPRESSES YOUR
OPINION ,OR FEELINGS TO THE STATEMENTS MADE BELOW.
STATEMENT/OPINION--1-STRONGLY-1-AGREE-1DONT-1-DISAGREE-1-STRONGLY-1-COMMENTS
1 AGREE	 1	 1KNOW 1	 1 DISAGREE 1 COMMENTS
1.Shop Stewards should'
negotiate danger mone/
for high-risk jobs
with management.
2.Banksmen are not
presently given
safety training to
help them work safe y on site.
3.Paying bonus to
workers lead to reduced
concern for safety I
on site.
4.A job with bonus
lead supervisors to
turn a blind-eye to
workers taking unsa e chances.
5.Paying workers safety
bonus would reduce
taking unsafe chances.
6.Workers will always'
take risks as part
of their jobs on site.
7. Productivity and
working safely on
site must go together.
LI believe my company cares
very much about my
personal safety than profits.
9.Does your Company operate a Bonus scheme?(a) Yes[ J,(b) Nof ),(c)Dont Know!
10.Does your company pay Danger Money for jobs with high risks?
(a) Yes [ ], (b) No [ ], (c) Dont Know[ ]
2
I	 I 
I	 I 
I	 I 
I	 I 
I	 I
I	 I
SECTION  THREE: PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS. (3)
*******AAAA**********************At*A****
NOTE:PLEASE TICK ONLY ONE BOX[1y1,FOR EACH QUESTION IN THIS SECTION.
STATEMENT/OPINIONS- -STRONGLY- -AGREE- -DONT- -DISAGREE- -STRONGLY-1-COMMENTS.
I
AGREE	 KNOW	 DISAGREE
3.The Health and Safety
at work,Act,1974. 1
has made me to think
more about safety on site.
4.Safety training 1
influences workers
to work more safel .
1
6.More experienced
and skillful worke s
have less accidents.
7.If my supervisor Is
careful about safety
on site that makes
me careful too.
9.Do you like working in the Building Industry? (a)YES [ ],(b)NO [ ]
* If your answer to question 9,is NO,Then go to question 11 below.
10.If your answer to question 9is YES,Do_yekli like walking in
Building because 	 ,PLEASE TICK ONE BOX[ ] ONLY BELOW:
It is easy to get work in it 	 I,
It pays good money
Most of the people I know work in building[ ],
My family have always worked in building [ 1,
I like working in the open air [ I,
other reason 	 Please state 	
11.Do you know of the following Regulations concerning safety in Building?
1 YES! NO 1
1.My own safety on
site is very important.
2.My workmates safety
on site is not very
important to me.
5.Building work is
tough and dangerous
as such,you need I
to be ready to take
some risks if you
are to work in it
8.If my workmates
care less about
safety on site,that
makes me careless I too.
(a)The Health and Safety at work etc,Act,1974? 1
(b)The working Rule Agreement 	
(c)The Construction(Health & Welfare)Reg.,1966 	 1
(d)The Construction(Working Places)..Reg.,1966 	 1
(e)The Construction(Lifting Operations)Reg.,19611
(f)The Construction(General Provisions)Reg.,19611
*IF NO,Please move on to SECTION FOUR(4) BELOW.
3 PL-E-AsE 7"LigAl OVER
I KNOW 1
1 	 1
•	 • •I•
1 DISAGREE1
1 	 1
12.If YES,how did you find out about them?
Were you
Informed by your company
Informed by your Trade Union, 
manag
or
er,or
Union Repres
supervisor? [ ].
entative[ ]o
c Told of it by your workmates [ ],
d You read about it [ ],
e other source,please state 	
SECTION FOUR:PROCEDURAL FACTORS.(4)
*-k*******************-k** AARA **irk-kirk,
NOTE:PLEASE TICK ONLY ONE BOX Sel,FOR EACH QUESTION IN THIS SECTION.
0 • 0' O"
I AGREE
1
1.My company ought'
to supply me with
safety boots,helmet
equipments on site
and all safety
2.Workers who refuse
to wear safety
protective equip-
ments on site
should be punished somehow.
3.Wearing safety
protective clothings
and equipments on
site can prevent I
serious accidents on site.
5.Every Company
should give their
workers some kind
of safety booklet
which tells them
how to work safe-
ly on site.
6.Every worker on
joining a new
company should
be given a short
talk on safety
and a safety book-
let on the first day at work.
7.1 believe receiving
safety instructions
on the first dayl
of joining a new
company will help
workers safety awareness.
4.Workers should
be trained on how
and when to wearl
their safety equip-
'
ments on site.
SECTION FIVE:TECHNICAL FACTORS.(5)
*************-k*****-k-k*****-ic-k***
NOTE:PLEASE TICK ONLY ONE BOX( ,FOR EACHQUESTION IN THIS SECTION.
STATEMENT/OPINION- -STRONGLY-I-AGREE- -DONT-DISAGREE--- -STRONGLY- -COMMENTS
-AGREE	 -I-	 - -KNOW	 -DISAGREE I-
1.Asbestos is harmful
to your health and
safety.
2.If I see asbestos
on site,I will know
it at once.
3.It is my own fault
if I handle asbesto
without protection.
4.My Company does not
have to tell me if
there is asbestos
on my site of work.
5.To use mechanical
plant or equipment
on site without
proper training,
can kill someone.
6.To clamber about on
scaffoldings instead
of using properly
tied ladders on sit
can cause serious
accidents to you.
7.It is not necessary
to have proper
scaffolding inspect-
ions on site before use.
8.Any person with some
commonsense and
some building
experience can put
up scaffolding for
workers on site.
9. You do not need any
training to become
a steel-erector.
10.Driving a dumper
on site is easy;
anybody with some
commonsense can
drive one too.
11 workers should
refuse to operate
mechanical plants
on site if they
have not received
safety or operating
instructions on them.
E4SE -7Li la 14 OVI1
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SECTION SIX:ORGANISATION FACTORS. (6)
*****-Irkic**********-31-1r************t*********
NOTE:PLEASE TICK ANY ONE BOX[ Nin OF YOUR CHOICE IN THIS SECTION.
• VIM , 	 0*	 0,	 IS'	 • 4
AGREE	 KNOW	 DISAGREE
1.More accidents
happen when workers
and managements
relationships are
bad on site.
2.Trade Unions
involvement with
safety,can reduce
accidents on site'
3. Sub-Contractors
donot care
about safety on
site as main
contractors do.
4.Having safety
Representatives
on every site,
can lead to less
accidents on site
	 I
_
 ___
5.Mangement alone
cannot prevent
accidents ,workers
must co-operate 1
by working safely.
6. Safety Committees
can improve
He.dth and Safety
on sites.
7.1 believe that
my company is
doing enough
about my safe-
-ty on site.
8.My managers and
supervisors do
not talk to me
enough about
health and
safety on site.
9.Properly
printed safety
posters and
warnings displ-
. ayed in site
huts,and around
the site,make
me think about
safety on site.
NOTE: PLEASE ALSO ANSWER QUESTIONS 10 to 12 below.
10.Do you have a safety Representative on the site where you are working now?
(a) YES [ ], (b) NO [ I, (c) DONT KNOW [ ]
11.Do you have a safety Committee in your present Company where you work?
(a) YES [ 1, (b) NO [ ), (c) DONT KNOW [12.What things are your company not doing in regard to Health and Safety?
SEE the list below,and tick those things your company is not doing at present.
i.Have daily safety inspections on my site
ii.Give safety training to all new workers 	
iii.Give workers safety bonus 	
iv.Give all workers safety boots and helmet 	
v.Give supervisors and workers joint training[ ]
vi.All access to positions of work clearly marked[ ]
vii.Workers are told how and when to use safety equipments.[ ]
viii.All scaffoldings are well inspected on site,
	
ix. All trenches are well timbered on site.
	 I;	before workers are allowed to use them. 	 [
x.Workers are sent home if found drunk on site[ j,
xi.Openings in floors are well protected with tapes or rails[ ]
xii.Leading-edges are regularly inspected on site[
xiii.Anything Else,Please state 	
-
SECTION SEVEN: ENVIRONMENTAL / EXTERNAL FACTORS. (7)
********************************* *****************
NOTE:PLEASE TICK ONLY ONE BOX [ TO EACH QUESTION BELOW AS BEFORE.
I
STATEMENT/OPINION - -STRONGLY- -AGREE,
AGREE
	 I
1.Clean and tidy
sites prevent some
accidents happenin .
1
2.Workers who know
their jobs,and
think about what they
are doing during
work,have less
accidents on site.
-DONT- -DISAGREE- -STRONGLY- -COMMENTS
KNOW I
	
I. DISAGREE
11
11
3.Untidy building sites
do not cause accidents.
1
4.Workers co-operat-
-ing with each other while
working together
have less accidents
5.My company do not gives
us instructions about
working with toxic]
materials,fumes,and
most harmful substances on site.
6.Workers are more
likely to follow
the good or bad
examples of their
supervisors and
managers,than theix
workmates on site.
7.Properly planned
and organised jobs
can reduce the causes
of some accidents 
1
8.Most accidents
on site can be
avoided by workers
being a little
more careful and
observant on site
I
7 PitAsE 711;e1.4 ovEl
SECTION EIGHT:SAFETY PERFORMANCE FACTORS.(8)kk*****************************-irk*************
NOTE:PLEASE TICK ONLY ONE BOX[ ITN ANSWER TO EACH QUESTION BELOW.
1.How often do you A:ea safety inspections carried out on your sites?
(a) Every day [ ], (b) Once a week [ 1,
(c)On,..e in two weeks	 : ], (d) Once a month	 [ ],
(d)Once in two months 	 [ ], (f) Once in three months[ ],
(g) Never ( ], (h) Other, please state 	
2.Have you received any training in Health and Safety at all?
(a) YES [ ], (b)NO [ ];*IF NO,Please GO onto Question 6 below.
3.If YES,continue and tick what type of safety training you have received:
(a) First-Aid course [ ], (b) Fire - Fighing and drill [ ],
(c) Scaffolding inspection [ ], (d) Working on roofs [ ],
(e)Timbering trenches [ ], (f) General site safety [ ],
(g) Any other type you have had,please state 	
4.Would you know if safety inspections are being carried out on site?
(a) Yes...[ ]	 (b) No [ ]
5.How would you describe the safety training you received?
(a) Very Useful [ ], (b) Useful abit[ ],
(c) Not very useful [ ], (d) totally useless [ ).
6.How long ago did you receive you safety training ?
(a) Under lyear,or 12 months ago [ ], (b)1 to 2 years ago [ ],
(c) 3 to 5 years ago [ 1, (d) 6 to 10 years ago [ ],
(e) Over 10 years ago [ 1.
7.Does your company tell you of accidents on their sites?(a)Yes[ 1(b)Nol 1
8.Have you ever had any accident/ or accidents on site,in the last 5 years?
(a)YES [ 1,(b)NO [ 1**IF NO,PLEASE STOP HERE,AND DONT GO ANY FURTHER:THANK YOU
****IF YES,PLEASE CONTINUE WITH QUESTION 9 BELOW. CHEERS.
9.What type or types of accidents did you have,or suffer?
PLEASE-,Tick as many as you know you had in the last 5 years
--while you were working in the Building Industry.
(a Falls from scafoldings and working platforms 	
/
working shoes( not wearing safety boots) .IC Nall: 
./rItgugh through roofs 	
d Falls from heights during erection of steelwork,formwork,or
other structural framework or platforms 	
(e) Falls due to collapse of scaffoldings,other frame-works,of platformi i
(f) Injury to eyes due to dust or debri,fumes or toxic substances 	 [ i
(g) Falls of materials from heights above your head level 	 [ i
(h) Falls from untied ladders,falls from ladders due to other reasons 	 [ ]
(i) Collapse of a trench or deep holes, while you were carrying out work[ ]
(J) Collapse or over-turning of crane,or other lifting equipment on site[ ]
(k) Accidents caused by transport vehicles,dumpers,lorries,trucks,etc...[ ]
8
(1) Fire or Explosions of any kinds on site
	
 [ [(m)Accidents caused due to electric shocks,or from electrical appliances( ]
(n)Any other type,please state 	
10.Did you take time-off because of the accident/s? (a)YES[ J(b)NO[ ]
11. IF NO did you receive any First-Aid on site,then went back to work?[ ]
(a) YES [ ]	 (b) NO ( ]
12.IF you took time-off because of your accident,how much timeoff ?
a Less than 3 days....
b 3-days to 1-week 	
More than 1-week 	
2-weeks to 1-month
	
Over 1-month 	
END.
THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR YOUR PATIENCE AND GREAT HELP.
EDWIN.
9
b Building and Civil Engineering contractors
d Plumbers 	
f Painters and Decorators 	
h Plasterers 	j Demolition contractors 	
pecialists 	
ers 	
	  
[11
I Reinforced concrete specialists 	
1 t Suspended Ceiling Specialists 	
; Heating
Hirers 	
[ 1
I
General Builders
Civil Engineers
Carpenters/Joiners
Roofers 	
Glaziers 	
Scaffolding 	
Electrical Engineers
Asphalt/Tar-Sprayers
Flooring Contractors
InsulatingSpecialist
Floor and Wall Tiling
Groundwork specialists
Others ,please state 	
4.What is your job Or position?
Pro ect Manager 	
Trade Foreman/ Chargehand 	
Supervisor 	
Site Manager/Site Agent 	 	 •
General Foreman 	
Sec ion Manager 	
Others ,please state ............. ...	 .........
PLEASE TURNOVER.>
SITE MANAGEMENT  QUESTIONNAIRE-FINAL SURVEY.
*************** AAAAA kirkirldric********-kirk*****
*NOTE: IN STRICT CONFIDENCE.
1NSTRUCTIONS:This questionnaire is arranged under Eight SECTIONS.
	
To complete each section,please follow the notes at the start
of the section,as you proceed from section to section,until you
reach the end of section (8).All you are required to do,is to
read each question,statement,or opinion,and put a tick ,in the
box which best describes your feelings, or thinking towards it.
There are no right or wrong answers,so feel free to indicate your
personal feelings or Yiews to the questions or statements made.
Please try to exercise patience, and complete all the sections
of the questionnaire.
COMPLETE CONFIDENTIALITY IS GUARANTEED. THANK YOU.
SECTION ONE: HISTORICAL FACTORS.
NOTE:Please tick only one box' j tor each question in this section.
1.What type of firm do you work for?
Main contractor(private company)
Sub-contractor (private company)
Government/Local Authority(Public)
Self-Employed 	
Management Contractor 	
Other type of firm not listed,please state 	
2. If your firm is a sub-contractor,Are you working in this project for a:-
(a Main Contractor 	
b Managing Contractor 	
/
I I c Project Manager
d Other,please state
3.What is the nature of your firm's work,or trade?
13a
5.What trade or craft did you come from(or Your trade background)?
Bricklayer 	
Painter/Decorator 	
Roofer 	
Plumber 	
Plant Operator.or.fitter.
Universtty Graduate 	
Others ,please state 	
b Carpenter&Joiner
	
d Plasterer
	
f Scaffolder
	
h Electrician
	j General Labourer 	
1 Technical College Educated 	
6.What is the size of your Organisation,or Firm?
( OR How many persons are employed in your firm?)
One person 	
4-to-7 persons 	
14-to-24 persons 	
35-to-59 persons 	
	
80-to-114 persons 	
300-to-599 persons
1,200 and over 	
/
b 2-to-3 persons 	
d 8-to-13 persons 	
f 25-to-34 persons 	
h 60-to-79 persons 	j 115-to-299 persons 	
1 600-to-1,199 persons 	
7.Do ylu belong to any Trade Union Organisation/Organisations?
(a) Yes [ ];	 (b) No [ ]
8.If yes,which Trade Union Organisation do you belong,Please state 	
9.Are you married? (a) Yes...[ ]; 	 (b) No...[ ]
10.1 am (a) Male..[ ], (b) Female....[ ]
11.YOUR AGE: ARE YOU:-
i
alUnder 21 years 	
c 26-to-30 years 	
e 36-to-40 years 	
g 46-to-50 years 	 1
(b) 21-to-25 years 	
: W 41.1O :N =::::: i
	
- 41 51 years,and over.
	 .
12.How long have you worked with this Company?
l
ainder lyear 	
c 6-to-
toe 16- -20years	
I	 [di litWIINft:s	
g 26-to-30years 	
13.How long have you worked in the Building Industry?
l
alUnder 1 year 	
c 6-to-10 years 	
e 16-to-20years 	
g 26-to-30years 	 	 II
14.Are you a member of any professional Institution?
(a) Yes 	
 [ ]; (b) No
15. If Yes,please state which one,or ones
	
; f 21-to-25years 	 []
; h 31 years,and over.[ j
1.
2
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AGREE
	
KNOW
	
DISAGREE COMMENTS
SECTION TWO:ECONOMIC FACTORS(2)
• ONSES TO THE STATEMENTS BELOW,
--- BY TICKING ONE SQUARE/BOX ONLY TO EACH QUESTION.
• 11124. ' • "4 •
M1M'	 0"	 O'
1.1onus systems
,1interfer with safety
organisation on
a site. I
2.Accidents invol-
ing injuries and
property damages,
amount to financial
and productivity 
1losses.
4.Spending on safety
training in the
'building industry
is inadequate for
improving safety yerformance
5.The need to achieve
Commercial advant-
ages by management
influences safety'
organisation on site.
1
tender documents.
8.Compliance with
safety provisions
in contract docum-
ents,will improve safety on
9.Site safety is a
more important
factor in build-
ing than product-
ivity.
10.Awarding safety
bonus to workers
would lead to
improved safety
performance in the
building industry.
PLEASE TURNOVER >
3.Bonus systems lead
to supervisors
turning a blind-eye
to safety hazards
6.Safety should bei
a separately priced
item in all tend- 
1
ers or contracts.
7.The Client shoul
ensure that all
contractors price
safety as a sepa-
rate item in their
ite.
3
SECTION THREE: PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS(3).
NOLE:PLEASh. INDIGAIE YOUR RESFUNbbbU [HE STATEMENTS BELOW,
---- BY TICKING ONE SQUARE/BOX ONLY TO EACH QUESTION.
THE SQUARE THAT MOST EXPRESSES YOUR TRUE FEELINGS/REACTION
TOWARDS THE STATEMENT MADE,IS THE ONE YOU SHOULD TICK.
.LAILMENI/UFINIUN- I -STRONGLY- -AGREE- -DUNK-I-DISAGREE- -STRONGLY- -ANY CUMMENIS
I AGREE	 KNOW I	 DISAGREE I
LUreating indivi-
dual safety aware-
ness can lead to
less accidents on
sites.
2.Worker's irrespon-
sible behaviour
on site can under-
mine safe-working.
3.Building work is
tough and danger-
ous and as such,
anyone who works
in building must
be strong,tough,
and be prepared
to take risks.
4.Client's pressur e
to achieve prog-
ramme lead to safety
being undermined.
5.Safety is mostly
a matter of
commonsense.
6.Individual care-
lessness is a
major cause of
construction
accidents.
7.The sense of
urgency in jobs
forces site -
managers to pay
less attention
to site safety.
8.Co-operation bet-
ween members of
project teams is
important for reducing
accidents on site.
9.Site Management's
attitude to
safety on site
is a major factor
of influence to
workers safety
behaviour.
10.Poor co-operation
between sub-con-
tractors on site
undermines safety.
4
' 0" 0 , S.11	 :5 (],FOR EACH QUESTION.IS • IPIDP
SECTION FOUR: PROCEDURAL FACTORS(4).
• '1WM' S.	 4 0, •
AGREE
•
KNOW
•
DISAGREE
•I`•	 • 'I 	 211`
.'epor	 ng	 'ear-
-Accident misses,
can lead to the
prevention of
future accidents.
2. Investigating
near-accidents on
site by site mana
is a fruitless
exercise.
ers
3.It is not really
necessary for
safetyprocedure
in a job to be
considered at
tender stages. .
4.Firms ought to
provide workers
with all their
safety equipments,
and safety protective
clothing,includinf boots.
5.Anyone who repeatedly
fail to wear
their safety
protective cloth ngs
.
and equipments,
 to be sacked.
6.Site Managers have
responsibility for
safe-working pro-1
-cedures,and systems
on their sites.
7.Considering safe
-procedures	 and
systems of work
at tender,leads
improved safety
performance.
to
8.All workers in
the building
industry , should
be provided with
safety booklets
and training.
9.Providing all .
workers with proper
safety training &
safety booklets
would improve
safety performance
in the building industry.
PLEASE TURNOVER>
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SECTION FIVE: TECHNICAL FACTORS(5)
'01'	 '0' S TO THE STATEMENTS/OPINIONS BELOW,
BY TICKING ONLY ONE SQUARE/BOX TO EACH QUESTION.
AGREE
1.Workers should I
refuse to operate
items of plant, 1
or equipments for
which they have 1
received no operating
and safety training.
2.Most workers in
the building industry
lack knowledge of1
safety hazards on site.
KNOW	 DISAGREE
3.Workers ability
to spot safety
hazards on site
would lead to
less accidents.
4.Most workers with
commonsense could
drive a dumper,
fork-lift,or other
machines on site
after a little
site demonstration.
6.Training of Sitel
managers in health,
and safety in the
UK,is inadequate
for carrying out
effective safety
inspections on s te.
7.The wearing of
safety protective clothings
and equipments reduces
workers efficiency.
8.All Specialist
-sub-contractors,
should supply method
statements and safety policies with their tenders.
9.Present methods
of tendering,
discriminate strongly
against safety
conscious contractors.
5.A steady flow of
safety information
from management
to workers,is very
lacking in the building industry.
10.Pressure and Tiredness
I	 Ilead to accidents on site.
6
•AGREE
SECTION SIX; ORGANISATION AND MANAGEMENT FACTORS(6).
NOIE.PLEASE INDICAIE YOUR ANSWERS TO THE STATEMENTS/OPINIONS BELOW,
	
BY TICKING THE BOX,WHICH BEST DESCRIBES YOUR FEELINGS TO THEM.
ONLY ONE BOX TO EACH QUESTION.
• '4• 31' Dr	 • •	 ' • '4
KNOW
• '
DISAGREE
.1, •	 • TIN,
1.More accidents	 I
occur ,when worker-
-management rela-
-tions are bad.
2.Trade Union
involvement with
safety,can reduce
accidents.
3.Having Safety
Representatives
on sites,will not
improve safety
standards.
4.Site Managers,an .
Safety Advisers I
or Officers have I
responsibility for
safety on sites.
5.Management alone
cannot prevent
accidents on site,
workers must pla
their part by
working safely.
6.Managers and
supervisors do
not talk to their
workers enough,
about Health and
Safety on site.
7.Having safety
Committees in a
company, improves
safety standards
in the organisat:_on.
8.More Factory
Inspectors in the
Building Industrir
would improve
health and safetf
performance.
9.Management safe
attitudes ,deter-
-mines worker's
safety behaviour on site.
10.Poor co-ordination
of sub-contractor's
work on site by I
main contractors I
and managing contractors
lead to poor safety
performance on site.
PLEASE 1.4.1104 OWE OE>
7
8SECTION SEVEN: ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS(7)
NU1E: Please indicate your answers to the statements/Opinions made below,
	
 by ticking one box only to each question.
SlAlUihNl/UP1N1UN-1-S1KUNGLY-1-A6KEh-l-DUN1-1-DISA6REh-1-S1RON6LY-1-ANY UUMM1.
1 AGREE	 KNOW	 DISAGREE 1 COMMENTS
1.A single contractor
responsibilitu for
all scaffolding on
site,is important
to the improvement
of safety standards.
2.Untidy building
sites can cause
accidents on site.
3.Provision of good
q-ality welfare,
and first aid faci ities
on site,improves
safety standards.
4.Providing workers
with thermal/warm
clothings in winter,
can improve safe
working on site.
5.Good job planning,
and site organisation,
causes low accidents.
6.An inadequate supply
of the right type I
and quality tools,
plants ,and equipments,
leads to accidents1
and damages on site.
7.The attitudes of
older workers to
safety and health,
is a major source
of influence to
new recruits in the
building industry.
8.Thermal discomfort
of workers in the
winter,is not a
major safety problem.
9. Inadequate control
and supervision of
.workers on site is
a major factor in
accident occurence
10.Workers can reduce
the causes of some
accidents on site
simply by being a
little more thought-
ful of what they do
' IS QUESTIONNAIRE.'Of	 •• 9	 O'
•
• II10'
KNOW DISAGREEAGREE
• I '11.71'
on contracts.
SECTION EIGHT: SAFETY PERFORMANCE FACTORS(8).
PLEASE CONTINUE.
M101' O" 0,
• egu ar assessmen
of safety on sites
on a competitive
basis increases
safety awareness.
2.The Health and safety
Inspectorate have
inadequate resour-
ces to enforce safety
in the construction industry
3.Regular hazard
analysis and updating
by management would
lead to an improved
safety performance on site.
4.Efficient hazard
analysis and upd-
ating should become
a key management 1
function to improve
safety performance on site.
5.Displaying all
accident inform-
ation on sites
would prevent ris -
taking by workers.
6.Alcohol and drugs
are not major problems
for safety on site.
7.All companies inl
the building industry
should have alcohol
and drug policies
8.Lack of safety
consultation bet-
ween Clients,Eng-
ineers,Designers,
Managing Contract
ors and Sub-cont-
ractors undermines
safety performance
9.Safety provision-
s in tender docume-
nts are too vague 1
for promoting better
safety on site.
10.Most accidents
occur on multi-
occupied sites due
to inadequate control
of sub-contractors. 1
MANY THANKS FOR YOUR PATIENCE,AND CO-OPERATION.
EDWIN.
9
PLEASE TURNOVER >
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE - FINAL SURVEY.
**************************************************
*NOTE: IN STRICT CONFIDENCE.
IETRUCTIIINSTI'sqinaire is arranged under Eight SECTIONS.
	 To complete each section,please follow the notes at the start
of the section,as you proceed from section to section,until you
reach the end of section (8).All you are required to do is to
read each question,statement,or opinion,and put a tick in the
box which best describes your feeling,or thinking towards it.
There are no right or wrong answers,so feel free to indicate your
personal feelings or views to the questions or statements made.
Please try to exercise patience, and complete all the sections
of the questionnaire.
COMPLETE CONFIDENTIALITY IS GUARANTEED. THANK YOU.
SECTION ONE: HISTORICAL FACTORS.
VE:Please tick only one box[ J tor each question in this section.
---
1.What type of firm do you work for?
a Main contractor(private company)
b Sub-contractor (private company)
Government/Local Authority(Public)
Self-Employed 	
Management Contractor
	
Other type of firm not listed,please state 	
2. If your firm is a sub-contractor,are you working in this project for a:-
I i
a Main Contractor 	
1
b Managing
Project Manage
Contrac
r
tor 	
c
d Other,please state 	
3.1hat is the nature of your firm's work,or trade?
Civil Engineers	
b Building and Civil Engineering contractorsj
c
a General Builders
Carpenters/Joiners
Roofers
	
Glaziers 	
Scaffolding 	
Electrical Engineers
Asphalt/Tar-Sprayers
Flooring Contractors
InsulatingSpecialist
GroundWorkers 	 	 kv Steel Erectors
Floor and Wall tiling Specialists 	
Others ,please state 	
4.What is your job Or position?
	
b
C Contracts Manager 	
d Project	 Manager 	
 I I 
	Managing Director 	
e Others,please state
5.Are you (a)Full-Time on site( ] (b)Part-Time on site/Visiting[ ]
6.If visiting,how frequently do you visit your sites?
(a)1-2times per week[ ] (b)3-5times per week[ ] (c)Fortnightly[ ]
(d)Others,please state
Plumbers
Painters and Decorators
Plasterers 	
	
Demolition contractors 	
Reinforced concrete specialists 	
Heating and Ventilating Engineers
Plant Hirers 	
	
Construction Engineers 	
Suspended Ceiling Specialists 	
1
7.11hat trade or craft did you come from(or your trade background,if any)?
Bricklayer 	
Painter/Decorator 	
Roofer 	
Plumber 	
Plant Operator.or.fitter.
University Graduate 	
Others,please state 	
b Carpenter&Joiner 	
d Plasterer 	
; f Scaffolder 	
h Electrician 	
; j General Labourer 	
, 1 Technical College Educated 	
Mat is the size of your Organisation or Firm?
OR How many persons are employed in your firm?)
(a) 1-to-10 persons 	  [ ]	 (b) 11-to-50 persons 	
(c) 51-to-200 persons 	  [ ]	 (d) 201-to-500 persons...[
(a) 501-to-1000 persons 	 [ ]	 (f) 1001 and above 	
9.Do you belong to any Trades Union Organisation/s?
(a) Yes [ ];	 (b) No [ ]
10.Are you married? (a) Yes...[ ] 	 (b) No...[ ]
11.1 AM-- 	  (a) Male..[ ]	 (b) Female[ ]
12.YOUR AGE: YOU ARE:-
e 36-to-40 years 	 	
 [ 1 ; gi til:;!, Yandr(11.7ej 1;
i 1 (b) 21-to-25 yea rs 	
Igc-ig -iO g= 	 	 (4) 31-to-35 years....
1g 46-to-50 years 	
D.How long have you worked with this Company?
/T 
16-to- 
lyeear 	
	ars	
c6-to-lOyears 	
e	 20y	
[ 1 rdl 11!%5X:ras 	
	
f 21-to-25years 	 	
-,
g26-to-30years 	  [ ; h 31 years,and over.	 .
14.How long have you worked in the Building Industry?
l
ar
to
nder 
10
1 year 	
c 6--	 years 	
e16-to-20years 	 	
i ICI 124.!%!Far% 	
g26-to-30years 	
15.Are you a Member of any professional Institution?
(a) Yes 	  [ ]; (b) No 	
16. If yes,please state which one/s-
17.Have you 'a Technical Qualification? (a) Yes..[ ] (b) No..[
(b)OND/ONC...[ ]	 (c	 C...[ ]	 (d)BTEC	 118.If yes ,what qualification s? (a) City & Guilds 	)HND(e)Others,please state
19.Was safety a taught subject on your Course of Studies?
(a)Yes 	  [ ]	 (b)No 	
 [
20.When did you first receive any formal instructions in safety at work?
Please state 	
1	
,
,; h 31years,and over..	 .
2
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AGREE
	
KNOW
	
DISAGREE COMMENTS
SECTION TWO:ECONOMIC FACTORS(2)
ONSES TO THE STATEMENTS BELOW,
--- BY TICKING ONE SQUARE/BOX ONLY TO EACH QUESTION.
' 1 • ' 1 "A •
Lbonus systems
interfer with safety
organisation on
a site.
i
I
LBonus systems lead
to supervisors
turning a blind-eye
to safety hazards.
CSpending on safety
training in the
'building industry
is inadequate for
*Toying safety yerformance
5.The need to achieve
Commercial advant-
ages by management
influences safety'
organisation on site.
tender documents. 
1
LCompliance with
safety provisions
in contract docum-
ents,will improve safety on
9.Site safety is a
more important
factor in build-
ing than product-
ivity.
10.Awarding safety
bonus to workers
would lead to
improved safety
performance in the
building industry.
PLEASE TURNOVER >
6.Safety should bel
a separately priced
item in all tend- 
I 
ers or contracts.
7.The Client shoul
ensure that all
=tractors price
safety as a sepa-
rate item in their
LAccidents invol-
ing injuries and
property damages,
amount to financial
and productivity 
1
losses.
ite.
3
le,S . 	I' • II •. MVP
KNOWAGREE
SECTION THREE: PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS(3).
'I 9 111*• ••• I	 • E STATEMENTS BELOW,
---- BY TICKING ONE SQUARE/BOX ONLY TO EACH QUESTION.
THE SQUARE THAT MOST EXPRESSES YOUR TRUE FEELINGS/REACTION
TOWARDS THE STATEMENT MADE,IS THE ONE YOU SHOULD TICK.
1
1"	 I '11131`
DISAGREE
•rea ng n v
dual safety aware-
ness can lead to
less accidents on
sites.
•
2.Worker's irrespon-
sible behaviour
on site can under-
mine safe-working.
3.Building work is
tough and danger-
mm and as such,
anyone who works
in building must
be strong, tough,
and be prepared
to take risks.
4.Client's pressure
to achieve prog-
ramme lead to safety
being undermined.
5.Safety is mostly
a matter of
commonsense.
6.Individual care-
lessness is a
major cause of
construction
accidents.
1.The sense of
urgency in jobs
forces site -
managers to pay
less attention
to site safety.
8.Co-operation bet-
ween members of
project teams is
important for reducing
accidents on site.
9.Site Management's
attitude to
safety on site
is a major factor
of influence to
, workers safety
behaviour.
10.Poor co-operation
between sub-con-
tractors on site
undermines safety.
4
SECTION FOUR: PROCEDURAL FACTORS(4).
NUlh;FLEASE fiLK ONLY UNh SQUARE	 BOX [],FOR EACH QUESTION.
• D1'101 ‘ 	 I
AGREE
• '4
KNOW
• III
DISAGREE
1' '	 I TIM'
1. investigating
Near-Accidents
can lead to the
prevention of
future accidents.
2.Pressure to get
on with the job
prevent managers
from investigatin
near-accidents
on site.
Lit is not really
possible	 for
safetyprocedures
in a Job to be
considered at
tender stages. .
.Firms ought to
provide workers
with all their
safety equipment
and weather-proof
clothing, includin boots. .
5.Distributing and
Tdating approved
whcontractor's
mthod statements
)n site would improve
mfety performance.
;.Failure to allow
adequate times in
programmes for sa
provisions lead to
ety
poor safety performance.
'.Considering safe!
procedures and
systems of work
at tender leads t
improved safety
performance.
LA11 workers in
the building
industry should
be provided with
safety booklets
by their companies.
1.Standard safety
conditions and method
statements for
sub-contractors
should be enforce
on site.	 i
PLEASE TURNOVER >
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KNOW	 DISAGREE
SECTION FIVE: TECHNICAL FACTORS(5)
S TO THE STATEMENTS/OPINIONS BELOW,
BY TICKING ONLY ONE SQUARE/BOX TO EACH QUESTION.
01 • 31 ' 	 I •	 '
AGREE
n15-fR-671-75-1517-d—i
refuse to operate
items of plant 1
or equipments for
wib.ch they have 1
received no operating
and safety training.
2Jts management's
obligation to demand
safety method sta-
tements for all
hazardous operations.
33roviding method
statements for safe
working procedures
should be a cond-
ition of contract
434earing protective
dothings and equipments
on site ought to be a
condition of employment
5.A steady flow of
safety information
from management 1
to workers is very
lacking in the
construction industry.
6Jraining of con-
tract managers in
health and safety
is inadequate for
carrying out efficient
safety administration on site.
LAll Specialist
sub-contractors,
should supply
method statement
and safety policies
with their tenders.
9 Present methods
of tendering
discriminate strongly
against safety 1
conscious contractors.
Wlatigue due to 1
long hours work-
aion site could 1
lead to accidents.
1.The wearing of I
safety protective
clothing and
equipment reduces'
workers efficiency.
6
•1 DO'
KNOW
SECTION SIX; ORGANISATION AND MANAGEMENT FACTORS(6).
NOTE:YLEASE 1NUiCATL YOUR ANsWtRb ICJ THE SIAIEMMEINIONS BELOW,
	 BY TICKING THE BOX,WHICH BEST DESCRIBES YOUR REACTION TO THEM.
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY FOR EACH QUESTION.
• D1'101`	 • '	 •
AGREE
• .4
DISAGREE
•I" • TM`
• ore acc en s
occur when worker-
management relat-
ions are bad.
LTrade Union
involvement with
safety,can reduce
accidents.
3.Having Safety
Representatives
on sites,will no
improve safety
standards.
4.Site Management
and main board
directors have
responsibility for
safety on sites.
5.Management alone
cannot prevent
accidents on site,
workers must pla
their part by
working safely.
6.Managers and
supervisors do
not talk to their
workers enough,
about Health and
Safety on site.
7.Having safety
Committees in a
company, improves
safety standards
in the organisavon.
8.More Factory
Inspectors in the
Building Industry
cannot improve 1
health and safetf
performance.
9.Management safety
attitudes deter-
mine worker's
safety behaviour
on site.
10.Poor co-ordin-
ation of sub-
contractor's wor
on site by main-
contractors and
managing contra-
ctors can influence
safety performance.
PLEASE TURNOVER >
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'0,	 •	 .1	DO.	 •• MIDI' •111
I AGREE
	
KNO
	
DISAGRE I COMMENTS
SECTION SEVEN: ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS(7)
NOTE: Please indicate your answers to the statements/Opinions made below,
	
 by ticking one box only to each question.
1.A single contractor
responsibility for
all scaffolding on
site is important
to the improvement
of safety standards.
2.Untidy building
sites can lead to
accidents occuring
3.Provision of good
quality welfare an
first-aid facilities
on site improves
safety standards.
4.Praviding workers
with thermal/warm
clothings in winter
can lead to accident
reduction on site.
5.Good job planning,
and site organisation,
improves safety performance.
6.An inadequate supply
of the right type I
and quality tools,
plants and equipment
leads to accidents
and damage on site.
7.The attitude of
older workers to
safety and health
is a major source
of influence to
new recruits in the
building industry.
8.Regular safety
meetings with main
and subcontractors s
imperative for imp-1
roving safety co-ordination on site.
9. Inadequate control
and supervision of
workers on site is
a major factor in
accident occurence.
10.Managers can reduce
the causes of most
accidents on site
by being a little
more thoughtful about
safety provisions on site.
8
SECTION EIGHT: SAFETY PERFORMANCE FACTORS(8).
NOTE: YOU HAVE COME TO THE FINAL SELflON OF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.
PLEASE TRY TO ANSWER THE REST,BY TICKING ONE BOX FOR EACH
QUESTION AS BEFORE:CHEERS.
SIAIEMENT/OFINION-1-SIRUNGLY-1-AGKEL-1-DONI- -DISAGREE- -STRONGLY- -ANY COMMENT
I AGREE
	 I KNOW	 DISAGREE
Lbatety assessment
of sites on very
competitive, and
regular basis ,encourages
safety awareness.
2.The Health and
I
I
Safety Inspect-
orate have inade-
quate manpower an
resources to enforce
safety in the
construction industry.
3.Hazard identifil
-cation or Hazard
seeking,ought to be
conducted regularly
by site managers.
4.Efficient hazard
identification,
is a key factor
in encouraging
effective safety
performance.
5.Displaying all
accident inform-
-ation on sites,
would not prevent
workers taking risks.
6.Alcohol and drugs
are not major
problems	 or safety _
n the construction industry
7.All companies in
the building
industry should
have an alcohol and drug poi cies.
8.Lack of safety
consultation in
the industry,
between contract
management, and
site management,
undermines safetT.
9.Safety provisions in
contracts are too vague
for promoting better safety on site.
10.Most accidents occur
due to inadequate control of sub-contractors.
on multi-occupied sites
MANY THANKS FOR YOUR PATIENCE,AND CO-OPERATION.
EDWIN.
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SAFETY ADVISER/OFFICER (ETC) QUESTIONNAIRE - FINAL SURVEY.
********************************************4 A A ************
*NOTE:IN STRICT CONFIDENCE.
ISTRUUTIIINSTTsqlffi—Windire is arranged under Eight SECTIONS.
	 To complete each section,please follow the notes at the start
of the section,as you proceed from section to section,until you
reach the end of section (8).All you are required to do is to
read each question,statement,or opinion,and put a tick in the
box which best describes your feeling,or thinking towards it.
There are no right or wrong answers,so feel free to indicate your
personal feelings or views to the questions or statements made.
Please try to exercise patience, and complete all the sections
of the questionnaire.
COMPLETE CONFIDENTIALITY IS GUARANTEED. THANK YOU.
SECTION ONE: HISTORICAL FACTORS.
ME:Please tick only one boxl J tor each question in this section.
...–
1.What type of firm do you work for?
Main contractor(private company)
b Sub-contractor (private company)
c Government/Local Authority(Public)
d Self-Employed 	
e Management Contractor 	
f Other type of firm not listed,please state
	
2. If your firm is a sub-contractor,are you working in this project for a:-
1
	  1 I 
a Main Contractor 	
b Managing
Project Manager
	
c
d Other,please state
3.What is the nature of your firm's work,or trade?
a General Builders
Civil Engineers
Carpenters/Joiners
Roofers 	
Glaziers 	
Scaffolding
	
b Building and Civil Engineering contractors
d Plumbers 	
f Painters and Decorators
	
h Plasterers 	
j Demolition contractors
	
I Reinforced concrete specialists
	
Electrical Engineers	 n Heating and Ventilating Engineers
	
1
Asphalt/Tar-Sprayers	 p Plant Hirers 	
Floorin& Contractors	 r Construction Engineers 	
InsulatingSpecialist	 t Suspended Ceiling Specialists
	
Floor and
workers 	
Tiling pecialists 	
G ou d 
Others ,please state
Clihat is your job Or position?
1
 a Chief Group Safety Adviser/Officer..1 1
b Safety Adviser
	
c Safety Officer
	
d Safety Engineer
	
e Others,please state
	
PLEASE TURNOVER >
5.What trade or craft did you
Bricklayer 	
Painter/Decorator 	
Roofer 	
Plumber 	
Plant Operator.or.fitter.
University Graduate
	
Others, please state 	
come from( or your trade background)?
b Carpenter&Joiner
	
•
• d Plasterer
	
• f Scaffolder
	
• h Electrician
	
General Labourer
	
•
Technical College Educated 	
6.What is the size of your Organisation,or Firm?
( OR How many persons are employed in your firm?)
(a) 1-to-10 persons
(c) 51-to-200 persons 	 [ ]	 (d) 201-to-500 persons...[
(e) 501-to-1000	 ]	 (f) 1001 and above 	
7.Do you belong to any Trade Union Organisation/Organisations?
(a) Yes [ ];	 (b) No [ ]
8.If yes,which Trade Union Organisation do you belong,Please state 	
9.Are you married? (a) Yes...[ ];
	
(b) No...[ ]
10.1 am (a) Male.,( 1, (b)
11.YOUR AGE: ARE YOU:-
a Under 21 years 	
g 46-to-50 years 	 	
: 5P iii-::113 Mr:::::
	i
	(b) 21-to-25 years 	
1
c 26-to-30 years 	
e 36-to-40 years 	
• 41 51 years,and over.
	 .
12.How long have you worked with this Company?
ialUnder lyear 	
c 6-to-l0years 	
16-to-20years 	
 li /9 1. 1 !(t);! 1=s
e
	
f 21-to-25years
	 	
•
,
g 26-to-30years 	 	 ; h 31 years,and over.
	 .
13.How long have you worked in the Building Industry?
ialUnder 1 year 	
g 26-to-30years 	
-	 y
e 16
6-to
-to
10
-to
	
	 [ li Y 11. !%!§=sc
	  [ I; b.1 31years,and over.. li
14.Are you a member of any professional Institution?
(a) Yes 	
 [ 1; (b) No
15. If Yes,please state which one,or ones
	
]	 (b) 11-to-50 persons 	
1.
2
----------
----- ----
---------- ------------
---------- ------------
------
------
------
------
------
----------
----------
----------
----------
SECTION TWO:ECONOMIC FACTORS(2)
Knh: LEASE INDIGAIE -YOUR KtbiJONSES TO THE STATEMENTS BELOW,
--- BY TICKING ONE SQUARE/BOX ONLY TO EACH QUESTION.
STATENIENT7UFINIUN-1-STRUNGLY- - AGREE- - DUNE- - DISAGREE- - STRONGLY- - ANY
I AGREE	 KNOW	 DISAGREE COMMENTS
Llionus systems
interfer with safety
organisation on
a site.
f
I
2.Accidents invol-
ing injuries and
property damages,
amount to financial
and productivity 
I
losses.
3.Bonus systems lead
to supervisors
turning a blind-eye
to safety hazards.
4.Spending on safety
training in the
building industry
is inadequate for
improving safety yerformance
5.The need to achieve
Commercial advant-
ages by management
influences safety;
organisation on site.
6.A percentage of
the job cost
should be include
in the tender sum
for safety in
every contract.
7.The Client should
do more to ensure
that contractor's
prices include a
percentage of the
Job cost for
safety in the ten er
--
--
---
---
------------8.Contractor's
compliance with
safety provision
promotes better safety.
----------------------------
9.Site safety should be a
more important
factor in build-
ing than product-
ivity.
-------
1.0 .Awarding safety
bonus to workers
would lead to
improved safety
performance in the
building industry.
PLEASE TURNOVER >
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SECTION THREE: PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS(3).
NO1E:PLEASE INDIOA1h YOUR RESPONSES TO iHE STATEMENTS BELOW,
---- BY TICKING ONE SQUARE/BOX ONLY TO EACH QUESTION.
THE SQUARE THAT EXPRESSES YOUR TRUE FEELINGS,OR OPINION
TOWARDS THE STATEMENT MADE,IS THE ONE YOU SHOULD TICK.
Wil.h.MENI7UYIN/UN-1-61RUNGLY- -AGREE- -DUNT-I-DISAUREb- -STRONGLY- -ANY LUMMENIS
I AGREE	 KNOW I	 DISAGREE
1..c.,reating indivi-I
dual safety aware
ness can lead to
less accidents on
sites.
2.Worker's irrespon-
sible behaviour
on site can under-
mine safe-working.
LBuilding work is
tough and danger-
ous and as such,
anyone who works
in building must
be strong,tough,
and be prepared
to take risks.
4.Safety awareness
can only be instL.led
into workers through
regular safety training.
5.Safety is mostly
a matter of
'commonsense & training.
6.Individual care-
lessness is a
major cause of
construction
accidents.
7A/A sense of
urgency in jobs
forces site -
managers to pay
less attention
to site safety.
LCo-operation bet-
ween site-manage-
ment and safety
Advisers is import-
ant in reducing
site accidents.
9.Site Management's
attitude to
safety on site
is a major factor
of influence to
workers safety
behaviour.
10.Poor co-operation
between sub-con-
tractors on site
undermines safety.
4
SECTION FOUR:PROCEDURAL FACTORS(4).
NU1E;FLEASL iILK ONLY ONE SQUARE	 BOX
 [],FOR EACH QUESTION.
• DI'131` e •	 ,e,
AGREE
•
KNOW
'
DISAGREE
'	 •	 DV
Linvestigating
Near-Accidents
can lead to the
prevention of
future accidents.
2Iressure to get
on with the job
prevent managers
from investigatin
near-accidents
on site.
Lit is not really
possible	 for
safetyprocedure
in a lob to be
considered at
tender stages.
i.Firms ought to
provide workers
with all their
safety equipment
and weather-proof
dothing,includint
i.Anyone who repeat-
pily fails to wearl
their safety
protective clothing
and equipment ought
to be sacked.
i.Site managers
must accept their
responsibility for
safe-working pro-
cedures and systems
on their sites.	
I
boots.
1
'.Considering safe-
procedures and	 I
systems of work I
at tender leads to
improved safety
performance. .
,All workers in
the building
industry should
be provided with
safety booklets
by their companies.
Providing all
workers with
safety booklets
would lead to a
reduction of
most accidents
on site.
PLEASE TURNOVER >
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SECTION FIVE: TECHNICAL FACTORS(5)
NUIL: PLEASE INDICALE YOUR RESPONSES TO THE STATEMENTS/OPINIONS BELOW,
	
 BY TICKING ONLY ONE SQUARE/BOX TO EACH QUESTION.
• •1V'IN , 	 • '	 ' '
AGREE
IS"
KNOW
•
DISAGREE
• • 'I•131
or ers s ou
refuse to operate
items of plant I
or equipments for
which they have I
received no operating
and safety training.
2.Most workers in
the building
industry lack
knowledge of
safety hazards
on site.
LWorkers ability
to spot safety
hazards on site
would lead to
less accidents.
--------------------
4.tiost workers
with commonsense
could drive dumpers,
fork-lifts,or other
machines on site
after a little
site demonstration.
5.A steady flow of
safety information
from management 1
to workers is ve
lacking in the
construction
industry.
6.Training of Safety
Advisers in health
and safety in the
UK is inadequate
for carrying out
effective safety
management.
7.The wearing of
safety protective
clothing and
equipment reduces'
workers efficiency.
8.All Specialist
sub-contractors,
should supply
method statement
and safety policies
with their tenders.
9.Present methods of
tendering discriminate
strongly against safety conscious
10.Pressure and Tiredness
leadto accidents on site.
contractors.
6
2131'	 0' • 'I	 1 I	 •	 •1	 • II	 • 'I' 011`• o
AGREE KNOW	 DISAGREE
SECTION SIX; ORGANISATION AND MANAGEMENT FACTORS(6):
NOTE:PLEASE INDTGAIE YOUR ANSWERS 10 THE STATEMENTS/OPINIONS BELOW,
	 BY TICKING THE BOX,WHICH BEST DESCRIBES YOUR REACTION TO THEM.
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY FOR EACH QUESTION.
1.More accidents I
occur when worker-
management relat-
ions are bad.
LTrade Union
involvement with
safety,can reduce
accidents.
Mailing Safety
Representatives
on sites,will not
improve safety
standards.
4.Site Management
and main board
directors have
responsibility for
safety on sites.
5.Management alone
cannot prevent
accidents on site,
workers must pla
their part by
working safely.
6.Managers and
supervisors do
not talk to their
workers enough,
about Health and
Safety on site.
7.Having safety
Committees in a
company, improves
safety standards
in the organisat on.
9.Management safety
attitudes deter-
mine worker's
safety behaviour
on site.
LMore Factory
Inspectors in the
Building Industry
cannot improve
health and safetf
performance.
10.Poor co-ordin-
ation of sub-
contractor's wor
on site by main-
contractors and
managing contra-
ctors can influence
safety performance.
PLEASE TURNOVER >
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•1'DO,
8	
••• • • 'I'• NI
I AGREE
	
KNO
	
DISAGRE	 COMMENTS
SECTION SEVEN: ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS (7)
• ease n ca e your answers o e statements/Opinions made below,
- by ticking one box only to each question.
.	 '	 I'
LA singie contractor
responsibility for
all scaffolding on
site is important
to the improvement
of safety standards.
-
2.Untidy building
sites can lead to
accidents occuring
•-	 	
3.Provision of good
quality welfare an
first-aid facilities
on site improves
safety standards.
4.Providing workers
with thermal/warm
clothings in winter
could improve safe-
working on sites.
5.Good job planning,
and site organisation,
improves safety performance.
•
6.An inadequate supply
of the right type
and quality tools,
plants and equipment
leads to accidents
and damage on site.
7.The attitude of
older workers to
safety and health
is a major source
of influence to
new recruits in the
building industry.
8.Thermal discomfort
of workers in the
winter is not a
major safety problem.
9.Inadequate control
and supervision of
workers on site is
a major factor in
accident occurence
10.Workers can reduce
the causes of some
accidents on site
by simply being a
little more thought-
ful about what they are doing.
1 .1 IS QUESTIONNAIRE.I	 • V• •	 11 'I
PLEASE CONTINUE.
1"	 9 '1' DI'•
AGREE
,
KNOW
•
DISAGREE
SECTION EIGHT: SAFETY PERFORMANCE FACTORS (8).
.aeyassessmen
of sites on very I
competitive and I
regular basis encourages
safety awareness.
2.The Health and
Safety Inspect-
orate have inade-
quate resources
to enforce safety
in the construction
industry.
3.Hazard identifi-
cation or Hazard
seeking,ought to be
conducted regularly
by site managers.
4.Efficient hazard
identification
is a key factor
in encouraging
effective safety
performance.
5.Displayin& all
accident inform-
ation on sites
would prevent risk-
taking by workers
6.Alcohol and drugs
are not major
problems fOr safety
on site.
7.All companies in
the building
industry should
have alcohol and
drug policies.
8.Lack of safety
consultation bet-
ween Clients,Eng-
ineers,Designers,
Managing Contract-
ors and Sub-cont-
ractors undermines
safety performance on contracts.
9.Safety provisions in
I
1
1 
tender documents are
too vague for promoting better safetT on site.
	  I 	 	 	  I
10.Most accidents occur
on multi-occupied sites
due to inadequate I	
1	 1	 1	 Icontrol of sub-contractors.
MANY THANKS FOR YOUR PATIENCE,AND CO-OPERATION.
EDWIN.
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Pilot Safety Study - Comments by V. C. Morrill - Bovis am% Site Manager
Page 1
Format messy	 , I would suggest the following example:
(1)	 What type of Company do you work for?
Please tick box
a) Main Contractor
b) Sub-Contractor
c) Etc.
(2) to (8)
	
Inclusive ditto, ditto.
Page 3
Item 9 & 10 close together
Page 4 
Layout good
Page 5
High
Generally questions quite good.
All the rest OK.
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1. Introduction
Over the last 20 years there has been increasing concern for
maintenance of safe working environments in industry. Construction
has not been exempt from the pressures of safer working — indeed many
would argue that the relatively poor record of the construction industry
in providing safe conditions makes it a focus for discussion. The thrust
of forcing safety improvements has lain with the Health and Safety at
Work Act of 1974 which sought to make industry more self-regulating
in respect of safety management.
The background to this philosophy has been based on an ever-increasing
set of statutory regulations re gardin g safety, and the Robens Report[1]
sou ght to evaluate this plethora of le gislative intervention. Robens found
that new hazards and problems based around modern processes and
materials were leadin g to declining standards of health and safety.
Moreover, problems eschewed detailed machinery, procedures and
inspections by individual factory inspectors and saw benefit in developing
well-regulated, disciplined employers or employees to guard against
breaches of safety. This process of self-regulation placed greater emphasis
on employers and training a gencies to stimulate safety trainin g. To this
end the BEC/CITB encoura ged a series of safety training seminars to
fit in with the spirit of the Robens Report and the subsequent legislation.
The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 presaged longer-term objectives
which were to change attitudes to safety so that this became part of
the normal practice of workin g behaviour. One of the instruments to
achieve these objectives and procedures was the introduction of a system
of Safety Committees and Safety Representatives in 1978.
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It will be recalled that the regulations prescribed the cases in which trade
unions may have appointed safety representatives and the functions of
such people. Additionally the regulations set down the instances where
an employer needed to establish a safety committee. Cradduce12], in his
paper "Safety Representatives", reviewed the impact of the regulations
on the construction industry and noted the particular difficulty in respect
of subcontractor involvement in safety management. Some five years
after the introduction of the Safety Committee and Safety Representative
regulations became law the CSU (Construction Study Unit) at Brunel
University sou ght to study the level of implementation and the effects
on construction of this legislative intervention.
At a basic level the consequences of the legislation and the subsequent
regulations can be monitored by the trends in accidents and particularly
the accidents per 100,000 at risk could be indicative. As can be seen
in Table I, despite the le gislation the safety position has not improved.
So, were other factors at work? The legislation set out to compare the
safety climate by chan ging attitudes and the question remained, "was
this happenin g?" Consequently, the aim of the research was to investigate
the general attitudes of construction workers towards safety
representatives and safety committees in the construction industry. Its
premise was that favourable attitudes towards the introduction of such
agencies may initiate positive attitudes towards general safety procedures
in the construction industry.
Table I
Rate of fatal accidents
per 100.000 at risk
Rate of serious accidents 	 Rate of all reported
per 100,000 at risk	 accidents per 100,000
at risk
1974 16.0 760 3460
1975 17.7 .740 3460
1976 15.3 650 3530
1977 13	 1 750 3300
1978 13.1 760 3400
1979 11.7 Not available 3150
1980 13.0 Not available 3000
1981 9.- 1687 4170
1982 9.9 1948 4060
1983 11.4 2176 Not available
1984 9.8 2191 Not available
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2. The Sample
The research used three distinct data bases for the sample with differing
research instruments. In order to obtain "official" views, organisations
involved with the external management of health and safety were
interviewed, this work supported the primary data drawn, by
questionnaire, from operatives and supervisors in ten construction
companies of varying size and regional origin. The companies involved
in the survey were drawn from all sectors of the industry, and the sample
was unstructured and random. Also the size of the organisations
providing assistance varied (see Table II).
Table II
Number of	 Number of
Companie‘	 Employees
1-49 
3 50 - 299
1 300 - 599
4 600+
The primary sample was the individual operative and site mana ger. Here
the ten companies involved received 364 questionnaires to distribute to
operatives and site-based supervisors and mana gers; again this -vas a
random sample. Some 200 questionnaires were returned giving a response
rate of 55 per cent. Of those returnin g the questionnaire, 85 per cent
were employed by private and public liability companies, 9 per cent by
statutory authorities and 2 per cent were self-employed. All had previous
knowled ge of the industry and Table III shows the distribution of
experience of the respondents.
Table III
18 aio had less than 1 year's experience
29 t5 had between 2-3 years' experience
13 c5 had between 4-5 years' experience
18 cr;o had between 6-9 years' experience
22% had between 10-20 years' experience
As can be seen, the majority of the sample have cumulative experience
of construction with its attendant work ethics and have been exposed
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to a construction work environment from 2 to 20 years. They therefore
may be considered to have developed useful insights into the issue under
investigation.
3. Results
3.1 Appointment of Safety Representatives and Safety Committees
All firms in the sample used safety officers and advisers, but it seems
that the same enthusiasm has not been shown towards the selection or
appointment of safety representatives and safety committees. The
research showed that several of the sample companies (including the
larger firms) did not use safety representatives and committees,
irrespective of project sizes or types. Four firms in the sample did not
have safety representatives and only one had any form of safety
committee. Constrastin,g this san guine approach to safety representatives,
some 60 per cent of the individual respondents believed that the presence
of safety representatives on sites would assist the construction industry
to become more self-regulator y than it is at present. Further, their
presence would lead to improvements in safety performance provided
they were of the right calibre and trained to spot potential hazards. They
were expected to be able to hold regular consultations on health and
safety matters with supervisors, site management and operatives; and
to be able to take part in arranged safety clinics on sites when necessary.
Essentially operatives believed that safety representatives had a very
important role to play in accident/hazard prevention at the workplace.
It was thought that their presence would supplant the role of the Safety
Inspectorate in the policin g of safety in the construction industry. Again,
the proviso attached to this role was that of adequate training to meet
the needs for objective safety monitorin g., safety control, safety
supervision and safety reporting.
On the question of safety committees. 65 per cent of the respondents
stated that their companies had no safety committees and 24 per cent
did not know if they had them or not. However, the 11 per cent who
had them thought them to be very effective in influencing company safety
policies and overall safety management. They were thought of very highly
by 40 per cent of the sample. Finally 53 per cent of respondents indicated
that the introduction of both safety representatives and safety committees
would greatly improve safety performance in the industry, through the
creation of greater safety awareness and individual safety organisation
at the workplace.
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3.2 Willingness of Operatives and Trade Foremen to become Safety
Representatives
The research showed that operatives and foremen were reluctant to
become safety representatives. Of the operative sample, only 27 per cent
were willin g to become safety representatives, 56 per cent were unwilling
and 17 per cent had no views either way.
It may be construed from this result that while most operatives, as shown
in Section 3.1, may express highly favourable attitudes towards the idea
of having safety representatives on every site/workplace in the industry
they themselves were unwilling to accept responsibility for their own
safety and that of their colleagues at work. Since the use of safety
representatives is not voluntarist and is required by law, then management
and trade unions have much to do to stimulate interest in this matter.
Creative use of incentives may be usefully considered. Yet the picture
is not entirely bleak, for while those willing to become safety
representatives were in a minority, the reasons for wishing to become
a representative were very encouraging.
Of those respondents who were willing to serve as safety representatives:
— 78 per cent thought Safety Representatives (SRs) were vital to the
construction industry, in terms of accident prevention, and the
creation of safety awareness within the operative groups;
— 4 per -cent believed that SRs were essential to the company image
and were "mana gement men";
— 11 per cent felt they would be playing a useful role to themselves
and their workmates by virtue of the safety knowledge they would
get through safety training;
— 7 per cent thought that the job of safety representative was easier
than normal working.
These responses indicate how aware the workforce was of the relevance
of the role of the SR to industry, the company and themselves. The
general view of SRs as . union appointees and. as such, anti-management,
was not borne out. On the other hand, mana gement was more concerned
that trade unions were reluctant to appoint SRs and give them the right
sort of trainin g. Management would prefer joint trainin g for operatives,
supervisors and appointed SRs rather than leaving it to trade unions.
3.3 Prevention of Accidents
The general view expressed by 86 per cent of the sample was that the
presence on sites of well-trained and competent safety representatives
would prevent the occurrence of most types of accidents. It must be
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stressed that the research did not seek to validate these feelings
empirically but merely sought to record them. More pertinently, the
sample felt that most accidents occur due to poor supervision, and these
may be distinguished from those which may occur as a result of
negli gence or carelessness on the part of the individual.
The significance of this response is the psychological impact of the SR's
presence which may create a favourable environment or atmosphere for
a safer site, and this could be advantageous both to the company and
the industry. Therefore trade unions should be encouraged, by
management, to appoint more safety representatives and provide them
with a joint TUC/employer training programme. This could lead to better
understanding of safety and health problems by trade unions and
employers' organisations.
3.4 General Safety Attitudes
Generally, most operatives' attitudes towards working in the construction
industry appear to be favourable. The research showed that:
—
82 per cent of the operative sample expressed very high positive
feelings towards their jobs and safety;
— 11 per cent expressed ne gative feelings;
—
7 per cent did not have any views as to the relevance of their jobs
and safety.
Additionally the data revealed that:
— 9 per cent of operatives worked in construction, despite the safety
record, because to them construction paid good money;
—
15 per cent worked in construction because they could not find
other work;
—
33 per cent said they liked working in the open air;
— 7 per cent felt they found it easier to change jobs from one
employer to another;
—
36 per cent worked in construction because they were following
family tradition.
However, the most strongly expressed attitude by operatives was towards
personal safety. Ninety-three per cent considered their safety as being
the single most important factor to them at the workplace. Only 4 per
cent thought safety was either irrelevant or unimportant.
Interestin gly, the research confirmed that most operatives considered
health and safety of great importance and felt that management did
not do enou gh for them in the form of safety training. The research
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also showed that considerable apathy persists in the job situation: apathy
is not conducive to good health and safety performances. However, the
root cause of such views was shown to be the uncertainty about future
employment in the industry and, at a more particular level, management
attitudes to labour are seen to be developing an apathetic atmosphere
within the labour force. On the other hand, if results of Carnegie's13]
research showing that "most men in construction look forward to going
to work" are generally accepted, then men must be motivated by
employers in an endeavour to reduce the expression of apathy. Hill and
Trist [4], in their research on accidents, have shown that "Accidents may
be considered as a means of withdrawal from the work situation, through
which individuals may take up the role of absentees in a way acceptable
to both himself and to his employing organisation". So, the apathy which
is shown to prevail among construction workers may be tenuously linked
with accident or safety performance for the reasons given above. Current
research by the CSU is addressing this hypothesis.
3.5 Other Findings
Asked if operatives have heard about the 1974 Act, S7 per cem answe-rell
in the affirmative. Of the 87 per cent, 55 per cent heard of the Act
through their trade union and not from their employer. Only 16 per cent
said that they were informed by their employers, the rest were informed
by their safety representatives, their fellow workers and other sources.
This finding shows the significant role of the trade unions in informing
their membership of relevant legislation in safety, health and welfare
in the workplace. On the basis of this result, it is suggested that both
employers and the trade unions must work together more closely in
promoting a better informed workforce in respect of health and safety.
The research suggests that the objective of a self-regulating industry
cannot be realised unless the workforce is made aware of its roles, duties
and responsibilities towards safe conduct at work.
Training is seen as an important factor in the promotion of safety
awareness and the creation of good safety attitudes. Notwithstanding
this observation, only 47 per cent of operatives had received safety
training, while 53 per cent had no training in health and safety. Some
management respondents indicated that "more often than not",
commercial forces dictated the level of training provision.
The research showed that while management was willing to co-operate
with safety representatives, 51 per cent of them did not feel that safety
representatives had any legal responsibility for safety on site.
Nevertheless, 64 per cent believed that the role of safety representative
on sites could reduce accident occurrence, but were happy to do without
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them. They blamed trade unions for failing to appoint safety
representatives, despite Section 2 of the Act, which imposes duties on
employers to consult with the employees' safety representative, under
the Safety Representative and Safety Committee's Regulation of 1977[5].
Conclusion
Despite the relatively low-key discussion of safety committees and safety
representatives it is clear that their introduction has had some impact
on attitudes to safety in construction. The research carried out indicated
that despite initial scepticism there is a general, if unfocused, belief that
safety committees and safety representatives contribute to a better safety
climate on construction sites. However, the data distinguish between the
responses made; safety representatives were regarded as having greater
impact ("hi ghly favourable" response) than safety committees which were
judged to be only "moderately" influenced. It is worth noting that these
responses were bipartheid in that both employers and employees recorded
the same view. Several reasons for the differences of attitude to
representatives and committees may be postulated. The most obvious
is the human dimension — representatives are real people while
committees are seen as bureaucratic instruments. Secondly, the form
of action for corrective measures in the event of breaches or rectifying
dangerous situations may be with representatives rather than committees.
Having noted these attitudinal responses it can be restated that the
research sought to test if the intervention of the law had improved safety
performance. The results sug gest that there is no clear evidence to support
the hypothesis that there is a relationship between attitudes (to safety
committees and safety representatives) and safety performance. However,
more subtle influences may be at work which are shapin g attitudes to
safety. Firstly the research indicated that attitudes to safety are key
variables in the attention paid to health and safety at work and this
process is evident in the pre-site planning and the execution of
construction work. Secondly the evidence suggests that while accident
data have not shown improvements there has been a concerted effort
to develop a co-operative attitude to the management of safety.
Management, trade unions, the Health and Safety Inspectorate and
Safety Committee and representatives appear to be committed to
improvement and the 1977 regulations seem to have galvanised this effort.
Thirdly the research noted that the concern of operatives for their own
safety was of supreme importance. This finding is tenuously linked to
the work of the safety agencies and the safety committees and SRs. In
short it is a reflection of the growing (positive) attitude of construction
operatives to safety and vindicates the philosophy of the 1974 Act and
the subsequent Safety Representative legislation.
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To conclude, this small-scale pilot study cannot claim to have uncovered
conclusive evidence regardin g the relationship between safety
representatives and committees and performance. However, this research
provided the springboard for more extensive work in the area of safety
management. This work is currently being conducted at Brunel and will
be reported in due course.
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APPENDIX : K:
RESULTS OF OPERATIVE DATA
1. Correlation Coefficient Matrix
2. Chi-Square Test Results
age
age service industry money banksman bonus blindeye reduce
Appendix K1
risks	 product
1.00000
service 0.50673 1.00000
Industry 0.80408 0.43874 1.00000
money 0.08578 0.15914 0.20282 1.00000
banksman -0.05206 0.00470 -0.05662 -0.00941 1.00000
bonus -0.02231 -0.28722 -0.11073 -0.17570 -0.03412 1.00000
blindeye 0.04690 -0.11970 0.05731 0.01625 0.11536 0.52234 1.00000
reduce -0.07580 -0.06599 -0.01579 0.32920 0.10040 -0.02129 0.22704 1.00000
risks -0.06463 -0.11241 -0.07134 -0.10198 -0.03442 0.09181 0.10720 -0.03977 1.00000
product -0.17256 -0.13408 -0.05175 0.07960 0.10511 -0.04928 -0.11406 -0.00543 -0.04711 1.00000
CMS -0.12788 -0.14539 -0.11299 -0.11542 -0.13170 -0.12399 -0.19701 -0.02166 -0.01004 0.15061
safety -0.05757 -0.09724 -0.01610 0.09005 -0.10258 0.01474 -0.03334 0.00536 -0.09305 0.32544
workmate -0.01850 -0.12787 -0.05605 0.14335 0.05223 0.15782 0.19959 0.19517 0.01548 -0.19611
safeact -0.05738 0.06247 0.00208 0.11750 0.02147 -0.06253 -0.06341 0.14179 -0.13322 0.26091
training -0.03100 0.06842 -0.00120 0.09263 -0.16921 -0.13572 -0.06166 0.04025 -0.04854 0.38992
risky 0.23137 0.08971 0.26350 0.00854 -0.06964 0.02443 0.07701 -0.11255 0.26461 -0.09434
skillful -0.04934 0.08034 -0.02322 -0.21417 -0.09318 0.06528 0.06441 0.02795 -0.15689 0.00860
careful -0.04961 0.00956 -0.07217 -0.00759 -0.02054 -0.12023 -0.06951 0.15760 0.06491 -0.05510
site 0.17862 0.02975 0.09273 -0.08224 -0.01957 0.14865 0.19395 0.15469 -0.04510 -0.16443
like -0.05863 -0.08130 -0.08903 0.01915 -0.03735 -0.12060 -0.07675 0.04152 -0.04563 0.20893
helmet 0.01167 0.01182 0.07271 0.14313 0.05100 0.05072 0.07942 0.10742 -0.10961 0.20489
wear -0.13090 -0.01808 -0.12438 -0.00958 0.02259 0.04105 -0.03683 -0.05594 0.03099 0.19182
protect -0.01175 0.01764 0.01276 0.17112 0.04440 0.07220 0.01863 0.12248 -0.06067 0.30741
equip -0.11997 -0.02757 -0.11888 0.09339 -0.13820 0.17954 0.05677 0.15505 -0.01734 0.18433
safebook -0.06581 0.00213 -0.14571 0.05081 -0.10830 0.11208 0.01436 0.21819 -0.04972 0.12853
talk -0.06326 -0.00475 -0.12601 0.08139 -0.08455 0.15052 0.07292 0.29219 0.00831 0.08970
believe -0.01929 -0.10634 -0.00253 0.05041 -0.02947 0.15258 0.11776 0.25643 -0.10510 0.20682
asbestos -0.11107 -0.14888 -0.09022 -0.00449 -0.23005 0.09251 0.08685 -0.02584 0.07683 0.05573
asbesite -0.11592 -0.00048 -0.09341 0.13368 0.04413 0.08154 0.01201 0.14137 -0.01629 0.09143
handle -0.04943 -0.06201 -0.14738 0.08341 0.18191 -0.03727 -0.01471 0.14606 -0.14150 0.32103
fell -0.02663 0.03559 -0 00129 0.04083 0.04041 -0.12077 -0.08938 -0.07071 0.08659 -0.08332
mechan -0.03686 0.04886 -0.05654 0.04637 -0.03977 0.01974 0.06072 -0.13050 -0.02663 0.19125
scaffold -0.08292 0.00663 -0.15100 0.03079 -0.11105 0.01413 0.02155 0.05006 0.02456 0.09650
proper 0.07045 0.09944 0.09204 0.00623 0.09313 -0.15655 -0.13292 0.07873 -0.06284 -0.21880
sense
-0.01985 0.08339 0.04311 0.04994 0.18741 -0.17066 -0.09068 -0.00703 0.07171 -0.14707
erector
-0.04232 -0.05103 -0.00672 0.07802 0.05343 -0.11868 0.07921 0.02997 0.11381 -0.03825
dumper 0.11715 0.16530 0.11373 0.04279 0.08023 -0.04008 0.08518 -0.02475 -0.02526 -0.09248
operate
-0.04008 0.01894 -0.14856 -0.00613 -0.00257 -0.01669 0.03414 0.12504 0.14169 0.22989
relation
-0.01347 0.16178 -0.08312 0.01733 -0.03932 0.00324 0.09193 0.06158 0.07877 0.04484
involve 0.00991 0.00437 0.01922 0.24547 0.04318 -0.08089 0.09033 0.21932 -0.15487 -0.05230
subcont
-0.13850 0.02344 -0.14445 0.05561 0.07664 0.08548 0.17915 0.19198 0.01065 0.21248
saferep
-0.01203 0.01910 -0.09174 0.19294 -0.06598 -0.12085 0.00411 0.23282 -0.11879 0.23368
cooperat
-0.03190 0.01774 -0.12252 0.01963 -0.17068 0.11846 -0.08522 -0.00393 0.03207 0.09586
commitee -0.06444 0.03571 -0.05475 0.04145 -0.07048 -0.16799 -0.16782 0.09230 -0.18202 0.24402
enough
-0.10168 -0.09859 -0.09292 -0.11094 -0.08213 -0.14803 -0.25629 -0.00450 -0.01148 0.16383
supetv 0.10901 0.05112 0.05512 0.06696 -0.02103 0.07269 0.29209 0.24179 0.07952 -0.12487
posters 0.00128 0.01431 -0.04207 0.06141 0.03092 0.03051 0.03903 0.09670 -0.17522 0.31849
tidysite
-0.01987 0.12187 -0.15488 0.06562 0.04181 0.03379 -0.08198 0.05276 -0.06461 0.33590
jobs 0.07962 0.10480 0.05021 0.11432 -0.08125 -0.06673 -0.06972 0.11767 0.00750 -0.00388
Cause
-0.07569 -0.05992 -0.00721 -0.11663 -0.16373 -0.12639 -0.16358 0.00678 0.08793 -0.12099
lessacci 0.05440 0.10632 0.01511 0.04298 0.04396 0.05858 0.03799 -0.01165 -0.12709 0.19522
toxic
-0.02798 -0.01167 -0.07053 0.08833 -0.12512 -0.11306 0.17408 0.16154 -0.01011 0.02372
examples 0.11996 0.13679 0.06154 -0.20173 -0.09433 0.05712 0.03511 -0.12532 0.14248 -0.06479
plan
-0.04296 0.22401 -0.02777 0.07657 -0.02859 -0.07848 -0.00668 0.01014 -0.10348 0.27998
avoid
-0.05817 0.09095 -0.02641 0.09202 0.05382 -0.09134 0.08455 0.15023 -0.04698 0.16939
safeinsp
-0.07572 0.07101 -0.05320 -0.03285 -0.08394 -0.19892 -0.12981 0.06419 0.02955 -0.02808
age
service
industry
money
banksman
bonus
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reduce
risks
product
cares
cares safety workmate safeact training risky skillful careful
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site	 like
1.00000
safety 0.20147 1.00000
workmate 0.07386 -0.13382 1.00000
safeact 0.31415 0.12127 -0.00811 1.00000
training 0.21411 0.39539 -0.10638 0.39517 1.00000
risky -0.11989 0.01344 0.10690 -0.30561 -0.07419 1.00000
skillful -0.00624 0.33137 -0.02622 0.09039 0.24921 -0.02370 1.00000
careful 0.13545 0.13278 -0.05788 0.20126 0.18964 -0.03141 0.29778 1.00000
site -0.08860 -0.07869 0.11078 -0.11775 -0.01977 -0.05595 -0.01086 -0.14224 1.00000
like 0.16430 0.50506 -0.11383 0.12660 0.29570 0.01669 0.25042 0.38675 -0.24551 1.00000
helmet 0.18541 0.33324 0.03100 0.19153 0.30249 -0.21099 0.17888 0.02439 0.05199 0.08844
wear 0.09414 0.00641 0.02623 0.07986 0.18887 -0.09484 0.02658 0.09183 0.06418 -0.08937
protect 0.20376 0.17522 -0.03234 0.21252 0.18934 -0.09562 -0.16953 0.09366 -0.08626 0.03615
equip 0.18482 0.18282 0.07072 0.20728 0.27478 -0.14918 0.07065 0.18374 0.04072 -0.04613
safebook 0.12721 0.12142 0.16590 0.20406 0.24469 -0.09382 0.00000 0.03849 0. 03544 -0.06276
talk 0.09774 0.15681 0.20243 0.15305 0.23520 -0.12569 0.01935 0.15530 0.08154 -0.00063
believe -0.01045 0.22058 0.14589 0.01518 0.17855 -0.12946 0.14983 0.00368 0.05166 0.02413
asbestos 0.15773 0.44064 -0.11593 -0.04039 0.24721 0.04331 0.06942 0.13141 -0.05980 0.36203
asbesite -0.08024 0.06178 0.12618 0.10954 -0.01783 -0.07605 -0.02167 -0.17329 0.01249 -0.01627
handle 0.18408 0.02448 -0.03725 0.20509 0.18110 -0.14286 -0.21431 -0.04010 0.11245 0.07278
tell 0.12892 -0.05232 0.01326 -0.09858 -0.16168 0.05431 -0.12321 0.08087 -0.01309 0.01207
mechan -0.00887 0.44245 -0.13056 0.07453 0.32365 0.01565 0.23888 0.08666 -0.22154 0.38868
scaffold -0.08469 0.37420 0.02528 0.04204 0.35242 -0.01825 0.19214 0.15147 -0.06513 0.30792
proper -0.01461 -0.07051 0.27564 -0.17782 -0.06594 0.09440 -0.05927 0.10770 0.16803 -0.12528
sense 0.00627 -0.25632 0.02636 -0.12394 -0.27974 0.12936 -0.06679 0.05444 0.11652 -0.28997
erector 0.05625 -0.29651 0.17717 -0.07282 -0.14022 0.05364 -0.29149 -0.02803 0.00485 -0.24025
dumper 0.06193 -0.12912 -0.12110 -0.03495 -0.09226 0.08407 -0.03815 -0.07565 0.00545 -0.17414
operate 0.05575 0.18403 -0.08778 0.09574 0.26939 -0.19961 0.05833 0.03453 -0.09722 0.16541
relation -0.12075 -0.10313 0.00407 -0.08464 0.07552 -0.00714 0.02061 -0.02464 0.11280 -0.14221
involve -0.02382 -0.09014 0.06747 0.15767 0.01060 -0.28764 -0.05003 0.14968 0.02481 -0.03293
subcont -0.00239 -0.00087 0.09199 0.14862 0.14833 -0.11379 0.01322 0.02271 0.04294 -0.04014
saferep -0.01303 0.14232 -0.10918 0.16120 0.20687 -0.31260 -0.00450 0.03195 -0.05906 0.09293
cooperat 0.10105 0.17307 -0.08106 -0.00181 0.07924 0.01597 -0.07934 0.09710 -0.11130 0.33348
commitee 0.13526 0.13639 -0.05641 0.22645 0.38111 -0.26108 0.07885 0.15303 -0.08966 0.05727
enough 0.38989 0.11702 0.07809 0.07333 0.07118 -0.08798 0.03921 0.08509 0.02115 0.04852
spew 0.00306 -0.07840 0.29850 0.05444 0.00285 0.01850 -0.06576 0.06999 0.21989 -0.11128
posters 0.23090 0.16716 0.05764 0.21509 0.22130 -0.17967 -0.00429 -0.09618 0.05492 0.07135
tidysite 0.06458 0.16715 -0.04949 0.20207 0.34005 -0.17526 0.13373 0.06423 0.01562 0.15060
jobs 0.03657 0.14025 0.06898 0.02471 0.08277 0.02188 0.01942 0.05833 -0.04736 0.01939
Cause 0.08123 -0.13696 0.04264 0.06519 -0.09670 0.00897 0.03547 0.03617 0.16037 -0.07820
lessacci 0.05517 0.20914 0.03950 0.11483 0.17833 -0.24044 0.11922 -0.00810 -0.12720 0.09534
toxic -0.12970 0.09426 0.03359 0.03891 -0.06364 0.01904 -0.03983 0.11961 -0.01529 0.08002
examples 0.13544 0.24226 0.02682 -0.08491 0.19491 0.12095 0.07994 0.09976 0.16536 0.11012
plan 0.16678 0.19127 -0.03804 0.19247 0.20543 -0.08912 0.12315 0.08978 -0.24995 0.08337
avoid 0.06441 0.16982 0.11363 0.01262 0.16837 -0.03278 0.04030 0.08001 -0.10699 0.06108
safeinsp 0.09596 -0.13121 -0.01028 0.15626 0.04243 -0.07765 -0.03534 0.15738 -0.04731 0.04474
age
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asbesite	 handle
Industry
money
banksman
bonus
blindeye
reduce
risks
product
cares
safety
workmata
safeact
training
risky
skillful
careful
site
like
helmet 1.00000
wear 0.08531 1.00000
protect 0.41424 0.23132 1.00000
equip 0.36994 0.35777 0.66292 1.00000
safebook 0.27205 0.38101 0.56355 0.67155 1.00000
talk 0.37590 0.40605 0.60095 0.72488 0.80281 1.00000
believe 0.31044 0.26955 0.35862 0.44018 0.53765 0.63464 1.00000
asbestos 0.16325 0.03725 0.12720 0.20286 0.15169 0.17380 0.09728 1.00000
asbesite -0.03782 -0.03469 0.10694 0.03293 0.03425 0.04239 0.08194 -0.00796 1.00000
handle 0.13345 0.08376 0.24928 0.13318 0.10624 0.17760 0.03931 0.14893 0.26628 1.00000
tell -0.19612 -0.17290 -0.03431 -0.19403 -0.21826 -0.26853 -0.26421 -0.16440 0.06369 -0.07166
mechan 0.27778 0.08510 0.11256 0.11309 0.23990 0.14627 0.17054 0.27350 -0.11305 -0.04096
scaffold 0.10972 0.30654 0.15568 0.25721 0.34331 0.34198 0.32453 0.50649 0.09425 0.10701
proper -0.19272 0.06439 -0.11472 -0.10696 -0.06288 -0.01187 0.07242 -0.12985 -0.07736 -0.18482
sense -0.05265 0.01527 -0.10228 -0.14209 -0.09111 -0.08757 -0.15067 -0.21479 0.04358 0.03217
erector -0.14770 -0.03030 -0.02931 -0.09463 -0.04963 -0.03902 0.01978 -0.16054 0.17199 0.07748
dumper 0.01181 -0.15195 0.08331 -0.01932 -0.06718 -0.08125 -0.06366 -0.16445 -0.05127 0.00962
operate 0.23399 0.09171 0.20594 0.30136 0.33988 0.28845 0.11388 0.10116 -0.11045 0.10634
relation 0.04386 0.29926 0.13325 0.11023 0.27111 0.21735 0.06570 0.00066 0.08337 -0.01866
involve 0.10703 0.12489 0.15464 0.09756 0.12438 0.17421 0.16193 -0.01245 0.10454 0.06551
subcont 0.11501 0.20637 0.04725 0.10247 0.24133 0.24063 0.26673 0.14715 -0.07580 0.13317
saferep 0.24841 0.19593 0.32141 0.22963 0.38503 0.39367 0.36407 0.12614 0.01887 0.21145
cooperat -0.01182 0.16917 0.17471 0.26949 0.33487 0.32188 0.20013 0.28569 -0.07396 0.11488
commitee 0.15982 0.33247 0.23480 0.34748 0.32992 0.34296 0.37395 0.13222 0.18928 0.20899
enough -0.03673 0.17730 0.00364 0.03575 0.05788 0.08368 0.09419 0.14418 0.05483 0.07754
superv -0.04852 -0.02651 0.11189 0.13989 0.25732 0.23826 0.08060 -0.06383 0.10679 -0.10052
posters 0.18207 0.23227 0.11253 0.18533 0.31596 0.17982 0.26940 0.03088 -0.08487 0.11564
tidysite 0.27104 0.14909 0.22185 0.33529 0.26058 0.32352 0.23701 0.17048 0.05921 0.30774
jobs -0.03476 0.04396 0.16651 0.24429 0.17404 0.22838 0.16968 0.08108 0.09339 -0.08031
cause -0.18136 0.06452 -0.12399 -0.07741 -0.00600 -0.03959 -0.05888 -0.09650 0.05651 0.00661
lessacci 0.33225 0.00974 0.23763 0.15269 0.20262 0.17243 0.05250 0.10132 -0.03890 0.04101
toxic -0.08624 -0.18177 0.06901 0.02091 0.12152 0.08832 0.07686 0.15878 0.10566 0.13936
examples 0.10532 0.04844 0.08297 0.06438 0.21635 0.17651 0.06354 0.31141 0.12109 -00..0041957695
plan 0.22519 0.21489 0.37718 0.43936 0.37352 0.34498 0.18635 0.15164 -0.03444
avoid 0.12739 0.16656 0.09013 0.24497 0.09324 0.16511 0.14571 0.24109 0.09929 0.04555
safeinsp -0.12283 -0.02318 0.06203 0.02261 0.04019 -0.00526 0.00975 -0.11864 -0.12466 -0.12066
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tell	 mechan	 scaffold	 proper	 sense	 erector	 dumper	 operate	 relation	 involve
age
service
industry
money
banksman
bonus
blindeye
reduce
risks
product
CMS
safety
workmate
safeact
training
risky
skillful
careful
site
like
helmet
wear
protect
equip
safebook
talk
believe
asbestos
asbesite
handle
tell 1.00000
mechan -0.12350 1.00000
scaffold -0.34782 0.51094 1.00000
proper 0.24738 -0.32283 -0.04082 1.00000
sense 0.24028 -0.21250 -0.28522 0.16391 1.00000
erector 0.11012 -0.32282 -0.23688 0.15666 0.28645 1.00000
dumper 0.16543 0.00339 -0.27528 0.08795 0.33888 0.34862 1.00000
operate -0.21078 0.45255 0.31178 -0.30580 -0.28594 -0.20622 -0.10839 1.00000
relation 0.02085 0.12315 0.13512 -0.00184 0.07460 0.13484 0.01499 0.21898 1.00000
involve 0.01326 -0.02966 0.07991 0.03813 0.00838 0.08779 -0.17697 0.04171 0.06726 1.00000
subcont -0.19972 0.21634 0.26423 -0.11062 -0.03989 0.01328 -0.13887 0.28240 0.23137 0.15756
saferep
-0.23598 0.22556 0.36375 -0.06622 -0.07236 -0.09189 0.01402 0.35208 0.18252 0.46795
cooperat -0.04925 0.32039 0.31281 -0.28008 -0.21588 -0.19245 -0.12050 0.24620 0.10368 -0.05541
commitee
-0.15814 0.07713 0.30296 0.06707 -0.19823 0.04241 -0.17496 0.14081 0.12232 0.36358
enough 0.01391 -0.04564 0.13299 0.08350 -0.07169 0.13469 -0.14419 0.18345 0.14465 0.02109
superv 0.05753 -0.08248 -0.05939 0.19997 0.02784 0.13097 0.04496 0.03929 0.09750 0.19835
posters
-0.17567 0.18789 0.05713 -0.01054 -0.06046 -0.02032 -0.00975 0.33969 0.15936 0.08810
tidysite
-0.05960 0.33890 0.27434 -0.11187 -0.23533 -0.21150 -0.06309 0.37275 0.08713 0.05216
jobs
-0.02638 -0.11326 0.16918 0.16373 -0.06248 0.04581 -0.20552 0.07344 0.20385 0.10905
cause 0.08249 -0.39108 -0.18908 0.11150 0.09727 0.19884 -0.04903 -0.28234 -0.01881 0.00150
lessacci
-0.10339 0.28623 0.14663 -0.11873 -0.10275 -0.13080 -0.00408 0.37484 0.19445 0.22020
toxic
-0.01623 0.11334 0.10803 -0.08644 0.05098 0.07822 0.09993 0.05508 0.04809 0.14520
examples 0.11670 0.15781 0.13702 0.04726 0.12058 0.01310 0.14059 0.15131 0.10318 -0.14092
plan
-0.00697 0.26282 0.16500 -0.13976 0.03231 -0.03433 0.04349 0.21613 0.13755 0.12790
avoid
-0.12733 0.14540 0.28166 0.04110 0.03474 0.04889 -0.09559 0.10311 0.11218 0.14517
safeinsp 0.03468 -0.27586 -0.12722 0.12863 -0.00748 0.12492 -0.01216 -0.05483 0.13411 -0.01387
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proper
sense
erector
dumper
operate
relation
involve
subcont 1.00000
saferep 0.24518 1.00000
cooperat 0.29305 0.23918 1.00000
commitee 0.10763 0.33751 0.21390 1.00000
enough 0.04835 0.03289 0.08394 0.17364 1.00000
superv 0.11545 0.03636 -0.19683 -0.01482 -0.13356 1.00000
posters 0.26966 0.35618 0.13441 0.14712 0.14361 0.05786 1.00000
tidysite 0.21249 0.23284 0.28994 0.30191 0.08458 -0.02688 0.21492 1.00000
jobs
-0.04274 0.06558 0.12980 0.14373 0.10556 0.02758 0.02001 0.19098 1.00000
cause
-0.08940 -0.02938 -0.09159 -0.04525 0.16448 0.03432 -0.08178 -0.34776 -0.32331 1.00000
lessacci 0.09408 0.28714 0.04069 0.22113 -0.00274 0.01952 0.10351 0.33431 0.30468 -0.43487
toxic 0.12357 0.14144 -0.03017 0.07891 -0.18672 0.23445 0.07900 0.03906 -0.04409 -0.05208
examples 0.15208 0.00603 0.14524 -0.05202 0.05442 0.03308 0.07162 0.08277 -0.03725 0.11187
plan 0.20282 0.19671 0.17317 0.23087 0.06133 0.16285 0.22166 0.36728 0.32278 -0.17177
avoid 0.18665 0.10593 0.06184 0.27144 0.13480 -0.03386 0.14178 0.29807 0.32631 -0.20419
safeinsp
-0.04126 0.08754 -0.09323 0.00528 0.07195 0.11062 0.11623 -0.26158 -0.10653 0.43557
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Mrabte
age
service
industry
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banksman
bonus
blindeye
reduce
risks
product
cares
safety
workmate
safeact
training
risky
skillful
careful
site
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helmet
wear
protect
equip
safebook
talk
believe
asbestos
asbesite
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tell
mechan
scaffold
proper
sense
erector
dumper
operate
relation
involve
subcont
saferep
cooperat
commitee
enough
superv
posters
tidysite
jobs
cause
lessacci
toxic
examples
plan
avoid
safeinsp
lessacci toxic examples plan avoid safeinsp
1.00000
-0.08542
0.14963
0 44481
0.33068
-0 30855
1.00000
0.06562
0.01877
0.04798
0 08827
1.00000
0.24855
0.07979
0.05538
1.00000
0.46903
-0.10139
1.00000
-0 10912 1.00000
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ECONOMIC FACTORS - C4 = plc!
TABLE 4.6:	 Correlation of Relationship betwen paying 
danger money, and Safety Performance (Accident) 
= 0.366 . - .Corre C124 and C301 = 0.366 
'Danger Money' Accident Performance
Rows : C124 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 30 2 32
2 0 62 62
3 19 13 32
ALL 49 75 126
Chi-Square = 85 .63; df = 2, sign at p<0.001
TABLE 4.17:	 Correlation of 'Banksman Training and Safety
Performance = 0
'Banksman Training' Safety Performance
--
Rows : C125
.	 .	 -
Columns : C301
1 2 AL
1 22 27 49
2 10 33 43
3 17 17 34
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-Square = 6. 93; df = 2, p<.05
TABLE 4.18:
	
Correlation of 'Bonus Payments' and Safety
Performance (Supervisory Behaviour) = 0.701
Bonus and
'Blind eye'
_
Safety Performance
Rows : C127 Columns : CO1
1 2 AL
1 39 0 39
2 26 67 93
3 0 10 10
ALL 49 77 126
	 	 _
Chi-Square = 47.18; df = 2, p<.001
.029
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TABLE 4.19:	 Correlation of 'Safety Bonus' and Safety
Performance =_0.839
Safety Bonus Safety Performance
• _	 "
Rows : C128 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 39 0 39
2 10 66 76
3 0 11 11
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-Square = 89.46; df = 2, Significant at p = 0.001
TABLE 4.20:	 Correlation of 'Risk-taking' and Safety Performance
= 0.784
Risk-Taking Safety Performance
Rows : C129 Columns : C301
_
1 2 ALL
1 43 10 53
2 6 61 61
3 0 6 6
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-Square = 68.88; df = 2, p<.001
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS 7_C5 = C10
TABLE 4.22:	 Correlation of 'Care for Personal Safety' and
Safety Performance = 0.718 
Personal Safety Safety Performance
Rows : C132 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 46 6 52
2 3 63 69
3 0 8 8
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-Square = 91.62; df = 2; p<0.001
TABLE 4.23:
	 Correlation of 'Care for Workmates' Safety' and
Safety Performance = 0.143
Workmates'
Safety Safety Performance
Rows : C133 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 4 6 lo
2 27 31 58
3 18 140 58
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-Square = 2.94; df = 2, not significant p = 0.100
TABLE 4.24:
	 Correlation of 'Health & Safety Act, 1974' and
Safety Performance = 0.768 
1974 Safety Act Safety Performance
Rows : C134 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 140 o 40
2 9 63 72
3 o 14 14
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-Square = 92.86; df = 2, p=0.001
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TABLE 4.25: Correlation of 'Safety Training' and Safety 
Performance = 0.244 
Safety Training Safety Performance
Rows : C135 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 24 17 41
2 23 52 75
3 2 8 10
ALL 49 77 126
_
Chi-square = 10.29; df = 2, p<0.01
NOTE: 1 cells with expected counts less than 5.0
p<.01
TABLE 4.26:
	
Correlation of 'Construction as a tough and
Dangerous industry, and preparedness to take
risks' and safety performance = 0.461 
Experience and
Skill of worker Safety Performance
Rows : C137 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 34 4 38
2 13 59 72
3 2 14 16
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 58.75; df = 2, p=0.001
TABLE 4.28:
	
Correlation of 'Supervisor carefulness behaviour' 
and Worker Safety Performance = 0.507
Supervisor
Carefulness
Safety Performance
Rows : C138 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 32 2 34
2 12 63 75
3 5 12 17
ALL 49 77 126
TOLE 4.29:	 Correlation of 'Workmates' Carelessness
about Safety' and Safety Performance = 0.039
Workmates'
Carelessness Safety Performance
Rows : C139 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 11 16 27
2 2 10 12
3 36 51 87
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-Square = 2.76; df = 2, p<0.10 not significant
NOTE:
	 1 cells with expected counts less than 5.0
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TECHNICAL FACTORS - C6 = C10
TOLE 4.30:	 Correlation of 'Asbestos Awareness' as a health
Hazard' and Safety Performance = 0.817 
Asbestos Awareness Safety Performance
Rows : C147 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
-
1 47 0 47
2 2 75 77
3 0 2 2
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-Square = 117.80; df = 2, p<0.02
NOTE: 2 Cells with expected counts less than 5.0
UM 4.31:	 Correlation of 'Asbestos Recognition' and Safety
Performance = 0.604
Asbestos
Recognition Safety Performance
Rows : C148 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 35 6 41
2 12 52 64
3 2 19 21
AL 49 77 126
Chi-Square = 55.81; df = 2, p<0.001
TABLE 4.32:	 Correlation of 'Asbestos Handling' and Safety 
Performance
Asbestos
Handling Safety Performance
Rows : C149 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 28 45 73
2 2 7 9
3 19 25 44
AL 49 77 126I
Chi-square 1.40; df = 2, not significant.
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TABLE 4.33:	 Correlation of 'Asbestoc Information' and
TABLE 11.34:
Safety Performance = 0.601 
Asbestos
Information Safety Performance
Rows : C150 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 9 4 13
2 39 18 57
3 1 55 56
ALL 49 77 126
Correlation of 'Plant/Equipment Training before 
use and Safty Performance = 0.236 
Plant Training 1 Safety Performance
& use
,
Rows : C151 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 45 71 116
2 1 1 2
3 3 5 8
ALL 49 77 126
_
Chi-Square = 0.11; df = 2, not significant
TABLE 4.35:
	
Correlation of 'Scaffolding and Ladder Usage'
and Safety Performance = 0.744 
Scaffolding & Safety Performance
Ladder Usage
Rows : C152 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 45 1 46
2 4 71 75
3 0 5 5
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 105.95; df = 2, significant at p=0.005
Rows : C154 Columns : C301
Building Experience
and Commonseanse in Safety Performance
Scaffolding
1
	
2	 1 ALL
1 6 1 7
2 43 15 58
3 0 61 61
ALL 49 77 126
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TOLE 4.36:	 Correlation of 'Adequate Scaffolding Inspection'
and Safety Performance = 0.696 
Scaffolding
Inspection Safety Performance
Rows : C153 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 9 0 9
2 40 17 57
3 0 60 60
ALL 49 77 126
TABLE 11.37:
Ch-square = 75.80; df = 2, significant at p=0.001
NOTE: 1 cells with expected counts less than 5.0
Correlation of 'Commonsense and Building Experience
in Scaffolding Erection' and Safety Performance = 
0.699
Chi-square = 75.60; df = 2, significant at p<0.001
TABLE 4.38:
	 Correlation of 'Steel Erector Training Skills' and 
Safety Performance = 0.662 
Steel Erector
Training Safety Performance
Rows : C155 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 11 0 11
2 37 18 55
3 1 59 60
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 70.91; df = 2, significant at p<0.01
TABLE 4.39:	 Correlation of 'Reliance on Commonsense only
for dumper driving' and Safety Performance = 0.000 
Commonsense and
Dumper driving
(without training)
Safety Performance
Rows : C156 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 13 26 39
2 0 6 6
3 36 45 81
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 5.38; df = 2, not significant
TABLE 4.40:	 Correlation of 'trained Plant Driver' and Safety
Performance = 0.684
Plant Driver
Rraining Safety Performance
Rows : C157 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 39 0 39
2 10 67 77
3 0 10 10
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 89.39; df=2, significant at p<0.01
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PROCEDURAL FACTORS - C7 = C10
TABLE 4.41:	 Correlation of 'Provision of Protective Safety
Clothes etc' and Safety Performance = 0.310 
Provision of
Safety 'gadgets'
Etc
Safety Performance
Rows : C140 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 37 7 44
2 11 62 73
3 1 8 9
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 58.18; df = 2, p=0.001
NOTE: 1 cells with expected counts less than 5.00
TABLE 4.42:
	
Corelation of 'Workers' non-use of Protective
Safety Clothing etc/sanctions' and Safety Performance
= 0.113
Protective
Clothing etc
Non-use
Safety Performance
Rows : C141 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 33 53 86
2 5 12 17
3 11 12 23
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 1.43; df = 2, not significant
Vil3LE 4.43:
	 Correlation of 'Issuing Protective Equipment etc' 
and Safety Performance = 0.628 
Usage of
Protective
Clothing etc
Safety Performance
Rows : C142 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 41 3 44
2 6 64 70
ALL tig 79 126
Chi-square = 1.98; df = 2, not significant.
Appendix K/12
TABLE 4.44: Correlation of 'Familiarity with Safety Equipment 
and Clothing etc through training' and Safety 
Performance = 0.070
Safety Clothing
etc- training
Safety Performance
Rows : C143 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 46 69 115
2 0 3 3
3 3 5 8
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 1.98; df = 2, not significant
TABLE 4.45:
	
Correlation of 'Safety Procedure Booklet without
worker induction' and Safety Performance = 0.049 
Safety Booklet
without induction Safety Procedure
Rows : C144 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 32 5 37
2 11 61 72
3 6 11 17
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 52.25; df = 2, not significant.
TABLE 4.46: Correlation of 'Safety Booklet with induction on
first day' and Safety Performance = 0.718 
Safety Booklet Safety Performance
with Induction
Rows : C145 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 43 1 44
2 6 73 79
3 0 3 3
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 98.56; df = 2, significant at p=0.001
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TABLE 4.47: Correlation of 'Safety Induction without Safety
Manuals on first day' and Safety Performance 
= -0.031
Safety Induction
without safety
Manuals
Safety Performance
Rows : C146 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 42 67 109
2 5 7 12
3 2 3 5
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 0.05; df = 2, not significant.
ORGANISATION FACTORS -_C8 = C10 
TABLE 4.48:	 Correlation of 'worker-management Relationships'
and Safety Performance = 0.754 
Worker-
management
Relationships
Safety Performance
Rows : C158 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 44 0 44
2 5 69 74
3 0 8 8
ALL 49 77 126
'
Chi-square = 106.38; df = 2, significant at p<0.001
ABLE 4.49:	 Correlation of 'Trade Union Involvement with
Safety' and Safty Performance = 0.153
Trade Union
Safety Involvement Safety Performance
Rows : C159 Columns : C307
1 2 ALL
1 23 A9 142
2 22 52 74
3 4 6 10
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 7.07; df = 2, not significant
MLE 4.50:	 Correlation of 'SUb-Contractor Safety Behaviour'
and Safety Performance = 0.593 
Sub-contractor
Site Safety
Behaviour
Safety Performance
11
Rows : C160 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 22 3 36
2 16 60 76
3 0 14 14
ALL 49 67 126
Chi-square = 61.28; df = 2, significant at p<0.02
MGANISATION FACTORS - . C8 = C10 
BLE 4.48:	 Correlation of 'worker-management Relationships'
and Safety Performance = 0.754 
Worker-
management
Relationships
Safety Performance
Rows : C158 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 44 0 44
2 5 69 74
3 0 8 8
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 106.38; df = 2, significant at p<0.001
LE 4.49:	 Correlation of 'Trade Union Involvement with
Safety' and Safty Performance = 0.153 
Trade Union
Safety Involvement Safety Performance
Rows : C159 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 23 19 42
2 22 52 74
3 4 6 1 1 0
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 7.07; df = 2, not significant
,E 4.50:
	
Correlation of 'Sbb-Contractor Safety Behaviour'
and Safety Performance = 0.593 
Sub-contractor
Site Safety
Behaviour
Safety Performance
i1
Rows : C160 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 22 3 36
2 16 60 76
3 0 14 14
ALL 49 67 126
Chi-square = 61.28; df = 2, significant at p<0.02
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ABLE 4.51:	 Correlation of 'Having Safety Representaive on
Site' and Safety Performance = 0.497 
Safety Repre-
sentative Safety Performance
Rows : C161 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 32 11 43
2 16 64 80
3 1 2 3
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 34.89; df = 2, p<0.01
ME 4.52:	 Correlation of 'Management -workers' Co-operation'
and Safety Performance = 0.541 
Management-
Workers' Co-
operation
Safety Performance
Rows : C162 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 36 9 45
2 13 64 77
3 0 4 4
ALL 49 77	 1 126
Chi-square = 58.24; df = 2, p=0.001
IBLE 4.53:
	
Correlation of 'Safety Committe Input/Role to
Site Safety' and Safety Performance = 0.475 
Safety Committee
Input
Safety Performance
Rows : C163 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 32 15 47
2 16 58 74
3 1 4 5
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-Square = 26.89; df = 2, p=0.005
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BLE 4.54:	 Correlation of 'Workers' Belief in Company 
Safety Efforts' and Safety Performance = 0.084 
LE 4.55:
Belief in Company
Safety Effort Safety Performance
Rows : C164 Column	 : C301
1 2 ALL
1 38 41 79
2 1 17 18
3 10 19 29
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 11.47; df = 2, not significant
Correlation of 'Safety Talks by Managers and 
Supervisors to operatives' and Safety Performance
= 0.357
Regular Safety
Talks by Managers
& Supervisors
Safety Performance
Rows : C165 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 18 12 30
2 26 43 69
3 5 22 27
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 10.38; df = 2; p=0.01
LE 4.56:
	 Correlation of 'Use of Safety Posters on Site' and
Safety Performance = 0.287
Safety Posters Safety Performance
Rows : C166 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 23 20 43
2 26 49 75
3 0 8 8
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 29.77; df = 4, p<0.005
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1RONMENTAL/EXTERNAL FACTORS - C9 = C10 
.BLE 4.57:
	
Correlation of 'Clean and Tidy Sites' and 
Safety Performance = 0.794 
Clean and
Tidy Sites Safety Performance
Rows : C167 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 49 7 56
2 0 67 67
3 0 3 3
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 100.2; df = 2, significant at p<0.01
RE 4.58:
	
Correlation of 'Job Skills and Knowledge', and 
Safety Performance = 0.884
Job skills and
job knowledge Safety Performance
Rows : C168 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 48 1 49
2 1 69 70
3 0 7 7
AL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 117.73; df = 2, significant at p<0.001
CE 4.59:	 Correlation of 'Untidy Sites' and Safety Performance
= 0.417
Untidy sites Safety Performance
Rows : C169 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 13 3 16
2 30 26 56
3 6 48 54
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 34.69; df = 2, p<0.01
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ABLE 4.60:	 Correlation of 'Workers' Co-operation with
each other 'on site' and Safety Performance 
= 0.753 
Workers' on-site
Co-operation with Safety Performance
'each other
Rows : C170 Columns i C301
1 2 ALL
1 42 0 42
2 7 69 76
3 0 8 8
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 99.26; df = 2, significant at p<0.001
BLE 4.61:
	 Correlation of 'Company Instructions on Application 
of Harmful Substances and Safety Performance = 0.055 
Instructions on
Harmful Substance
Usage
Safety Performance
Rows : C171 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 23 33 56
2 9 16 25
3 17 28 45
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-Square = 0.22; df = 2, not significant
LE 4.62:
	 Correlation of 'Manager/Supervisor Safety Examples
to Workers and Safety Performance
Manager-Supervisor
Safety Behaviour Safety Performance
Rows ; C172 Columns : C301
-	 1 2 ALL
1 34 0 34
2 15 65 80
3 0 12 12
ALL 119 77 126
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,E 4.63:	 Correlation of 'Planned and Organised sites' and
Safety Performance = 0.418
Planned and
Organised Sites
-	
.	 .
Safety Performance
Rows : C173 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 13 3 16
2 30 26 56
3 6 48 54
ALL 49 77 126
Chi-square = 34.75; df = 2, p=0.001
LE 4.64:	 Correlation of 'Worker Carefulness and Observance
on Site' and Safety Performance = 0.340 
Worker Carefulnes
And Onservance Safety Performance
Rows : C174 Columns : C301
1 2 ALL
1 31 15 46
2 17 58 75
3 1 4 5
ALL 49 77 126
APPENDIX : L:
ATTITUDINAL/BEHAVIOURAL TEST OF
SIGNIFICANCE TABLES - COMPARISON
OF OPERATIVES' AND SITE MANAGERS
ATTITUDES
c16	 =	 C27
1
(1)
S
(2)
Others'
(3)
Sample
Size
OP-C 16 27 99 126
SM-C 2 7 42 32 74
2
x	 =	 25.75;	 p<0.05
df = 1 .
	 Very significant
C19 = C22 organisation.
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C19 124 2 126
sM-C 22 35 39 74
2
x =
df = 1
64.60; p<0.001
1. . Very significant
45.53; P<0.001
Very significant
2
x =
df = 1
19.10; p <.001
Very significant
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C 15 97 29 126
SM-C
	 26 21 53 74
2
x =
df = 1
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C18 103 23 126
SM-C 26 39 35 74
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ATTITUDINAL & BEHAVIOURAL : TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE
OPERATIVES AND SITE MANAGERS : ECONOMIC FACTORS
(a) TABLE NO:
Bonus systems lead to reduced concern
for safety on site.
1, 14	 - C 10
(d) TABLE NO
	
: More train-
ing leads to safety improvement.
C13	 = C21
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C 1 14 51 75 126
SM-c 18 39 35 74
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C 1 3 49 77 126
SM-C 21 54 20 74
2
x =
df = 1
2.82;p< not significant
. not significant
2
x =
df = 1
21.68;p<.001
. very significant
(b) TABLE NO	 : Need to meet
commercial profits influences safety
(e)	 TABLE NO	 : Safety 
bonus improves safety performance
(c) TABLE NO	 : Bonus systems 
leas supervisors to turn 'blind eye'
C15 = C26 to safety hazards.
(f) TABLE NO	 : Productivity
improves safety performance
C18 = C 26
NOTES: - x2 = Chi Square
SA =	 strongly agree
0th =
	 Others - disagree etc
SS =
	 Sample size
OP = Operatives
SM = Site Managers
safety perforamnce. C 25 - C 31 creased safety
awareness
C22 = C28
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C 28 114 12 126
SM-C 36 71 3 74
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C 26 117 9 126
SM-C 30 17 57 74
taking.
2
x
df = 1
2
x =	 102.98; p<0.001
dl = 1	 1 Highly significant
2.01;
Not significant
Appendix L/2
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
(a) TABLE NO:
Increased safety awareness influences
(d) TABLE NO
Safety trainin and updating in-
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C22 125 1 126
SM-C28 71 3 74
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C25 118 8 126
SM-C31 61 13 74
2
x =
df = 1
2.53; p<0.10
not significant
2
x =
df = 1
6.24 p<0.01
Significant
(b) TABLE NO
Workers' behaviour on site influences
C29	
safety performance 
C 29 = 
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C 29 86 40 126
SM-C 29 66 8 74
(e) TABLE NO
Safety is mostly a matter of common-
sense 
C29	 _ C32
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C29 86 40 126
SM-C32 44 30 74
2
x =
df = 1
11.20; p<0.01
. significant
2
x =
df = 1
1.58; p< not significant
not significant
(c) TABLE NO
Workers' perception of building work
as tough and dangerous, influences
C 26 = C 30 macho behaviour/risk
(f) TABLE NO
Site managers' safety attitudes
influences workers' saiety attitudes.
26 = C36
NOTES:
SA	 =
0th =
SS	 =
OP	 =
SM	 =
- x
2 
= Chi Square
strongly agree
Others - disagree etc
Sample size
Operatives
Site Managers
Appendix L/3
PROCEDURAL FACTORS
(a) TABLE NO:
Provision of safety protective 
clothing/equipment leads to safety 
=	 4 1	 awareness
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C39 119 7 126
SM-C41 60 14 74
(d) TABLE NO
Belief in receiving safety instruct-
ions on joining a new firm improves 
43 -	 46	 safety awareness
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C43 109 17 126
SM-C46 54 20 74
2
X =
df = 1
8.86; p<0.02
significant
2
x =
dl = 1
5.66; p<0.02
significant
(b) TABLE NO
Workers who fail to use protective 
clothing etc, be sanctioned to 
1 40 = U 42	 improve safety dis-
ci line on site
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C40 115 11 126
SM-C42 61 13 74
2
X =
df = 1
3.45; p<0.05
Significant
(c) TABLE NO
Providing new workers with safety 
manuals, followed by 
c 44 = c 45 Induction, improves
(1)
S A
(2)
Others
(3)
Sample
Size
OP-C44 126
SM-C45 74
2
X =	 7.34; p<0.025
df = 1	 Significant
Appendix L/4
TECHNICAL FACTORS
(a) TABLE NO:
Knowledge of safety hazards on site 
Influences safety performance 
C56 = C47
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-056 72 54 126
SM-C47 66 8 74
(d) TABLE NO
Hazard Identification equals less
Accidents on site 
1,55 	 = u50
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-055 98 28 126
SM-050 34 40 74
2
x =
df = 1
22.38; p<0.05
Very significant
2
x =
df = 1
21.05; p<
Very significant
(b) TABLE NO
Workers' ability to spot safety hazards 
bri-61I-67-Yeads to accident prevention 
51	 - U4t3
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-051 15 111 126
SM-C148 40 34 74
2
x =
	
41.54; p<
df = 1	 Very significant
(c) TABLE NO
Commonsense and building experience enough
for dumper (plant( driving and scaffolding 
53 = C 49	 erection 
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C 53 39 87 126
SM-C 49 68 6 74
2
x =
df = 1
69.59; p<
Highly significant
ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS
.W TABLE NO:
Worker-management relationships on 
site influences safety performance 
C 57 = £ 57
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C 57 90 36 126
SM-C 57 34 40 74
(d) TABLE NO
Having safety committees improves 
C61	 Safety standard' C62	 = 
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
op-c62 79 47 126
SM-C 69 5 74
2
x =
df = 1
12.85; p<
Very significant
2
x
df = 1
22.61; p<
Very significant
(b) TABLE NO
Trade Union involvement in safety 
Reduces accidents on site 
5b = C 5b
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C 58 93 33 126
sm-c 58 33 41 74
(e) TABLE NO
Managers and supervisors do not talk 
enough about safety to workers 
ub4	 = ub2
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C64 102 24 126
SM-C62 50 24 74
2
x =
df = 1
17.07; p<
Very significant
2
x =
di' = 1
4.58; p<
Significant
(c) TABLE NO
Workers' safe working and manage-
ment co-operation improves safety 
6 61 =
	 59	 on site
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C61 96 30 126
sm-c59 30 44 74
(0 TABLE NO
Management Safety attitudes determine 
workers' safety behaviour on site
C 63 = C6 3
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C63 61 65 126
sm-c63 58 16 74
25.42; p<
. Very significant
2
x =
df = 1
17.37; IX
Significant
NOTES: - x
2 
= Chi Square
SA = strongly agree
0th = Others - disagree etc
SS = Sample size
OP
• 
Operatives
SM Site Managers
Appendix L/6
ENVIRONMENTAL/EXTERNAL FACTORS
(a) TABLE NO:
Untidy building sites leads to accidents 
C 83 = C 68
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
OP-C83 83 43 126
SM-C68 68 6 74
2
x =
df = 1
17.06; p<
Very significant
(b) TABLE NO
Good job Planning, and site organisation 
lead to low accidents 
Cdi	 =
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
0P-C 87 42 84 126
SM-C 71 63 11 77
x =
	 50.17; p<
df = 1
	
Highly significant
(c) TABLE NO
Workers who know their jobs are 
thoughtful of the way they work,
82 - e 7b & have less accidents 
(1) (2) (3)
S A Others Sample
Size
op_c 82 58 68 126
Ri-C 76 69 5 74
44.83; p<
Highly significant
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Variable Skewness p-value Kurtosis p-value
age 0.4878 0.0254 -0.6746 0.0020
asbesite 0.3624 0.0968 -0.6259 0.0041
asbestos 2.5749 0.0000 9.2013 0.0000
avoid 0.9402 0.0000 2.3290 0.0000
banksman 0.0185 0.9325 -0.6333 0.0037
believe 1.0793 0.0000 2.1882 0.0000
blindeye -0.1769 0.4175 -1.2262 0.0000
bonus -0.0364 0.8675 -1.1772 0.0000
careful 1.0900 0.0000 1.4014 0.0000
cares 0.0125 0.9542 -1.1681 0.0000
cause -0.7446 0.0006 -0.4815 0.0274
commitee 0.8030 0.0002 1.2635 0.0000
cooperat 1.3056 0.0000 2.3014 0.0000
dumper -0.5659 0.0095 -0.8983 0.0000
enough 0.7125 0.0011 -0.3494 0.1094
equip 1.4062 0.0000 3.3871 0.0000
erector -1.0276 0.0000 0.1702 0.4354
examples 0.5721 0.0088 -0.6761 0.0019
handle 0.2938 0.1782 -1.1989 0.0000
helmet 1.7690 0.0000 3.4182 0.0000
howmuch 1.3302 0.0000 0.6875 0.0016
industry 0.4610 0.0347 -0.6357 0.0036
involve 0.4336 0.0469 -0.3700 0.0900
jobs 1.4163 0.0000 2.0691 0.0000
lessacci 1.1370 0.0000 1.3096 0.0000
like 4.0683 0.0000 24.7383 0.0000
mechan 1.6932 0.0000 4.2162 0.0000
money 0.4115 0.0593 -0.9281 0.0000
operate 0.8848 0.0001 0.0572 0.7931
perform 2.7275 0.0000 8.8537 0.0000
plan 1.2947 0.0000 3.6342 0.0000
posters 0.8909 0.0000 0.4766 0.0290
product 1.1380 0.0000 1.4593 0.0000
proper -1.1734 0.0000 0.9786 0.0000
protect 1.3943 0.0000 4.4SVS 4 0.0000
reduce 0.3636 0.0956 -1.1075 0.0000
relation 0.9723 0.0000 0.8118 0.0002
risks 0.9063 0.0000 -0.1762 0.4194
risky 0.0491 0.8219 -1.4682 0.0000
safeact 0.5644 0.0097 -0.2318 0.2881
safebook 1.4840 0.0000 4.2574 0.0000
safeinsp -1.2161 0.0000 -0.1191 0.5852
saferep 0.7070 0.0012 0.5111 0.0192
safety 2.2707 0.0000 6.0998 0.0000
scaffold 1.7410 0.0000 4.3573 0.0000
sense -1.3623 0.0000 1.4988 0.0000
service 1.2389 0.0000 1.5544 0.0000
site -0.8036 0.0002 -0.1916 0.3798
skillful 0.6050 0.0056 -0.4742 0.0298
subcont 0.7957 0.0003 -0.3882 0.0753
superv -0.0034 0.9876 -1.3945 0.0000
talk 1.2668 0.0000 2.4894 0.0000
tell -1.0638 0.0000 0.7312 0.0008
tidysite 1.0870 0.0000 3.4518 0.0000
toxic 0.0290 0.8942 -1.1001 0.0000
training 0.9788 0.0000 2.2936 0.0000
wear 0.8032 0.0002 0.0099 0.9638
workmata -1.1005 0.0000 0.3086 0.1573
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Final Statistics
Variable Communality * Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct
*
AGE .88155 * 1 7.47630 13.4 13.4
ASBESITE .73907 * 2 3.36423 6.0 19.4
AVOID .61941 * 3 2.93368 5.2 24.6
BANKSMAN .70771 * 4 2.71302 4.8 29.4
BELIEVE .71708 * 5 2.43282 4.3 33.8
BLINDEYE .75258 * 6 2.12314 3.8 37.6
BONUS .72182 * 7 2.09807 3.7 41.3
CAREFUL .73571 * 8 1.86113 3.3 44.6
CARES .74799 * 9 1.79600 3.2 47.9
CAUSE .74099 * 10 1.74164 3.1 51.0
COMMITEE .68721 * 11 1.63690 2.9 53.9
COOPERAT .77580 * 12 1.54180 2.8 56.6
DUMPER .65542 * 13 1.38063 2.5 59.1
ENOUGH .64286 * 14 1.30806 2.3 61.4
EQUIP .79703 * 15 1.25756 2.2 63.7
ERECTOR .69321 * 16 1.24149 2.2 65.9
EXAMPLES .63998 * 17 1.11895 2.0 67.9
HANDLE .72319 * 18 1.10026 2.0 69.9
HELMET .69509 * 19 1.03733 1.9 71.7
INDUSTRY .87078 *
INVOLVE .77305 *
JOBS .68219 *
LESSACCI .75060 *
MECHAN .76018 *
MONEY .77568 *
OPERATE .75213 *
PLAN .76583 *
POSTERS .70405 *
PRODUCT .69169 *
PROPER .77524 *
PROTECT .78043 *
REDUCE .61624 *
RELATION .69906 *
RISKS .69219 *
RISKY .65226 *
SAFEACT .65904 *
SAFEBOOK .79806 *
SAFEINSP .70772 *
SAFEREP .71845 *
SCAFFOLD .73946 *
SENSE .68310 *
SERVICE .70342 *
SITE .71480 *
SKILLFUL .80856 *
SUBCONT .69406 *
SUPERV .61490 *
T_ASBEST .57548 *
T_LIKE .76791 *
T_SAFETY .63938 *
TALK .86435 *
TELL .54741 *
TIDYSITE .66787 *
TOXIC .72536 *
TRAINING .78027 *
WEAR .66006 *
WORKMATA .67805 *
••
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DATA MAHALANOBIS
DISTANCE
COOK'S
DISTANCE
LEVERAGE DATA MAHALANOBIS
DISTANCE
COOK'S
DISTANCE
LEVERAGE
1 13.74600 .00019 .10997 64 7.32801 .00018 .05862
2 6.11365 .00127 .04891 65 9.07275 .00070 .07258
3 15.56630 .02734 .12453 66 3.80103 .00035 .03041
4 5.11484 .00528 .04092 67 25.58835 .01102 .20471
5 22.29945 .00040 .17840 68 5.88802 .00083 .04710
6 7.57266 .00132 .06058 69 9.25581 .00012 .07405
7 13.83750 .00307 .11070 70 25.70815 .00120 .20567
8 20.40999 .00001 .16328 71 19.37552 .00011 .15500
9 20.84809 .00086 .16678 72 16.23552 .00280 .12988
10 22.06737 .00017 .17654 73 5.12980 .00072 .04104
11 10.05248 .00097 .08042 74 10.46793 .00193 .08374
12 12.30928 .00045 .09847 75 28.57172 .17229 .22857
13 15.50026 .00090 .12400 76 3.66906 .00893 .02935
14 28.04247 .00025 .22434 77 8.83564 .00284 .07069
15 7.80477 .00452 .06244 78 9.52162 .01355 .07617
16 6.33330 .00291 .05067 79 6.38849 .01112 .05111
17 6.24658 .00088 .04997 80 5.65237 .00625 .04522
18 8.51992 .00028 .06816 81 11.32395 .02638 .09059
19 3.63179 .00051 .02905 82 9.10080 .00756 .07281
20 10.07652 .01676 .08061 83 3.13618 .00205 .02509
21 8.48917 .00087 .06791 84 5.91761 .00439 .04734
22 7.33103 .03200 .05865 85 11.11288 .00016 .08890
23 9.34663 .00050 .07477 66 6.81256 .00213 .05450
24 8.09889 .01891 .06479 87 11.28590 .00638 .09029
25 9.07673 .01228 .07261 88 4.82867 .03241 .03863
26 7.79246 .00044 .06234 89 15.14684 .00395 .12117
27 14.75770 .02636 .11806 90 37.59804 .00017 .30078
28 13.37462 .00020 .10700 91 16.78579 .00031 .13429
29 7.77407 .00041 .06219 92 21.27507 .00119 .17020
30 4.93143 .00125 .03945 93 15.72348 .00122 .12579
31 4.50882 .01658 .03607 94 8.20965 .00215 .06568
32 6.44290 .00381 .05154 95 11.99844 .01027 .09599
33 11.73762 .03419 .09390 96 3.58216 .00019 .02866
34 11.08689 .01311 .08870 97 11.44870 .00048 .09159
35 14.80867 .01057 .11847 98 10.92551 .00498 .08740
36 12.78239 .00028 .10226 99 5.44638 .00026 .04357
37 10.58281 .00145 .08466 100 10.61051 .00005 .08488
38 5.15993 .04021 .04128 101 9.47162 .00028 .07577
39 14.11946 .00103 .11296 102 12.07449 .00227 .09660
40 8.43710 .00708 .06750 103 14.74747 .02271 .11798
41 4.90907 .00406 .03927 104 12.54420 .00220 .10035
42 6.04991 .00007 .04840 105 11.30841 .01603 .09047
43 6.59971 .00003 .05280 106 8.26617 .00632 .06613
44 9.13894 .00057 .07311 107 13.20594 .00128 .10565
45 6.77820 .00059 .05423 108 7.12729 .00062 .05702
46 7.12982 .00200 .05704 109 14.15077 .00199 ,11321
47 9.10094 .04553 .07281 110 9.53633 .00066 .07629
48 20.55889 .00430 .16447 111 4.22801 .00080 .03382
49 4.87353 .00179 .03899 112 15.52689 .01025 .12421
SO 11.28246 .00093 .09026 113 12.05654 .00102 .09645
Si 11.12715 .01888 .08902 114 11.15540 .00109 .08924
52 14.91791 .01824 .11934 115 9.43871 .06890 .07551
53 10.77009 .00009 .08616 116 7.18852 .00457 .05751
54 14.88160 .00069 .11905 117 5.01731 .00234 .04014
55 8.77543 .00207 .07020 118 5.09974 .02043 .04080
56 5.81607 .00188 .04653 119 6.18189 .00260 .04946
57 7.59566 .00291 .06077 120 6.71358 .03137 .05371
58 4.75387 .00060 .03803 121 7.47164 .00120 .05977
59 11.12810 .00019 .08902 122 9.07188 .00000 .07258
60 4.25911 .00117 .03407 123 4.22015 .00037 .03376
61 38.21413 .00179 .30571 124 7.62699 .00106 .06102
62 27.42147 .08999 .21937 125 5.71663 .00209 .04573
63 14,77841 .00113 .11823 126 5.50246 .00692 .04402
APPENDIX : M:
ATTITUDINAL /BEHAVIOURAL TEST OF
SIGNIFICANCE TABLES - COMPARISON OF
SITE MANAGERS, CONTRACT MANAGERS
AND SAFETY ADVISERS (ETC), ATTITUDES
NOTE: Key:
S M = Site management
C M = Contract Management
S A = Safety Advisers/Managers etc
N S	 Not significant
Significant
3 S	 Very significant
Appendix M/1
ATTITUDINAL/BEHAVIOURAL TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE : SITE MANAGER VERSUS
CONTRACT MANAGER AND SAFETY ADVISERS/MANAGERS : ECONOMIC FACTORS
1. Bonus systems influence
safety organisation on site
A B C
S M = C18
-C100 39 35 74
C M = C23-C100 31 25 56
S A = C18 -C100 42 13 55
2
X
2
=	 0.09 df =	 1;	 p =	 N S
X2X
=	 5.44 df =	 1;	 p =	 S
r.	 8.30 df =	 1;	 p=	 S
2.	 Injury-related accidents lead
to productivity loss.
C12 = C24 =	 C19
A B C
S M = C19 67 7 74
C M = C23 49 7 56
S A = C19 53 2 55
X
2 
= 0.31 df =	 1;	 p	 = N S
X
2 
= 2.93 df =	 1;	 p	 = N S
X2 = 2.86 df =	 1;	 p	 = N S
2.	 More safety training equals
better safety standards.
C 21 = c 26 = c 21
A B C
S M = C 21 54 20 74
C M = C 26 35 21 56
S A = C 21 47 8 55
x=1.621.62	 df	 =	 1;	 p	 =
 
NS
x
2
	
=7.58
	 dr .	 1;	 p
	
-S
X
2 	
=7.53
	 df	 =	 1;	 p	 , S
5.	 Need to achieve commercial
Advantage in tenders influences
site safety organisation.
C22.	 C27 C22
A B C
S M = c 22 34 40 74
C M = c 27 34 22 56
S A = C 22 44 11 55
X 2 = 2.79 df	 =	 1;	 p ,- N S
X2 .4.94 dr	 =	 1;	 p =S
X
2	
.15.32 dr	 ,	 1;	 p -VS 
Bonus s ystems lead supervisors
to turn a 'blind eye'	 to safety
hazards on site.
C 20= C25 = C20
A B C
SM = C 20 21 53 74
CM = C 25
	 . 20 36 56
SA = C 20 36 19 55
X 2 = 0
' 
79	 df =
	 1;	 p = N S2 X 2 = 9 ' 82	 df =	 1;	 p = s
X	 =19.00	 df =	 1;	 p = V S
6.	 A per centage safety job-cost
allowed in every tender will
improve safety on site.
C23. C28. c 23
A B C
S M = C23 58 16 74
c M = C 28 39 17 56
S A = C 23 48 7 55
2X -	 = 1.28	 cif	 =	 1;	 p	 . N	 S2X=5.09	 (if	 =	 1;	 p	 = S2X	 = 5.09	 df	 =	 1;	 p	 = S
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7.	 Client contribution to en-
force safety Input at tenders
improves safety organisation on
site.
C24= C29= C24
-
A B C
S M = C 24 59 15 74
C M = C 29 41 15 56
S A = C 24 49 6 55
X
2
= 0.76df = 1;	 p	 = NS
X
2
= 4.45df = 1;	 p	 = S
X
2
= 4.51df = 1;	 p	 = S
8.	 Contractor compliance with
contract safety provisions promot
better safety performance on site
C25= C 30= C25
A B C
S M = C 25 67 • 7 74
C M = C 30 40 16 56
S A = C 25 51 4 55
X
2 
=	 8
'
 00 df =	 1;	 p	 =2 
X	 =	 8.25df =	 1;	 p	 =
S
S
X
2
	= 12.71df	 =	 1;	 p	 = VS
9.	 Workers' safety consciousne:
on site influences productivity
targets.
C26= C 31= C 26
A B C
SM = C26 39 35 74
C M = C 31 32 24 56
S A = C 26
.
35 20 55
X 2 = 0.25df = 1;	 p	 =	 NS
X
2
 = 0.49df = 1;	 p	 =	 NS
X
2
 = 1.54df = 1;	 p	 =	 NS
1
10.	 Awarding safety bonuses lea(
to improved safety performance.
C27 = C32 = C27
A B C
S M = C27 42 32 74
C M = C32 25 31 56
S A = C27 29 26 55
X
2
 =	 1 - 8 7 df =	 1;	 p = NS
X
2
 - 0-73 df =	 1;	 p = NS
X2 :	 1.90 df =	 1;	 p = NS
O. Workers' perception of
building work as tough and dang-
erous influences macho behaviour
and risk-taking.
C30 = C 35= C 30
A
SM = C 30 17 57 74
CM = C 35 16 40 56
S A = C 30 9 46 55
X2 = 5.32 df = 1;	 p	 = S
X 2 = 2.37 df = 1;	 p	 = NS
X 2 = 2.36 df = 2;	 p = NS
Appendix M/3
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
11.	 Individual safety awareness
improves safety performance
C28 = C33 = C 28
A B C
SM = C28 71 3 74
C M = C33 51 5 56
s A = C28 50 5 55
X2
2	
=	 1.31	 df	 =	 1;	 P	 =
„
A	 =	 0.00 d f =	 1;	 P =
NS
NS
X	 =	 1.67 dr =	 2;	 P = NS
112.	 Workers'	 irresponsible site
pehaviour undermines safety per-
formance.
C29 = C34 = C29
A B C
S M = C29 66 8 74
CM = C34 50 6 56
S A = C29 51 4 55
2
X
2 
= 0.00 df =	 1;	 p = NS
X	 = 0.40 dl =	 1;	 p = NS
X
2
 = 0.54 df =
	 2;	 P = NS
14.	 Pressure to achieve prog-
ramme and lack of safety update
undermines safety performance.
C31 =	 c36 = 	c31
A B C
S M = C31 61 13 74
C M = C36 32 24 56
S A = c31 1-13 12 55
X
2
	= 10.01 dl =	 1;	 p	 = S
X
2 	
=	 5.60 df	 =	 1;	 p	 =S
X 2 	 = 11.35 df	 =	 2;	 p	 = VS
15.	 Safety is mostly a matter
of commonsense.
C32= C37= C32
A B C
S M = c32 44 30 74
c M = C 37 43 13 56
s A = c 32 40 9 55
X 2	 = 14 . 32
	 df	 =	 1;	 p
	
=S
X 2 =0.82	 df =	 1;	 p = NS
X 2 =10.08	 dl = 2;	 p	 =S
16.	 Individual carelessness is
responsible for most accidents
on site.
C 33 = c 38 = c 33
A B C
S M = C 32 44 30 74
c m = c 38 47 9 56
s A = o 32 46 9 55
X
2 	
=9.09	 df	 =	 1;	 p	 = S
X
2
	= 0.00	 cif	 =	 1;	 p	 = NS
X 2	=13.67	 dl =	 2;	 p
	
-VS
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17.	 Urgency to achieve prog-
ramme forces site management to
pay less attention to safety on
site.
C34 = C39 = C34
---	 -	 -	 - -	 -
A B C
-
-
SM = c34 68 6 74
CM = C39 35 21 56
s A = C34 44 11 55
X 2 -	 16.73df =
-
1;	 p =	 VS2X	 =	 4.14df = 1;	 p	 =	 S
X 2 =	 16.89df = 1;	 p =	 VS
18.	 Construction Team co-oper-
ation on site influences safety
performance on site.
C 35= C 40= C	 35
A B C
SM = C 35 40 34 74
c m = c 4o 52 4 56
S A = C 35 50 5 55
X 2 =23.20 df =	 1;	 p =	 VS
X 2 = 0.14 df =	 1;	 p =	 NS
X 2 =35.69 df = 2;	 p = VS
19.	 Site management's safety
behaviour on site is a major
influence on workers' safety
behaviour.
C36= C 41= C 36
A B C
SM = C 36 71 3 74
CM = C 41 56 0 56
SA = C 36 54 1 55
.2
A	 = 2.32 df =	 1;	 p = NS
X 2 t	 1.03	 df =	 1;	 p	 = NS
X
	 2.52 df = 2;	 p = NS
20.	 Poor co-operation between
sub-contractors on site under-
Mines safety performance.
C37 = C42 = C37
A B C
S M = C 37 71 3 74
c M = C 42 52 4 56
S A = C 37 55 0 55
X 2 = 0.60 df = 1; p = NS
X 2 = 4.08 df = 1; p = S
X 2 =	 3.91	 df = 2; p = NS
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21.	 Investigating and report-
ing near-accidents leads to
prevention of future accidents.
C38 = C43 = C 38
-	 -	 -	 -	 •	 -
A B C
S M = C 38 50 24 74
C M = C 43 46 10 56
S A = C 38 50 5 55
X 2
 =	 3.51	 df =	 1;	 P =	 NS
X 2 =	 1.82 df =
	 1;	 P	 =	 NS
X2
 =10.83 dr =	 2;	 P = S
22.	 Considering safety pro-
cetres at tender stage is un-
ecessary.
C 40= C 45= C 40
A B C
S M = C 40 18 56 74
C M = C 45 14 42 56
S A = C 40 8 47 55
X
2 
= 0.81	 df =	 1;	 p = NS
X
2
	. 1.91	 df	 =	 1;	 p	 = NS
X
2 
= 2.32
	
dl =	 p = NS
23.	 Provision of protective
clothing etc by all firms,	 is
necessary to improve safety on
site.
01 = C 116 = c 41
A B C
S M = C 41 60 14 74
CM = C46 . 42 14 56
S A = C 41 ' 47 8 55
X
2
=0.71 df = 1;	 p	 =NS
X
2	
=1.91 df = 1;	 p	 =NS
X
2	
= 1.96 df = ;	 p = NS
24.	 Considering safety pro-
cedures and work methods at
tender improves safety per-
formance.
c1111 = c119 = c1111
A B C
S M = c1111 61 13 74
C M = C 49 45 11 56
S A = C 44 54 1 55
2X	 = 0.09	 01	 =	 1;	 p	 = NS
X'	 = 9.14	 dl	 =	 1;	 p	 = S
X 2	 .9.28	 dl	 = 2;	 p
25.	 Providing all employees
with safety manuals/booklets
improves safety performance.
C46 = C50 = C46
A B C
S M = C46 54 20 74
C M = C50 51 5 56
S A = C46 23 32 55
X 	 6.72df	 =	 1;	 p	 =5
X 2	 =	 30.29dr	 =	 1;	 p	 =VS
X
2	
=196.891r	 =	 2;	 p	 =VS
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TECHNICAL FACTORS
-
26.	 Workers should be dis-
couraged from operating plant
or equipment for which they
have received no training.
C47 = c52 = c147
---	
.
A B C
S M = C 47
C M = c 52
S A = c147
66
148
51
8
8
4
74
56
55
X
2
 =	 0.36 dl =	 1;	 p =	 NS
X
2
 =	 1.42 df =	 1;	 p =	 NS
x 2 =	 1. )-i2 df = 2;
	 P=	 NS
27.	 Provision of safety info-
rmation to workers is lacking
in the construction industry.
C 51= C56 =	 C51
A B c
S M = C51 42 32 74
C M = C56 38 18 56
S A = c51 39 16 55
X
2 
=	 1.66 dl = 1;	 p = NS
X
2
 = 0.12 df = 1;	 p = NS
X
2 
= 3.19 dl = 2;	 p = NS
29.	 Wearing protective safety
clothing and equipment reduces
worker efficiency.
C 53 = c 58= c 53
A B C
S M = C 53 34 40 74
C M = c 58 22 34 56
S A = c 53 11 44 55
X 2 = 0.58	 df =	 1;	 p = NS
x 2	= 4.94	 df	 =	 1;	 p	 = S
x
2 
= 9.52	 dl = 2;	 p = S
30.	 Present methods of tender-
ing discriminate strongly against
safety conscious contractors.
C55 ,	 cof1 , C 55
A B C
S M = C 55 48 26 74
C M = C60 41 15 56
S A = C 55 43 12 55
X=1.031.03 df	 =	 1;	 p =NS
X 2 = 0.37 dl	 =	 1;	 p =NS
X 2 = 2.87 dl
	 = 2 ;	 P =NS
28.	 Training of contract
managers in health and safety is
inadequate for efficient safety
administration.
C52= C 57= C52
• A B C
S M = C 52 33 41 74
C M = C 57 .	 26 30 56
S A = C 52 30 25 55
x
2 
= 0.04	 df =	 1;	 P = NS
X2 = 0.73
	
dl =	 1;	 p	 = NS
X
2
 = 1.3 14	 df =	 2;	 p = NS
31.	 Work pressure and fatigue
leads to accidents on site.
C56 = c61 = c56
A B c
s m = c56 53 21 74
C M = c61 42 14 56
s A = C 56 50 5 55
X 2	= 9.99
	
df	 =	 1;	 p
	
=5
X 2	= 4	 95	 (If	 =	 1;	 p
	
=52X	 = 7. /47	 dl	 =	 2;	 p	 =S
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32.	 More accidents occur when
worker-management relationships
are poor.
C57 = C62 = C57
A B C
-
S M = C57 34 40 74
c M = C62 28 28 56
SA = C57 39 16 55
X
2
 -	 0
' 
21	 df =	 1;	 P =	 NS
a - 	 „A
2	
.,
=	 5 . 0 7 	 al	 =	 1 ;	 p	 =	 s
X	 = 8.62 df =	 2 ;	 P = s
33.	 Trade Union involvement in
safety reduces accidents on
site.
C 58= C 63= C 58
A B c
sM = C 58 33 41 74
Cm = c 63 33 23 56
s A = C 58 39 16 55
X 2 =2.62	 df =	 1;	 p	 = NS
X 2 = 1.75	 df =	 1;	 p	 = NS
X 2 =9.06	 df =	 2;	 p = NS
35.	 Site management and safety
advisers etc, are responsible
for site safety.
c 60 = c 65 ,. C 6°
A B C
S M = C 60 67 7 74
c M = c65 44 12 56
s A = C60 52 3 55
2
X 2	 =3.66	 di'	 = 1;	 p = SX 2 444 ' 08	 di' = 1;	 p =VS
X	 = 7.45	 df = 2.,	 p --S
36.	 Management and workers co-
operation essential for safe
working.
C61 =	 C66 =
	 C61
A B C
S M = C61 69 5 74
C M = C66 55 1 56
S A = c61 54 1 55
X 2
	=1.79
	
di'	 =	 1;	 p	 =NS2X 2	 =0.00	 (If	 =	 1;	 p	 = NS
X	 =2.99
	
di =	 2;	 p	 = NS
3. Having safety represent-
ative on site improves safety
standards! performance.
C59 = C64 = C59
A B C
S M = c59 30 44 74
CM:  C614 20 36 56
s A = c59 16 39 55
X 2 = 0.312
di' = 1;	 p = NS
X 2 = 0 ' 56X	 =	 1.80
di' =
df =
1;	 p
2;	 p
=
=
NS
NS
37.	 Managers and supervisors
do not talk enough about safety
to their workers.
C62 = C67 = C62
A B C
S M = C62 50 24 74
C M = C67 39 17 56
S A = C62 49 6 55
X 2 =0.06	 df = 1;	 p	 =NS	 .
x
2
=6.39	 df = 1;	 p	 =S
X
2
z8.75	 df = 2 ;	 p
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38.	 Having safety committees
improves safety standards of an
organisation
C 6 3 = C68 = C63
---
_
A B C
_.._
S M = c63 58 16 74
C M = c68 34 22 56
S A = C63 45 10 55
2
X 2 =	 4.81	 df = 1;	 P = S
X 2 = 6.02 df = 1;	 P = S
X	 = 7.63 df = 2;	 p = s
39.	 More Factory Inspectors in
the building industry will
improve health and safety per-
formance.
c64 = c69 = c64
A B C
S M = C 64 49 15 74
C M = C 69 21 35 56
S A .= C 64 16 39 55
X
2
 = 18.75df = 1;	 p = VS
X
2
 = 0.88df = 1;	 p = NS
X
2
 = 31.14df = 2;	 P = VS
40.	 Management safety attitudes
determine workers' safety
behaviour on site.
C 65= C 70= C 65
,
A B C
S M = C 65 67 7 74
C M = C 70 44 12 56
S A = C 65 51 4 55
X
2
 = 3.66	 df =	 1;	 P =
	 S
X
2
 = 4.51
	 df =	 1;	 p =	 S
X
2
 = 6.11
	 df =	 2;	 P =
	 S
41.	 Poor co-ordination of sub-
contractors' work on site
influences safety performance
on site.
c66 = c71 = C66
A B C
S M = c 66 59 15 74
C M = c71 49 7 56
S A = c66 ill 1 55
x 2 =1.37
	 dr .	 1;	 p =NS
X 2 =0.73	 df =	 1;	 p = NS
X
2
 =9.87	 df = 2;	 p =	 S
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42.	 A single contractor
responsibility for all scaffold-
ing on site is important to the
improvement of safety standards.
c67= C72= c67
A B C
•
S M = C 67 61 13 74
C M = C 72 48 8 56
S A = C 67 47 8 55
2
X:0.25	 df =	 1;	 p =	 NS
2
X
2
=0.00
	
df =	 1;	 p =
	 NS
X	 =0.3 14	 df =	 2;	 p =	 NS
43.	 Untidy building sites do
not lead to accident
occurrence.
C 68 = C 73= C 68
A B C
S M = C68 68 6 74
C M = C73 51 5 56
S A = C 68 54 1 55
X 2 = 0.03 df = 1;	 p = NS
X
2
 =2.74 df = 1;	 p = NS
X
2
 =2.85 df = 1;	 p = NS
45	 Providing workers with
thermal/warm clothing in winter
can lead to accident reduction.
C70 = C75 = C70
A 8 c
S M = C70 42 32 74
C M = C75 19 56
S A = C70 41 14 55
X
2
	=1
'
 16	 cif	 =	 1;	 p	 = NS2 
X
2 
=0
'
95
	
dl =
	 1;	 p = NS
X	 =4.43	 cif = 2;
	 p = NS
46.	 Good job planning and site
organisation improves safety
performance.
C71 = C76 = C 71
A B C
S M = C71 63 11 74
C M = C76 49 7 56
S A = C71 54 1 55
X
2
=0.15
	 df	 =	 1;	 p = NS
x 2 df	 =	 1;	 p = S
X
2
=6.26	 dl =	 2;	 p = S
44.	 Provision of good quality
welfare and first-aid facilities
on site improves safety
standards
C69= C74= C69
A B C
S M = C 69 54 20 74
C M = C 74 45 11 56
S A = C 69 50 5 55
X
2
=0.96 df = 1;	 p	 = NS
X
2
=2.50 df = 1;	 p	 = NS
X2 =6.48 df = 2;	 p	 = S
47.	 An inadequate supply of
the right type of plant and
quality of tools/equipment
leads to accidents and damage
C72 , C77 = C72 on site.
A R C
S M = C72 63 11 74
C M = C77 53 3 56
S A = C72 51 54 55
X
2
	=3.00	 df =	 1;	 p = S
X
2	
=0.17	 dl	 =	 1;	 p = NS
X
2
 =3.82	 df =	 2;	 p = S
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48.	 Older workers' attitudes
to safety and health on site is
a major source of influence to
new recruits to the construct-
C73 = C78 = C73 ion industry.
A B C
---
S M = C73 54 20 74
C M = C78 47 9 56
S A = C73 44 11 55
X
2
 =	 2.21 dl =	 1;	 p =	 NS
X
2
 =	 0.29 dl =	 1;	 p =	 NS
X
2
 =	 2.38 dl = 2;	 p =	 NS
49.	 Inadequate control and
supervision of workers on site
is a major factor in accident
occurrence.
C75 = C80 = C75
A B C
S M = C75 61 13 74
C M = C80 46 10 56
S A = C75 52 3 55
X2 = 0.00 df = 1;	 p = NS
X
2
 = 4.13 df = 1;	 p = S
X
2
 = 4.79 df = 2;	 p = S
50.	 Workers and managers can
reduce the causes of most acci-
dents on site by being a little
more thoughtful about safery
C 76= C 81= C76 provision.
A B C
S M = C 76 69 5 74
C M = C 81 43 13 56
S A = C 76 53 2 55
X2
 = 7.24	 df =	 1;	 p = VS
X
2
 = 9.10	 df =	 1;	 p = VS
X
2
 =	 13.91df	 =	 2;	 p = VS
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51.	 Regular safety assessments
on a competitive basis increases
safety awareness.
C77 = C82 = C77
-	 -	 '
A B C
•
S M = C77 57 17 74
C M = C82 38 18 56
S A = C77 48 7 55
X 2 =	 1.38 df =2 1;	 p = NSX 2 = 5.99 df =X	 = 5.97 df =
1;	 p	 =	 S
2;	 p = S
52.	 The Health and Safety
Inspectorate have inadequate
resources to enforce safety in
the donstructive industry.
C78 = C83 = C 78
A B C
S M = C78 55 19 74
C M = C83 42 14 56
S A = C78 50 5 55
X
2
	= 0.01
	 df	 =	 1;	 p... NS
X 2 = 4.95
	 df =	 1;	 p = S
X 2 = 6.30	 df = 2;	 p = S
54.	 Efficient hazard identifi-
cation and analysis as key man-
agement functions, is a key
factor in encouraging improved
C80 = C85 = C80 safety performan
A B C
S M = C80 66 8 74
C M = C85 39 17 56
S A = C51 51 4 55
X 2 	 =7.84	 df =	 1;	 p =S
X 2	=9.64	 dr	 =	 1;	 p	 -,S
X 2	 =13.39 dl'	 =	 2;	 p	 =VS
55.	 Displaying all accident
information on sites, would
prevent risk-taking by workers.
C81 = c86 = c81
A B C
S M = C81 55 19 74
C M = C86 29 27 56
S A = C81 23 22 55
2
X
2 	
=7
'
08	 df =	 1;	 p =S
X 2 =0 ' 00	 df .	 1;	 p =NSX	 =9.38	 df = 2 ;	 p =S
53.	 Hazard identification,
analysis, and updating by man-
agement would lead to improved
safety performance on site.
C79= c811= C79
A B C
S M = C 79 69 5 74
C M = C 84 43 13 56
S A = C 79 50 5 55
2
X 2 = 7.24	 df =	 1;	 P =S
X
2 =4 '
07	 df =	 1;	 p =S
X	 =8.73	 df =	 1;	 p =S
56.	 Alcohol and drug abuse are
not major problems for safety on
site.
C82 = C87 . C82
A B C
S M = C82 33 41 74
C M = C87 26 30 56
S A = C82 27 28 55
X 2 =0
' 
042 df . 1;	 p	 =NS
X 2 =0 ' 08X	 =0.26
df	 .7.
dr =
1;	 p	 =NS
2;	 P =NS
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57.	 All companies in the build-
industry should have alcohol &
drugs policies.
C 83= C” = C 83
A B C
S M = C
	 83 53 21 74
C M = C	 88 39 17 56
SA=C 
	 83 47 8 55
2
X 2 = 0.06 df =	 1 ;	 P = NS
X 2	 3.98
  
df =
	 1;	 P = S
X
	
=	 4.53 Qui	 =	 2;	 P =	 S
,
58. Lack of proper consultation
between clients, engineers,
designers, managing contractors
and sub-contractors undermine
' "= 
C 89= C84safety performance
-	 -
A
-
B C
S M = C 84 40 34 74
C M = C 89 42 14 56
S A = C 84 54 1 55
= 6.00 df = 1;	 p	 = S
X	 =	 12.76df = 1;	 p = VS
= 31.64df = 2;	 p = VS
59.	 Safety provisions in
tender documents are too vague
for promoting better safety on
site.
C 85= C 90= C 85
A B C
S M = C 85 40 34 74
C M = C 90 46 10 56
S A = C 85 48 7 55
X 2 = 11.23df = 1;	 p =VS
X
2
=	 0.56df = 1;	 p =NS
X
2
=21.23df = 2;	 p =VS
60.	 Most accidents occur on
multi-occupied sites due to
inadequate control of sub-
contractors.
C86 = C91 = C86
A B C
S M = C86 42 32 74
C M = C 91 39 17 56
S A = C86 40 15 55
X
2
 =2.25 df =	 1;	 p =NS
X
2 
= O. 13 df =	 1;	 p =NS
X
2
 =4.19 df = 2;	 p =S
APPENDIX : N:
List of Operative Accidents
Table 4.15(b)
TABLE 4.15(b) : ACCIDENT EXPERIENCES - TYPE OF ACCIDENTS BY OPERATIVES 
No %
(a)	 Falls from scaffolding/work platforms 10 8
(b)	 Falls from or through	 roofs
(c)	 Nails through feet/work shoes (not wearing proper
safety boots)
(d)	 Falls from heights during erection of steel work/
formwork
(e)	 Falls due to collapse of scaffolding or other frame-
works of platforms
(f)	 Injury to eyes due to dust or debris, fumes or toxic
substances
2
124
3
8
6
2
98
2
7
5
(g)	 Falls of materials from heights above head level
(h)	 Falls from untied ladders, and falls from ladders due
to other reasons
3
2
2
2
(i)	 Collapse of a trench/deep holes while working
(j)	 Collapse or over—turning of crane or other lifting
equipment on site
(k)	 Accidents caused by transport vehicles,
	 dumpers,
lorries,	 trucks etc
6
if
1
5
3
1
(1)	 Fire or explosions of any kind on site
(m)	 Accidents caused due to electric shocks or from
electric appliances on site
9
40
7
32
(n)	 Any	 other types 126 100
APPENDIX : 0:
Operative Ratings of Things they
want but which are not done by their
Companies
TABLE 4.14 (b) : RATINGS OF THINGS OPERATIVES WANT THEIR COMPANIES TO DO, WHICH ARE
NOT CURRENTLY DONE BY THEM
SAFETY NEEDS
RATINGS
No
(i)	 Have daily safety	 inspections on site
(ii)	 Give safety training and 	 inductions to all new
recruits
123
121
98
96
(iii)	 Give safety bonus to employees
(iv)	 Provide all workers with safety boots,	 helmets
etc
(v)	 Give operatives and supervisors joint safety
training
124
122
124
98
96
98
(vi)	 All	 site	 access positions to be clearly marked
(vii)	 Operatives are	 informed how,	 where and when to
use all	 safety equipment/clothing
122
123
96
98
(viii)	 All	 scaffolding	 inspected regularly before used 123 98
(ix)	 All	 trenches well	 timbered
(x)	 Workers sent home without pay	 if found drinking/
drunk on site
(xi)	 All openinging	 in	 floors are well protected with
tapes,	 railings,	 etc
123
96
103
98
76
81
(xii)	 Leading-Edges are	 regularly	 inspected on site 108 86
(N	 =	 126)
APPENDIX : P:
Tables of Historical (etc) Data
age
DATA
service	 industry money banksman bonus blindeye reduce risks
Appendix P
product	 cares
4 2 2 1 1 5 2 2 1 2 4
5 3 5 4 3 4 4 4 1 1 1
4 3 3 2 3 4 4 4 4 2 2
2 2 2 1 3 4 4 2 1 1 4
3 3 4 5 2 5 2 2 2 2 5
2 2 3 1 4 4 5 1 2 5 4
5 2 6 1 1 5 2 2 1 2 4
10 2 10 1 4 4 4 1 1 4 4
2 2 3 1 4 4 4 1 2 4 5
8 2 e 4 1 4 4 1 2 4 5
8 2 8 1 2 5 4 2 2 1 2
7 2 7 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 3
5 4 6 4 1 2 2 1 2 2 2
6 3 6 5 5 5 5 5 2 1 2
5 4 5 5 4 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 1 3 2 2 2 4 2 3
3 1 3 1 3 4 4 2 2 2 3
8 3 6 4 3 2 3 2 2 2 4
3 2 2 2 3 5 3 2 2 3 3
4 3 3 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 3
2 1 1 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 2
5 5 5 4 4 2 2 4 2 2 4
5 3 5 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 3
9 5 9 4 3 4 4 4 2 2 2
2 2 2 4 4 3 3 3 1 1 4
6 6 6 4 4 2 4 2 2 2 3
3 2 3 1 2 4 1 1 2 1 5
5 3 6 2 3 2 4 4 2 2 4
5 3 4 1 4 4 4 1 1 1 4
6 5 6 4 4 2 4 2 2 2 3
4 3 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 4
3 3 4 2 5 2 2 3 2 2 2
5 5 5 5 1 2 2 4 2 4 5
1 1 1 3 3 5 1 1 2 5 1
4 4 4 1 2 4 1 2 1 1 4
2 0 3 2 2 4 4 4 2 2 4
3 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 4 4
3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 2 3
9 8 e 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 4
2 2 2 3 2 3 4 2 1 2 4
4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3
3 3 4 3 3 4 4 2 4 2 3
6 2 7 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3
5 2 7 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 4
7 5 7 3 3 3 3 2 4 2 3
3 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 4
5 6 6 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 4
9 5 7 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 5
3 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 5 1 2
6 4 4 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 5
2 2 3 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 5
6 5 1 1 3 1 1 3 2 1 4
4 2 3 1 3 4 4 2 1 1 1
6 4 6 1 5 4 5 3 3 1 1
4 2 2 1 4 4 4 2 5 2 5
6 5 7 4 4 2 4 2 2 2 2
6 3 7 2 4 1 1 3 1 1 1
5 2 4 4 1 4 4 4 2 2 2
4 1 3 1 5 5 5 1 2 1 2
4 2 5 4 4 3 4 4 2 2 2
2 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
10 2 10 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 3
1 1 2 5 2 4 5 4 4 1 4
9 1 7 3 4 3 3 2 2 2 2
8 2 a 2 2 1 1 1 4 2 5
6 1 7 3 3 3 2 4 2 2 4
2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3
2 2 2 2 3 3 2 4 4 3 2
3 2 3 1 3 3 3 2 4 3
3 1 2 2 4 2 4 4 1 1
8 3 3 1 2 5 5 1 2 2 1
8 2 2 1 3 4 4 1 2 1 2
8 3 3 1 4 4 2 2 4 2 4
9 4 4 2 4 4 2 2 2 1 3
5 1 6 1 1 5 5 1 5 1 5
4 3 4 2 3 2 2 2 4 2 2
6 6 6 1 3 1 2 1 2 3 1
2 2 2 1 3 4 2 2 4 2 2
2 2 2 2 3 4 4 1 2 2 1
8 4 8 4 3 2 2 1 2 2 1
2 2 2 3 3 4 4 2 4 2 2
2 2 3 2 3 4 2 1 2 2 2
2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 4 2 2
1 2 2 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 3
8 5 6 4 2 2 2 3 3 2 2
9 6 6 2 2 4 4 1 2 1 2
2 2 2 2 1 1 4 3 2 1 5
4 2 1 2 1 4 4 4 4 2 3
5 3 5 4 2 4 4 4 2 4 4
2 1 1 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 4
6 6 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
10 8 7 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2
6 2 7 3 1 5 5 1 5 1 1
7 5 8 5 2 2 2 4 2 2 2
2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 2 3 4 4 4 4 2 2
7 2 6 2 2 4 4 4 4 1 1
7 3 6 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
4 5 5 1 3 4 4 4 2 2 2
4 3 4 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 5
1 2 2 2 3 2 4 4 2 2 2
2 3 3 3 3 4 3 2 2 2 2
4 3 5 5 4 1 1 2 3 2 4
2 2 3 4 4 2 2 2 4 2 5
4 2 5 2 3 3 4 3 4 2 4
4 3 5 1 5 1 1 3 3 4 5
3 3 4 1 2 4 2 1 4 2 2
4 3 4 1 2 5 4 2 4 2 4
5 2 6 2 4 2 4 2 2 4 4
2 2 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 4 4
3 2 4 2 3 3 2 2 2 4 4
8 4 8 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 4
9 3 9 5 2 4 4 3 2 2 2
4 5 5 3 3 4 4 2 2 1 2
7 7 7 2 3 2 4 2 2 2 2
5 4 6 4 3 2 3 1 2 1 2
2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4
5 2 6 4 2 2 2 4 2 2 2
2 2 2 4 2 2 4 4 2 2 4
6 2 3 4 2 4 4 4 2 2 4
6 3 6 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 1
5 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4
5 2 5 2 2 4 4 4 2 2 4
7 4 5 2 2 5 5 1 5 1 2
3 2 2 4 2 2 4 4 2 2 2
3 2 3 2 2 4 4 4 2 2 4
safety workmate safeact training risky skillful careful site like
Appendix P
helmet
	 wear
1 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 1 1 4
1 4 2 2 2 4 2 4 1 4 1
2 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 1 2 4
1 5 2 2 2 2 2 4 1 1 3
1 5 3 2 5 1 3 1 1 2 4
2 5 2 2 4 2 2 2 1 1 2
4 5 1 2 4 5 1 5 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 4 2 2 4 1 2 2
3 2 5 2 2 5 2 2 2 5 1
4 4 2 4 4 4 1 5 2 5 1
1 4 4 4 2 4 2 4 1 1 2
2 4 2 2 4 2 2 4 1 2 4
1 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 1 1 2
1 5 2 1 2 1 1 5 1 1 1
1 5 2 2 4 2 2 4 1 1 1
1 4 3 2 2 2 2 4 1 1 1
2 4 3 2 2 2 2 4 1 1 2
1 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 2 1 2
1 4 3 2 2 2 3 4 1 1 2
1 4 3 2 2 2 2 5 2 1 2
1 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 1 3
1 4 3 2 2 2 3 5 1 2 2
1 5 2 2 4 2 2 4 1 2 3
1 4 4 2 4 2 2 4 1 1 2
1 5 1 1 2 1 1 5 1 2 3
2 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 1 2 2
1 5 4 1 4 2 1 4 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 4 2 2 4 1 2 2
1 5 2 1 1 2 2 4 1 2 2
2 4 4 2 4 2 2 4 1 2 2
1 5 2 2 4 2 3 5 1 i':::::::',:.:::' I	 :::-.::::::*: 4
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 1 2
2 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 1 1 2
1 2 4 2 1 1 1 5 1 1 5
1 5 4 2 2 2 2 4 1 4 2
2 4 3 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 2
2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 1 2 2 3 1 4 1 1 2
1 4 3 2 2 4 3 3 1 2 2
1 4 2 2 2 3 2 4 1 1 2
2 2 2 1 1 3 2 3 1 2 2
2 4 3 2 2 3 3 3 1 2 3
2 4 4 3 2 3 3 3 1 2 3
2 4 4 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 4
2 4 3 2 3 3 2 2 1 2 2
4 3 2 3 3 3 1 5 1 3 3
2 2 4 4 2 4 2 4 1 2 4
1 1 2 2 4 1 4 5 1 1 2
1 5 2 2 3 1 2 4 1 1 3
1 4 3 2 2 4 4 5 1 1 5
2 4 3 2 2 4 4 5 1 1 4
1 5 2 2 5 2 3 4 2 2 2
1 5 1 1 2 4 2 4 1 2 2
1 5 1 2 4 3 1 5 1 1 2
1 5 2 2 5 2 2 5 1 1 5
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1 5 2 1 4 1 1 2 1 1 2
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2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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2 4 2 2 1 2 3 4 2 2 4
4 2 1 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 1 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 2
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Are you working for a Managing Contractor on this job?
Frequency
Count
TABLE 4.2
0.2.
PercentageRowRESPONSE TYPE:
(a) Yes 1 69 54.76
(b) No 2 51 40.48
(c) DPn't	 know 3 6 4.76
TOTAL:	 (N) =	 126 =	 100%
TABLE: 4.3 : THE CROSS—SECTIONAL STUDIES : SAMPLE SIZES ACCORDING TO
OCCUPATION
0.3.	 What is your job or trade?
OCCUPATION
SAMPLE
SIZE
PROPORTIONS
OF TOTAL
(%)
General labourers 46 36.51
Carpenters/joiners 26 20.63
Bricklayers 16 12.70
Masons/pavers — —
Slaters/tilers
(floor, wall & ceilings)
2 1.59
Plasterers — —
Painters/decorators 5 3.97
Plumbers/gas fitters 2 1.59
H & V Engineering workers 2 1.59
Glaziers 1 0.79
Steel erectors/sheeters — _
Scaffolders 6 4.76
Electricians 2 1.59
Mechanical/plant operators 6 4.76
Banksmen 5 3.97
Others 6 4.76
Missing data 1 0.79
TOTAL	 (N) 126 100.00
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TABLE 4.4
0.4.	 If you are a tradesperson, how did you learn your trade?
Trade/craft training: Row
Frequency
Count
Percentage
Score
(a) By apprenticeship	 (post—school) 1 38 30.16
(b) Technical College	 (F/T) 2 9 7.14
(c) Technical College (P/T) 3 6 4.76
(d) Apprenticeship with no pre-
school education 4 9 7.14
(e) Other methods 5 17 13.13
(f) Acquired by experience 6 46 36.51
(g) Uncertain 7 1 0.79
TOTAL: (N) = 126 100%
TABLE 4.5
0.5.	 Do you belong to a trade union?
Response Type: Row Frequency
Percentage
Score
(a) Yes 1 60 47.62
(b) No 2 66 52.38
TOTAL: (N) = 126 100%
TABLE 4.6
0.6.	 If yes, which trade union do you belong to?
Response Type: Row Frequency
Percentage
Score
(a) UCAAT 1 65	
.
51.59
(b) T GWU 2 38 30.16
(c) Others 3 23 18.25
TOTAL: (N) = 126 100%
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TABLE 4.9
0.9.	 How long have you worked in the building industry?
INDUSTRY WIDE EXPERIENCE
Classification Row
Frequency
Count
Percentage
Score
(a) Less	 than 1	 year 1 4 3.17
(b) 1-5 years 2 27 21.43
(c) 6-10 3 22 17.46
(d) 11-15 4 16 12.70
(e) 16-20 5 1 0.79
(f) 21-25 6 19 15.08
(g) 26-30 7 12 9.52
(h) 31-35 8 7 5.56
(1) 36-40 9 2 1.59
(j) 41	 years	 and over 10 2 1.59
TOTAL (N) .	 126 100%
4.4.2	 Site Management Questionnaire -_-Results
1.	 SECTION ONE : HISTORICAL/BIOGRAPHICAL FACTORS (Sample Population (N)=74)
Q.1.	 What type of firm do you work for?
TABLE 4.16
NO. TYPE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE
1. Main contractor 60 81.08
2. Sub-contractor 3 4.05
3. Govt./Local	 Authority NIL -
4. Self-employed 1 1.35
5. Management Contractor 9 12.16
6. Project Management 1 1.35
7. Others NIL -
TOTAL N .	 74 100%
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Q.2.	 If your firm is a sub-contractor, are you working on
this project for a:
TABLE 4.17
NO. TYPE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE
1. Main Contractor	 (traditional) 55 74.32
2. Managing Contractor 11 14.86
3. Project Manager NIL -
4. Others 8 10.82
TOTAL	 (N)	 .	 74 100%
Q.3.	 What is the nature of your firm's work or trade?
TABLE 4.18
NO. TYPE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE
1. General Builders 19 25.68
2. Building & civil	 engineering 43 58.11
3. Civil	 engineering	 only 9 12.16
4. Painters & decorators 1 1.35
5. Plasterers 2 2.70
6. Others NIL -
TOTAL	 (N)	 . 74 100%
Q.4.	 What is your job or position?
TABLE 4.19
NO. TYPE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE
1. Site Manager/Agent 39 52.70
2. General Foreman 13 17.57
3. Trade Foreman/chargehand 2 2.70
4. Supervisor NIL -
5. Project Manager 15 20.27
6. Section Manager 4 5.41
7. Others 1 1.35
TOTAL	 (N)	 . 74 100%
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Q.5.	 What trade or craft did you come from (your trade
background)?
TABLE 4.20
NO. TYPE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE
1. Bricklayer 4 5.41
2. Carpenter & Joiner 23 31.08
3. Painter & Decorator 1 1.35
4. Plasterer 1 1.35
5. Roofer/slater NIL -
6. Scaffolder 1 1.35
7. Plumber NIL -
8. Electrician 1 1.35
9. Plant	 Operator/fitter 2 2.70
10. General	 Labourer 2 2.70
11. University Graduate 21 28.38
12. Technical College Educated 17 22.97
13. Others 1 1.35
TOTAL (N) = 74 100%
ORGANISATION/POPULATION SIZE:
Q.6.	 What is the size of your organisation or firm (how many
persons employed)?
TABLE 4.21
SIZE CLASSIFICATION ROW FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE
(a) One person 1 - -
(b) 2-3 persons 2 1 1.35
(c) 4-7 persons 3 2 2.70
(d) 8-13 persons 4 - -
(e) 14-24	 persons 5 - -(0 25-34 persons 6 1 1.35
(g) 35-59 persons 7 1 1.35
(h) 60-79 persons 8 1 1.35
(i) 80-114 persons 9 2 2.70
(j) 115-299 persons 10 11 14.86
(k) 300-599 persons 11 11 14.86
(1) 600-1,199 persons 12 18 24.32
(m) 1,200 and over 13 26 35.14
TOTAL (N) .	 74 100%
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TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP
Q.7.	 Do you belong to any trade union?
TABLE 4.22
NO. RESPONSE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE
1 Yes 5 6.76
2 No 69 93.24
TOTAL	 (N)	 . 74 100%
TRADE UNION TYPE
TABLE 4.23
NO DESCRIPTION FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE
1 UCAAT - -
2 THWU - -
3 EEPTU - -
4 Others 5 6.76
5 None 69 93.24
TOTAL	 (N)	 . 74 100%
MARITAL STATUS
TABLE 4.24
NO. STATUS FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE
1 Married 60 81.08
2 Single 14 18.92
TOTAL	 (N)	 . 74 100%
SEX
TABLE 4.25
NO. TYPE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE
1 Male 72 97.30
2 Female 2 2.70
IOTAL	 (N) .	 74 100%
AGE
TABLE 4.26
-
NO. CATEGORY FREQUENCY
,
PERCENTAGE
1 Under 21 years 1 1.35
2 21-25 years 5 6.75
3 26-30 years 9 12.16
It 31-35 years 12 16.22
5 36-40 years 20 27.03
6 41-45 years 7 9.46
7 46-50 years 6 8.11
8 51	 and over 14 18.92
10TAL (N) = 74 100%
'SERVICE' TO COMPANY
TABLE 4.27
NO. CATEGORY FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE
1 Under 1	 year 7 9.46
2 1-5 years 26 35.14
3 6-10 years 13 17.57
It 11-15 years 10 13.51
5 16-20 years 5 6.76
6 21-25 years 2 2.70
7 26-30 years 2 2.70
8 31 and over 9 12.16
TOTAL	 (N) .	 74 100%
TABLE 4.30
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'SERVICE' TO INDUSTRY
TABLE 4.28
NO. CATEGORY FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE
1 Under 1	 year 3 4.05
2 1-5 years 9 12.16
3 6-'10	 years 9 12.16
4 11-15	 years 10 13.51
5 16-20 years 8 10.81
6 21-25 years 14 18.92
7 26-30 years 6 8.11
8 31	 and over 15 20.27
TOTAL (N) = 74 100%
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIP
TABLE 4.29
NO. RESPONSE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE
1 Yes 29 39.19
2 No 45 60.81
TOTAL (N) = 74 100%
PROFESSIONAL BODY
Key:	 * Discounted (See Table 4.20)
**Inst. Occupational Safety &
Health.
NO. TYPE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE
1 CIOB 20 27.03
2 Graduate 21*
-
3 MICE - -
4 MIStruct.E - -
5 Inst.	 of Petroleum Engr. - -
6 IOSH**
- -
7
8
Others COND/C,	 HND/C,	 B.Tech
	 9
None 	
45
12.16
60 .81
TOTAL	 (N)	 =	
I-	
74 100%
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Results of Contract Management Responses 
Section 1: Historical/Biographical Factors : Sample Population (N=56)
Q.1	 Firm:
TABLE 4.38
No FIRM	 TYPE
,
FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Main Contractor 42 75.00
2. Sub-Contractor 3 5.36
3. Local Authority	 etc
- -
4. Self Employed
- -
5. Management Contractor 11 19.64
6. Others
- -
_
TOTAL N . 56 100.00%
Q.2	 Contract:
TABLE 4.39
No FIRM	 TYPE FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Main Contractor	 (Trad) 44 78.57
2. Managing Contractor 11 19.64
3. Project Manager 1 1.79
4. Others _ -
TOTAL N . 56 100.00%
Q.3	 Trade/Business:
TABLE 4.40
No FIRM TYPE FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. General Builders 9 16.07
2. Building & Civil Engineering 39 69.64
3. Civil Engineers only 4 7.14
7. Roofers 1 1.79
10. Demolition Contractors 1 1.79
20. Suspended Ceiling Specialist 1 1.79
24. Others (M&E) 1 1.79
TOTAL N = 56 100.00%
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Q.4	 Status:
TABLE 4.41
No JOB/POSITION FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Managing Director 2 3.57
2. Contracts Director 5 8.93
3. Contracts Manager 30 53.57
4. Project Manager 9 16.07
5. Other Categories 10 17.86
TOTAL N . 56 100.00%
Q.5	 Full/Part-time Position (site):
TABLE 4.42
No FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Full-time on	 site 17 32.69
2. Part-time (multi-sites) 33 63.46
3. Agency base 1 1.92
5. Other arrangements 1 1.92
6. Unclear	 (spoilt) (4) -	 ?
TOTAL N . 56 100.00%
Q.6	 Frequency:
TABLE 4.43
No SITE VISITING FREQUENCY FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. 1-2 times per week 29 51.79
2. 3-5 times per week 6 10.71
3. Fortnightly 4 7.14
4. Other patterns 17 30.36
TOTAL N . 56 100.00%
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Q.7	 Craft Background:
TABLE 4.44
No TYPE FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Bricklayer 7 12.50
2. Carpenter/Joiner 13 23.21
3. Painter/Decorator NIL -
4. Plasterer NIL -
5. Roofer 1 1.79
6. Scaffolder NIL -
7. Plumber NIL -
8. Electrician 1 1.79
9. Plant Operator/Fitter NIL -
10. General	 Labourer NIL -
11. University Graduate 14 25.00
12. Technical	 College 17 30.36
13. Other category 3 5.36
1
TOTAL N . 56 100.00%
I
Q 8	 Organisation Population:
TABLE 4.45
No POPULATION FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. 1-10 persons employed 1 1.79
2. 11-50	 "	 II 2 3.57
3. 51-200	 "	 " 5 8.93
4. 201-500 "	 If 11 19.64
5. 501-1000 "	 " 10 17.86
6. 1001	 and above persons employed 22 39.28
7. Other categories 5 8.93
TOTAL N . 56 100.00%
Q.9	 Union Membership:
TABLE 11.116
No RESPONSE FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. YES 1 1.79
2. NO 55 98.21
TOTAL N . 56 100.00%
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Q.10	 Marital Status:
TABLE 4.47
No STATUS FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Married 43 76.79
2. Single 13 23.21
TOTAL N . 56 100.00%
Q.11	 Sex:
TABLE 11.118
No TYPE FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Male 53 94.64
2. Female 3 5.36
TOTAL N . 56 100.0
Q. 1 2 Age :
TABLE 11.49
No CATEGORY FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Under 21 years 7 12.50
2. 21 — 25 years 3 5.36
3. 26 — 30 years 1 1.79
4. 31 — 35 years 8 14.29
5. 36 — 40 years 9 16.07
6. 41 — 45 years 19 33.93
7. 46 — 50 years 4 7.14
8. 51	 years and over 5 8.93
TOTAL N . 56 100.00%
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Q.13 Service to the Company:
TABLE 4.49(b)
No CATEGORY FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Under	 1	 year 5 8.93
2. 1 - 5 years 12 21.43
3. 6 - 10 years 11 19.64
4. 11 - 15 years 10 17.86
5. 16 - 20 years 5 8.93
6. 21 - 25 years 9 16.07
7. 26 - 30 years 3 5.36
8. 31	 years and	 over 1 1.79
TOTAL N . 56 100.00
Q. 14 Industry 'Service':
TABLE 11.50
No CATEGORY FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Under 1	 year 4 7.14
2. 1	 - 5 years 4 7.14
3. 6 - 10 years 3 5.36
4. 11 - 15 years 6 10.71
5. 16 - 20 years 15 26.79
6. 21 - 25 years 11 19.64
7. 26 - 30 years 10 17.86
8. 31 years and over 3 5.36
TOTAL N . 56 100.00
Q.15 Membership of Professional Institutions:
TABLE 11.51
No RESPONSE FREQUENCY Score
%
1. YES 29 51.79
2. NO 27 48.21
TOTAL N . 56 100.00%
Q.16 Professional Institute:
TABLE p4.52
No INSTITUTION FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. CIOB 15 26.79
2. JOSH _
3. ICE 5 8.93
4. MIRISK etc -
5. Others (including RICS	 etc) 9 16.07
6. None 27 48.21
TOTAL N . 56 100.00%
Q.17	 Any Technical Achievements
TABLE 11.53
No RESPONSE FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. YES 45 80.36
2. NO 11 19.54
TOTAL N . 56 100.00%
Q.18 Qualifications:
TABLE 11.511
No TYPE FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. City	 and Guilds 10 17.86
2. OND/ONC 9 16.07
3. HNO/HNC 22 39.29
4. BTEC 1 1.79
5. Degree (BSc etc) 7 12.50
6. Post Graduate (MSc etc) - _
7. Others 7 12.50
8. Doctorate (Phd)
- -
TOTAL N . 56 100.00%
Q.19 Was Safety Taught as Subject:
TABLE 4.55
No RESPONSE FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1.
2.
YES
NO
22
44
39.29
60.71
ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION OF SAFETY ADVISERS/OFFICHiSetc RESPONSES
Section 1: Historical/Biographical Factors : Sample Population (N=55)
Q 1	 Firm:
TABLE 4.63
No FIRM TYPE FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Main Contractor 37 67.27
2. Sub-contractor 6 10.91
3. Local	 Authority etc 1 1.82
4. Self-employed 5 9.09
5. Management Contractor 5 9.09
6. Others 1 1.82
,
TOTAL N . 55 100.00%
Q.2
	
Contract:
TABLE 4.65
No FIRM TYPE FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Main Contractor	 (traditional) 41 74.55
2. Management Contracting 8 14.55
3. Project Management - -
4. Others 6 10.90
	
.
TOTAL	 N . 55 100.00%
Q.3	 Trade/Business:
TABLE 4.65
No FIRM TYPE FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. General	 Builders 7 12.73
2. Building & Civil	 Engineering 37 67.27
3. Civil Engineering 1 1.82
8. Plasterers 1 1.82
11. Scaffolding 2 3.64
18. Construction Engineers 1 1.82
22. Ground workers 1 1.82
23. Others 5 9.09
-.
_ 	
TOTAL	 N	 . 55 100.00%
_
Craft Background:Q.5
TABLE 4.67
Q.4	 Status
TABLE 4.66
No JOB/POSITION FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Chief	 Group Safety Adviser 12 21.82
2. Safety Adviser 28 50.91
3. Safety Officer 11 20.00
4. Safety Engineer 1 1.82
5. Others 3 5.45
TOTAL . N 55 100.00%
No TYPE FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1.
2.
3.
Bricklayer
Carpenter & Joiner
Painter/Decorator
4
12
-
7.27
21.82
-
4. Plasterer 1 1.82
5. Roofer - -
6. Scaffolder 4 7.27
7. Plumber - -
8. Electrician 1 1.82
9. Plant	 operator/fitter 3 5.45
10. General	 labourer - -
11. University Graduate 1 1.82
12. Technical College educated 5 9.09
13. Others 24 43.64
TOTAL . N 55 100.00%
Q.6	 Population
TABLE 4.68
No
-
ORGANISATION SIZE FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. 1 - 10 persons 6 10.91
2. 11 - 50	 " - _
3- 51 - 200	 " 4 7.27
4. 201 - 500	 " 7 12.73
5. 501 - 1000 " 4 7.27
6. 1001	 and above 34 61.82
TOTAL . N 55 100.00%
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Q.7	 Union Membership:
TABLE 4.69
No RESPONSES FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Yes NIL -
2. No 55 100.00%
TOTAL N . 55 100.00%
\
Q.8
	
T.U. Type:
TABLE 4.70
No TYPE FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Void - -
2. NIL 55 100.00%
TOTAL N . 55 100.00%
Q.9	 Marital Status:
TABLE 4.71
No STATUS FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Married 48 87.27
2. Single 7 12.73
TOTAL N . 55 100.00%
Q.10	 Sex :
TABLE 4.72
No TYPE FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Male 54 98.18
2. Female 1 1.82
TOTAL N . 55 100.00%
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Q.11	 Age:
TABLE 4.73
No CATEGORY FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Under 21	 years 3 5.45
2. 21 - 25 years - -
3. 26 - 30	 " 2 3.64
4. 31 - 35	 " 3 5.45
5. 36 - 40	 " 6 10.91
6. 41 - 45	 " 8 14.55
7. 46 - 50	 " 8 14.55
. 51 years and over 25 45.45
TOTAL N . 55 100.00
Q.12	 Service to Company:
TABLE 4.74
No CATEGORY 1 VilatTrAtl	 d Sttlt	
e
%
1. Under	 1 year 7 12.73
2. 1 - 5 years 12 21.82
3. 6-10 	 " 8 14.55
4. 11 - 15" 7 12.73
5. 16 - 20 " 7 12.73
6. 21 - 25 " 5 9.09
7. 26 - 30 " 3 5.45
8. 31	 years and over 6 10.91
TOTAL N . 55 loo.o%
Q.13	 Service to Industry
TABLE 4.75
No CATEGORY FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. Under 1	 year 1 1.82
2. 1 - 5 years 3 5.45
3. 6-10 	 " 7 12.73
4. 11 - 15" 6 10.91
5. 16 - 20 " 9 16.36
6. 21 - 25" 8 14.55
7. 26 - 30 " 5 9.09
8. 31 years	 and over 16 29.09
TOTAL N . 55 loom%
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Q.14	 Professional Membership:
TABLE 4.76
No RESPONSE FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1.
2.
Yes
No
55
-
100.00
-
TOTAL N . 55 100.00%
Q.15	 Professional Institute Membership
TABLE 4.77
No INSTITUTION FREQUENCY SCORE
%
1. CIOB 18 32.73
2. IOSH 30 54.55
3. Degree - -
4. MIIRISK etc 4 7.27
5. ICE 1 1.82
6. Others 2 3.64
TOTAL N . 55 100.00%
